

**MASS RAPE IN WAR:
FEMINIST THOUGHT AND
BRITISH PRESS
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
BALKAN CONFLICT 1991-1995**

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SUMMARY

This thesis is concerned with the possible inter-relationships between mass rape in war, the representation of rape in the Balkan conflict in major British broadsheet newspapers, and feminist thought. The empirical focus of the thesis consists of a critical analysis of the journalists' reports of the occurrence of mass rape in the Balkan conflict as published in The Guardian, The Times, The Observer and The Sunday Times. Part One contextualises the thesis by providing an extensive discussion of rape, the history of mass rape in war, and the historical build-up to the Balkan conflict. Part Two contains the bulk of the empirical research: this is a critical examination of press representations of incidents of mass rape in the Balkans 1991-1995. Part Three investigates in more detail the relationship between feminist thought and the press representations of rape in war as highlighted in Part Two. Moreover, it examines some feminist 'solutions' to mass rape in war: those ideas were prompted by press interest in the subject, and its subsequent influence on particular feminist scholars. There are four main conclusions from the thesis. First, it shows that there is a complex relationship between feminist thought and press representations. Second, it argues that the relationship has positive results for both feminist theorising (providing information and ideas) and in terms of raising awareness of previously 'silenced' issues in the public domain. Third, it suggests that the media in general has played an important role in placing the issue of mass rape in war on the international political agenda. Finally, the thesis vindicates the claim in the Introduction that the academic discipline of International Relations should be more attentive to this violent phenomenon, which has been such a regular feature of the history of war, and consider it a legitimate area of study.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	2
BACKGROUND.....	2
AIMS	4
CASE STUDY	6
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDIA.....	7
SOURCE MATERIAL.....	10
STRUCTURE.....	13
 PART ONE	
INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE.....	19
CHAPTER ONE: DEFINITIONS OF RAPE.....	21
RAPE IN BRITISH LAW.....	23
DEFINITIONS	26
THEORIES	28
<i>Feminist Theories of Rape</i>	30
<i>A Social Learning Theory of Rape</i>	33
<i>An Evolutionary Theory of Rape</i>	34
COMPLEXITIES	37
<i>Social/Cultural Factors</i>	40
<i>Collective Responsibility</i>	43
CONCLUSION.....	49
CHAPTER TWO: MASS RAPE IN WAR	52
THE ANCIENT WORLD.....	53
TWENTIETH CENTURY WARS	57
<i>World War I</i>	59
<i>The Rape of Nanking</i>	64
<i>World War II</i>	66
RECENT WARS	71
<i>Bangladesh</i>	72
<i>Vietnam</i>	73
CONCLUSION.....	77
CHAPTER THREE: THE BALKAN CONFLICT.....	79
HISTORY - PRE-1939.....	80
WORLD WAR II.....	82

<i>Tito</i>	85
IDEOLOGY	90
ECONOMY	92
NATIONALISM	94
<i>Religion</i>	96
<i>Propaganda</i>	97
WESTERN RESPONSE	101
CONCLUSION.....	105

PART TWO

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO.....	108
RESPONSES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	109
STRUCTURE OF PART TWO	115
CHAPTER FOUR: NATIONALISM.....	117
RAPE AS 'ETHNIC CLEANSING'.....	118
RAPE AS RELIGION	130
RAPE AS PROPAGANDA	136
CONCLUSION.....	152
CHAPTER FIVE: WAR GAMES	154
RAPE AS STRATEGY	155
R&R (& 'RAPE CAMPS').....	161
RAPE AS MISOGYNY.....	172
<i>Militarisation</i>	179
<i>Mutilation and Male Rape</i>	191
CONCLUSION.....	206
CHAPTER SIX: WESTERN RESPONSES	209
RAPE AND WESTERN INVESTIGATIONS.....	209
RAPE AND 'RAPE BABIES'	227
RAPE AND WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS	233
RAPE AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL	251
CONCLUSION	261

PART THREE

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE	265
FEMINIST THOUGHT	266
CHAPTER SEVEN: PRESS AND FEMINIST THEMES	270

RAPE AS A 'WEAPON'	271
THE REPRESENTATION OF 'WOMEN'.....	283
BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM	299
CONCLUSION.....	312
CHAPTER EIGHT: FEMINIST THOUGHT AND PRESS REPRESENTATIONS.....	314
MASS RAPE IN THE BALKAN CONFLICT.....	316
WAR GAMES	318
NATIONALISM	325
IDENTITY.....	332
MISOGYNY	338
CONCLUSION.....	351
CHAPTER NINE: FEMINIST 'SOLUTIONS' AND THE PRESS.....	352
INFILTRATION AND RESISTANCE	353
RADICAL PENALTIES	356
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION.....	360
REDEFINITION	364
ENDING THE SILENCE.....	373
CONCLUSION.....	379
CONCLUSION: MASS RAPE IN WAR, PRESS REPRESENTATIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE	382
BIBLIOGRAPHY	387

PART ONE

CONTEXTS

INTRODUCTION

Background

As early as 1992, articles reporting the systematic rape of Bosnian Muslim women and the existence of 'rape camps' in Bosnia-Herzegovina were appearing in the British press.¹ In 1993/4 journalists were publishing books describing accounts of the mass raping of Muslim girls and women.² Yet, despite this media/public discourse, by late 1995 there was still little attempt by scholars of International Relations (IR) to openly discuss mass rape in war as a historic and political problem. Where debates did take place, they were primarily published in law reviews³, medical journals⁴ and feminist publications.⁵ Given that this was a phenomenon occurring in war and given also that for the academic discipline of International Relations *war* has been a defining issue,⁶ the silence from these quarters was deafening.

*Note on referencing. The first time a reference is used in a chapter the source will be given in full; thereafter, in that chapter only, the name and date of the source (book/article) will be given.

¹Maggie O'Kane in Zenica and Mark Tran in New York, "UN Security Council condemns Serb 'policy' of rape," The Guardian, 19 December 1992, sec. HOM, p.1; also, Maggie O'Kane, "Bosnia Crisis: Forgotten women of Serb rape camps," The Guardian, 19 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 9.

²Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element, 1993); also, Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).

³Elizabeth Kohn, "Rape as a Weapon of War: Women's Human Rights During the Dissolution of Yugoslavia," Golden Gate University Law Review Vol. 24, no. 169 (1994): pp.199-221; also, Danise Aydelott, "Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under International Law," Emory International Law Review Vol. 7, no. 2 (Fall 1993): pp. 585-631.

⁴Shana Swiss and Joan Giller, "Rape as a Crime of War," JAMA Vol. 270, no. 5 (4 August 1993): pp. 612-615.

⁵Catharine Mackinnon, "Rape in War," Ms. January/February and July/August 1993, p. 15.

⁶See, for example: Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 74-75; Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science," Millennium Vol. 16, no. 2 (1987): pp. 186-206; John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Francis Pinter, 1983), Ch. 2.

Moreover, I would suggest that until mass rape in war is analysed as a *political* phenomenon - not merely a sexual act that is commonly accepted as a 'natural'⁷ wartime event - an understanding of the strategic role it plays in the discourse of war and the effects it may have on women, society, and society's attitudes to women, will not be forthcoming. This is not to suggest that IR scholars are responsible for changing society's 'norms' and values: the point is that they *are* responsible for setting the academic IR agenda. As Robin May Schott has suggested, it is academics who contribute to the moral and political environment which either accepts the type of violence that has been witnessed in the Balkans, or opposes it, and can therefore create both a climate and a critical discourse that informs political decision-making.⁸ Therefore, it is suggested throughout the thesis, that scholars of IR should be attentive to the issue of mass rape in war.

Mass rape in war, then, remains an under-theorised phenomenon of war, with the discipline of International Relations having failed to engage with this recurring aspect of wartime activities. This neglect, combined with the advent of the Balkan conflict and the ensuing reports in the British press of rape and mass rape, presented an ideal opportunity to research this new, yet very ancient, topic.

As mentioned, prior to the Balkan conflict, very little academic work had been undertaken on the subject, with the most oft-cited work being a single chapter in Susan Brownmiller's seminal work Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape⁹. This was based on oral and documentary empirical research into the general theme of 'rape in war'. This thesis, grounded as it is in feminist thought, rape theory and Balkan history, attempts to do something to fill this gap, by starting a research project that is both sufficiently large in terms of data *and* sufficiently accessible and focused to enable completion within the necessary time constraints. However, while this thesis offers the first part of a larger on-going research project, it also presents us with an interesting project in its own right. Moreover, this comprehensive analysis of the

⁷Throughout the thesis the word 'natural' is enclosed within quotation marks. This is used simply as a way of questioning gendered assumptions that deem certain social practices to be predestined and not socially constructed.

⁸Robin May Schott, "Gender and 'Postmodern War'," *Hypatia* Vol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996): p. 27.

⁹Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975).

wartime phenomenon of mass rape in war will enable other researchers to take this thesis as a starting point in their efforts to further theorise the problem.

Aims

Given the paucity of research into the issue of mass rape in war, the primary aims of this thesis are three-fold: to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in war historically; to gauge current attitudes in Britain to the phenomenon through an analysis of the press representations of mass rape in the Balkans; and to discuss future possibilities for creating a series of strategies for its demise, or at least its control. Furthermore, it should be noted that although 'feminism' is a central theme running through the thesis - due to the fact that rape is an issue which is of interest to all strands of feminism - this research project is not about feminist theory *per se*, but is concerned with 'feminist thought'. This notion of 'feminist thought' is utilised within the thesis in the following manner: in Part One it is identifying rape as being on the 'feminist agenda'; in Part Two it is offering an analysis of the press reports of rape through a 'feminist lens'; and in Part Three it is suggesting 'feminist solutions'. Thus, it is not concerned with different 'feminisms', but with rape as an agenda that they all share.

The first objective (to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in war historically) is pursued by researching archival material - such as legislative documents, ancient religious texts, United Nations and war documentation, as well as secondary sources. The second objective (to gauge current attitudes to the phenomenon) is pursued by researching and analysing one of the most prolific contemporary sources of information available on mass rape in war, namely the reports in the British press of the alleged incidents of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. Indeed, during the initial stages of this research project, the media was the only source of information on the reported rapes. One could even argue that due to the reporting from the Balkans the media placed mass rape in war on the agenda, which eventually led to its recognition as an international political issue. Not only did the British press offer a rich source of material for this project, but it also revealed a great deal about the current social

attitudes towards the phenomenon of mass rape in war itself, and the most commonly cited explanations for its occurrence. The thesis will illustrate how the press has adopted many ideas that originated from feminist thought, and how the British press has used those ideas when constructing their explanations for mass rape in war.

The third objective (to discuss future possibilities for creating strategies for change) is pursued by researching the responses of feminist scholars to the reports of mass rape in war in the Balkans, and noting how new feminist theories have been developed with an acknowledged input from the media - either in terms of press reports providing the motivation for feminists to contribute to the literature on the issue, or by using the reports as terms of reference for their theorising. Furthermore, many feminists have written in direct response to the press reports in an attempt to find possible solutions to this long-standing international problem. Their aim has been to try to stop, or at least curtail, its occurrence.

In these different ways the thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of mass rape in war, a phenomenon that appears to have been present throughout history, yet one which has failed to attract the curiosity of academic scholars and politicians alike. It is my intention to show that the subject of 'rape in war' *matters* for both international relations as practice and International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline.¹⁰ Given the lack of IR literature relating to this subject it is difficult to gauge exactly the potential impact mass rape in war has in war situations - on the recipient population, the military strategists, the soldiers, governments, and so on - or the potential impact the creation of such a discourse might have on the conceptual landscape of IR as an academic discipline.

Nevertheless, this thesis will suggest that it is a phenomenon of war that does have significant immediate and far-reaching repercussions. The mass raping of a section of the enemy's population, particularly when that section is traditionally regarded as non-combatants, could not only alter the course of a war - fuelling public opinion and/or strategies of retaliation - but, even after the war it could contribute to the continuation

¹⁰Throughout the thesis international relations, as it relates to the *practice*, is referred to in lower case. The academic discipline of International Relations, however, is capitalised.

of underlying national antipathy, thus possibly affecting future conflicts, or attempts at reconciliation. The thesis will argue, then, that mass rape in war has wide-ranging consequences for relations between political groups and should, therefore, be a legitimate subject to study within the academic discipline of International Relations.

Case Study

The press reports of rape from the war in the former-Yugoslavia were chosen as a case study because although the situation of mass rape in wartime is certainly not unique to the Balkans, it was the first instance in which the British public were simultaneously witnessing the reports of rapes as they were taking place, *and* recognising and condemning the abhorrence of the acts.

The analysis of the reporting of these experiences and in particular the language used, forms the core of the primary research upon which the arguments contained within the thesis are based. This analysis will be conducted by an examination of the press reports through a 'feminist lens' that will serve to highlight the gendered language, assumptions, and the misconceptions surrounding the issue of mass rape in war. Given the rich source of feminist theorising on the subjects of war and rape - but little on their simultaneous occurrence - there are many explanations that further our understanding of the issues and through which comparisons can be made with the often gendered and biologically-based explanations offered by the journalists.

Furthermore, this investigation is also an interesting one as an analysis of these press representations will highlight the ways in which journalists have used some mainstream feminist theories to understand and explain the occurrences of mass rape in war. And it also reveals how, in turn, feminist theorists have been motivated into extending and developing their theories on war and rape by examining contemporary social theories of war and rape within press reports.

The thesis, therefore, attempts to offer a new analysis of the phenomenon of mass rape in war through a study of some British press reports of mass rape, with respect to

the war in the Balkans. The resulting evaluation is then discussed in relation to feminist thought with the suggestion that particular insights advanced by particular feminist theories since the 'second wave of feminism',¹¹ have contributed to the way in which mass rape in war is now reported. Moreover, that the press reports have, in some way, encouraged the expansion of existing theories, and the development of new ideas, within feminist thought. The thesis could also be seen to extend some of the 'Gender in IR' arguments into an underdeveloped area while making the point that mass rape in war is an important issue for IR scholars to address.

The case study, by analysing the press reports of mass rape in war, will provide a unique picture of an important aspect of British opinion on this international wartime problem in the 1990s, and will provide some thought-provoking explanations for this ancient phenomenon. As such, it will also highlight some interesting relationships between men and women, between the press and feminist theorising, and between human rights issues and the influence of the media.

The Importance of the Media

The post-Cold War conflict in the Balkans placed 'mass rape in war' on the media's agenda. This is not the first time that wartime rapes and sexual assaults by soldiers have made 'headline news'.¹² However, because the stories ran concurrently with the mass rapes and were not prior events, it could be argued that this made the conflict in the former-Yugoslavia unique. Indeed, as already mentioned, the phenomenon of mass rape in wartime was not peculiar to the Balkans. However, it was nevertheless the first instance in which the 'international community' had been simultaneously witnessing, and condemning, the rapes and atrocities as they were taking place. This highlights the particular importance of the media in the case of the Balkan conflict: moreover, the importance of the media in representing all 'distant' wars should also be noted.

¹¹The second-wave of feminism is generally acknowledged as the emergence of the modern 'Women's Movement' in the 1960s and 1970s. See, for example: Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Dell, 1974) originally published in 1963.

¹²Brownmiller (1974), Intro.

The media representations of rape analysed here are the primary source of information for our understanding of this phenomenon at this point in time. Furthermore, I would suggest that they are somewhat influential in creating and altering social attitudes in their readership.¹³ For example, within the Western world¹⁴ it is virtually impossible to remain detached and unaffected by the media in some form or other. Although some people may have succeeded in effectively insulating themselves from its influence, for the majority of society the media permeates our lives, consciously and subconsciously, through newspapers, magazines, television, radio, advertising, video, the Internet, and so on. The media, in its various forms makes increasing *demands* on our lives, and to some extent it could be argued that it even plays a part in *defining* our lives - our patterns of leisure, our preferences as consumers, and what is of political, economic or cultural interest to us. Similarly, it also helps mould our attitudes, values and beliefs, be it politically, economically, and/or culturally. In fact it is now widely accepted that we live in a 'global media culture', with the collective media forming the 'world's central nervous system'.¹⁵

Therefore, given the influence that the media has over the lives of even the most critically-aware of us, studying the media's representations of rape in war is an important research project, particularly in determining whether these reports either support or challenge existing theories of mass rape in war. This rationale does not mean that the thesis is concerned with studying the media's *influence* on society; that is another thesis. Here I am simply highlighting its influence in order to make the point that the ideas put forward in the British press, and as purveyors of the most popular social attitudes of the moment, are worthy of serious consideration.

Moreover, I would argue that the study of journalism is in fact a form of social research: there are many similarities between classic social research and the way in

¹³Sandra Jovchelovitch, "In Defence of Representations," Journal for The Theory of Social Behaviour vol. 26, no. 2 (June 1996): pp. 121-133.

¹⁴I am using a fairly wide definition of the term; i.e. the group of highly advanced industrial states.

¹⁵John Downing, Ali Mohammadi and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, eds., Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. xvi; Martin Shaw, Civil Society and Media in Global Crisis (London: Pinter, 1996); Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

which journalists represent social life.¹⁶ For example, journalists not only report on current events, but they also offer historical perspectives and in-depth interpretations. They also address major trends and social problems and these reports can be likened to the research projects of social scientists. Furthermore, like social researchers, journalists develop specific areas of expertise: some focus on political events; some on economic trends; some on women's issues; some offer analysis of major international events; and so on. However, regardless of topic, journalists all face the same problem regarding 'evidence' or 'facts' and this problem could be seen to parallel that of the social researcher facing 'data'. Both collect information that could become evidence for a report, and they also both have to be selective in identifying which bits of information are pertinent to the report, they have to analyse that data and arrange it in a presentable order, thus developing a focus for the investigation and the subsequent report. In this selection process much potential evidence and many potential stories are left out.

While the timescale of this process may differ between the journalist and social researcher, nevertheless, the above is an accurate reflection of social research. Social scientists have to select from a vast amount of information that social life offers and then construct their representations from carefully chosen pieces of data: a process which is necessarily selective and becomes more so as the investigation progresses. Therefore, both journalists and social researchers find at the end of their reports that much of the information which they initially thought was relevant turns out to be either false or superfluous.

This issue of possibly disseminating false information is also a problem for both journalists and social researchers. Stemming from the need to be selective in gathering information, both have to be aware of 'false leads' and also that they may not recognise them as such. On one hand, false leads may be issues that have been biased by accepted knowledge, stereotypes, and common, every-day understandings of social life. Using potentially 'biased' starting points could lead to false representations and/or the perpetuation of erroneous stereotypical images. On the other hand, false leads may be either an unconscious or a deliberate act of deception

¹⁶Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research (London: Pine Forge Press, 1994), ch. 1.

on the part of an interviewee. While this problem is mostly one that journalists have to remain vigilant of, social researchers also have to deal with bias, distortion and cover-up: 'social-facts' can be as elusive as bias-free journalism.

The point of this discussion has been to highlight the similarities between the work of journalists and the work of social scientists, thus arguing that journalism is a valid means of studying a social phenomenon, indeed, some of the parallels between the two are striking. Of necessity, both selectively gather evidence, analyse it, discard bits, and construct a report: which is arranged and summarised in a way that illustrates the investigator's conclusions. Therefore, in both social research and in journalism the representations of social life are condensed descriptions that have been structured according to the author's own subjectivities. Even some of the results of both journalism and social research are similar: they both work to construct representations of social life that fulfil many functions, from documenting broad social patterns and changes in those patterns, to giving voice to some of society's marginalised groups, and even influencing social change. This point will be argued further in the Conclusion.

Source Material

The decision to use the media as the focus of the research project was the result of recognising that it was the only medium through which the general public came to be aware of the alleged occurrences of mass rape in war in the Balkans. However, during the research process it came to light that it was not only the general public who were informed of the rapes through the media, but the media was also used by NGOs, EC¹⁷ Commissioners, political elites, academics and feminist theorists as a research tool. Therefore, the analysis of an important section of the media as a basis for a research project within an International Politics Department seemed pertinent and justified.

¹⁷This thesis covers articles written between 1991 and 1995, during which time the Maastricht Treaty on European Union replaced the European Community (EC) with the European Union (EU): this took place on 1 November 1993 following ratification of the Treaty by all member states. Therefore, both acronyms are used depending on the date of the article in question.

Researching the media as a whole was initially considered, however, the researching, gathering and analysing of *all* the reports concerning rape during the Balkan conflict which were disseminated through the media would have proved to be too great a task to complete within the time parameters allowed for the thesis. Therefore, while the media as a whole offered an excellent source of research material, the formidable amount of potential raw data had to be narrowed down in order to select the data which would prove to be the most relevant to the thesis question.

The section of the media that was finally chosen for analysis was the British press, and within that section four British broadsheet newspapers were identified as a focus for the study: The Times, The Sunday Times, The Guardian and The Observer. These were selected, and other forms of the media rejected, for three main reasons. First, not only did they purport to offer more 'factual' data than other areas of the media, for example British 'tabloid' newspapers, but they also appeared to offer the most in-depth analysis of the reports of rape in war in the Balkan conflict. The other two main British broadsheets, The Independent and The Telegraph were not looked at in full due to their lack of indexing facilities, however, key dates were researched and incorporated into the press analysis in Part Two. In comparison, the British tabloid newspapers offered little in the way of either 'facts' or analysis, and although research of The Sun and The Mirror was carried out for key dates, little in the way of either social or political analysis was evident. Which is, of course, an interesting issue in itself, although not one which will be explored within the remit of the thesis.

Second, over the period covered by the research (1991-1995) feminist theorists¹⁸ within academia began to comment on the rapes in the Balkans in the form of articles and eventually books. After studying this growing body of literature it became apparent that much of the empirical data on which this work was based was, in fact, taken from articles and reports from British, North American, and to a lesser extent, German and Italian broadsheet newspapers. These reports, then, were used as a basic

¹⁸See, for example: Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Miranda Davies, ed., Women and Violence: Realities and Responses Worldwide (London: Zed Books, 1994); Jeanne Vickers, Women and War (London, Zed Books, 1993); Chris Corrin, ed., Women in a Violent World: Feminist Analyses and Resistance Across Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).

source of empirical data, particularly as they were published before the information was available anywhere else. Therefore, although this form of data can be critiqued as being subjective and lacking in verifiability, in the absence of any other more authenticated information, it nevertheless was used to form the basis of a growing body of theoretical work and political opinion on the subject. It should be noted that even in the Western world in the late twentieth century, when the visual media is often regarded as the dominant form of media, no television coverage was referred to by any of the feminist scholars researched for the final chapters of the thesis. Nor, as it happens, were any reports from either radio broadcasts or tabloid newspapers.

Third, although television reports on the subject and, to a lesser extent radio reports, did occasionally offer some analysis of 'the rapes' in the form of reports and documentaries, early research indicated that they were not sufficiently indexed: therefore it would have proved impossibly time-consuming and extremely expensive (a not insignificant factor) to purchase transcripts and video copies of all the relevant information required.¹⁹ Therefore, given the time and financial restrictions under which this research had to be carried out, this section of the media was rejected. Another explanation for the lack of analysis of television reports for use in this research project and the preferred use of broadsheet newspapers was that there was very little visual material available for television reports to use and therefore for research. The now well known images of Muslim men being held in a 'detention centre' was shown widely on television due to the television footage which accompanied the report. However, to my knowledge there has been no filming of incidents of rape (apart from uncorroborated reports that some Serbian soldiers made videos of rape for propaganda and/or pornographic purposes, which will be discussed in Chapter Four). As a result of the paucity of material, television was not a promising medium through which to analyse the problem (while at the same time being very time-consuming and expensive).

¹⁹When this research was begun in 1994, the cost to access the ITN archives was £31+ VAT for every five news items viewed, only three of which can be transferred onto VHS tape. The BBC Newsline service charged £15 per. news item. WTN (Worldwide Television News) charged £25 per/hr for access to the public research room plus £10 per item retrieved from the archives for viewing.

Structure

The majority of explanations for rape in war, stemming from both journalists and feminist scholars, use basic theories of rape as their starting point. Therefore, in order to understand the differing explanations for rape in war more fully, Chapter One attempts to set out various definitions and theories of 'rape'. These sometimes controversial definitions and theories stem from sociological, anthropological, medical, legal and feminist perspectives; the complexity and multiplicity of rape theories will be illustrated as well. This chapter also attempts to review and evaluate how the 'crime' of rape has been defined and controlled, both historically and within contemporary legislation - which in itself is an indicator of the prevailing social attitudes towards the phenomenon.

Chapter One, then, looks at the single issue of 'rape' and seeks to identify whether attitudes and beliefs about rape in 'peacetime'²⁰ have any bearing on the way mass rape in *war* is thought about and theorised - theorised in terms of the press representations which make up Part Two and also in terms of the most recent feminist theorising on mass rape in war which is discussed in Part Three.

Chapter Two charts accounts of rape in war throughout history and suggests that it has formed an important, yet neglected, wartime phenomenon. In analysing the historic occurrences of mass rape in war, this chapter attempts to question some main-stream but superficial explanations for rape in war and also to explore other lines of enquiry, customarily disregarded or ignored, which could further develop our understanding of why mass rape in war occurs. Chapter Two begins by looking at the role that rape has played in the accounts and causes of ancient 'mythical' wars. However remote and shrouded in mythology those ancient times and civilisations may appear, we need only compare them with today's 'rape myths' - as reviewed in Chapter One - to

²⁰The term 'peacetime' is enclosed within quotation marks throughout the thesis to suggest that although there are specific times when a state is not engaged in war with another state and these are recognised as periods of peace, in feminist circles, however, it has been suggested that there is always an ongoing war against women. Therefore, 'peacetime' is an elusive concept for many women.

appreciate the importance and value in understanding what these ancient myths and stories portray.²¹

The chapter then moves from ancient Greek mythology and Machiavelli's warning about the practical dangers of rape in war, through eighteenth century conflicts in the Scottish Highlands, to discuss some twentieth century wars. The leap from occasional eighteenth century reports to the twentieth century is a large one. This is due in no small part to the lack of information or documentation available on 'rape in war' during the intervening period. Moreover, when rape *has* been reported, it is usually bound up within a domestic legal discourse, and not directly related to war. However, there is the occasional mention of rape during that time and these instances are also discussed in Chapter Two.

Given the complex history of the Balkans, Chapter Three is important background. Not only does it 'set the scene' for the ensuing case study, but it also attempts to simplify some of the possible causes of the war which may have a direct bearing on the occurrence of mass rape in the conflict. The chapter identifies various factors which worked together to trigger the collapse of the former-Yugoslavia, such as the region's ideological heritage, its pre-war economic crisis, the re-emergence of the 'national question' and the reactions of the Western powers.

The last decade has seen tumultuous changes on a global scale, much of which has been welcomed, particularly by Western democratic governments. However, the negative side of those monumental upheavals is now apparent. The effect of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the accompanying political economic insecurity was felt throughout the Eastern bloc and, it is argued by many commentators that this has fuelled 'ancient feuds' throughout the former Eastern bloc and the Balkans (or so reads the 'official' and some 'unofficial' stories). In reviewing these events I attempt to contextualise some of the historical, societal and political factors in which the mass raping of women in the Balkans took place. This will allow an appreciation of the

²¹Gerd Bohner et al, "Salience of Rape Affects Self-esteem: The moderating role of gender and rape myth acceptance," European Journal of Personality Vol. 23 (1993): pp. 561-579.

cultural forces and tensions operating on both the individual and collective level, which resulted in such devastation, both materially and emotionally.

Chapters Four, Five and Six (Part Two) form the heart of the thesis. Now armed with an understanding of some basic theories of rape, of the history of mass rape in war and some knowledge of the background to the Balkan conflict, Part Two offers a critical examination of the reports of mass rape as published in the chosen British broadsheet newspapers. In analysing the 200-plus newspaper articles that deal with the rapes, the reports are categorised depending on the context in which the rapes were represented. As such, the subject categories in which they were placed often depended on the emphasis placed on the report by the journalists. For example, Chapter Four analyses articles which claim that nationalism was at the root of the mass raping of women in the Balkans and these reports have been categorised depending on the way in which this nationalism has been expressed. Some reports claim that the alleged rapes in the Balkans were due to 'nationalistic' ethnic cleansing, some suggest religious manifestations of nationalism, and yet more claim that nationalistic propaganda has been the spur.

In Chapter Five, the articles analysed have 'war games' as their focus, suggesting that the rapes were either part of a pre-planned strategy of intimidation and terror by the military elites. Some articles suggest that, as in most wars, the rapes simply formed a part of the soldier's R&R (rest and relaxation) - part of the 'game' of war. Moreover, other articles state that the rapes were the result of either a 'natural' in-built misogyny or a misogyny that is derived from militarisation and in particular military training. This chapter also gives details of a section of reports that deal with the subject of male rape and mutilation, of which there are a surprising number, given that this is generally regarded as an even more taboo subject than the raping of women in war.²² Finally, Chapter Six looks at articles that are primarily forms of response by Western political elites, feminists, and other commentators on the reports of mass rape in the

²²See, for example: Claire Armitstead, "Sentenced to silence," *The Guardian*, 21 July 1994, sec. G2T, p. 15; Sarah Boseley, "End to silence on male rape," *The Guardian*, 24 April 1991, sec. FEA, p. 23; Madeleine Bunting, "Confronting last taboo of male rape," *The Guardian*, 24 August 1992, sec. HOM, p. 2; Clare Dyer, "Rape law helps male victims," *The Guardian*, 12 July 1994, sec. HOM, p. 2; Val Sampson, "Against their will," *The Guardian*, 23 July 1991, sec. FEA, p. 17; Alan Travis, "Male rape

Balkans. For example, these are articles by journalists who have concentrated on one or more aspect of the 'Western response' to the reports of rape. These responses have been as varied as EC (as it was known then) or NGO investigations, the adoption of 'rape babies', comments on women's human rights, and the setting up of the War Crimes Tribunal.

The analysis of the newspaper articles contained within Chapters Four, Five and Six, then, not only give us a rich source of information on the mass raping of (predominantly) women in war, but are crucial to our understanding of the current social attitudes toward the occurrence of rape in war.

Having analysed and discussed in Part Two the press representations of the rapes in the Balkan conflict, Part Three begins with Chapter Seven, in which a closer look is taken at the contemporary social attitudes towards rape in war which the journalists portray. Through the analysis of the press reports in Part Two, it became apparent that the journalists have utilised some feminist ideas in attempting to explain mass rape in war. In this chapter I illustrate how some of the ideas championed by feminist scholars over the past three decades have gradually permeated the social consciousness and have become part of mainstream social discourse.

Likewise, Chapter Eight briefly examines how feminist scholars, who have written on mass rape in war recently, and as a response to the reporting of the phenomenon from the Balkans, have used some ideas to develop their theories that stem from the press and their explanations for mass rape in war. Overall, then, Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrate the complex relationship that exists between feminist theorising and the press: indeed, between feminist theorising and the social world *in toto*.

As already mentioned, many of the feminists who have commented recently on mass rape in war have taken broadsheet newspaper reports as one primary source of information, and have developed novel ideas in response to this information. Chapter Nine identifies some feminists who claim to have been motivated into theorising the

recognised in law," *The Guardian*, 12 July 1994, sec. HOM, p. 1; Stephen Ward, "Crime that strikes at the heart of masculinity," *The Guardian*, 9 November 1994, sec. G2T, p. 27.

issue by reading the press representations of mass rape in war. Indeed, they have all developed theories that look to the future and envisage what changes are possible regarding the way in which mass rape in war is dealt with, both theoretically and practically.

The chapter identifies four feminists who, following their own analysis of the press reports of the mass raping of women in the Balkans, have devised new thought-provoking ideas and theories on rape in war, which all offer 'solutions' involving social analysis, political action and agendas for change. Given their common belief that unless some form of either theoretical and/or practical 'action' is taken mass rape in war will re-occur, these feminists have each suggested ways in which the problem of rape in war can be solved, or at least controlled, by taking some relatively unconventional approaches to the problem. Although their solutions are very different, they all agree that acknowledging the problem and dealing with it in a more open forum will go some way to end the silence that has characteristically surrounded this issue in the past.²³ Therefore, within this chapter these new ideas are analysed and challenged and their possibility for adoption discussed, and moreover, whether these new feminist perspectives can, in fact, move forward the debate on mass rape in war.

The primary aim of the thesis, then, is to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in war historically, the attitudes toward it currently, and some future possibilities for its control or elimination. This aim is pursued through a critical examination of selected British press representations of mass rape in war and an analysis of the role that feminist thought plays in informing those representations and the role that the press plays in motivating and informing feminist theorising. As such it provides new knowledge on mass rape in war with respect to the Balkans, it situates this in feminist

²³As an example of the traditional silence which surrounds the issue of rape in war, while researching the newspaper articles which made reference to 'rape in the Balkan conflict' for Part Two of the thesis, it was interesting to note the differences in indexing methods used by the broadsheet newspapers. Researching The Guardian, for example, was reasonably straightforward. By using the key words 'rape' and 'war', the majority of appropriate articles were forthcoming. However, when using the same two key words for researching articles from The Times and The Sunday Times only one or two articles were accessed and those articles were not concerned with war in a standard IR sense, but were about 'rape' in general combined with either the 'war between the sexes' and/or the 'feminist war' against inequitable legislation. After using various combinations of key words, it was the use of the phrase 'war crimes' that finally allowed me access to the required information. What does this tell us about how rape in war is represented in Western society?

and IR literature, and offers the starting point for what must be a much larger project aimed at trying to understand all aspects of mass rape in the Balkan conflict in the first half of the 1990s. Moreover, this research project seeks to identify how the interplay between the press representations analysed and feminist theorising might aid the reconceptualisation of current thinking - indeed, in the Conclusion I draw attention to the potential political significance of these representations - with a view to aid the development of feminist theory and praxis which seeks to eliminate mass rape in war.

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

The primary role of Part One is to contextualise the thesis by providing an extensive discussion of three specific issues: the phenomenon of rape, the history of mass rape in war, and the historical build-up to the Balkan conflict. It is important for the thesis that these issues be considered at the start in order that the reader might be provided with sufficient background knowledge to enable a fuller appreciation and understanding of the main elements in the conflict, and the phenomenon of mass rape in war: which in turn will allow a fuller understanding of the case study - British press representations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict - in Part Two.

It is important to discuss the basic theories of rape at the outset because, for the most part, the theories of mass rape in war, used by both feminists and journalists in Parts Two and Three, are based on these long-standing explanations of the occurrence and the motivations for rape. Theories of rape in contemporary social discourse are examined, as is the legal status of rape. This discussion helps to indicate developing social attitudes towards the phenomenon: for example, national legislation regarding rape is a significant indicator of its social acceptability, or not, at a particular moment in history.

One of the central arguments of the thesis is the belief that mass rape in war has been a regular feature of war, one that spans both time and culture. Chapter Two illustrates this by detailing reported occurrences of mass rape in war at different times and in different regions of the world. This picture of the prevalence of rape underlined the difficulties facing those who seek to eradicate it.

As mentioned previously, the case study in Part Two focuses on mass rape during the Balkan conflict following the break up of the former-Yugoslavia. Given the complex

history of the area, Chapter Three is necessary to provide a context in which to situate the mass rapes. The chapter attempts to identify the main political, economic, and cultural features of the war, which have been said to have had a direct bearing on the incidence of mass rape in the conflict.

In summary, the function of Part One of the thesis is to put the subsequent arguments in context, both theoretically and historically. It offers an account of the phenomenon, the history and the circumstances in which the mass raping of (predominantly) women in the Balkans occurred, and the environment in which British press representations of the incidents were written.

DEFINITIONS OF RAPE

'Misunderstood crime', 'motiveless crime', 'lust-murder', 'recreational murder', 'sexual murder', 'crime of passion', 'functional phallic terrorism', these are all emotive terms used regularly by the press to describe the act of 'rape', and rape/murder.¹ These press representations and simplifications of 'rape' have, arguably, led to the act of rape being misrepresented. In other words, represented in ways which do not challenge society's gendered foundations by suggesting that the occurrence of rape is just one manifestation of the inherent social domination and control of women by men, which in turn has encouraged the proliferation and dissemination of these 'rape myths' throughout society.² This chapter seeks to introduce the subject of rape by setting out various, often conflicting, social theories of rape in order to identify how these 'rape myths' develop and also to provide the context for later comparisons between rape during 'peacetime' and the phenomenon of 'mass rape in war'.

Evidence emanating from anthropological, religious and literary sources, all attest to the influence of historical myths on Western culture.³ From primitive times to the present day, the 'myth' has influenced the evolution of Western thought, and thus, society's culturally accepted 'norms'. These historical myths, particularly those based on theories of origin, have been transformed through time into ethical, literary, and in the 'modern' period, scientific rationalisations for the gendered, hierarchically ordered, dichotomous relationship between men and women in the industrial Western world. Concepts of what constitutes the 'masculine' and the 'feminine' have passed

¹Jane Caputi, *The Age of Sex Crime* (London: Women's Press, 1987), p. 2.

²See, for example: M. Burt, "Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* Vol. 38 (1980): pp. 217-230.

³ Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," in Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall, eds., *Women, Knowledge and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 141.

through these ethical, literary and scientific stages, to become a highly influential 'legitimate' justification for contemporary Western patriarchal society. This issue will also be raised throughout Part Two of the thesis and discussed more fully in Chapter Seven. Those 'myths' which surround rape play an important role in the normalising of the act of rape within Western culture and it is for this reason that it is appropriate that this chapter identifies some of these 'rape myths' and examines their possible effects.

The first section of this chapter, however, relates some interesting moments in the historical development of 'rape in law' in Britain, as markers of British social development concerning what has traditionally been regarded as a 'women's issue'. Moreover, this summary of the progress of rape as a legislative issue in Britain will also highlight the way in which a woman's 'class' has traditionally affected her chance of being protected from rape by law. If it can be identified how rape has gradually been accepted and recognised as a crime in Britain then it may offer an insight into how rape has come to be recognised and regarded by contemporary British society as a whole. Linked to this, in the second section, the question of a consensual definition of rape is addressed, as is the need for a modern, just and ungendered definition of rape in law. Again, this section is relevant to the thesis due the need to understand society's current views on rape as a serious crime committed predominantly against women.

In the third section, various theoretical explanations for rape will be introduced. These divergent attempts at explaining the general causes behind the act of rape, while theoretically conflictual, do attempt to gain some intellectual leverage on the subject of rape. However, while some, such as the 'feminist' and social learning theories of rape, try hard to dispel the 'myths' surrounding the issue of rape, others, in particular the 'evolutionary' theory of rape, appear to deepen them and even normalise their existence.⁴ As the second part of the thesis will be analysing press representations of rape in war, which will also include many journalists' explanations for rape, it is important to be able to relate their ideas back to some basic theories of

⁴For a further investigation into theories of rape see: Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical Investigation (Dartmouth: Aldershot and Brookfield VT, 1996).

rape and to gauge which theories, if any, have become mainstreamed and now form part of the current social discourse on rape.

The fourth section will deal with the complexities that are inherent in any theoretical discussion that is primarily concerned with the investigation and interpretation of human behaviour. Primarily, this section attempts to look a little deeper into some established social theories regarding possible motives for rape, in order to develop further understanding of why rape occurs. For example, often cited as fundamental reasons for rape are issues such as 'childhood', 'social attitudes towards women', 'power and domination', 'aggressive tendencies', and so on. These and other underlying stimuli for rape will be briefly analysed and conclusions drawn. Furthermore, an analysis of these theories of 'peacetime' rape will prove particularly useful when, in Chapter Two, an attempt is made to identify theories of mass rape in war, many of which have the same basic underlying principles.

The final section in this chapter deals with an interesting idea put forward by two sociologists, Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, called 'collective responsibility'.⁵ The suggestion is that all men should take responsibility for the occurrence of rape within their own society. The basic tenets of this theory are set out and briefly analysed as certain aspects of the idea are utilised in the final chapter of the thesis, when some feminists 'solutions' to the wartime phenomenon are offered.

Rape in British Law

In Britain, the punishment for the act of rape, given the evolving priorities and beliefs of any society, has varied over time, thus reflecting differing social and cultural attitudes towards its gravity. Moreover, a closer inspection of bygone British law also highlights who, and who could not, be legally classified as having been subjected to rape. Pre-1066 (the Norman Conquest), the penalty for rape was 'death and dismemberment', although this law was reserved exclusively for the rape of landed

⁵Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, "Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape," *Hypathia* Vol. 9, no. 2 (1994): pp. 134-151.

virginal heiresses:⁶ no mention is made of 'other' women. Moreover, Sidney Painter's research in this area suggests that the chance of a man, and in particular a 'nobleman', being convicted of raping a 'commoner' was very slight.⁷ By the time of William the Conqueror, 'virgins' of any class were still the only women defended in British law, although, the punishment had now been reduced to castration and the loss of both eyes.⁸ Henry of Bracton, who lived and wrote in the thirteenth century, detailed the law of the time:

Let him lose his eyes which gave him sight of the virgin's beauty for which he coveted her. And let him lose as well the testicles which excited his hot lust.⁹

However, the punishment was reduced considerably during the reign of Edward I when the offence was reduced to a 'trespass' which carried a sentence of two year's imprisonment and a fine 'at the King's will'.¹⁰ This notion of 'trespass' and the implicit assumption that the woman was a man's 'property' will be discussed at a number of junctures throughout the thesis. Nevertheless, the subsequent reforms instigated by King Edward I, enabled significant legislation to be passed which served to alter both public and state perception of the crime of rape. The reformation of the law allowed for married, old, young, and ignoble women all to be recognised under the law as being worthy of defence, which could, arguably, be cited as the first piece of legislation avowing women's rights. Moreover, in 1285 rape once again became a capital felony¹¹ and it remained so until the nineteenth century.¹²

⁶William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books: IV (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859), p. 211.

⁷Sidney Painter, History of the Middle Ages (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 120.

⁸"The Laws of William the Conqueror," Ancient Laws and Institutes of England 1840 XII ed.: XVIII.

⁹Samual Thorne, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard, 1968), pp. 414-415.

¹⁰Edward Coke, 'The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England', in Statutes of Westminster Vol. I (London: W.Clarke, 1809), pp. 179-181.

¹¹Edward Coke (1809, Vol. II.), pp. 432-436.

¹²The following Acts covered the crime of rape through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries:

- Offences against the Person Act 1861
- Sexual Offences Act 1956
- Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976

Further amendments covering the sentencing of attempted rape were set out in the Sexual Offences Act 1985.

Rape today remains an illegal act during peacetime and has also been outlawed as a criminal act under the international rules of war.¹³ However, there appear to be profound disagreements about what rape is and what it is not - or at least over the differing ways in which it is conceptualised.¹⁴ The conservative theory suggests that rape is still a trespass upon the property of the man, the 'wrong' being done to the *man* who owns the violated woman. (This notion of woman as 'property' will be discussed in Chapter Seven.) The liberal theory regards rape as unconsented sexual violence, the wrong being done to the individual woman whose own choices with regard to her bodily integrity are denied. While the radical theory regards rape as just one more instance of the subordination of women by men, the wrong being done to the female gender as a whole whose entitlement to equal respect and consideration is dishonoured. Miranda Davies, however, writing in Women and Violence, contends that twentieth century law, and in particular the possibility of obtaining adequate and timely justice for a raped woman from the existing legal system, regardless of the conceptualisation, remains wholly unsatisfactory. Indeed, she states that '[e]very aspect of the law - its definition of rape, due process, the law of evidence, the burden of proof and, not least, the evident prejudices of the judiciary - militated against victims of rape'.¹⁵

Writing in her latest book Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial, Sue Lees comes to a similar conclusion as Davies following her attempts to monitor the British judicial service. She claims to have discovered a dangerous combination of bad legal practice and general, misogynistic attitudes, where testimony regarding the behaviour, lifestyle, clothing, character and past sexual conduct of women is not only admitted in court, but is seen as having a direct bearing on the question of whether a rape occurred.¹⁶ The notion that *consent* is the central issue in question, and that the complainant is no more than a witness within an adversarial hearing which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt and tolerates the admission of certain kinds of evidence, according to Davies and Lees is justice at its most gendered and inequitable. Thus, the stage is set for a display of prejudicial attitudes and procedures

¹³See for example: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 2nd. ed. (London: Harper Collins, 1977), chap. 4.

¹⁴Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical Investigation (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996).

¹⁵Miranda Davies, ed., Women and Violence (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), p. 74.

¹⁶Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996).

that favour the defendant at the cost of humiliating the accuser. This is a significant point and will be returned to again in Chapter Seven within the context of rape in war.

Definitions

The word *rape* is derived from the Latin *rapere*, meaning to steal.¹⁷ The etymological status of the word *rape* is manifest in traditional sentences that focused solely on the marital status of the victim, or more explicitly, her status as property. Consequently, throughout history, the rape of a woman has been viewed, and remains so in many cultures, as an attack on the property-owning *men* of the family and community and not as a physical or psychological attack on the woman. However, taking this analysis one step further, feminist Catharine MacKinnon argues that for women, 'To be property would be an improvement'.¹⁸ MacKinnon agrees that rape, as legally defined, is centred upon a *male*-defined loss, but she qualifies that loss as a 'loss of exclusive access', the loss of the sexual exclusivity of a woman for a man. Rape, according to MacKinnon, is construed in legal terms as an attack on female monogamy, rather than an attack on women's sexual and personal integrity. Indeed, MacKinnon takes issue with those who analyse rape in terms of 'property', stating that 'to analyse sexuality as property short-circuits analysis of rape as male sexuality and presumes rather than develops links between sex and class'.¹⁹

While appreciating MacKinnon's point, this rejection requires some reassessment when one considers the role played by social class in the findings of the brief study into the origins of British 'rape' law above, for example, the applicability of the law to only 'propertied heiresses'. Rape, therefore, undoubtedly began its passage through the legal system as a 'class issue'. Nevertheless, MacKinnon does make an interesting general observation. She comments that through societal and cultural structures,

¹⁷Sylvana Tomaselli and Roy Porter, eds., *Rape* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 10.

¹⁸Catharine MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 172.

¹⁹*ibid.*, p. 295, n. 3.

women's sexuality is traded, bought and sold by men, but never treated with the respect and regard for which men have for property.²⁰

Just, ungendered working legal definitions appear to be difficult to achieve and yet they are extremely important when dealing with such a sensitive and emotive issue. This is highlighted when examining the influence that particular legal terminology can exert: this will become particularly pertinent when the setting up of the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague is discussed in Chapter Six. The definition of rape employed by the contemporary legal system is obviously crucial to the outcome of rape trials. However, given the fact that all legal definitions are products of the values and 'norms' of the lawmakers who create them and the cultures in which they live, one must, therefore, while appreciating the difficulty of the task, acknowledge the need for a gender-neutral, unambiguous definition. This is a crucial point and one that will be raised again in Chapter Eight.

In Britain until 1976, there was no statutory definition of rape. It was simply defined in common law as 'unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, by *force, fear or fraud*'.²¹ It could be argued, however, that this definition is ambiguous and potentially misleading. The essence of rape as a crime is the *absence of the woman's consent*, and therefore, it is rape to have non-consensual intercourse with a woman whether or not she resists, is in fear, or deceived. Following public, media, and parliamentary concern, the obvious ambiguity in the law was eventually rectified and the opportunity taken to declare in statutory form a consensual definition of rape. Thus, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 provides that '[a] man commits rape if (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and (b) at the time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she has consented to it.'²² Consistent with this legal definition, rape today is defined in the Chambers Dictionary, compiled by Cambridge University Press, as 'unlawful sexual intercourse (usually by force) with another person without that person's consent: violation,

²⁰ibid., p. 172.

²¹S. Edwards, "Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences," British Journal of Criminology Vol. 32, no. 2 (1992): pp. 245-246. (emphasis added)

²²ibid.

despoliation.²³ Therefore, in some sense there does appear to be a consensus of opinion in Britain on what precisely constitutes 'rape'.

Theories

The standard 'common-sensical' arguments used in many attempted explanations of the motivations for 'rape', are generally based on the inevitability of actions due to male 'human nature'. These biological determinist and naturalisation arguments, are generally found to be not only cyclical and unproductive, but also intellectually closed. They rely on a very simplistic view of male 'nature' which suggests that the rampant male sex drive is only tempered and reigned in by social and cultural forces and that women play a stereo-typically subservient role; it is even suggested by some theorists that women enjoy being violated and/or dominated, and are in fact 'asking for it'.²⁴ However, the following quotations, all by US politicians, are classic examples of how these naturalisation theories (or rape 'myths') are perpetuated.²⁵ Moreover, they suggest that even in political circles, where one could be forgiven for thinking that 'gender lenses' are more frequently utilised,²⁶ these 'myths' remain influential in forming attitudes towards rape. Consider the following statements:

Rainy weather is like a woman being raped; if it's inevitable just relax and enjoy it.²⁷

The only difference between rape and seduction is salesmanship.²⁸

²³Chambers Dictionary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 823.

²⁴Jill Radford, "Womanslaughter: A License to Kill? The Killing of Jane Asher" in Jill Radford and Diana Russell, eds., Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), p. 260.

²⁵For an in-depth analysis of the influence of 'myths' see, Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans., Annette Lavers (London: Vintage 1993).

²⁶David Robertson, Dictionary of Politics (London: Penguin, 1993), pp.387-388.

²⁷As quoted by Julie Allison and Lawrence Wrightsman, Rape: The Misunderstood Crime (London: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 1.

²⁸As quoted by M. Cambell, "Mayor assailed over rape 'joke'." Kansas City Star, 3 July 1990: pp. B1-B2.

You can't get pregnant if you're truly raped, because if the woman is not a willing sex partner the juices won't flow and it's impossible for her to get pregnant.²⁹

These beliefs, based on masculinist tradition and/or hearsay, and with almost a banal acceptance of rape as inevitable due to 'natural' forces, are typically circulated within a patriarchal 'rape society', as defined by anthropologist Peggy Sanday (see below), and serve only to provide a safe harbourage for rapists, precisely as it serves to exempt individuals from ultimate responsibility for their 'involuntary' actions. These ideas have become ingrained in Western society's standard discourse of rape as will become evident throughout the thesis.

To contest the 'myth' that rape is a 'natural' human action and to highlight that these notions are irrational and invalid, a comprehensive study by Peggy Sanday has revealed that many societies throughout the world are, to attach Sanday's official label, 'free-of-rape', that is, 'the act of rape is either very infrequent or non-existent'.³⁰ This fact would indicate that theories based on human nature cannot adequately, or solely, explain the motivations for 'rape', therefore, further understanding of why rape occurs should be sought within a societal/cultural context. For example, a closer inspection of, and a comparison between, 'rape-free' and 'rape-prone' societies has indicated that in rape-free societies, women, and in particular their *reproductive* roles, are given a high status within the societal framework. Moreover, according to Sanday, women are 'respected and influential members of the community'.³¹ Incidentally, Sanday also noted that in societies where rape was almost unknown, violence of any kind was also minimal and the population regarded the natural environment in a reverential manner. In contrast, Sanday found that the structural framework of a 'rape-prone' society, was based on a dominant form of patriarchy, including interpersonal violence, and the ostracisation of the female sex. Furthermore,

²⁹This statement was allegedly made by a state representative, called Aldridge, during a live debate on the repealing of state funding for abortions in the instance of rape, in the state capital of North Carolina, in November 1995. The broadcast was taped and relayed by Chuck Johnson to the Minerva International Feminist Discussion Group on 15 November 1995 via E-mail.

³⁰Allison and Wrightsman (1993), p. 13.

³¹Peggy Reeves Sanday, "Rape and the Silencing of the Feminine," in Tomaselli and Porter, eds., *Rape* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 84-85.

the attitude towards nature was one of dominance and exploitation.³² Sanday's study also concludes that although the traditional social roles played by each sex in *both* societies are similar, of importance is not what the sex-roles are of whether men and women's roles are different or not, but whether the sexes 'have access to balanced power spheres'.³³

Most Western industrial countries, according to Sanday's study, are officially classified in the middle category, that is, 'possessing rape but not frequent enough to be considered rape-prone'³⁴. As both Britain and the former Yugoslavia are included in this category, the analysis can be restricted to the examination of the motivations for rape solely within this middle group. American psychologist, L. Ellis, identifies three possible theoretical explanations for rape within Western society: the 'feminist' theory, the 'social learning' approach and the 'evolutionary' theory.³⁵ Each of these explanations will be considered in isolation.

Feminist Theories of Rape

Rape, according to Ellis's first theory, it is 'the result of long and deep-rooted social traditions in which males have dominated nearly all important political and economic activities'.³⁶ She suggests that the prevalence and societal acceptance of prostitution and pornography allows women to be portrayed in humiliating and subservient ways, thus normalising male dominance over women. The key term for Ellis in this explanation is the 'powerlessness of women'.³⁷ One feminist who would no doubt support this theory is Andrea Dworkin who has commented that 'all men benefit from rape, because all men benefit from the fact that women are not free in this society'.³⁸ In addition, one particular quotation from feminist Susan Brownmiller that has come

³²ibid., p. 85.

³³ibid., p. 93.

³⁴Sanday's three categories are as follows: (1) 'rape-prone' - where rape is an accepted part of the cultural framework; (2) 'possessing rape but not frequently enough to be considered rape-prone'; (3) 'rape-free' - where the act of rape is either very infrequent or non-existent. See Peggy Reeves Sanday, "The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A Cross-Cultural Study," *Journal of Social Issues* Vol. 37, No. 4 (1981): pp. 5-27.

³⁵L. Ellis, *Theories of Rape: Inquires into the Causes of Sexual Aggression* (New York: Hemisphere, 1989).

³⁶ibid. p. 10.

³⁷ibid.

³⁸Andrea Dworkin, *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (New York: Plume, 1989).

to characterise the radical feminist standpoint surrounding rape also reiterates this position. Brownmiller states that '[f]rom prehistoric times to the present, I believe, rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which *all men* keep *all women* in a state of fear'.³⁹ Brownmiller is suggesting that due to the interminable threat of rape and sexual abuse, women are kept in a constant 'state of fear', which constitutes one form of social control *of* women *by* men. This notion, indeed this quotation, will be alluded to throughout the thesis.

However, Ellis's feminist approach does not consider male sexual frustration and the need for sexual gratification to be a prime motive for rape, rather, sexuality is viewed as a method by which men establish and maintain their dominance and control over women.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, a brief analysis of this theory does raise certain questions surrounding the basic loaded statement, the 'powerlessness of women'. For example, are all women simply helpless victims, merely pawns in a man's game? Have women only marginal control over their lives and their bodies? If so, can this argument, based on the notion of women as victims, be viewed as equally cyclical and unproductive as those based on naturalisation? However, legally women *do* have the right to 'consent' or not, at least within our Western society. In response to these questions one could argue that *consent* is indeed the women's method of control over wanted/unwanted intercourse. However, this legislative issue of consent presupposes that men and women stand on level terrain, that they possess equality of power and that when a woman says 'no' it will be heard, respected and acted upon. Consent, as stated in the law of rape, assumes itself to be the exercise of free sexual choice, while denying, or at least ignoring, the pressures of underlying patriarchal structures: structures of male dominance and violence resulting in female subordination and the 'powerlessness of women'. According to Catharine MacKinnon this interminable patriarchal culture of intimidation and disparity have indeed rendered women 'powerless' under the law of rape. For example, she states that:

Fundamentally, desirability to men is supposed a woman's form of power because she can both arouse it and deny its fulfilment.

³⁹Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 5.

⁴⁰L. Ellis (1989), p. 11.

To woman is attributed both the cause of man's initiative and the denial of his satisfaction. This rationalises force. Consent in this model becomes more a metaphysical quality of a woman's being than a choice she makes and communicates. *Exercise of women's so-called power presupposes more fundamental social powerlessness.*⁴¹

Catherine MacKinnon, in fact, offers a host of possibly explanations for why men rape: all of which are alluded to by the journalists whose reports are analysed in Part Two as possible explanations for the occurrence of mass rape in war. They include the following (they = men): because 'they want to'; because they 'enjoy it'; because the act, particularly the dominance, is 'sexually arousing' and 'sexually affirming'; because it increases the rapist's self-esteem; because it is an 'exciting' form of sex; because it is an 'adventure'; because it is a means of revenge or punishment; and, because it is 'rewarding' for the rapist.⁴² MacKinnon's point here is that all the above could equally be used to describe the reasons why men want sex, as well as being used to describe some men's motives for rape. However, MacKinnon claims that no matter what the motive for rape, once the act has been labelled 'rape' there is an epistemological problem with seeing it as 'sex'.⁴³ Rape is generally recognised in our society as something that a rapist does, as if he were a separate species. Sex is what 'normal' men do and rape is what 'psychopathic' men do. But in reality, no personality disorder distinguishes most rapists from normal men: psychopaths do rape, but only in about five percent of cases are the rapists diagnosed as such.⁴⁴ Despite the number of rape victims and the apparent 'normality' of the majority of the offenders, rape is still considered, within Western society, to be psychopathological and therefore not about sexuality.

As a classic feminist analysis of rape this explanation suggests that rape is not, as common mythology insists, a crime of frustrated attraction, victim provocation, or uncontrollable biological urges: nor is rape perpetrated only by a psychopathic aberrant fringe. Rather, rape is a direct expression of sexual politics, an act of conformity to masculinist sexual norms and a form of terrorism that serves to preserve the hierarchically gendered status quo.

⁴¹Catharine MacKinnon (1989), p. 175. (emphasis added)

⁴²ibid., p. 145.

⁴³ibid.

⁴⁴ibid.

A Social Learning Theory of Rape

The 'social learning' theory dates back to the work of psychologist Albert Bandura in the 1970s⁴⁵ who suggests that 'aggression is learned primarily through imitation (modelling), and thereafter sustained largely through various forms of intermittent reinforcement'.⁴⁶ In using this hypothesis to further elucidate the act of rape, this social learning theory proposes that 'rape', as a form of aggressive behaviour, is learned from observing similar acts in 'real life', through the mass media, or 'observing' rapes that have gone unpunished.

Superficially, social learning theory appears to be closely related to the suggested 'feminist' theory of rape in the previous section, in that social and cultural factors are considered primarily responsible for the motivations initiating rape. The main difference between these two standpoints, however, lies in the role given to sexuality in cultural traditions, with social learning theory giving *more* precedence to those cultural traditions that are directly linked to interpersonal aggression and sexuality. Moreover, the social learning theory of rape concludes that rape *could be* sexually motivated. This is not to deny the 'feminist theory' link between rape and sexuality, but Ellis's 'feminist' theory connects sexuality with the more complex dynamics of power and control, whereas the social learning theory accords primacy to the more apparent notions of aggression and lust: this theory accords with some journalistic and feminist thinking on the causal factors for mass rape in war, and in particular the aggression which stems from military training. This will be discussed further in Chapters Five and Eight respectively. However, as Ellis points out:

Social learning theorists see rape as resulting from the joint influences of cultural and experimental factors mediated by attitudes, sex role scripts, and other thought processes that link physical aggression and sexuality in the minds of males.⁴⁷

One example of the differing views of the suggested 'feminist' theory of rape outlined above by Ellis and the social learning theory is the relative link and evaluation

⁴⁵A. Bandura, *Aggression: A Social Learning Process* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973); and "Social Learning Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Communication* Vol.28 (1978): pp. 12-29.

⁴⁶L. Ellis (1989), p. 12.

⁴⁷*ibid.*, p. 14.

between pornography and rape. The social learning theorists have claimed that it 'is sexually *violent* material, rather than sexually *explicit* material, that results in harmful effects'.⁴⁸ Challenging this view - that non-violent pornography has no detrimental or harmful effects for women - feminist Diana Russell claims that '[m]y reading of the research conducted on pornography in the last decade is that for the most part it strongly supports the causative link between pornography and violence against women...In many instances the actual *making* of pornography involves or even requires violence and sexual assault'.⁴⁹ The debate concerning the causal link, if one exists, between pornography and rape is set to continue, as both positions appear to have substantial amounts of data gleaned from in-depth empirical research to support their opposing standpoints. However, I would argue that their conclusions are incongruous. As Linz *et al* suggest, methodological limitations resulting from research in laboratory settings and the use of 'artificial' measures of aggression 'prohibit direct extrapolation of experimental findings to situations outside the laboratory'.⁵⁰ This is a difficult and controversial issue that requires more research.

An Evolutionary Theory of Rape

The proponents of the evolutionary (or socio-biological) theory of rape propose that social behaviour has evolved for the sole purpose of propagating the human species.⁵¹ Basically, as mammals, men and women have evolved different proclivities in ordering their time and energy in direct relation to their respective tasks of reproduction. For example, females retain guardianship and nurturance of the offspring while the priority for men is to secure as many sex partners as possible, thereby propagating their genes as far and wide as possible.⁵² As a consequence of the lack of knowledge that males subsequently have about their own offspring once they are born - for example, the inability to identify their own progeny, or, the lack of

⁴⁸D. Linz, S. Penrod and E. Donnerstein, "The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: The gaps between "findings" and facts," American Bar Foundation Research Journal Vol. 23 (1987): p. 713.

⁴⁹Diana Russell, "Pornography and Rape: A Causal Model," Political Psychology Vol. 9, no. 1 (1988): pp. 44-73.

⁵⁰D. Linz *et al* (1987), p. 714.

⁵¹See, for example: Mark Ridley, Evolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and Animal Behaviour: An Introduction to Behavioural Mechanisms, Development and Ecology (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995).

⁵²L. Ellis (1989), p. 14.

certainty of parenthood - evolutionary theorists contest that 'males have a stronger tendency for evolving traits (behavioural and otherwise) that increase their chances of inseminating large numbers of females, rather than fastidiously taking care of a few offspring'.⁵³ Thus, the next sequential step along this line of inquiry is that *forced* copulation, or rape, is an extreme response to the rules of 'natural selection'.

Leading the field in this area of theoretical research are the 'socio-biological conservatives' who base their research on a certain set of assumptions. Firstly, they contend that the *human* male is no different from males of other species in that he is subject to the evolutionary process of natural selection. Also, as David Barash, a proponent of the socio-biological thesis, has stated: 'The central principle of socio-biology ... [is] that individuals will tend to behave in a manner that maximises [both] their inclusive fitness [and] their success in projecting copies of their genes into succeeding generations.'⁵⁴ Thus, socio-biologists also believe that males have the 'natural' power to initiate and maintain sexual partnerships and they even describe rape as a reproductive strategy among the male's 'bag of dirty tricks'.⁵⁵ In short, biological conservatives do not question the universality and 'natural' state of male dominance in contemporary society.

Secondly, socio-biology attempts to explain behaviours such as rape, war, male dominance, homosexuality, and so on, by referring to similar behaviours in non-human species. They consider these factors to be universal within human society and prevalent among non-human animals as well; contending that if a particular behaviour is found in both human and non-human societies then there is strong evidence that it contributes to 'biological success' *per se*. However, all these factors have a political, legal and consensual content that precludes their application to the non-human animal world. In the case of rape, socio-biologists seem to ignore the fact that in the majority of human societies rape is a *crime* that occurs when a woman is unable or unwilling to give her consent. Some socio-biologists fail to offer rigorous definitions of terms such as 'rape'; perhaps if they did they would lose many, if not

⁵³L. Ellis (1989), p. 15.

⁵⁴David Barash, *Sociobiology and Behaviour* (New York: Elsevier, 1982), pp. 45-46.

⁵⁵*ibid.*, p. 269.

all, of the universals between humans and animals on which the very crux of their theories depend.

However, if the socio-biological theory *is* correct it raises some further interesting although speculative questions, which again, only serve to refute the very core of its conceptual framework. For example, if men have evolved such aggressive copulating tactics, should/have women evolve(d) strong tendencies to resist such forced copulation, inasmuch as it is in their best interests to have a sex partner who is prepared to make a long-term commitment and to share the division of labour in the raising of their offspring? Or, perhaps there are other proclivities that *have* developed over time for women that are being suppressed by the pressures or 'norms' of our current social structures. Alternatively, perhaps women have been socialised into passive receptivity, believing there to be (or actually having) no other choice of action available to them, but acquiescence: submission being preferable to further injury or death.

While appearing superficially feasible, another of the implications of the socio-biological/evolutionary theory of rape is also rather alarming. In suggesting that a man rapes due to some biological or genetic tendency, it almost presupposes that rape is inevitable, and furthermore, that all men are potential rapists. It could be argued that Brownmiller, writing two decades ago from her own distinctive feminist standpoint, supports this view. She states that 'man's discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric times'.⁵⁶ Although in the contemporary feminist climate this view may be viewed by many feminists as too reductionist to be viewed as mainstream.

However, would socio-biologists not take this one step further in claiming that these potential rapists could not be held responsible for their 'natural' actions should they chose to rape? Socio-biologists, defending the main premise on which their thesis rests, which is an extension of Darwinian theory ('survival of the fittest'), claim that on a fundamental level, *all* of humankind is motivated to produce offspring and this is

⁵⁶Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 5.

the basis for having both consensual and non-consensual intercourse.⁵⁷ Affirming this position, biological determinist Donald Symons, states that the process of natural selection predisposes males to copulate with fertile females whenever this potential can be realised.⁵⁸ However, little empirical evidence has been accumulated to support this theory. As Julie Allison has observed, '[a]lthough young women in their fertile years are most susceptible to rape, many individuals who are not fertile, including children, post-menopausal women, and men, are also raped'.⁵⁹ Moreover, the socio-biological position also fails to account for why many rape victims are also killed. However, for the thesis the key point is not whether one theory of rape is 'correct' or not: it is what implications and effects are a consequence of the various theories and beliefs about rape within society?

Complexities

Interlinked with the motivations for the rape, are the characteristics of the rapist. Can researchers predict who may have the propensity to rape and who may not? Unfortunately and potentially dangerously, when reading or hearing of a rape often a stereotypical image of the rapist habitually comes to mind; a perverted, obsessed, psychopathic monster is envisaged. This instinctive and commonplace notion has its roots in the traditional 'Psychiatric View' of the rapist, which is premised on three basic psycho-analytical assumptions: (1) rape is the product of great psychological disturbance; (2) the act of rape is primarily sexual in nature; and (3) the behaviours associated with the act of rape are both strange and abnormal.⁶⁰ M.L.Cohen supports this view, stating that 'every act of rape is expressive of psychopathology: of a disturbance, moderate or severe, in the developmental history of the offender and his current efforts'.⁶¹ This perspective implies that rape occurs infrequently and by

⁵⁷Matt Ridley, The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 198-199.

⁵⁸D. Symons, The Evolution of Human Sexuality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 101.

⁵⁹Allison and Wrightsman (1993), p. 36.

⁶⁰R. Albin, "Psychological Studies of Rape," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society Vol. 3 (1977): p. 423-435.

⁶¹M.L. Cohen cited in Koss and Leonard, "Sexually Aggressive Men: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications" in N. Malamuth and E. Donnerstein, eds., Pornography and Sexual Aggression (New York: Academic Press, 1984), p. 217.

atypical individuals. However, by segregating 'rapists' from 'normal' men in this manner, we are allowing ourselves to preserve the illusion that we live in a secure environment and that we could easily recognise and avoid rapists if we simply use the appropriate caution.

Yet, contrary to this view, Ted Bundy, a serial rapist and murderer in the US, has stated in an interview that rapists '[a]re not some kind of inherent monsters. We are your husbands, and we grew up in regular families'.⁶² Rapists, according to this statement are just 'regular guys'. Carolyn Craven, a rape victim, was left with the same impression. In an in-depth interview she explained how she was startled by the normality of her attacker: 'He felt so common, he felt so ordinary, he felt so familiar, and it was maybe that what frightened me the most was that how similar to other men he seemed. They don't come from Mars, folks'.⁶³ This point will be reiterated in Chapter Five, as many of the Rape victims in the Balkan conflict reported that some of their attackers were former friends and neighbours - ordinary men.

Despite initial acceptance of the 'dysfunctional psychiatric model'⁶⁴ approach as being a useful method of understanding rape, attempts to identify rape as an uncommon or atypical act, perpetrated by easily identifiable psychiatric dysfunctional 'men', have proved to be unproductive and, therefore, the majority of research has now moved on to explore other, potentially more fruitful lines of inquiry, although opinions within the medical profession, as in most academic disciplines, appear divided. This is reflected in conflicting medical research, some of which supports the idea that the majority of rapists are not pathological individuals. As one key medical textbook states, 'psychiatric disorders are rare among rapists'.⁶⁵ While, in contrast, the Dictionary of Modern Medicine suggests that rape is 'an aggressive act that is considered to be sadistic rather than sexual in nature'.⁶⁶ Moreover, studies within the medical profession have resulted in four main 'behavioural types' of rapist being

⁶²J. Lamar, "I Deserve Punishment," *Time* 6 February 1989, p. 34.

⁶³Cited in Catharine MacKinnon (1989), p. 171.

⁶⁴Sylvana Tomaselli and Roy Porter, *Rape* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

⁶⁵M. Gelder, D. Gath and R. Mayou, eds., *Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry* 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 885.

⁶⁶J. Segen, ed., *The Dictionary of Modern Medicine* (Carnforth, Lancs: The Parthenon Publishing Group, 1992), p. 607.

defined, which, while attempting to move away from the assumption that all rapists are suffering from psychiatric illness, tend to obscure more than they enlighten. They are as follows:

(1) aggressive antisocial men who have a history of general criminal behaviour, but do not have a formal psychiatric disorder; (2) aggressive and sadistic men who wish to humiliate and hurt women; (3) 'explosive' rapists who are often timid and inhibited; and who carry out the act as a deliberate plan to relieve their frustration; (4) mentally-ill rapists, who most often suffer from 'mania' - this is the least common group.⁶⁷

Again, counter to the 'psychiatric dysfunctional model' of rape, neither the feminist nor the social psychological viewpoints consider rape to be an abnormal or perverted act, but rather, they suggest it is an accordant response to veiled cultural 'norms'. They propose that the broad ideology of Western values and beliefs serve only to enhance the inherent dichotomy of the male/dominance and female/passivity roles, and in doing so encourage the general acceptance of illusory assumptions about rape.

There is an additional 'myth' which has emerged from psychoanalysis, and the ideas of Sigmund Freud in particular, which needs to be addressed before moving on to outline the possible social/cultural factors involved. While Freud himself wrote very little about rape and why it occurs, neo-Freudians have presented their own explanations centred partially around the rapist's 'irresistible impulses' or 'diseased mind', but, primarily their model has been built on the proposition that within the subject 'woman' lies a site of unresolved conflict. This contention is between the conscious wish to resist the rapist and the unconscious desire for violence, the latter disabling the victim's ability to resist. To quote two neo-Freudians: 'What the woman secretly desires in intercourse is rape and violence, or in the mental sphere, humiliation'.⁶⁸ Therefore, because of such urges, they 'unwittingly co-operate with the rapist in terms of covertly making themselves available to the rapist'.⁶⁹ Here is an

⁶⁷T. Gibbens, C. Way and K. Soothill, "Behavioural Types of Rape," British Journal of Psychiatry Vol. 130 (1977): pp. 32-42.

⁶⁸Karen Horney, "The Problems of Feminine Masochism" in J. Miller, ed., Psychoanalysis and Women (Baltimore, MD.: Penguin, 1973), p. 22.

⁶⁹N. Littner, "Psychology of the Sex Offender: Causes, Treatment, Prognosis," Police Law Quarterly Vol. 3 (1973): pp. 5-31.

example of a possible origin of one of the most dangerous rape myths at large in Western society - that all women secretly wish to be raped.

Social/Cultural Factors

The 'reductive' explanations outlined thus far, focusing as they have on mono-causal factors in attempting to explain rape, are perhaps too narrow and theoretically restricting to enable more useful research. Whatever the merits of these accounts they may require supplementing with a range of other factors in order to adequately deal with the complex issues which are raised when dealing with an issue such as rape. Perhaps by incorporating social and cultural factors into our understanding of 'rape', research could prove to be more productive. Furthermore, many studies, some conflicting and some corroborating, have revealed that no single variable in the social, environmental, or personal make-up of an individual can be used as a reliable indicator for predicting the propensity to rape. Although the following 'characteristics' have been suggested by researchers as being possible contributory factors:

(1) Sex/Gender: most rapists are male. This point may seem obvious, yet because so, its significance is often disregarded. A study by Wilson and Herrnstein has verified that the consistency across societies is impressive. When taking gender as a correlate of criminal behaviour, throughout all countries where records are kept, men are arrested up to 50 times more often than women are.⁷⁰ Moreover, it should be noted, that during this research project there has been no evidence unearthed that suggests that any women have raped or sexually abused men or women in the Balkan conflict.

(2) Childhood: profound impact on adult behaviour. It has been suggested that children living with violence, sexual or physical abuse are more likely to become offenders themselves in later life. However, there are conflicting results from research in this area. Two studies which illustrate this point are, first, A. Groth, who reported that 90% of the offenders he studied claimed to be victims of childhood sexual abuse and 34% of physical abuse⁷¹ compared with D. Scully's interviews with convicted rapists which revealed that only 9% had been sexually

⁷⁰J. Wilson and R. Herrnstein, *Crime and Human Nature* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

⁷¹A. Nicholas Groth, *Men who Rape: The Psychology of the Offender* (New York: Plenum, 1980).

abused as children.⁷² In addition, 50% of offenders in Scully's report claimed to have grown up in non-violent homes. Moreover, if, as current research shows, the majority of abused children are girls, then one would expect the majority of abusers to also be women, but this is not the case. Therefore, while it can be concluded that childhood 'violence' is a related factor in raping as an adult, it cannot be claimed that there is a necessary *causal* relationship. As will become evident in Part Two, this is also an explanation utilised by some journalists in explaining the behaviour of those men who have raped in war.

(3) Attitudes and beliefs about women. Possibly the most damaging findings in the literature on rape is the role played by adversarial attitudes toward women, and the unquestioning acceptance of rape 'myths', on the propensity to rape. Again, detailed in Scully's study is evidence that convicted rapists 'approve' of violence against women; with 45 percent believing that hitting a woman proves a man 'cares'. Such attitudes serve not only as a justification for the rapist, but also contribute to a denial of individual responsibility. Moreover, a study by Sussman and Bordwell found that rapists frequently blamed their actions on the 'behaviour' or 'dress' of the woman.⁷³ These attitudes, as well as being used as a rationalisation for rape, also involve the creation and perpetuation of an inequitable power division which confers on men 'authority' and 'domination' over women, which in turn perpetuates the type of society which, while not condoning rape, nevertheless appears to maintain an atmosphere of acquiescence. Feminists such as Ruth Seifert,⁷⁴ Alexandra Stiglmayer⁷⁵ and Catharine MacKinnon⁷⁶ have all suggested that social 'peacetime' attitudes toward women have contributed to rape in war: this will be outlined in Part Three.

(4) Power and domination. In Groth's study, the desire for power is identified as the most common motivation for rapists and subsequent studies by N. Malamuth have supported Groth's findings. Malamuth, in researching primarily US college students, concluded that for those men who displayed and engaged in sexually

⁷²D. Scully, Understanding Sexual Violence: A Study of Convicted Rapists (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

⁷³Les Sussman and Sally Bordwell, The Rapist File (New York: Chelsea House, 1981).

⁷⁴Ruth Seifert, "War and Rape," Argument Vol. 35, no. 1 (1993): pp. 81-90.

⁷⁵Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).

⁷⁶Catherine MacKinnon, "Turning Pornography into Rape: Postmodern Genocide," in Stiglmayer, Alexandra, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. 75-76.

aggressive behaviour, dominance was indeed a principal sexual motivator.⁷⁷ B. Burkhart and M. Fromuth, however, have taken this theory one step further, suggesting that sexually aggressive behaviour in men is linked to a more fundamental and enmeshed set of motives; including power, dominance, anger, and frustration, of which it may be impossible to entangled one from another.⁷⁸ This is one explanation for rape which feminist Claudia Card⁷⁹ has utilised and developed into a possible solution to the problem of mass rape in war. This will be discussed at length in Chapter Nine.

(5) General aggression and hostility. It has also been suggested that for some men, rape is just another method by which they express violence. Research has indicated that men with histories of 'sexually coercive behaviour' have a general tendency toward violence in general, this proclivity, combined with a deficiency in social skills - another characteristic often found in men who have raped - could lead to an increased likelihood of having the propensity to rape.⁸⁰ Following on along these lines, Allison and Branscombe's study⁸¹ included assessments of Machiavellianism⁸² and Hyper-masculinity⁸³, stating that men with these tendencies were more likely to use force to obtain sex. This issue is one that feminists such as Cynthia Enloe⁸⁴ and Nancy Hartsock⁸⁵ have used, particularly in connection with military training, to explain male sexual aggression and rape in war and will be considered primarily in Chapter Eight.

⁷⁷N. Malamuth, "Predictors of Naturalistic Sexual Aggression," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Vol. 50 (1986): pp. 953-962.

⁷⁸B. Burkhart and M. Fromuth cited in E. Gruerholz and M. Koralewski, eds., Sexual Coercion: A Sourcebook on its Nature, Causes and Prevention (Lexington, MA.: Lexington, 1991).

⁷⁹Claudia Card, "Rape as a Terrorist Institution," in R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris, eds., Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 296-319; and Claudia Card, "Rape as a Weapon of War," Hypatia Vol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 5-18.

⁸⁰Burt (1980), pp. 217-230.

⁸¹Allison and Branscombe, "Unpublished manuscript" (1992), cited in Allison & Wrightsman (1993), p. 261.

⁸²Machiavellianism refers to persons who characteristically manipulate, dominate and control others through guile, deceit and opportunism. See for example: R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism (New York: Academic Press, 1970).

⁸³Hypermasculinity refers to the 'macho' man and relates to three related components; callous sexual attitudes toward women, violence is manly, and danger is exciting. See for example: D. Mosher and R. Anderson, "Macho Personality, Sexual Aggression, and Reactions to Guided Imagery of Realistic Rape," Journal of Research in Personality Vol. 20 (1986): pp. 77-94.

⁸⁴Enloe, Cynthia, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives (London: Pandora, 1988).

⁸⁵Nancy Hartsock, Sexuality and Politics: The Barracks Community in Western Political Thought (New York: Longman's, 1983).

Whether one, some or all of the above can be identified as being contributory factors in a 'man's' motivation to rape, and although taking the above factors *en masse* one could use those particular mental and physical traits to make up a personal profile of a potential rapists, nevertheless, it would be a dangerous practice to attempt to then distinguish certain men as having the propensity to rape in 'peacetime' and even more so in war, with a myriad of other factors coming in to play. However, regardless of the individual's social and cultural background, it has been suggested that once a man rapes it is not only that particular rapist who should take responsibility for his actions but that all men are collectively responsible, and this possibility is discussed next.

Collective Responsibility

Before concluding this chapter, it would be interesting to briefly look at some ideas on the 'collective responsibility' for rape introduced by Larry May and Robert Strikwerda in 1994,⁸⁶ as this notion of 'collective responsibility' is raised in the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter Eight) with regard to the suggestion that all soldiers should take responsibility for those who rape in war. Although the work of May and Strikwerda is primarily dealing with rape in 'peacetime', their theories concerning 'men in groups' could also prove equally enlightening and useful when analysing rape in war in Chapter Two. Their work mainly revolves around the premise that in Western societies men are collectively responsible for rape in that most, if not all, men contribute in various ways to the prevalence of rape. For example, they suggest that most men do very little to actually *oppose* rape. The fact that most men do not speak out in open opposition to rape leads May and Strikwerda to ask whether this makes them co-conspirators with the men who do rape. Moreover, if they do speak out, is this symbolic act enough to diminish their responsibility? May and Strikwerda would suggest that unless men speak out against the rapes in the Balkans they are collectively responsible for the continuation of the rapes. Basically, if men remain silent they are complicit with the rapists. They sum up their arguments in the following manner:

We will argue that insofar as male bonding and socialisation in groups contributes to the prevalence of rape in western

⁸⁶Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, *Hypatia* Vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1994).

societies, men in those societies should feel responsible for the prevalence of rape and should feel motivated to counteract such violence and rape. In addition, we will argue that rape should be seen as something that men, as a group, are collectively responsible for, in a way which parallels the collective responsibility of a society's crimes against humanity perpetrated by some members of their society. Rape is indeed a crime against humanity, not merely a crime against a particular woman. And rape is a crime perpetrated by men as a group, not merely by the individual rapist.⁸⁷

In expanding this theory May and Strikwerda set out four primary ways in which the responsibility for rape is generally understood. First, the rapist is seen as solely responsible for committing an intentional act of rape; second, and related to the socio-biological explanations discussed above, it is sometimes suggested that no-one can be held responsible since rape is merely a biologically motivated response to stimuli that men have no direct control over; the third notion of responsibility for rape suggests that both women and men should be held equally accountable for the prevalence of rape - not in the sense that the 'woman as victim' is blamed because of not taking adequate safety precautions, by dressing seductively, and so on, but in the sense that women, as well as men, contribute to the perpetuation of the violent environment in which we live; and fourth, rather than holding individual men, or groups of men, responsible for rape, the wider notion of 'patriarchy' is cited as being 'to blame'. Before summarising May and Strikwerda's final position on the subject, a brief elaboration of each of these stand-points is needed as they will prove to be useful analytical tools when analysing rape in *war*.

Their first possibility for understanding the responsibility of rape is that the rapist should be held *solely* responsible. Following Mike Tyson's rape, trial journalist Joyce Carol Oates wrote an article in which she stated that 'no one is to blame except the perpetrator himself'.⁸⁸ She absolves society at large of any blame for Tyson's behaviour. Oates even labels Tyson a 'sadist' and a 'sociopath' suggesting that he is different from other men. However, as mentioned above, studies have revealed that

⁸⁷Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, "Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape," in Karen Warren and Duane Cady, eds., Bringing Peace Home: Feminism, Violence and Nature (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 176.

⁸⁸Joyce Carol Oates, "Rape and the boxing ring," Newsweek, 24 February 1992, pp. 60-61.

most rapists are *not* psychologically 'abnormal',⁸⁹ and while most men who engage in rape are undoubtedly at least partially responsible for those rapes, the main question posed by May and Strikwerda is are those who perpetrate rape the *only* ones who are responsible for rape? Contrary to Oates' view, May and Strikwerda believe that rape is not best understood in individualistic terms and that it is a serious mistake to think that only the perpetrators are responsible. They feel that the interactions of men, particularly in all-male groups, contribute to a pattern of socialisation that also plays a major role in the incidence of rape: this point will be expanded on later.

Their second suggestion is that the rapist merely a victim of biology. As this explanation has also been adequately covered above in the biological determinist arguments there is no need to repeat the analysis here, save to say that this theory is generally promoted on the premise that, like it or not, these are the hard facts of biological life and we are unable to control what is biologically 'natural' and that those feminist theorists who take a socio-cultural view should 'get real about rape'.⁹⁰ Under this explanation, *no-one* is responsible for rape, after all, if rape is a biologically predetermined response to different sexual development in males and females, those human beings who engage in rape are powerless to fight against their 'natural' urges which are inextricably linked to the natural evolution process.

The third option in May and Strikwerda's analysis of the 'responsibility for rape' suggests that the rapist could be a victim of a violent society, of which both men and women must take responsibility. As well as a sex crime, rape is also a crime of violence, and many factors within our society have increased the prevalence of violence. It is this increased level of violence that May and Strikwerda suggest is a result of the patterns of male socialisation which in turn creates collective male responsibility. However, they point out that socialisation patterns are created by both men *and* women. They cite the work of Sam Keen, for example, who also regards men and women as equally to blame by working together to perpetuate the system of violence, especially in the way in which they transmit to their male children an

⁸⁹Susan Griffin, "Rape: The all-American Crime" in Marilyn Pearsall, ed., Women and Values: Readings in Feminist Philosophy (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1986), p. 178.

⁹⁰See for example: Thornhill and Thornhill cited in May and Strikwerda (1996), pp. 180-181.

acceptance of violence.⁹¹ For instance, boys' bad behaviour is more often condoned, or even expected, than bad behaviour in girls. As such, boys are often given mixed signals about misbehaviour. Among peers at school bad behaviour is frequently regarded as 'macho' or 'cool' and boys soon learn that they are ostracised for being too 'goody-goody'. It is as if the message being sent to boys is that they have a tacit license to misbehave and in as much as women take a part in the socialisation of men, and their sons in particular, Keen contends that they should accept their share of the responsibility for the creation of a violent society.⁹²

While this view does take account of the fact that the socialisation of men is the responsibility of both men and women, and that rape is indeed part of a larger set of violent practices that harm both men and women, Keen fails to recognise that it is men, and not women, who are the vast majority of rapists in Western society. Moreover, as May and Strikwerda maintain, 'even if some women do act in ways which trigger violent reactions in men, nevertheless, in our opinion this pales in comparison with the way that men socialise *each other* to be open to violence'.⁹³

The last suggestion is that the rapist a victim of 'patriarchy'. One way of explaining the notion that all men are collectively responsible for the prevalence of rape in Western societies is to suggest that men, as a group, are responsible because they form some sort of intangible super-entity that causes, or at least supports, the prevalence of rape. Feminists, of course, would suggest that this entity is 'patriarchy, which on this reading can be conceived as a social structure which exists only in virtue of the practices of men (or, indeed, any social agent, but for the purposes of this argument I am dealing solely with 'men'); although those same men, of course, need not be aware of the manner in which their practices are sustaining and/or transforming such a structure. Therefore, if we accept that patriarchy is the oppressive practices of men, which are co-ordinated by their common interests, but not *intentionally* organised, and that rape is one violent practice which results from patriarchy, then how does this affect our understanding of whether men are collectively responsible for rape? For, if patriarchy is supporting or even creating the

⁹¹Cited in May and Strikwerda (1996), *ibid.*

⁹²*ibid.*

⁹³*ibid.*, p. 184. (emphasis added)

prevalence of rape in Western societies it cannot be claimed that it intentionally plans the rape of women. However, the kind of oppression characterised by the prevalence of rape in most Western societies does appear to be systematic, though perhaps not organised. But this situation merely means, again, that men are collectively responsible for the prevalence of rape and yet no men are held individually responsible.

May and Strikwerda, however, have suggested a variation on this theme as a way in which collective and individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive. They suggest that if patriarchy is understood as something which is based on the common interests and benefits of all men within a particular society, then it may be that men are collectively responsible for the harms of patriarchy in a way which affects all men, making each man in a particular society at least partially responsible for the harms attributable to patriarchy; including rape. May and Strikwerda elaborate on this theory by suggesting that their claim - that all men in Western societies are collectively responsible for the prevalence of rape in their culture - rests on five main points. They are as follows:

- (1) Insofar as most perpetrators of rape are men, then these men are responsible, in most cases, for the rapes they committed.
- (2) Insofar as some men, by the way they interact with other (especially younger) men, contribute to a climate in our society where rape is made more prevalent, then they are collaborators in the rape culture and for this reason share in responsibility for rapes committed in that culture.
- (3) Also, insofar as some men are not unlike the rapist, since they would be rapists if they had the opportunity to be placed into a situation where their inhibitions against rape were removed, then these men share the responsibility with actual rapists for the harms of rape.
- (4) In addition, insofar as many other men could have prevented fellow men from raping, but did not act to prevent these actual rapes, then these men also share responsibility along with the rapists.
- (5) Finally, insofar as some men benefit from the existence of rape in our society, these men also share responsibility along with the rapists.⁹⁴

May and Strikwerda claim that all men fit into at least one of the above categories; and even those men who would claim to be adamantly opposed to rape in every sense,

⁹⁴ibid., p. 186.

still fall into category (5) by directly, or indirectly, benefiting from living in a 'rape' culture. They cite some examples of these benefits on both a personal level and in a wider context. On a personal level May and Strikwerda claim that they benefit by being able to walk relatively fearlessly through their university grounds at night, an activity avoided by most women. They suggest that another comparative benefit which they enjoy as a result of this 'travel' advantage is their 'ability to gain academically by being able to use the library at any hour [they] chose'.⁹⁵ The fear of rape and violence, therefore, limits women's freedom of movement. It constrains what they can do, where they can go, and perhaps even with whom they can socialise. In other words, both the reality and the fear of violence, as Susan Brownmiller stated earlier, act as a form of *social control*.

Within a wider context May and Strikwerda claim that men benefit from the prevalence of rape because many women are made to feel dependent on men for protection against potential rapists. They explain this claim in the following way:

It is hard to overestimate the benefit here for it potentially effects all aspects of one's life. One study found that 87% of women in a borough of London felt that they had to take precautions against potential rapists, with a large number reporting that they never went out at night alone. Whenever one group is made to feel dependent on another group, and this dependency is not reciprocal, then there is a strong comparative benefit to the group that is not in the dependent position.⁹⁶

This benefit, combined with the benefits mentioned above, support the view that men as a group have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the rape culture in ways that most women do not. Consequently, as the benefits to men as a group are dispersed throughout the male population in any given society, according to May and Strikwerda, so the responsibility should be dispersed as well.⁹⁷ This is not to say that all men everywhere are responsible for rape, but that in Western societies where rape is deeply embedded in a wider culture of male socialisation, then those who act to sustain that culture must also recognise that they are in some way responsible for the

⁹⁵ibid., p. 188.

⁹⁶ibid. Also cited is Jill Radford, "Policing male violence, policing women," in Jalna Hanmer and Mary Maynard, eds., Women, Violence and Social Control (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1987).

⁹⁷May and Strikwerda (1996), p. 188.

harmful aspects of that culture. Moreover, these 'acts of maintenance' men make to the rape culture do not necessarily have to be a direct contribution, negligence, similarity of disposition, or by simply keeping silent is enough to suggest complicity in the prevalence of rape and to thereby become responsible.

While May and Strikwerda offer some interesting suggestions for raising awareness of how society's 'norms' and values directly affect the incidence of rape and how men, in particular, should move towards taking responsibility for that occurrence, in their analysis, however, they fail to recognise that the majority of women are also silent on the issue. For the most part, unless directly involved in direct action against rape or working with the victims of rape, women also fail to protest as vocally and as concertedly as one might expect. Moreover, as Sam Keen mentioned above, women are often complicit in generating the appropriate social discourses that allow boys to receive messages that condone their aggressive behaviour and promote the continued domination of men over women. Therefore, while helpful in making those links between rape and society and in acknowledging the overall problem, May and Strikwerda's theory of 'collective responsibility' offers little in the way of an agenda for change - i.e. what can non-raping men do in order to alter the cultural discourse? However, in the final chapter of the thesis some feminists do offer possible 'solutions', some of which indirectly draw on the notion of 'collective responsibility'.

Conclusion

The standard explanations for the occurrence of rape as analysed within this chapter can be grouped into five areas: sex/gender, psychological/ psychiatric, social/cultural, power/domination, and violence/aggressiveness. While, of course, these factors are not mutually exclusive, research does tend to suggest that when rape does take place, these factors, or some combination of them, can be identified. This also suggests that no sole variable can be singled out and used as a reliable predictor for rape, indeed, it would be dangerous to do so. Research is currently focusing on multi-dimensional

approaches in order to develop more productive theories for understanding 'why' rape occurs in 'peacetime'.⁹⁸

It is possible that some of the theories referred to in this chapter have contributed to the contemporary social ideas that surround the issue of rape. While some of the explanations, such as the 'feminist' and 'social learning' theories, attempt to invalidate those based on 'biological' factors, those based on evolutionary and biological determinist arguments have been gradually formed and perpetuated throughout history and are consequently a stronger force within mainstream social discourse. This has not only affected the way in which women have been viewed by society, but has also led to the lack of women's rights historically. The issue of biological determinism and the way in which women are represented within society are both issues will be addressed at length in Chapter Seven. It has also been illustrated that this historical gendering of the issue of rape and the perpetuation of rape 'myths' has, in addition, led to the construction of unsatisfactory 'rape' legislation, based, in part, on the fact that the legal definitions which surround the issue of rape have been based on historically gendered 'norms' and values.

This chapter also identified possible motives for rape, for example, an abusive childhood, misogynistic attitudes towards women, the need to exert power and domination, and so on. This is not to suggest that this is one of the primary questions for the thesis, however, a limited understanding of current explanations for 'why men rape' will enable some comparisons to be drawn between these contemporary 'peacetime' theories and the explanations offered by both feminists in Chapter Two and journalists in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Moreover, unless some consideration is given to the rapist's motives, it would be difficult to suggest any solutions to the problem, or indeed analyse and critique those solutions that have already been offered, as in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, it could also be argued that during wartime some of the possible motivational factors mentioned above could also play a greater role than might be expected in a non-war situation, or at least some particular characteristics may find the 'anarchy of war' aids their emergence and the opportunity to rape. These additional factors which are prevalent in war will be discussed in the next

⁹⁸Allison and Wrightsman (1993), p. 45.

chapter, and combined with the analysis of rape in this chapter will serve to aid and further our understanding of mass rape in war.

May and Strikwerda's theory of 'collective responsibility' was also discussed within this chapter. Although not without flaws, this theory is at least attempting to stem the silence surrounding rape and to widen the sphere of responsibility to include all men who directly, or indirectly, benefit from living within a patriarchal society and one that has rape as a feature. While the possibility of practical application is, no doubt, remote, in war the theory might prove to be more applicable with the military unit being a classic 'male bonding group'.⁹⁹ Moreover, the 'collective responsibility' theme is one that has indirectly influences one of the 'solutions' discussed in Chapter Eight. The next chapter sets out the historical and theoretical context for the phenomenon of mass rape in war.

⁹⁹Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 187.

2

MASS RAPE IN WAR

Rape seems to have accompanied most wars, whether categorised as 'wars of gain, wars of fear or wars of doctrine'¹, or regarded as a 'just' or an 'unjust' war within the international political sphere. It has been stated by a famous World War Two general that during war there will 'unquestionably be some raping'.² Moreover, writing on the laws of war, sixteenth century commentator on political ethics, Francisco de Vitoria suggested that rape in war was 'necessary for the conduct of war [and] as a spur to the courage of the troops'.³ Viewed from this 'traditional' perspective, rape in war appears to be an inescapable side effect of war. It also seems to be regarded with the same regret, but resignation, as a missile which missed its target, as civilian casualties, as the loss of ancient buildings, the loss of homes, bridges, or next year's harvest - an unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of war.

The intention of this chapter is to discuss the persistence of 'mass rape' as a phenomenon of war historically, and to question the traditional notion that rape in war is simply evidence of war's violent 'nature'. Although there is relatively little written on mass rape in war historically, this chapter will use what exists - such as legislative documents, ancient religious texts, United Nations and war documentation, as well as secondary sources - to discuss the persistence of the phenomenon.

Therefore, the chapter begins with a brief chronological survey of the historical evidence of mass rape in war, which also includes some ancient accounts where the

¹Martin Wight, cited in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, eds., Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 138.

²General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 23.

³Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, trans., John Pawley Bate (Washington, D.C., 1917), p. 176; also see, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, eds., Political Writings: Francisco de Vitoria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

'evidence' is unverifiable and shrouded in myth. However, as discussed in Chapter One, historical myth permeates our culture and its influence can be felt throughout Western culture. For this reason it is appropriate to include within this chapter mythical accounts of rape in war, which, while no 'truth' can be attached to them or original documentation verified, have nevertheless become an accepted part of Western cultural history.

The Ancient World

Within the Western tradition, Greek myth is a reservoir of powerful archetypal images that lay claim to privileged 'truths' about 'human nature'; they invoke with convincing authority a sense of incontrovertible 'reality'. As a product of a male-dominated society, Greek myths overtly use the aggressive exercise of phallic power as the physical sign of male supremacy, which could explain the overwhelming presence of rape in the birthplace of Western civilisation. Froma Zeitlin suggests that the ultimate exemplar of this patriarchal figure is Zeus, father of gods and men. For example, she states:

Enthroned on Olympus, he augments his political and cosmic power, symbolised by his sceptre and thunderbolt, with a sexual energy of seemingly unlimited desire by which he pursues and mates unstintingly with both gods and mortals.⁴

The ritual raping of ancient goddesses is traceable throughout Greek mythology, and has played a crucial role in accounts and explanations of the rise and fall of cities, the causes of wars and revolution. Helen of Troy, Lucretia, and the Sabine women, all illustrate this point.⁵

The 'story' of the rape of the Sabine women begins only four months after the foundation of Rome. During this post-war period, Rome was suffering from a lack of manpower, so much so that Romulus, the Roman Emperor, had encouraged asylum-seekers, outlawed by neighbouring states, to take refuge within the city. This measure,

⁴Froma Zeitlin, "Configurations of Rape in Greek Myth," in S. Tomaselli and R. Porter, eds., *Rape* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 124.

⁵Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960).

while increasing the male population, was insufficient for Rome's needs; Rome needed to multiply and replenish the populace. Romulus, therefore, sent delegations into the surrounding communities to invite the neighbouring people to give their daughters to Romans in marriage. Faced with complete refusal, Romulus turned to more desperate measures. A festival of games in honour of Neptune was organised, with families invited and accommodation provided - a particularly warm welcome was extended to the neighbouring Sabine people. During the games at a pre-arranged signal, the Romans seized the marriageable Sabine women; the Sabine men fled for their lives. Some years later, having waited until certain of success, a Sabine force seeking revenge entered Rome by stealth at night and engaged the Romans in battle. The Sabine women, however, who had since borne Roman children, intervened, and the Romans and Sabines duly made peace, became equals within Rome, with Tatius, the Sabine leader, and Romulus jointly ruling the city.⁶ That the resulting political solution was peace in this instance does not detract from the way in which the Sabine women were used as pawns in a political game. The consequences could equally have been continuous ethnic hatreds, retaliation, and war, as witnessed in the former-Yugoslavia.

The rape of the Sabine women, in contrast to the rape of Lucretia,⁷ which is commonly viewed as an individual sexual act, can be viewed as a fundamentally political act.⁸ The former were not merely a cluster of individual acts of sexual violence perpetrated against individual women, but were an integral part of a premeditated plan with political ends. This issue, raised as one of the potential explanations for the mass raping of women in the Balkans will be discussed in Chapters Five and Seven. As evidence of the political nature of the raping of the Sabine women, note the following:

⁶S. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (New York: Schocken Books, 1975).

⁷I. Donaldson, The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and its Transformation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

⁸Mary Hutcheon, "Stories of Lucretia: Rape to Justify the Nation-State," Paper given at International Studies Association Conference Minneapolis, Minnesota (March 1998).

- Romulus ordered that no married women be taken. Plutarch interpreted this fact as showing 'that they did not commit this rape wantonly, but with the design of forming alliance with their neighbours by the greatest and surest bonds'.⁹
- The women were not raped on the spot. The Roman men were not allocated a 'wife' until the next day.
- Note the word 'wife'. The women were not kept as concubines, but were married and become 'legitimate' Roman citizens.
- The women were not kept, or treated, as slaves, but had an 'honourable' place within the household. Plutarch expanded on this point, stating that the Romans promised the Sabines that the women would 'not carry out any servile work in the house, but only spin'.¹⁰

The 'rape' of the Sabine women is one illustration of the all-encompassing nature of ancient patriarchal rationale. This 'crime', for it is undoubtedly a crime if analysed through our contemporary perception of rape, when viewed from the perspective of ancient Rome, dissolves simply into a *lack of parental consent* - hardly a crime at all by the 'norms' of the day. Sanctioned and devised by the Emperor himself, there was no contravention of Roman State law. On the contrary, the taking of the women culminated in marriage and the birth of 'legitimate' offspring, all that is missing is the bestowal of the Sabine daughters on their new husbands by their Sabine fathers. If one analyses the 'myths' surrounding the building of Rome, of which this narrative containing the rape of the Sabine women is a part, its function does appear to be primarily political rather than sexual, both in defining relations between nations and between the sexes. In other words, the soldiers were under orders to take the women as part of a political strategy (as some commentators have suggested was the case in the Balkan conflict) rather than simply to satisfy their own sexual desires and fantasies (as other commentators have suggested was the case in Vietnam). This question will be raised again later in this chapter.

Throughout ancient history rape during 'wartime' - which would have to be very loosely defined given the events outlined above - was not only regarded as legitimate

⁹C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome: Life of Romulus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 89-94.

¹⁰ibid.

action, but was openly condoned and encouraged by heads of state. This advocating of rape in war was also prevalent throughout ancient Near East history. In Babylonian society, the acceptance of rape within their culture can be traced back to their own 'creation myth', which was based primarily on the rape and murder of woman by man. The 'myth' states that the male-god Marduk slays the primordial female-creator Tiamat in order to reform the world, which he then accomplishes by using her dismembered body. Consequently, Marduk declares himself creator of the world.¹¹

The potency of these myths is evident throughout the Hebrew Bible where women are depicted as mere objects of male possession and control. Women were defined in relation to their sexuality, and because the basic social structure was built on the value and significance of legitimate heirs, a woman's identity, her life, her 'very being', was *instrumental* not proactive within Hebrew patriarchal society. Biblical references clearly illustrate this point in relation to the treatment of women in wartime, where they were regarded as 'spoils of war', as property. The notion will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. Old Testament Law lays down precise rules for the plunder and capture of enemy cities. In Deuteronomy it states that the Lord God will deliver into the male warriors' hands, 'the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself.'¹²

It is interesting, however, that the word for rape is never actually employed in the texts in Deuteronomy, which describe the conduct of war, but neither is rape forbidden. However, due to the position of women within Hebrew society, when the male warriors are instructed to 'enjoy the use of the *spoil* of your enemies which the Lord your God gives you' it is accepted that women are included in this category.¹³ To reiterate this point, Moses in the book of Numbers instructs the Israelite men to 'kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him. But all the women children, who have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves'.¹⁴ When contextualised within a modern discourse of rape,

¹¹Charles Long, Alpha: The Myths of Creation (New York: Brazilliar, 1963), pp. 88-93.

¹²The Bible, Deuteronomy 20:14 (King James Version).

¹³Susan Brooks-Thistlethwaite, "You May Enjoy the Spoil of Your Enemies': Rape as a Biblical Metaphor for War," Semeia Vol. 61 (1993): pp. 59-75. (emphasis added)

¹⁴The Bible, Numbers 31:17-18 (King James Version).

the 'women children', referred to by Moses, were no-one's 'property' - their fathers, brothers, uncles had been killed - they did not fall into the category of females who *could* be violated by rape since there is no male to offend.

In analysing these examples of rape in war in the ancient world, I would suggest that there are two main points of comparison with contemporary notions of rape in war. First, again, the act of rape itself was not seen in antiquity as a sexual attack on the woman, but as a theft of male sexual property. Second, and inextricably linked with the first point, is how women's identity was defined. Perhaps our contemporary perception of rape is now so conditioned by the historically specific discourses of our own period that those of ancient times, which consider women 'booty' or 'spoil' to be 'enjoyed' as 'property', appear alien. However, a feminist reading of reports of rape in war in contemporary Europe would analyse the events and the attitudes towards women and their identity in surprisingly similar ways.

Twentieth Century Wars

As mentioned in the Introduction, the leap from Greek mythology to reports of mass rape in war during twentieth century wars is a large one. This is due to the lack of information or documentation available on 'rape in war' during the intervening period, although there is the occasional reference to rape during that time. For example, the French chronicler Monstrelet noted that when the French Army captured Soissons in 1414, 'noblemen joined the ordinary soldiers in indiscriminately raping women of all ranks'.¹⁵ Also writing in the fifteenth century Machiavelli, concerned for the stability and maintenance of power, was eager to emphasise the political danger that rape in war represented. In The Discourses he gives the following advice:

First, we see how women have been the cause of many troubles, have done great harm to those who govern cities, and have caused in them many divisions...we read in Livy's history that the outrage done to Lucretia deprived the Tarquins of their rule, and that done to Virginia deprived the Decemviri of their power.

¹⁵Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 37.

Among the primary causes of the downfall of tyrants, Aristotle puts the injuries they do on account, whether by rape, violation or the breaking up of marriages...absolute princes and rulers of republics should not treat such matters as of small moment, but should bear in mind the disorders such events may occasion and look to the matter in good time, so that the remedy applied may not be accompanied by damage done to, or revolts against, their state or their republic.¹⁶

An praiseworthy suggestion, although as one can see there has been so little written concerning the incidence of rape in war that it is impossible to gauge whether to not his advice was heeded. However, if Machiavelli saw fit to write concerning the issue, one can assume that it was a regular feature of war in his time.

Another reference, which is unusually detailed in its recording of the raping of women in war, is that of the raping of Scottish highland women, both during and after the Battle of Culloden in 1746. The modern British historian, John Prebble, has collated the information from old tribal records scrupulously kept by the Scottish clansmen, in which they claim that the raping of their 'clanswomen' was a deliberate act of tyranny by the English.¹⁷ However, this appears to be unusual, and it was not until World War I that the occurrence of rape in war was documented with more interest and concern, although the motives for this concern are questionable, as shall be demonstrated.

As the following quotation illustrates, even twentieth century historians have been unwilling to research the subject of rape, whether in war or in 'peace'. Historian N. Basher commented that, '[I]t seems that rape is too risky, too political a subject to be dealt with comfortably by the present day male historian'.¹⁸ This observation highlights the relative lack of documentation, or 'hard' evidence available to historians, and therefore, the lack of research within this area. Even in important historical studies such as Vern Bullough's, Sex, Society and History¹⁹ and J. Week's Sex, Politics and Society²⁰ rape is absent from all discussion. By the same token, war historians have also failed to consider rape in war noteworthy. For example,

¹⁶Bernard Crick, ed., N. Machiavelli: The Discourses (London: Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 477-8.

¹⁷ibid., pp. 38-40.

¹⁸N. Basher - London Feminist History Group, "Rape in England between 1550 and 1700," The Sexual Dynamics of History (London: Pluto Press, 1983): pp. 28-46.

¹⁹Vern LeRoy Bullough, Sex, Society and History (New York: Science History Publications, 1976).

²⁰J. Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society (New York: Longman, 1981).

approximately 94% of academic books analysing war do not mention rape and/or violence against women in war.²¹ This leads one to the conclusion that rape has been considered unmentionable, even in wartime, where violence abounds. Violence against women remains taboo within mainstream academia. However, during the two World Wars in the twentieth century, the mass raping of women has been increasingly documented, yet only selectively reported to the general public. This fact, particularly relevant in the case of World War I, raises a particular issue that this section will attempt to examine, namely the use of 'rape in war' as propaganda. It should, therefore, be noted that the eyewitness accounts, particularly those contained within the World War I and II sections, should be read with care.

World War I

Integral to the history of rape in war and its representations are the reports of German soldiers' rapacity in World War I. These were often held to be the fabrications of desperate allied governments seeking to enlist support from powerful neutral states. First World War historiography appears to be clouded with stereotypes, images and fantasies, made increasingly complex by the inter-war pacifist reaction against the exaggerations of wartime propaganda.²² Throughout the war various 'official Commissions of Inquiry' were set up in France, Belgium and Britain in order to gather information, document atrocities, and ascertain damage to civilians. The commissioners went to great lengths to discard evidence that was 'too full of rumour to be reliable' and they 'did their best to include in the published reports only direct testimony from victims and crimes witnessed by more than one person'.²³ Despite the efforts of the allied Commissions to record only direct testimony and to recognise the violence and pain endured by the victims, women's narratives appear to have been lost as the discourse of rape was transformed from the suffering and victimisation of individual women into an international metaphor for French and Belgian humiliation. The testimony of witnesses and soldiers appeared more dramatic and sensational than the accounts from the raped women themselves. The male narrative again emerges as

²¹Of the thirty general academic books on war consulted, twenty-eight did not make any reference to rape in war, or violence against women in war.

²²James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972 - original 1941).

²³M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda During the First World War* (London: MacMillan, 1982).

the dominant account used in newspapers, posters, and pamphlets; it was 'male' anxiety and even fantasy, much more than the tragedy of the women's experience that shaped the discussion of rape in war.²⁴

Consider, for example, this eyewitness account given to the French commission by a soldier:

The Bavarians came into the village of Nomery, after chasing the French and the inhabitants away, they abducted a young pregnant woman, opened her belly and threw the child on the dung heap; since the mother was still living, they finished her off. Then they took another woman; after having raped her, they opened her legs and they singed her pubic hair...they cut the breasts off and they played *palet* (quoits) with them.²⁵

In contrast, many women when interviewed by the commissioners were reluctant to speak freely, perhaps aware of the double standard of sexual morality which operated within their patriarchal society. Whilst willing to tell of their experiences in order to pursue the enemy, they nevertheless wished to retain their sexual honour and did not want to further dishonour themselves by discussing incidents in detail. Women often told as little as possible. For example, R. Harris quotes from the French records:

A seventy-one-year-old, unmarried woman from the Meuse was unable to find words: 'One of them turned me over, threw up my petticoats and...' One woman who told an investigator, 'I don't need to tell you the rest, you can guess it without trouble', struck a common note. Others merely stated that they were subject to 'odious violence', which they refused to speak about or specify.²⁶

Women's narratives, then, were generally unembellished and reticent, and as will become apparent, so are the related experiences of the raped Bosnian Muslim women in the recent Balkan conflict. These individual women, stoical and proud even while suffering, were transformed by propagandists, who preferred a more dramatic image to adorn their publications, into frail and ravished *jeune filles*, the perfect allegorical image of France and Belgium being raped by the German barbarian. For allied forces

²⁴See, for example: Arthur Ponsonby, *False-hood in Wartime* (London: Methuen, 1928); and Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (London: Knopf, 1927).

²⁵Testimony of a brigadier in the 20th Artillery Regiment, 16 October 1914. Cited in R. Harris, "The 'Child of the Barbarian': Rape, Race and Nationalism in France during the First World War," *Past and Present* No. 141 (1993): p. 188.

²⁶Testimony of Yvonne G., 23 October 1914, *ibid.*

and civilians alike, these gendered personifications of France, Belgium and Germany were convincing, and they tapped into a rich vein of existing cultural stereotypes, stemming from the relatively recent French experience of defeat and occupation (1870-71). Therefore, in 1914 psychological structures were already in place for the further development of the images and caricatures representing the 'barbarian' and the 'victim'.²⁷ It was in this context that the victims of rape described their experiences. These accounts differ considerably in tone and emphasis from the rape 'stories' relayed by the witnesses and soldiers and expropriated by the propagandists, which appear to stress the relations between men, and even establish new relations of power between allied and enemy forces. As Lasswell noted in his pioneering work of propaganda analysis, '[a] handy rule for arousing hate is, if at first they do not enrage, use an atrocity'.²⁸ Speculating on the propaganda value of rape Lasswell continued, '[t]hese stories yield a crop of indignation against the fiendish perpetrators...and satisfy certain powerful, hidden impulses. A young woman, ravished by the enemy, yields a secret satisfaction to a host of vicarious ravishers on the other side of the border'.²⁹ Contrary to my previous assertion, it appears to be the case that when it suits the ends of the political elites and propagandists, the raping of women in war can be elevated to the position of a serious national problem, which needs to be addressed.

While acknowledging that the propagandists undeniably played a role in the dramatisation and dissemination of rape 'stories' throughout World War I, this should in no way detract from the violent rape and atrocities that women unquestionably suffered during the war. But unfortunately, it does. Once the raping and violation of French and Belgian women had been turned to allied advantage, the propaganda, and the rapes along with it, were promptly denied.³⁰ It is difficult to appreciate the trauma endured by women whose violation was at first investigated with enthusiasm, enshrined in the mythologies of nationalist propaganda, then forgotten amidst the countless other horrors and atrocities of war and finally denied, as part of a

²⁷Gerd Krumeich, "Joan of Arc between Right and Left," in Robert Tombs, ed., Nationhood and Nationalism in France: From Boulangism to the Great War 1889-1918 (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 63-73.

²⁸Lasswell (1927), p. 56.

²⁹ibid.

³⁰Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 47.

manufactured 'atrocity hysteria', in the aftermath of the war. This issue of 'rape as propaganda' will be raised again in Chapters Four and Seven.

Yet, individual historians and feminists, who are concerned that the mass raping of women in World War I has disappeared without sufficient recognition or study, have rediscovered information which goes some way to substantiate the women's experiences of rape. Firstly, Susan Brownmiller has brought to light the writings of two British academics, Arnold Joseph Toynbee and J. H. Morgan, a professor at Oxford and a Professor of constitutional law respectively, both of whom witnessed the raping of French/Belgian women at first hand and published their findings.³¹ Professor Morgan, after examining thirty sworn statements, and medical certificates of injury, from the women of Bailleul, was convinced that the German General Staff had mounted a deliberate campaign of rape and terror in the first three months of the war. This quotation from his report, although in tone orderly and constrained, still captures a sense of fear and outrage:

Outrages upon the honour of women by German soldiers have been so frequent that it is impossible to escape the conviction that they have been condoned and indeed encouraged by German officers...At least five officers were guilty of such offences, and where the officers set the example the men followed...In one case, the facts of which are proved by evidence that would satisfy any court of law, a young girl of nineteen was violated by one officer while the other held her mother by the throat and pointed a revolver, after which the two officers exchanged their respective roles.³²

The second piece of substantial 'evidence' which undoubtedly bears witness to the 'mass' raping of women, can be found in French Government and Catholic church documentation relating to the considerable number of women demanding abortions following rape by German soldiers. The implications of these rapes, and subsequent pregnancies, first became public when a Catholic priest offered, in a newspaper article, 'absolution before God and before man' to women who aborted infants of German paternity. The priest, using patriotic and racist arguments, reportedly urged women to exterminate 'without scruple, the ignoble and criminal chaff which would

³¹Cited in Susan Brownmiller (1975), pp. 41-42.

³²ibid., p. 42.

one day dishonour the pure wheat of our plains on which blows the wind of liberty'.³³ Predominantly Catholic, the French populace felt that if a Catholic priest was advocating abortion, then the German rapists must indeed carry morally debilitating genes, and fearing 'teratological offspring' demanded radical solutions. The public's attention, sustained by the media, remained stoically focused on the issue, note the development of the issue in the press at the time:

Further reports of raped and pregnant women were emerging from other invaded department' of France, and they were preparing for abortion;³⁴ A spokesman for the Catholic church argued in the press that many Catholic women would not consider abortion;³⁵ The senator for the Var, Louis Martin, proposed the temporary suspension of penalties for abortion in the invaded territories, and means by which mothers could abandon their babies safely and anonymously;³⁶ Maurice Barres, writing in a Catholic daily, urged the Government to allow women to implement anonymous abandonment of infants to 'prevent the imminent wave of child murder';³⁷ Compensation was also publicly demanded from the German officer corps, who Barres held collectively responsible for the financial maintenance of these infants.³⁸ Public discussions took place involving an eminent list of intellectual, political, religious and literary figures;³⁹ A Feminist newspaper and a popular medical journal, encouraged readers to join in the debate and controversy by airing their views.⁴⁰

The conclusion to this socially and politically damaging scenario for France came through Government intervention on 24 March 1915, in the form of a ministerial directive. Its aim was to avert the prospect of widespread abortion, and to spare women the 'shame and disgrace' of bearing Germanic children. This would be achieved by

allowing them to give birth in Paris maternity hospitals or to bring the children to the capital after delivery, whereupon they

³³Jean d'Orsay, "Pour la race," Le Matin 7 January 1915, cited in R. Harris (1993), p. 179.

³⁴Maurice Barres, "Une loi necessaire," L'écho de Paris 10 February 1915, *ibid.*, p. 192.

³⁵Jean de Bonnefon, "Le douloureux probleme: l'attentat et l'enfant devant l'église," Le Journal 26 January 1915, *ibid.*, p. 191.

³⁶"Pour les femmes victimes de violences," Informations Parlementaires 10 February 1915, *ibid.*

³⁷Maurice Barres, Chronique de la Grande Guerre 1914-1920 (Paris: Plon, 1931-9), *ibid.*, p. 192

³⁸Barres (1915), *ibid.*

³⁹The list included T. Ribot, P. Adam, Abbe Wetterle, Duchesse de Rohan and many others, "L'enfant du crime, doit-il naitre?" La Revue 15 February - 1 March 1915, pp.397-404; and 15 March - 1 April 1915, pp. 53-76, *ibid.*

⁴⁰'La Francaise' (feminist newspaper) and Chronique Medicale (medical journal), *ibid.*, pp. 192-193

would be given a falsified birth certificate and taken into public care. The only requirement was a statement from the local *juge de paix*, or mayor, testifying to the women's sexual respectability prior to the attack.⁴¹

The governmental discussions surrounding this portentous bureaucratic decision are, to my knowledge, unknown at present, although any government documentation regarding the 'rape babies' of the Balkan conflict will not be forthcoming for some time yet. However, the enormity of the official administrative and practical measures taken here, confirms the seriousness with which the French government regarded the dilemma, as well as the magnitude of the problem. It will, no doubt, be years until official government documents are released and researchers are able to discover how seriously the Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, and British governments took the issue of 'rape babies' in the Balkan conflict.

There is little documentation concerning the raping of women in war in the period between World War I and the reports concerning the Rape of Nanking. However, recent research concerning the raping of women during the Bolshevik Revolution⁴² confirms the point that regardless of whether the conflict is a war of gain, a war of fear or a war of doctrine⁴³ rape appears to be a common feature.

The Rape of Nanking

In 1937, Japanese forces seized Nanking and held it until 1945; the capture of the city was accompanied by such atrocities that it became known as the 'rape of Nanking'.⁴⁴ The full horror and magnitude of the events which transpired at Nanking in 1937, including the incalculable number of rapes that took place, were not fully realised until the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, after the end of the war in the Pacific.⁴⁵ Although none of the defendants were tried for rape, a situation similar to that at Nuremberg, the prosecutors submitted evidence of mass rape in an effort to convict several

⁴¹ibid.

⁴²See, for example: Vladimir N. Brovkin, The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 224-231.

⁴³Martin Wight, cited in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, eds., Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 138.

⁴⁴Encarta, "Nanjing," CD ROM Encyclopaedia (Microsoft Corporation, 1993).

⁴⁵C. MacDonald, "Japan and the Nanking Massacre," Paper given at the Department of War Studies, London (Pacific Security Seminar Series) 18 January 1996.

defendants of crimes against humanity.⁴⁶ The Chinese decision not to defend Nanking, and the army's subsequent withdrawal, had left the city - full of refugees, women, and children - defenceless against the Japanese advance.⁴⁷ The invading, Japanese army found minimal resistance; the scenario is now familiar, and the result, rape. Leon Friedman, writing on the laws of war, says of Nanking:

There were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty for the slightest resistance on the part of a civilian or the members of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls of tender years and old women were raped in large numbers throughout the city, and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behaviour in connection with these rapings occurred. Many women were killed after the act and their bodies mutilated. Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city during the first month of the occupation.⁴⁸

Despite an official news blackout ordered by General Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese leader, countless reports of rape and unchecked violence leaked out of the besieged city. Yet, although the mass raping of women were reported alongside lootings, beatings and murders, the Western press, keen to inform their readers of these atrocities, appeared reluctant to discuss rape. Arguably, the 'Rape of Nanking' could at that point, have been stifled, and effectively eliminated from history, relegated to hearsay, rumour, and wartime propaganda. However, the instigation of the War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo, enabled the previously excluded accounts of the mass raping of women to resurface.⁴⁹ Although no raped women were called to give evidence at the tribunal, a group of missionaries from the Nanking International Relief Committee, who had elected to remain in the city throughout the invasion, were asked to testify. A quotation from the diary of an American missionary in Nanking, James McCallum, was entered as evidence at the tribunal, and reads as follows:

Never have I heard or read of such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape!
We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night, and many by day. In

⁴⁶C. Hosoya, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986).

⁴⁷Arnold C. Brackman, *The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (London: Collins, 1987), p. 176.

⁴⁸Leon Friedman, ed., "The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties," *The Law of War: A Documentary History* Vol. 2 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 842.

⁴⁹*ibid.*, pp. 1060-1064.

case of resistance...there is a bayonet stab or a bullet. We could write up hundreds of cases a day.⁵⁰

The eyewitness statements and the testimonies of rape appear endless,⁵¹ and all seem to have a ritualistic similarity to them.⁵² They all talk, not just of rape, but of horrific mutilations, of brutality beyond comprehension, of sadistic humiliating practices.⁵³ This evidence, presented to the Tokyo tribunal, was ultimately conclusive as General Iwane Matsui, the military commander of the Nanking invasion, was found guilty of crimes against humanity, and sentenced to death by hanging.⁵⁴ It appeared that mass rape in war was at last being recognised as a crime against humanity. However, it was not until many years later that the full horror of the sexual slavery and rape committed by the Japanese army was brought to light through investigations into the fate of countless Asian 'comfort women'.⁵⁵ This issue will be discussed in the final chapter. Although it should be noted, that to date no one has stood trial for these other 'atrocities' suffered by these women.⁵⁶ Moreover, recent historical revisionists from Japanese academic circles have denounced the reports of Japanese rape and atrocities at Nanking, and they have specifically singled out Iris Chang's book The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II for criticism, some even claiming that no massacre occurred.⁵⁷

World War II

Nietzsche has stated that '[m]an should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly'.⁵⁸ As Hitler and his armies marched over Europe in the early days of World War II, one could imagine that this provocative piece of advice was the inspiration for both the motivations behind the German rapacity and brutality

⁵⁰Brownmiller (1975), p. 58.

⁵¹ibid.

⁵²Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 131.

⁵³Peter Karsten, Law, Soldiers and Combat (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 84.

⁵⁴The tribunal ruled that the behaviour of the Japanese army could not be considered the acts of a military group that had temporarily 'gotten out of hand'; rather, rape, arson, and murder had continued to be committed on a large scale for at least six weeks after the initial invasion. Cited in Brownmiller (1975), p. 61.

⁵⁵Jeanne Vickers, Women and War (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 21; Hester Lacey, "The Emperor's Forgotten Army," The Independent on Sunday, 25 May 1997, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁶Associated Press, "Japan's Apology," The Guardian, 15 August 1996, p. 11.

⁵⁷Iris Chang, "It's History, Not a Lie," Newsweek, 20 July 1998, p. 29.

⁵⁸R. J. Hollingdale, trans., A Nietzsche Reader (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 275.

during World War II. There are reports of German soldiers raping women on a massive scale in Poland, Russia, France, Belgium, and Jewish women in Germany itself. Similar patriarchal sentiments could equally have been the source of motivation for the Japanese army's 'Rape of Nanking', the enormity of which did not come to light until the Tokyo War Trials in 1946.⁵⁹ The documentation of wartime crimes against women, and in particular rape, has been improving throughout the twentieth century, as such, the scale of reported German violence toward enemy women during World War II is too great to cover adequately in this brief section. For this reason I will focus on the German advance through Russia and the retaliatory 'Rape of Berlin', as an example of Nazi and allied atrocities, and I will also briefly examine the 'Rape of Nanking'. The decision to concentrate on the reports of rape in war committed by both the German and Japanese armies, is due primarily to the lack of documentation and subsequent research on allied wartime raping: one example, perhaps, of the victors having written history.

As Hitler's army advanced through Eastern Europe, the Jewish communities were the first to suffer, even though technically it was forbidden for a German to rape a Jew, due to the prohibition against 'race defilement' and the 'contamination of Aryan blood' set out in the Nuremberg race laws of 1935.⁶⁰ Captured German documents presented at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in 1946 corroborate the routine use of rape as a weapon of terror. It was not Jewish women alone who suffered rape at the hands of the German army, from evidence submitted at the Nuremberg Tribunal it becomes clear that all women were 'prey'.⁶¹ Throughout World War II, the Soviets, who sustained the greatest allied losses, had collected a disturbing amount of data detailing Nazi atrocities. Exhibit No. 51, presented to the Tribunal, was prepared by the Russian foreign minister in January 1942. It contained a summary of Nazi turpitude during the invasion of 1941, and was entered as evidence at Nuremberg as 'The Molotov Note'. Susan Brownmiller has summarised some of the evidence that it

⁵⁹C. Hosoya, ed., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986).

⁶⁰Anthony Kauders, German Politics and the Jews (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); I. Ingeborg, Invisible Walls: A German Family under the Nuremberg Laws, trans., J. Maxwell Brownjohn (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985).

⁶¹ibid.

contained and the following extract is one small list that illustrates some typical examples:

In the village of Borodayevka the fascists violated every one of the women and girls; in Berezovka drunken German soldiers assaulted and carried off all the women and girls between the ages of sixteen and thirty; in the city of Smolensk the German command opened a brothel for officers in one of the hotels into which hundreds of women and girls were driven - they were dragged down the street by their arms and hair; the lust-maddened German gangsters break into the houses, rape the women and girls under the very eyes of their kinfolk and children, jeer at the women they have violated, and then brutally murder their victims; in Lvov, thirty-two women working in a garment factory were first violated and then murdered by German storm troopers. Drunken German soldiers dragged girls and young women in Lvov into Kesciuszko Park, where they raped them; near Borissov seventy-five women and girls attempting to flee at the approach of the German troops fell into their hand, they raped and murdered thirty-six of them. By order of a German officer named Hummer, the soldiers marched L. I. Melchukova, a sixteen-year-old girl, into the forest, where they raped her. A little later, some other women who had also been dragged into the forest saw some boards near the trees and the dying Melchukova nailed to the boards. The Germans had cut off her breasts in the presence of these women, among whom were V. I. Alperenko and V. H. Bereznikova; in Tikhvin a slightly wounded fifteen-year-old girl named H. Koledetskaya was taken to hospital, despite her injuries the girl was raped by a group of German soldiers and died as a result of the assault.⁶²

All these incidents are alleged to have occurred in the first few months of invasion, and although some of the language used, for example 'lust-maddened German gangsters', can only be described as 'dramatic' and used to incite hatred of the German oppressors, one can nevertheless see through the emotive language and appreciate the real scale of horror and 'crime of war' suffered by these women.

Rape was not a 'weapon of war' used solely by the Axis forces during World War II. When the tide of war turned, the Red Army advanced through German territory with

⁶²Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 456 (1947), (quoting V. M. Molotov, A Note by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1942)), cited in D. Aydelott, "Mass Rape during War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under International Law," Emory International Law Review Vol. 7, No. 2 (1993): pp.585-631.

an air of vengeance and retaliation. Many Red Army soldiers involved in the 'Rape of Berlin' were veterans of 'Stalingrad' and saw it as their duty to re-establish national pride through retribution.⁶³ Cornelius Ryan, a historian conducting research in Berlin in the 1960s, obtained firsthand accounts from the victims of rape, and commented that 'hordes of Russian troops coming up behind...demanded the rights due the conquerors: the women of the conquered'.⁶⁴ The following accounts suggest that they succeeded:

Ursula Koster was sleeping in a basement shelter with her parents and her three children when six Russian soldiers raped her at gunpoint. Hannelore von Cmuda, a seventeen-year-old, was raped by a mob of drunken soldiers, after which they fired three shots into her body. She survived. Margarete Promeist, warden of an air-raid shelter, watched for two days and nights as 'wave after wave of Russians came into my shelter plundering and raping. Women were killed if they refused. Some were shot and killed anyway... I found the bodies of six or seven women, all lying in the position in which they were raped, their heads battered in'. Frau Promeist herself was assaulted despite her appeals that she was too old for them. Mother Superior Cunegundes of Haus Dahlem, an orphanage and maternity hospital run by the Mission Sisters of the Sacred Heart, was shot by a soldier when she tried to interfere with the rape of the mission's Ukrainian cook, Lena. The mission was over-run with soldiers who entered maternity wards and raped pregnant women and those who had given birth.⁶⁵

At the end of World War II, prosecutors at the Nuremberg Tribunal were attempting to establish that the rape of women by the German Army had been part of a pre-planned campaign of violence and terror, and in Tokyo the Allies were making a similar case against the Japanese, and Jewish women's charge of rape were also being heeded. But what of the defeated *German* women? There were no international tribunals held to expose and judge allied atrocities and no incriminating governmental documents were revealed from allied sources. A German schoolteacher from Breslau (now Wroclaw) echoed the voices of countless silenced women, when she said,

⁶³Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation 1945-1949 (London: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 69-140.

⁶⁴Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (London: Collins, 1966), p. 26.

⁶⁵All accounts are translated in Brownmiller (1975), pp. 67-68.

'[w]here could one lodge a complaint? Everywhere one was chased away like a stray dog'.⁶⁶

Given the evidence thus far regarding the dynamics between soldiers in war and violence against women, even if one sets aside the Russian experience, one would have to conclude that allied forces also committed rape: although it has been argued that British soldiers, at least in the First World War, had little or no casual sex during their service abroad.⁶⁷ However, even if the numbers of victims may not be comparable, the nationality and ideology of a woman is insignificant when one considers the violence, pain, and humiliation suffered by all victims of rape. Furthermore, while the allied forces may not have used rape as a weapon of war to effect the total 'destruction of inferior peoples', as it has been suggested the Axis forces did,⁶⁸ the motivations of the allied soldiers, whether retaliation, revenge, or 'over-exuberance', the result was still the same for the women.

In 1951, to redress the balance and to document the retreat and expulsion of German nationals from Eastern and Central Europe following Red Army victories in the region in 1944-1945, a committee of anti-Communist German academics, under the direction of Dr. Theodor Schieder of the University of Cologne, compiled personal testimonies of refugees who allegedly suffered atrocities at the hands of Russian soldiers, many of which contained accounts of the mass raping of women. The German professors, in addition to documenting the reports of rape, attempted to assimilate and analyse the material they had been given, and they concluded with the following statement:

The raping of German women and children by Soviet officers and men was systematic in the truest sense of the word. Apart from the physical and spiritual suffering inflicted upon the huge numbers of women raped, the brutality and shamelessness with which this was done increased the fear and terror of the German population. It is clear that these rapings were the result of a manner of conduct and mentality which are inconceivable and repulsive to the European mind. One must partially attribute

⁶⁶ibid., p. 69.

⁶⁷Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and The Great War (London: Reaktion Books, 1996).

⁶⁸ibid., p. 52.

them to the traditions and notions in the Asiatic parts of Russia, according to which women are just as much the booty of the victors as jewellery, valuables, and property in dwellings and shops. The nature and the huge number of rapings would be inconceivable if there had not been a fundamental motive of such a kind at the back of the minds of the Soviet troops.⁶⁹

During World War II, then, there were many incidents involving the raping of women by both the Axis and the allied forces, even if one could not define these incidents as *mass* rape. As General George S. Patton, Jr. stated in his memoirs of World War II, 'in spite of my most diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some raping'.⁷⁰

Recent Wars

Compared with the estimated five percent civilian casualty rate in World War I, an estimated ninety percent of war casualties in 1990 were civilians.⁷¹ The majority of whom were women and children. This dramatic increase is due in part to the deliberate and systematic violence against whole populations and in wars that are increasingly waged against specific ethnic groups. This section will attempt to illustrate that even after a significant increase in public awareness and, indeed, military awareness of the illegality of rape during wartime following the convictions at Nuremberg and Tokyo, rape in war has continued unabated. Moreover, in situations of ethnic conflict, rape appears to be used as a military strategy, a nationalistic policy and as an expression of ethnic group hatred: all of the above points will be discussed in the context of both the press representations in Part Two and feminist thought in Part Three. Moreover, evidence points to the fact that the rape of 'enemy' women is often explicitly ordered, or, at least tacitly condoned by military authorities. One conflict that falls into this category is Bangladesh's nine-month war of independence in 1971, where reports of rape have reached the 400,000 mark⁷². The Vietnam war will also be briefly examined as a 'recent' war and in particular the widely reported atrocities of 'Mai Lai' ('My Lai').

⁶⁹ibid., p. 70.

⁷⁰Cited in Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 72-73.

⁷¹R. L. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1991 - 14th ed. (Washington D.C.: World Priorities Inc., 1991).

⁷²International Planned Parenthood figures, cited in Brownmiller (1975), p. 81.

Bangladesh

In March 1971, with support from India, West Bengal - a region of seventy five million people - declared itself independent as the state of Bangladesh. Pakistan immediately sent soldiers to the region to quell the 'rebellion'. During the subsequent nine-month war, approximately three million people were killed, ten million fled across the Indian border as refugees, and it has been reported that up to 400,000 women, eighty percent of whom were Muslims were raped.⁷³ It has been suggested that the Pakistani troops believed that they, themselves, were the 'true' Muslims and it was their 'official' duty to 'purify' Hindu converts to Islam.⁷⁴ This attitude - similar to what is now referred to as 'ethnic cleansing'⁷⁵ - combined with the failure of the Pakistan government to convict those responsible for the atrocities, could be considered official complicity. The location, the historical moment, the designers and actors may be different, but the discourse of mass rape in war now has a familiar 'narrative'. The rapes of the women in Bangladesh are reminiscent of rapes during many other wars: women and children of all ages are raped; they are raped in their houses and on the streets; thousands are abducted and held in military barracks or makeshift brothels for 'nightly use' - a situation which mirrors the reports of mass rape in the Balkans.⁷⁶

Within nationalistic patriarchal structures, of which Bengali society is archetypal, women's traditionally prescribed sexual/gender roles are recognised as integral to the survival of the nation. As reproducers of the race, as preservers and transmitters of culture, as markers of the boundaries that define national groups, women have come to symbolise national honour. (Indeed, through the discourse of nationalism, the nation is often regarded as 'female'.) It is these specifically described female roles that make women so indispensable to a patriarchally-defined nation and its nationalist cause, and by the same token, ensures women's vulnerability when their nation is under threat from another patriarchally-defined nation. This point will be raised again

⁷³Editorial, "Mass Rape in War: Prosecute the Guilty," *Ottawa Citizen* 17 January 1993: p. B1.

⁷⁴ibid.

⁷⁵Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): pp. 110-121.

⁷⁶Brownmiller (1975), p. 82.

in Chapter Eight and this same scenario, as will become apparent, was reported to have been replayed in the Balkan conflict.

Vietnam

Susan Brownmiller's seminal work on rape includes numerous accounts of rape and atrocities committed by US soldiers on Vietnamese civilian women throughout the Vietnam War. The majority of these accounts did not become known until the results of court-martials were made public. The Mai Lai massacre of 16 March 1968, arguably the most infamous atrocity of the Vietnam War, was one example. The full extent of the atrocities at Mai Lai were unknown until journalist, Seymour M. Hersh, broke the story, which led to the Army investigation into the incident and the subsequent court-martial of Lieutenant William L. Calley.⁷⁷ The rapes and atrocities that occurred at Mai Lai were no more sadistic or ritualistic than have been suffered by some women in other wars and at other times during the Vietnam War. They included the wanton destruction of unarmed civilians, the raping of young girls and old women, and the unchecked brutal mutilation of women's bodies. Of the soldiers who took part in these atrocities - many of whom did not and made protestations to that effect⁷⁸ - two characteristics of soldiers' behaviour do stand out as being particularly prevalent in Vietnam. First, rather than take women hostage for 'nightly use' and/or impregnation, as has been characteristic of reports of rapes in other wars, the American GIs preferred to kill their victims, as though destroying evidence.⁷⁹ Second, the incidence of 'gang rape' appears to have been considerably higher than attacks on an individual basis. A war reporter named Peter Arnett, who was a New Zealander and, therefore, according to Brownmiller, more objective than US reporters, recalled that 'gang rapes' were so prevalent for the following reasons:

It was so easy to rape on a squad level. Soldiers would enter a village without an interpreter. Nobody spoke Vietnamese. It was an anonymous situation. Any American could grab any women as a suspect and there was little or no recourse to the law by the people ... and because the Americans were trained in the buddy

⁷⁷ibid., p. 106.

⁷⁸Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

⁷⁹ibid.

system, for security. They were warned against the dangers of individual fraternising on operations.⁸⁰

Following the questioning of informant-soldiers, Hersh concluded that 'most of the company knew there were rapes that day in March, but remained reluctant to talk about them'. One soldier Hersh interviewed, John Smail, when asked about the rapes, commented, 'that's an everyday affair, you can nail just about anybody on that - at least once. These guys are human, man'.⁸¹ Another Vietnam veteran, stated that rape was 'pretty SOP' (standard operating procedure).⁸² Yet another veteran, George Phillips, when asked to comment on the reports of rape, stated, 'They only do it when there are lots of guys around. You know, it makes them feel good. They show each other what they can do ... they won't do it by themselves'.⁸³ One 'informer', a helicopter door 'gunner, Ronald L. Ridenhour, emotionally recounted his first discovery of a rape victim as he and his helicopter crew spotted a dead body while flying low over a rice paddy. He recalled that '[i]t was a women, she was spread-eagled, as if on display. She had an 11th Brigade patch between her legs - as if it were some type of display, some badge of honour'.⁸⁴

The next cases recalled by Vietnam veterans, are typical examples of 'rape' incidents. They are taken from a vast collection of data amassed by an organisation called 'Vietnam Veterans Against the War', who in February 1971, attempted to record the atrocities witnessed and committed by GIs in Vietnam.⁸⁵ The first comment is by Vietnam deserter who used the name 'Jerry Samuels':

Me and one of the buck sergeants and two other guys took these four chicks into the elephant grass. We balled these chicks...then one of the girls yelled some derogatory thing at the guy who'd balled her...he just reached down for his weapon and blew her away. Well, right away the three other guys, including myself, picked up our weapons and blew away the other three chicks.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ibid., p. 100.

⁸¹ibid., p. 108.

⁸²ibid., p. 110.

⁸³ibid., p. 111.

⁸⁴ibid., p. 109.

⁸⁵Vietnam Veterans Against the War (1972).

⁸⁶Brownmiller (1975), p. 111.

This next incident is recalled by Sergeant Scott Camil, a forward observer with the 1st Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. He had already explained that the raping of Vietnamese women was merely a form of 'searching', suggesting that the justification for rape was that soldiers 'would use their penises to probe [the women] to make sure they didn't have anything hidden anywhere'. However, when asked about the company commander's view of the situation, he asserted the following:

He never said not to or never said anything about it. The main thing was that if an operation was covered by the press there were certain things we weren't supposed to do, but if there was no press there, it was okay. I saw one case where a woman was shot by a sniper, one of our snipers. When we got to her she was asking for water. And the lieutenant said to kill her. So he ripped off her clothes, they stabbed her in both breasts, they spread-eagled her and shoved an E-tool up her vagina, an entrenching tool, and she was still asking for water. And then they took that out and they used a tree limb and then she was shot.⁸⁷

There have been many attempted explanations for why rape is a perpetual phenomenon of war. In the case of Vietnam, the most frequently cited justification for the rapes stems from the fact that the average age of conscripted US soldiers was only nineteen. Most of these young men were probably virgins, fighting in a war they did not understand, and faced with the daily threat of death. This scenario, journalist Peter Arnett suggests, induced the attitude, 'I'm gonna get screwed tonight - this may be my last'.⁸⁸ A similar defence has also been put forward for the 'older' soldier, who apparently found a one-year 'tour of duty' in Vietnam, too long to be 'without a woman'.⁸⁹ Rape for the sexually experienced soldier, therefore, was merely a way of releasing repressed sexual tension. This explanation is reminiscent of the biological determinist arguments for rape in Chapter One, and will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven. Yet, consider this account lifted from the testimony of a Vietnam veteran concerning war crimes he witnessed and participated in during the war. A squad of men have just raped, beaten, and shot Vietnamese woman to death. One of the group, a representative of USAID, approached the body:

⁸⁷ibid., pp. 112-113.

⁸⁸Cited in Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 99.

⁸⁹ibid.

He went over there, ripped her clothes off, and took a knife and cut from her vagina almost all the way up, just about to her breast and pulled her organs out, completely out of her cavity, and threw them out. Then he stooped and knelt over and commenced to peel every bit of skin off her body and left her there as a sign for something or other.⁹⁰

This sadistic and ritualistic form of sexual atrocity is indistinguishable from the mutilations and sexual crimes of notorious 'peacetime' serial killers.⁹¹ Although not characteristic of a 'typical' rapist's behaviour, neither is it characteristic of a young soldier's first sexual encounter, nor the kind of act one would expect an 'older' soldier to carry out if he was trying to 'relieve his sexual tension'. Moreover, the availability of virtually 'free' sex, courtesy of 'clean' (free from VD) military brothels on army base camps, does render these arguments, based on the need to satisfy biological urges, a little unconvincing.⁹²

Moreover, Brownmiller states categorically that, in her opinion, rape during war has nothing to do with biological 'necessities' or the availability of women's bodies. Brownmiller, has carried out research which shows that in war locations where brothels and prostitutes were readily available, and in some cases brought onto the army base by officers specifically for their soldiers 'R&R', men *still* preferred to rape civilians.⁹³ Ruth Seifert comes to a similar conclusion:

A rape in the war zone has no relation to available women or prostitutes. That means that in the 'open space' of war, many men simply prefer to rape: it has nothing to do with sexuality, but rather reflects the exercise of sexual, gender-specific violence.⁹⁴

Furthermore, as one GI remarked upon his repatriation in February 1973: 'This stuff about not being able to live without sex is nonsense. What I dreamed about was food and medicine'.⁹⁵

⁹⁰The Winter Soldier Investigation (1972), p. 74.

⁹¹Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996).

⁹²Brownmiller (1975), p. 98.

⁹³Brownmiller (1975), pp. 92-113.

⁹⁴Ruth Seifert, "War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis," in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape in War: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 58.

⁹⁵Brownmiller (1975), p. 99.

As this brief survey has illustrated, although many of the reported instances of mass rape in war are shrouded in ancient myth and hearsay, rape does, indeed, appear to be a regular phenomenon of war. And whatever the possible explanations for mass rape in war it remains an act of extreme violence, perpetrated by men against, for the most part, women.

Conclusion

The main concern in this chapter has been to transcend specific locations to demonstrate that rape has been a regular accompaniment to war. Moreover, given the cultural differences among countries, it is striking to note that rape and sexual violence have been common human rights abuses - even though they have not always been recognised as such - in almost every documented war. However, just because rape and sexual torture are so prevalent in war, one should not assume that they are 'natural' to either humans or to wars.

Many feminist scholars who have written in response to the press representations of mass rape in war in the Balkans, as detailed in Part Two, have questioned the notion that rape in war is 'natural' and simply evidence of war's violent excess. Moreover, they have argued that however prevalent rape in war has been historically, this in itself does not categorically 'prove' that it is a 'natural' phenomenon. On the contrary, the majority of feminists who have written on the issue since the onset of the Balkan conflict, as will be indicated in Part Three, have claimed that rape in war is a culturally-constructed practice grounded in various patriarchal 'norms' and values, which are also manifest in 'peacetime' and in war.

Although rape occurs in most wars, as the earlier quotation from the repatriated GI suggested, it is evident that not all soldiers rape in war. Therefore, any attempt to create an overarching theory which explains rape in war and which looks at either men or soldiers as a whole risks being fraught with contradictions and anomalies. Nevertheless, this simply indicates that more research is needed in order to shed more light on this complex and perplexing international problem. As mentioned above, this

exploration of how feminist theorists are attempting to gain some intellectual leverage on the subject will be addressed in Part Three. It will not be dealt with here primarily because the majority of feminist authors identified in Part Three have acknowledged that they were motivated to write about mass rape in war by reading and analysing the press reports concerning the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict. Thus, this issue is best developed following the extensive analysis of the press representations in Part Two. We, therefore, now turn to the empirical heart of the thesis, namely, the Balkan conflict and first look at the background - historically, politically and culturally - in an effort to understand the contexts in which mass rape in war occurred.

3

THE BALKAN CONFLICT

The war in the former Yugoslavia has sparked a great deal of interest in the Balkan region's interesting but turbulent history, as the observers and participants search for explanations for the eruption of the 'Balkan powder-keg'.¹ Or, in Alexandra Stiglmayer's words, they try and find explanations for the recurrence of 'genocide on European soil less than half a century after the Nazi holocaust and after three generations of Europeans and Americans have come of age accepting the motto 'never again'.² It is this war which is the empirical referent for the thesis. The present chapter provides essential background, both of historical and theoretical material.

This chapter attempts to identify the various factors which analysts have argued have worked together to trigger the collapse of Yugoslavia. These include key historical events, the region's ideological heritage, its economic crisis, the re-emergence of the 'national question' and the reactions of the Western powers. While the history and origins of the war in the Balkans are not the central themes of this thesis, they will nevertheless provide the necessary background and context for discussing the reports of mass rape in that war. Moreover, the further understanding of the historical, societal and political context in which the mass raping of women in the Balkans took place, will result in an added awareness of the cultural forces and tensions operating both on the individual and collective level which ended in such devastation.

¹For a detailed historical analysis, see Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994).

²Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. xii.

History - Pre-1939

The history of Yugoslavia is a complex one and as such it would be impossible to include a detailed breakdown of every possible conflictual event in the history of the region which might possibly be cited as a causal factor in the break-up of Yugoslavia and its descent into war, within the parameters of the thesis. Therefore, while there is no intention to trivialise any part of Yugoslavia's history or the conflict's development, either by making generalisations or by omitting certain events, it should be noted that this is merely an attempt at a general reflection of some of the divergent factors involved in the onset of the war, rather than a search for a precise chronological breakdown of events, any definitive answers, or ultimate 'truths'.

In June 1991, a war erupted in Yugoslavia that helped to shatter many visions of the 'New World Order' and a peaceful, united Europe. Dominating the media with heart-rending images of misery and suffering, this war brought to the world stories of concentration camps reminiscent of a bygone era, of mass rapes and mutilation, and of atrocities committed by neighbour upon neighbour. What triggered a war so barbaric, in Europe, where civilians are the major casualties, in the late twentieth century? Martin van Creveld might suggest that the 'low-intensity conflict', of which the war in the Balkans could be described as an example, is the war of the future. He states that:

War will become a much more direct experience for most civilians, even to the point where the term itself may be abolished, or its meaning altered. War will affect people of all ages and both sexes. They will be affected not just accidentally or incidentally or anonymously from afar, as in the case of strategic bombing, but as immediate participants, targets and victims.³

In support of this argument, the Economist has also suggested that Yugoslavia may well portray an image of future wars - wars waged between 'different tribes, harbouring centuries-old grudges about language, religion and territory, and provoking bitterness for generations to come'.⁴ However, in order to explore this

³Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 203.

⁴The Economist, 21 December 1991 - 3 January 1992, p. 73.

possibility further we need to look back into Yugoslavia's history to try to unearth possible reasons for Yugoslavia's descent into war.

The former Yugoslavia, like the majority of contemporary states, is not ethnically homogeneous.⁵ Since medieval times, the Balkan region has been colonised by, influenced by, or ruled over by, the Church,⁶ Islam, the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Jews, Gypsies, communism, and most of its European neighbours, notably Germany, Italy, Turkey, Hungary and Bulgaria. Therefore, there are probably few individuals in the entire Balkan Peninsula who could claim an ethnically pure ancestry for themselves. According to Noel Malcolm, the lineage of the Bosnian people is even more complex and heterogeneous than other states as settlers arrived from 'Italy, Africa, Spain, Gaul, Germany, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and Egypt'.⁷ Yet, despite this claim, ethnic tensions and rivalries remain high on the list of causal factors, which ushered in the war. There appear to be as many variations of Yugoslav history as there are commentators on the subject and this is reflected in the contradictory versions of Yugoslav history on offer from historians, social scientists and political commentators. While Malcolm suggests that other ethnic groups were integrated into the region with the minimum of disharmony, Alexandra Stiglsmayer claims that the Serbian people have always, since the Ottoman era, borne a grudge against the Bosnian Muslims, stating that it is 'understandable that the Serbs have a deep-seated fear of Islam'.⁸ This illustrates that the contradictions appear to be as prevalent as there are purveyors of Balkan history and which have given rise to seemingly incommensurable theories.

In the aftermath of World War I, which saw the disintegration of both the Habsburg and the Turkish empires,⁹ political unification and statehood, for centuries a common 'intermittent' objective of the South Slavs despite their profound religious and cultural differences, was finally achieved by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In the preceding

⁵William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993): pp. 97-109.

⁶Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (London: University of California Press, 1996), ch. 2.

⁷Malcolm (1994), p. 3.

⁸Stiglsmayer (1994), p. 5.

⁹Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), p. 77.

centuries, as mentioned above, the region had been partitioned and re-partitioned by neighbouring powers, with the result being a patchwork of political units, some independent states, and some achieving semi-autonomous dependency. The unification of these seemingly disparate units resulted in the peoples of the region at last realising their long-sought emancipation from the imperial powers of both East and West, and ruled by King Peter I they were also joined by Montenegro, Kosovo and northern Macedonia. However, the reign of Alexander, who succeeded his father Peter I in 1921 when he died, was not without political strife. Serbian dominance of the government and the denial of autonomy to the Croats, Slovenes and other minority groups provoked feelings of hostility and discrimination within the opposition parties. In 1929, with the growing possibility of civil war, King Alexander, took some drastic measures in his attempt to impose national unity. He dissolved parliament and all political parties, abolished the traditional provinces, assumed dictatorial control of the government, and changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, thus was created the 'first' Yugoslavia.¹⁰

World War II

Following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the Yugoslav government initially declared its neutrality, but in March 1941, after succumbing to pressure from the Axis powers, the government agreed to adhere to the Tripartite Pact with Germany, Italy and Japan.¹¹ This politically unpopular move culminated in a bloodless *coup d'état* after only two days, and with King Peter II's (son of Alexander) backing the insurgents formed a government dedicated to the maintenance of neutrality. Axis retribution was swift. The German army, supported by Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces invaded Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, and incidentally, the date on

¹⁰Stephen Clissold, ed., A Short History of Yugoslavia: From Early Times to 1966 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Payam Akhavan, ed., Yugoslavia the Former and the Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995); William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): pp. 97-109; Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

¹¹Malcolm (1994), p. 173.

which the European Community in 1992 chose to recognise Bosnia. Following the Nazi invasion, the government fled and the Yugoslav army, unable to offer much resistance, either surrendered or went into hiding, leaving the vanquishing powers to dismember the remains of the 'first' Yugoslavia. Italy took the Dalmatian region, part of Slovenia and Montenegro. Germany took the remainder of Slovenia and Serbia, where they installed a puppet government. Hungary seized western Vojvodina, and Bulgaria gained most of Macedonia. A pro-fascist puppet state, fronted by the native nationalist Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic and under Italian protection, was formed in Croatia, to which Bosnia was annexed.¹² Thus, the stage was set for the massacres and atrocities which fifty years later will be the most oft-cited cause of the recent Balkan conflict.¹³

For more than two years after the partition of Yugoslavia, the Serbian nationalists or Chetniks - under the royalist general Draza Mihajlovic - waged guerrilla warfare against the Croatian state leaders and their Nazi supporters. Consequently, the nationalist Croatians retaliated with a campaign to exterminate the Serbian people. The situation was not as straightforward as it appears as it was not simply a conflict between a united Serbian guerrilla force and the nationalist Croatian government forces. There were also other guerrilla forces, and one group in particular led by Josip Broz Tito, a communist, half Croat, half Slovene, campaigned vigorously against the Croatian fascists and the 'invaders'. The two guerrilla camps differed widely, not only on political ideology, but also on tactics. One particular move, which further complicated domestic politics and whipped up nationalistic fervour and insecurities on all sides even further, was made in December 1941 by the exiled Yugoslav government; they recognised Mihajlovic as the commander in chief of the nationalist resistance movements.¹⁴ The massacres and counter-massacres then began in earnest.

Almost continuously from 1941-1945, massacres and counter-massacres, mostly of civilians, took place throughout Yugoslavia. The worst of the massacres were reported to be those carried out by the Croat fascist Ustasha (Ustase) against the

¹²Stevan Pawlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988 (London: Hurst, 1988).

¹³Malcolm (1994), p. 174.

¹⁴Stiglmeier (1994), p. 11.

Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia, and against left-wing Croat sympathisers, Jews and Gypsies. Perhaps lesser in number, but no less brutal, were the massacres committed by the Serbian Chetniks against Muslim civilians in Bosnia, Montenegro, and in Serbia itself, as well as Croat villagers.¹⁵ In addition to the above, Hungarians were massacring Serbs in Vojvodina, Albanians and Bulgarians were also killing Serbs, Italians were burning villages, and the Germans were massacring Jews and other civilians, mostly in Serbia, for showing resistance. Even after the Partisans and the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) who Tito had rallied under him had been victorious, the slaughtering continued. The YNA, initially consisting of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegrins, were joined in 1943 by Croats from Dalmatia, Slovenes, Muslims, and Croats from Croatia.¹⁶ Their acts of brutal revenge - possibly inspired in part by political ideology as well as nationalism - included the executions of tens of thousands of surrendered Ustasha, Croat Domobran (Home Guard) Army, and Serbian Chetniks, many of whom had escaped to Austria and had been returned to Yugoslavia by the British.¹⁷ The Communists also massacred large numbers of civilian 'internal enemies', both real and imagined, during and immediately after the war.¹⁸ All in all, although figures vary, conservative estimates suggest that during the four years between 1941-1945, at least one million people died in Yugoslavia.¹⁹

It is these massacres, committed half a century ago, that have formed the basis of the justifications used in the current conflict to try to absolve each warring faction of blame. As Bogdan Denitch has commented:

The massacres committed during the Second World War have not become merely historical facts. They are part of the present-day political scene. They are politically almost as powerful as the history of the Holocaust is in Israeli politics today. They are also just as often misused for narrow political and partisan ends. They represent the basis for what appear to be wild charges and

¹⁵For a comprehensive account of the massacres and the Yugoslav war in general see, Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Chetniks* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1975); and *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Ustashe* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1978).

¹⁶Stiglmyer (1994), p. 11.

¹⁷Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 31.

¹⁸For suggested sources for numerical statistics, see Stiglmyer (1994), p. 30, n. 42.

¹⁹Malcolm (1994), p. 286, n. 1.

counter-charges of past attempts at genocide, charges that can be used in the present or future to justify new rounds of killing.²⁰

There is no doubt that the massacres briefly outlined above were indeed horrific. In fact, it is difficult to find appropriate words to continually express the revulsion and horror that these crimes conjure up, particularly given the scale of the death toll and its relatively recent occurrence. Nevertheless, it is also difficult, when looking back through history to find a country, a state, or a nation, which does not have either blood on *its* hands, or has been the victim of another state's self-interest, which has resulted in bloodshed. This fact leads one to question commonly held beliefs: Have the 'ethnic tensions' in former Yugoslavia always been 'just under the surface' as some commentators suggest? Did communism merely 'suppress' ancient hatreds? Did this animosity 'naturally' rise to the surface? Was it inevitable that one day these ethnic tensions would have to be 'worked out'? If all hideous spectres of the past are destined to resurface and continuously haunt future generations on a global scale, what hope for other countries with a history of war and atrocities?²¹

Answers to these questions will be suggested throughout this chapter, however, whether the people of Yugoslavia were used and manipulated as pawns in a game which was orchestrated by political elites, or whether they were part of a collective and popular upsurge of nationalistic hate rising from below, or possibly a combination of both, the causal factors were undoubtedly wider, more complex and more inextricably linked than narrow traditional analysis would have us believe.

Tito

In November 1945, following controversial elections, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (the 'second' Yugoslavia) was proclaimed, and duly recognised by both Eastern and Western powers, notably the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. By February 1946, the elected constituent assembly had reconstituted itself as the national parliament, complete with a new cabinet, with Marshal Tito - handpicked by Stalin to lead the Yugoslav communists - at the head, and with a substantially

²⁰Denitch (1994), p. 31.

²¹Donald Acheson, "Preventing Genocide: Episodes must be Exposed, Documented, and Punished," British Medical Journal Vol. 313, no. 7070 (December 1996): pp. 1415-1418.

increased communist representation. Once in power the Tito government took steps to secure control under the banner of the communist ideology, thereby attempting to suppress, indeed to *eradicate*, the 'national' question. Various sectors of the economy were nationalised, restrictions were imposed on the Roman Catholic Church, and various uncooperative opposition groups were 'liquidated'. In addition, all newspapers critical of the Tito regime were suppressed, and Mihajlovic was captured, indicted for treason, convicted and executed, along with eight other Chetnik leaders.²² Tito went on record as saying in 1948, '[o]ur national question has been...solved, and solved very well indeed, to the all-round satisfaction of our nations. It has been solved in the manner taught to us by Lenin and Stalin'.²³

The 'second' Yugoslavia was a federation of South Slav nations and some national minorities. When drawing the borders of the six component republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) Tito attempted to utilise historical boundaries, although Serbia had to accede to two sensitive losses as both Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted autonomous status. Tito's main aim in federalising Yugoslavia, as mentioned above, was to eradicate, or at least control, the 'national' problem. However, the primary question when analysing Yugoslavia under Tito, in relation to the search for possible causal factors of war, is whether the ethnic groupings of the region retained an independent and distinct national consciousness and felt themselves to be nations in either the sociological or political sense, or whether they considered themselves to be a constituent part of an emerging unified Yugoslav nation. In the nineteenth century, the Yugoslav idea did not originate from the desire to live as a united community of nations, but principally as a common defence against the threat of assimilation from more powerful neighbours, notably Germany, Romania, Hungary and Turkey.²⁴ But, what of the 'second' Yugoslavia? Was the cohesive power of the 'class' principle and the state apparatus assumed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Tito strong enough to dispel ethnic tensions

²²Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).

²³Cited in Stiglmeier (1994), p.30, n. 44.

²⁴Dusan Necak, "Historical Elements for Understanding the 'Yugoslav Question'" in Payam Akhavan, ed., *Yugoslavia the Former and the Future: Reflections by scholars from the region* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 13-28.

and to bind these nations into a stable 'state'? Or, are the forces of division and disintegration ultimately stronger than those of unity and consolidation?

Opinion appears divided on the question of Yugoslavia's artificiality, or rather, some scholars feel that the perception of integration and like-mindedness, accrued over nearly five decades, is more important and had more influence on the populace than historical reality. Branka Magas has stated categorically that Yugoslavia was 'a far-from-artificial state, born of a genuine revolution, a country that was not fated to disintegrate but which has nevertheless been destroyed'.²⁵ Although in sympathy with Magas' view, Denitch, maintains that the artificiality of the state was immaterial, he suggests that in reality Yugoslavia, despite all nationalist propaganda to the contrary, made it possible for individual citizens to retain pride in their own national heritage, while also feeling comfortable with their broader Yugoslav identity. In the following rather lengthy quotation Denitch mourns the passing of 'his' Yugoslavia and the creation of a new 'ethnic' minority:

For many - for the children of the more than one and one-half million mixed marriages and for all those who had identified only as Yugoslavs and not as members of constituting nations - the death of Yugoslavia is a great personal loss. They no longer have a country of their own. Those who identified as Yugoslavs in censuses, not to speak of those who might have chosen to do so if the choice was that identity or a narrower national one, were more numerous than two nations, the Macedonians and Slovenes, which did acquire separate national states. Their national rights have been totally overlooked in the gathering of the tribes because, according to the nationalist gospel, there is no such thing as a "Yugoslavia", and all who identify as such are suffering from false consciousness or are hidden Serbian hegemonists.²⁶

In contrast, psychologist Paul Parin argues that the peoples of Yugoslavia, while constrained within an artificial state and under an artificial ideology, did not feel 'at home' with either a national identity or a broader Yugoslav one, which led to feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. Therefore, the descent into war was according to Parin, a

²⁵Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (London: Verso, 1993), p. xii.

²⁶Denitch (1994), p.15.

search to 'confirm their identity through aggression', and they were prepared to suffer other disadvantages - for example, economic ones - to acquire it.²⁷

Whether regarded as an artificial, ignoble experiment, or a practical alternative to the options available in both 1918 or 1945, during Tito's 'reign', due in part to the way in which the state and provincial boundaries had been drawn, he was able to protect the federation from the domination of the largest national group, the Serbs. Although Tito did not appear to be nationally minded, the fact that he was a Croat made the federal centre appear more neutral. Indeed, Tito went to great lengths to ensure that all the organisations of state - the Army, the Political Police, cabinet posts, ambassadorships and other influential roles within government - were distributed proportionately among all the ethnic groups. This deliberate policy avoided claims by the ethnic minorities that one ethnic group was dominating the centre of power. This quotation by Denitch further explains the situation:

Generally speaking, then, the leaders of the two largest republics, Serbia and Croatia, were for the most part kept from dominating the major federal posts. This is still worth mentioning today because the current nationalist fairy tales repeatedly mention the supposed domination of the federal Yugoslav states as a major grievance of the Slovenes and Croats during the years of the Communist rule. It was simply not the case; the perfectly *legitimate* complaint was against the authoritarian Communist rule as such, but that rule was essentially equally hostile to all nationalism.²⁸

Zoran Pajic, writing of his experiences within the former Yugoslavia on a grass-roots level and discussing the pluralistic policies aimed at accommodating the republics, notes that the Yugoslav multi-lingual and multi-cultural policies were not simply a sham or a token concession. Pajic complains that many analysts emphasise the Serb domination of the higher echelons of the military, but omit to mention that the federal civil service was representative of all the main linguistic and cultural groups. Pajic continues to press his argument by pointing out that the Yugoslav federation established an Albanian-language university in Albania, just as the federal multi-cultural policy supported Macedonian-language education in the republic of

²⁷Paul Parin, "Open Wounds: Ethnopschoanalytic Reflections on the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia," in Alexandra Stiglmeier (1994), p. 48.

²⁸Denitch (1994), p.38.

Macedonia.²⁹ This situation, until possibly the second half of the 1980s, produced a reasonably stable multi-national federation, at least as far as the national question was concerned. For the politicians other more urgent problems - democratisation, the crumbling economy, and entry into the European Community - relegated romantic notions of nationalism to the margins: seemingly of importance only to scholars, novelists or academics.

However, one could ask whether Tito's commitment to the equal distribution of positions of power throughout the national groups turned out to be self-defeating? Moreover, did his constant attention to the issue of multi-nationalism, particularly in preventing domination by the most numerous national group, keep the issue of national identity prominent in the minds of the populace? This concern for national identity was effectively the central tenet in determining the career paths of two generations of politicians and civil servants. In addition, Tito's concern with protecting the rights of the republics from domination by the federal centre, encouraged the republics to develop a 'controlled' or 'sanctioned' nationalism. Therefore, people's loyalties to the republics, meant *national* loyalties. It has been suggested that in terms of ideological structure, nationalism and communism have common affinities: they are both based on an anti-liberal ideology, they advocate collectivism, and on occasion, violence. With regard to Yugoslavia, Zarko Puhovski has noted:

Class struggle was a dominant ideological doctrine, and for decades society was indoctrinated with collectivist rhetoric. Against this background of an indoctrinated "public sphere", it was relatively easy to transform one form of collectivist ideology into another, even if it was distant in content, so long as the collectivist nature of the ideology was preserved. Therefore ethno-national collectivism was almost tailor-made to replace the old ideological schema.³⁰

While Tito was attempting to create a Yugoslav identity based on his own brand of socialism and Marxism, an identity which was distinct and separate from the direct

²⁹Zoran Pajic, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to 'Apartheid,'" in Payam Akhavan (1995), pp. 152-163.

³⁰Zarko Puhovski, "Yugoslav Origins of the Post-Yugoslav Situation and the Bleak Prospects for Civil Society," in Akhavan (1995), p. 123.

influence of Moscow, one unanticipated, but in retrospect predictable result was nationalism. Without any voluntary group identities, which are assumed most easily in a contested multi-party environment, the only group identity which was officially recognised was the 'nation', which in turn was expressed through the republic in which it was dominant. Thus, following Tito's death, and in the absence of an institutional equivalent to act as a legitimate arbiter *and* with the system in a severe state of decay, local nationalist leaders found it reasonably unproblematic, particularly in the rural areas, to begin mobilising traditional nationalisms.

Ideology

The idea that there was no liberal ideological base in Yugoslavia, and that this could have been a contributory factor in the descent into war, has been mentioned above. However, some scholars, for example Robert Howse as mentioned below, have based their analysis of the Balkan conflict on this one fundamental point. Therefore, this idea is worth pursuing briefly. Nationalism (ostensibly the essence of all these discussions), no less than communism, appears to legitimate the exercise of ultimate power by an elite in the name of a unifying ideology that suppresses individual expression, identity and freedom in a collective struggle against a recognised 'other'. Although, as mentioned above, Tito attempted to break the 'standard' mould of the communist state by introducing pluralistic policies and spreading the balance of power: these 'rights' were always viewed in collective terms - as collective 'rights'. It appears that they were not perceived, particularly by the ethnic minorities, as individual rights to allow self-development and equality within their own linguistic and cultural setting within a wider multi-cultural federation. Robert Howse takes this argument one step further by suggesting that the transformation from nationalism to multi-culturalism within the Yugoslav model was simply not possible. He states categorically that:

The failure of the Yugoslav communists to transform nationalism into multi-culturalism cannot simply be attributed to either the supposedly intractable or immutable character of nationalism as a mode of ethnic self-assertion or the suppression of ethnic conflicts under Tito. What was absent was an essential

foundation of liberalism, which could not be supplied by the fundamentally collectivist ideology of Yugoslav communism.³¹

In support of Howse's argument, Dusan Janjic maintains that:

Where the collectivity prevails over individuality and individual rights are repressed, the conditions for critical thinking or plural identities are not found. Within such a context, ideological rhetoric and artificial political integration rule the day.³²

In the 1970s, Tito had virtually reduced all liberal reformers to the status of 'non-persons'; that is, non-party philosophers, political scientists, jurists and economists alike.³³ However, it is clear that the ordinary citizens of Yugoslavia had more 'rights' than citizens of other 'communist' countries. At least until the mid-1980s, when the country was irretrievably immersed in deep financial crisis and unable to meet its foreign debt repayments, the Yugoslav people were relatively prosperous, with access to Western clothes, music, and films. Indeed, the younger generation, particularly in urban areas, practised a lifestyle closely resembling their counter-parts in the West; hedonistic, sexually liberated, and with little fear of state repression. Why then, as Fukuyama and other liberal idealists would have us believe, did the Westernisation and modernisation of personal lifestyles not lead to a liberal foundation within Yugoslavia?³⁴ By way of explanation Slavenka Drakulic, a Croatian journalist, suggests the following:

We traded our freedom for Italian shoes...Millions and millions of people crossed the border every year just to savour the West and to buy something, perhaps as a mere gesture. But this freedom, a feeling that you are free to go if you want to, was very important to us. It seems to me now to have been a kind of contract with the regime: we realise you are here forever, we don't like you at all but we'll compromise if you let us be, if you don't press too hard...We didn't build a political underground of people with liberal, democratic values ready to take over the government; not because it was impossible, but on the contrary, because the repression was not hard enough to produce the need for it.³⁵

³¹Robert Howse, "A Horizon Beyond Hatred," in Akhavan (1995), p. 6.

³²Dusan Janjic, "Resurgence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia," in Akhavan (1995), p. 42.

³³Vojin Dimitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia," in Akhavan (1995,) p. 53.

³⁴F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

³⁵Howse (1995), p.7

Under Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, citizens, particular the urban middle-classes, were able to enjoy an acceptable degree of personal freedom, which was devoid of civic or personal responsibility, in return for political apathy. A liberal democratic revolution entails an assumption of responsibility through citizenship - the missing link in Yugoslavia. For the Yugoslav people, the ultimate fate of their society was seen to be in the hands of the communist elite, not with themselves, as citizens with 'rights'. But as Kant suggested, it is not only the force of authoritarian repression that can delay the advance of liberal enlightenment, but also the reluctance to assume ultimate responsibility for one's own life choices; the absence of self-discipline and personal existential courage.³⁶ Perhaps this highlights the complacency, or perhaps naivete, of Yugoslavia in having the desire for Western material values, without wanting to pay the 'real' price. Yet Yugoslavia should not be judged too harshly as this is an accusation which could be levelled at all Western states in one context or another.

Economy

There is a strong set of arguments suggesting that a severe economic crisis was at least a background factor in the onset of the war in the Balkans. In the former Yugoslavia where nationalist demagogues and propagandists were disseminating seeds of dissatisfaction and contention, the unstable economic situation guaranteed fertile ground. During the 1980s living standards had fallen dramatically with inflation spiralling out of control, unemployment had escalated and the country's foreign debts ran into billions of dollars.³⁷ Urban and rural populations alike were feeling aggrieved. For the rural, mostly southern agrarian peasant farmer's discontent had been steadily growing for many years. Since the Second World War, agriculture had been a persistent problem for Tito and his government. Tito's priority had been industry not agriculture, thereby favouring the development of the northern states. Post-war spending to rebuild, expand and modernise heavy industry averaged about \$1 billion annually, while the predominantly agrarian southern regions were starved

³⁶Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 54.

³⁷Magas (1993), p. 81.

of capital, leading to poor cultivation and poor irrigation, which in turn led to the susceptibility to drought, and, as occurred intermittently, severe food shortages. Also fuelling the fire was the constant conflict between the government and the southern rural population over the 'collectivisation' of farmland, which was never resolved. The north/south divide continually increased over the decades.³⁸

As Yugoslavia began to 'open-up' to world trade and tread the path toward a socialist 'market economy', the payoff, in addition to the extensive aid and credit deals supplied by the West, provided Yugoslavia with the highest living standard in Eastern Europe. However, the decentralised federation into which Yugoslavia evolved appeared locked into an unequal distribution of this wealth, due in part to the traditional Communist pro-industrial bias. This resulted in, as alluded to above, the agricultural and raw material producers of the south feeling discriminated against by a government whose policies had skewed economic growth in favour of the north. In actual monetary terms the statistics show that the income per capita ratio between Slovenia in the north and Kosovo in the south grew from three in 1947 to five in 1985 and eight in 1989.³⁹

Although the more developed regions in the north benefited from the expansion and development of the Yugoslav economy, this did not prevent dissatisfaction and discontent germinating in the north as well. While the southern states were complaining about receiving too little, Slovenia and Croatia were grumbling about the inefficient southern regions costing the north too much. Denitch describes the situation, in the following manner:

The citizens of the richer republics in the north became ever more firmly convinced that their relative prosperity was due to the fact that they worked harder, were more virtuous, were more European, and in general more superior to those in the backward south.⁴⁰

³⁸Dragomir Vojnic, "Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic Dimension of Yugoslavia's Demise," in Akhavan (1995), pp. 75-111.

³⁹Hakan Wiberg, "Societal security and the explosion of Yugoslavia," in Ole Waever, ed., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 2.

⁴⁰Denitch (1994), p. 71.

If this was indeed the general attitude of the urban populace of the northern states, then it is easy to understand how in the hands of powerful propagandists one region's pride at their economic success and development was played off against another region's poor infrastructure, relative poverty and hence their insecurities.

The failure to deal equitably and effectively with multi-ethnicity and to develop a cohesive federal model contributed greatly to both the breakdown and demise of the 'first' Yugoslavia between the two world wars, and to the moral and political defeat of the non-communist parties directly after the Second World War. Potentially, one of the strongest sources of unity for the 'second' Yugoslavia was economic interdependence between its multi-ethnic federation of states. However, if the state of Yugoslavia's economy led to arrogance and disdain from one quarter, and fear and hostility from another, then the contribution of Yugoslavia's economic crisis toward the onset of war, was not a minor one. Indeed, Professor Janjic has concluded that the point when the collapse of Yugoslavia was no longer preventable, in economic or social terms, was 1989. He illustrates his claim in the following statement:

That year witnessed and revealed the economic collapse and the bankruptcy of the identifying values of socialism, self-management and Yugoslavia as a confederation under communist rule. Socialist ideology made way for nationalist ideology, homogenisation, and hegemony. Since then, all political, social, and other conflicts have been expressed exclusively in nationalist terms. All the existing differences and the complexity of society were replaced by only one reality: national divisions.⁴¹

The country's severe economic crisis, while probably not solely responsible for the decent into war, nevertheless, created a situation conducive to the rise of demagogues and propagandists who played on the dissatisfaction and resentments of the Yugoslav people.

Nationalism

⁴¹Janjic (1995), p. 44.

The war in the former Yugoslavia, replete with ethnic tensions and hatred, can be partly attributed to the complex ethnic structure of the country. However, the single fact that Yugoslavia was a highly heterogeneous society does not alone infer a predisposition to war. The nations which made up the former Yugoslavia had evolved through distinct social, economic and historic circumstances, and when they were united under the banner of the Yugoslav federation they were also at varying stages of development; socially, economically and culturally.⁴² However, despite their great diversity, residing at the cross-roads between East and West, the people of the Balkan region do appear to have more in common with one another than they do with other people; their common identity to an 'outsider', appears distinct. Nevertheless, regardless of the views of others, history shows that with minimal manipulation the disagreements and tensions which arose between the constituent republics, including the autonomous provinces of Serbia, were easily turned into inter-ethnic conflicts: more successfully by leaders with radical nationalist tendencies than others. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in Chapters Four and Eight, nationalism, and all its attendant tensions, has been cited as one possible explanation for the mass raping of civilians in the Balkan conflict.

The most serious threat to the institutionalisation of democracy within the former Yugoslavia was the prominence and influence of radical nationalism in political life. As Dusan Janjic has stated, '[i]n a society such as Yugoslavia, nationalism represents a sort of social cancer and an enemy of democracy'.⁴³ The fundamental premise on which democracy is formed is that of equality; equal rights for all individuals regardless of their ethnic, social, religious, national or linguistic origin. Nationalism, however, is based on exclusionist principles, such as segregation, the rejection of pluralism, and the repression of individual rights. Individual liberty is negated because the citizen does not choose his/her ethnic or national group, it is merely assigned at birth. Nationalism establishes a boundary between 'us' and 'them', and bases that boundary on inborn national characteristics. The use of this 'politics of identity' - the defining of one's own identity only in relation to the 'other' in order to

⁴²For a comprehensive statistical breakdown of the economic and ethnic disparities between the republics of the former Yugoslavia, see Dragomir Vojnic (1995), pp. 75-111.

⁴³Janjic (1995), p. 42.

arouse nationalistic pride or evoke patriotic emotions as has been seen throughout the Balkans - is a tool used to incite an already insecure public into paranoia and hatred for their fellow countrymen by those, who arguably have an incomprehensible sense of morality. Paul Parin, in response to claims that the descent into war was due to the Balkan 'temperament', has stated:

Errors come about if the ethnologically understood unique character of a people, based on its recorded historical experiences and traditional mentalities, is deemed the determining cause of conflicts. Pseudopsychologists have tried to do this, attributing a "phallic-aggressive," warlike character to the Serbs, for example, and an "anal-passive", deceitful nature to the Croats. Such views are nothing other than psychologically disguised prejudices and projected fantasies.⁴⁴

Therefore, pre-war claims by Serb nationalists that the Albanians were conspiring with Islamic fundamentalists and 'eternally lust after pure Serbian womanhood', that the Croats were plotting with the Vatican against Orthodox Christianity, or that Germany still retained expansionist policies, is the politics of identity reduced to mere 'sound bites', of the most destructive form.⁴⁵ This manipulation of personal and national insecurities into inter-ethnic rivalry appears to have been viewed by some nationalist leaders as more an opportunity than a danger, and they chose to exploit ethnic nationalism as a political resource - with disastrous consequences.⁴⁶

Religion

Religious-based national intolerance has been a common feature of Yugoslav history. Catholic right-wingers in Croatia and Slovenia, religiously identified Muslim Slav nationalists, and Christian Orthodox nationalists, all preach their own brand of religious nationalism, which appears to have no connection with the 'Christian' or 'Muslim' teachings of the actual religion.⁴⁷ Religion in Yugoslavia also seems to serve as a national identifier. For example, Bogdan Denitch has suggested that in

⁴⁴Parin (1994), p. 36.

⁴⁵Denitch (1994), p. 159.

⁴⁶Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition - 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 51.

⁴⁷Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (London: University of California Press, 1996).

Yugoslavia one can have a 'Christian' or 'Muslim' atheist.⁴⁸ The actual religious beliefs one holds appears to be a secondary issue, the crux of the matter within this brand of 'identity politics', is that the attached religious label defines whether you are located within the community, or, often more significantly, whether you are located outside the community - the 'other'. To illustrate this point, Denitch recounts a conversation in Yugoslavia:

Religion is the most commonly used ethnic identifier...This was brought home to me years ago when I was pretesting a survey questionnaire that included the question, "What is your religion?" The first respondent immediately asked me, "And what is yours?" I replied, "I am an atheist." To which he shot back, "I know all you damn intellectuals are atheists but are you a Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim atheist? I want to know your nationality!"⁴⁹

For many centuries, particularly under the Ottoman Empire, religion was recognised as the most significant national identifier throughout the region and this still exists in areas where a legacy of nationally identified churches have been left, for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church. Roman Catholicism lost much of its universal, or trans-national appeal in Eastern Europe when the church became less hierarchically based and the clergy began to flirt with populist, often nationalist, politics. By becoming more closely nationally identified, these churches inherited the specific traditional, national hostilities toward the rivals of their chosen nation, for example, traditional Christian/Muslim rivalries. Thus, it could be argued that the churches have exacerbated rather than mediated ethnic tensions.⁵⁰ As will be discussed in Chapter Four, it has been suggested that religion played a significant role in the incidents of mass rape in the former-Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s.

Propaganda

The case that the use of propaganda by nationalist leaders to promote ethnic rivalries and hatred hastened the onset of war by encouraging civilians to take up arms against their neighbours, is a strong one. Whilst again, not the *sole* cause of war, it is

⁴⁸Denitch (1994), p. 29.

⁴⁹ibid.

⁵⁰Denitch (1994), p. 133.

nevertheless difficult to find a commentator on the subject who would claim that propaganda was not used or did not have any influence on the general Yugoslav public. Indeed, as will be noted in Part Two, some journalists were also convinced of the crucial role that propaganda played in inciting and prolonging then use of rape in the Balkan conflict. Taking the lead in the propaganda war was Serbia's Slobadan Milosevic who, as early as 1981, began to arouse Serbian nationalistic passions during the uprising of the Kosovo Albanians who were demanding more autonomy. The rebellion was quashed, but in Serbia it was reported that the Albanians were planning 'genocide' against the Serbs, Albanians were raping 'pure Serbian women', slaughtering cattle and destroying property.⁵¹ The stories were reportedly untrue, nevertheless, Milosevic, the most ardent promoter of the 'genocidal Kosovo Albanians' theory, 'swept to power using the 'national' ticket and was president of Serbia by 1987.⁵²

Consequently, the press and national television network were taken over by Milosevic and in regular impassioned speeches he talked of Serbian 'disfranchisement', of past 'injuries', of Serb 'historical greatness', and of Slovenia and Croatia as 'enemies of Serbia'.⁵³ The Serbian people, who were all too willing to believe in someone who would 'deliver' them from the 'evils' of their life, were obviously stirred by the fervour and passion with which he accused Franjo Tudjman (the Croatian President) of being a 'Ustasha' agent and the leader of the 'new fascists'.⁵⁴ Moreover, to exacerbate the situation, rather than denounce the accusations as nationalist propaganda, Tudjman chose to change the Croatian constitution and demote all Serbs living in Croatia from a 'national people' to a 'minority', thereby, in the minds of the Serbs, confirming the propaganda. Both Milosevic and Tudjman used emotive terminology such as 'Ustasha' or 'Chetniks' and old national symbols to conjure up the buried memories and fears of past atrocities. In campaigning for a greater-Serbia, the leader of the Croatian Serbs, Milan Babic, played on the Serbian people's fear that they would become a displaced people. He stated that, '[i]f Yugoslavia collapses and the present-day borders of the

⁵¹Stiglmeier (1994), p. 14.

⁵²ibid.

⁵³Stiglmeier (1994), pp. 14 -18.

⁵⁴ibid.

republics remain intact, then we Serbs would have to live in four different republics. What people want to be treated like the Kurds?⁵⁵

In turn, Milosevic's attention was focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina and in particular the Muslim population who he branded as 'Islamic fundamentalists' and 'extremists'. Milosevic used Serbian state television to broadcast the message that the Serbian nation was under threat from another 'genocidal' neighbour. Alexandra Stiglmeier claims that Serbian television was the linchpin in disseminating war propaganda:

Television Belgrade played and continues to play an important role, for it is the only Serbian information medium in all the war zones and far-flung sections of Serbia and Montenegro. It spreads the idea of 'dangerous Muslim fundamentalists' and 'fascistic, genocidal Croats'. Nor does it back away from lies. Thus for two months Belgrade television did not report that Serbian troops were firing on Sarajevo - rather, it reported that 'Muslim extremists' were shooting at their own people.⁵⁶

The combination of Milosevic's presidential and media control allowed him to build up and project his own distorted and biased view of reality for his own ends. No doubt many Serbs were taken in by the complex web of lies and deceit spread by Milosevic and his followers, and were convinced that they must fight to protect themselves against the 'genocidal tendencies' which their former friends and neighbours harboured against them. Political statements made in the Serbian parliament such as, '[t]he truth is that all non-Serbian ethnic groups, especially the Croats, are at this very minute preparing the genocide of all Serbs',⁵⁷ when heard by an increasingly scared and insecure Serb population are surely going to sound convincing, and as history shows, they were.

As outlined above, nationalistic propaganda is based on the deliberate creating of negative, threatening images of the 'enemy', in this case of reducing the 'other' to primitive stereo-typical images of Serb, Muslim or Croat zealots. When this 'image' can be combined with 'real' experiences, either remembered or relayed from generation to generation - memories of a grandfather murdered by a Ustasha guard or

⁵⁵Stiglmeier (1994), p. 6.

⁵⁶Stiglmeier (1994), p. 20 (also see p. 34, n. 71).

⁵⁷Parin (1994), p. 50.

an aunt raped by an armed Chetnik - then the manipulation of peoples emotions, and then actions, through propaganda, becomes a strong political weapon.⁵⁸ As memories, either individual or collective, are revitalised through the media, collective national bonds and hatreds are forged. Those critically minded people (most often children or intellectuals) who attempt to stand on the side-lines and claim immunity to nationalism, are ostracised from the community, or are seen as 'ignorant, naive, or crazy and lose all influence on the public consciousness'.⁵⁹ The difficulty faced by those 'neutrals' attempting to persuade the public of the futility of war, is appreciated when one is aware of the power generated by the images the propagandists choose to project. British journalist Ian Traynor describes a typical image in the 'television war':

Contorted corpses, maimed bodies of children or old peasants, singed limbs and faces with bloody holes in place of eyes - this was the everyday fare...The perpetrators and victims of this kind of slaughter are not invented characters in an imported horror film. The scenes come from Yugoslavia's television war; they were snapshots of the atrocities being committed on both sides in the Croatian war zones. The continual presentation of the massacre victims incited fear, hatred, hysteria, and blood lust on both sides of the ethnic border.⁶⁰

Even experienced foreign observers have stated that the war in the Balkans was fundamentally different to other 'civil' wars - for example; Lebanon, Afghanistan or Angola - due primarily to the 'intensity and effectiveness of the rival propaganda machines'.⁶¹ Marco Altherr, head of the International Red Cross delegation in Yugoslavia has stated that, '[i]f you talk to them, the people on both sides are absolutely convinced that the other is intent on killing them. And it's all the result of propaganda'.⁶² However, in the people's defence, for individuals living in perpetual fear, lacking civil and legal protection, and under pressure economically, the collective shelter of nationalism could have appeared to be a convenient and welcome outlet for their frustration and discontent.

⁵⁸Denitch (1994), p. 181.

⁵⁹Parin (1994), p. 40.

⁶⁰Ian Traynor, cited in Parin (1994), p. 41.

⁶¹ibid.

⁶²Marco Altherr, cited in Parin (1994), p. 41.

Western Response

With the end of the Cold War and the ensuing collapse of communism throughout the Eastern Bloc, two seemingly diametrically opposed schools of thought concerning the future of the region came to the fore. Francis Fukuyama's theory suggested that the collapse of communism was the manifestation of the progression and expansion of capitalist liberal democracy which would ultimately be recognised, universally, as the only viable social and political order.⁶³ In contrast, John Mearsheimer, an ardent neo-realist, predicted that the resurgence of ethnic conflicts was inevitable as the world returns to the instability of the past.⁶⁴ It has been suggested, that while seeming to be at opposite ends of the political spectrum, both these theories can be, and have been, used by the West to justify their minimalist response to the war in the former Yugoslavia.⁶⁵ For Fukuyama, as an inevitable stepping-stone on the path to a stable liberal democracy, the Yugoslav conflict would also appear temporary, it would therefore, be pointless to forfeit Western lives and resources to what amounts to no more than a localised growing pain in the Eastern reaches of Europe. As for Mearsheimer and the realist camp, they would suggest that the structure of international politics in the post-Cold War age is characterised by unpreventable and unsolvable national conflicts, the key is simply to prevent them from escalating into a conflict between the major powers. Thus, considering Germany's historical links with Croatia, and Russia's historical, religious and ideological links with Serbia, the Western response, quite understandably, was one of minimalist intervention in Yugoslav affairs and this rationale forms the basis of the West's justifications for rejecting immediate intervention in Yugoslavia. Moreover, whatever our moral stance or instincts, given the ideological character of the forces the West would be facing, the Western response has been regarded by many scholars, and politicians, as entirely reasonable,⁶⁶ but not by all.

⁶³Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest (Summer 1989); and The End of History and The Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

⁶⁴John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security Vol. 15, no. 1 (1990): pp. 5-56.

⁶⁵Robert Howse and Karen Knop, "Federalism, Secession and the Limits of Ethnic Accommodation," New Europe Law Review Vol. 1 (1992): pp. 269-320.

⁶⁶Howse, (1995), p. 2.

Many scholars and commentators on the Balkan conflict blame the combination of Western complicity, ignorance and inaction as a major causal factor in the onset of the Balkan war. Denitch, for example, complains bitterly at the lack of sensitivity on the part of Germany:

One would have hoped that some minimal historical memory of, and shame about, the German responsibility for the genocidal horrors that took place in its satellite "Independent State of Croatia" in 1941-1945, as well as the wide destruction and carnage caused by Hitler's aggression against Yugoslavia, would have made the now democratic states extra cautious about meddling in Yugoslav matters....Absent such sensitivities, the Germans have ended up as major external factors in the destruction of two Yugoslavias.⁶⁷

While this quotation may seem a little harsh in its indictment of German policy towards the recognition of Croatia, and undoubtedly with hindsight it is much easier to pass judgements, nevertheless, generally one expects the leaders of western powers to have a degree of *foresight* regarding their policies, particularly in such delicate matters - there is no doubting that Slobadan Milosevic's policies were imbued with a great deal of foresight.⁶⁸

The United States, particularly the Bush administration, has also been criticised for their inaction and their inability to recognise, or admit, when change was inevitable. To justify U.S. inaction, a directive from the Bush administration was issued which stated that the war was to be portrayed as an 'impenetrable civil war' with no possibility of intervention. This fact came to light with the resignation, for reasons of conscience, of George Kenney, the State Department responsible for the Balkan region, in 1992. To explain his resignation, Kenney wrote the following:

The Bush administration pronouncements on the Yugoslav crisis between February and August exhibited the worst sort of hypocrisy, I know; I wrote them. My job was to make it appear as though the U.S. was active and concerned about the situation and, at the same time, give no one the impression that the U.S. was actually going to do something significant about it....It managed to downplay the gravity of the crisis and obscure the

⁶⁷Denitch (1994), pp. 51-52.

⁶⁸For an interesting account of the German decision to recognise Croatia, see Hella Pick, "A master Germany wants to lose," The Guardian, 10 January 1992.

real issues. Of course, it did so at the expense of civilian casualties in numbers that are not yet known...The which in this instance was to ignore any facts - whether they pertained to atrocities, rumours of concentration camps, or starvation - that would complicate the goal of not getting involved.⁶⁹

Thus, for the US administration the fact that there was not a large community of US expatriates or military presence in the Balkans and the region was of little economic worth to the United States, the 'powers that be' took the decision to ignore the conflict until the closing stages of the 1992 presidential campaign. While acknowledging the delicate position the United States was in politically, past history does reveal that the U.S. is no stranger to intervention for political or economic ends; but what of *humanitarian* ends?

Britain was no less culpable. John Major, addressing the House of Commons in the summer of 1993 'explains' the root-cause of the Balkan conflict as follows:

The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred. There were subsidiary elements, but that collapse was by far the greatest.⁷⁰

While Moscow undoubtedly retained a modicum of influence over Yugoslavia, when Tito was expelled from Stalin's Cominform organisation in 1948, any direct 'discipline' exerted by the Soviet Union was immediately curtailed. As for the 'ancient hatreds' which John Major refers to, and to reiterate a point made above, although the Balkans had ethnic tensions and racial problems, those hatreds were not innate but were aroused and mobilised by nationalist leaders, through the use of historical and religious symbolism, as a means to actualise their own agenda. In other words, although there may have been suppressed tensions and even hatreds which were carried on through the retelling of past atrocities, those feelings were not predestined to create war at a predetermined time, and may have eventually have been consigned to the annals of history as folklore or legend. However, they were picked up and used

⁶⁹George Kenney, "See No Evil: Make No Policy," Washington Monthly, November 1992, p. 33. cited in Stiglmeier (1994), pp. 22-23.

⁷⁰John Major, Hansard, 23 June 1993, col. 324. Cited in Malcolm (1994), p.xx.

as a tool by the nationalistic leaders who were intent on building a nationalist movement and a war.

Of all the accusations of diplomatic horse-trading,⁷¹ of ineptitude, and of 'processing words while Croatia burns and Europe freezes',⁷² the European Community (EC) came under the most sustained attack. Jonathan Eyal has made the following incriminating observation:

The tribulations of the Community would have been funny, had they not sown the seeds of a greater war in Yugoslavia. The entire debate about the recognition of Yugoslavia's constituent republics missed the essence of the problem from the beginning. The question was not recognition *per se*, which could not have been avoided and should have actually come much earlier if only in order to serve notice on the Serbian-controlled military that the old states could not be kept together by force....the real tragedy was to be found not in the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as such but, rather, in the Community's determination to take any risk in order to maintain a semblance of unity. Recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia was bowing to the inevitable; transforming it into a process applicable to all former Yugoslav republics was the true mistake committed in December 1991. It was a shameful game that failed both to preserve the Community's reputation, or prevent the war from widening.⁷³

Paradoxically, a western policy which was initially an attempt to hold Yugoslavia together, ended up forcing Bosnia and Macedonia to ask for independence based on criteria which were, arguably, inappropriate. Eyal in his condemnation of European Community policy outlines many other unanswered, unresolved questions and suggests that the priorities of the European Community were; to appease public opinion; to limit the damage to the reputation of European institutions and individual governments; to prevent any further confrontation within the EC; and finally, to reduce the fighting in the Balkans without acquiring open-ended obligations. Eyal

⁷¹Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure (London: Whitehall Paper Series, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p. 25.

⁷²The Independent, 10 December 1991. cited in Eyal (1993), p. 47.

⁷³Eyal (1993), pp. 48-49.

concludes that the EC failed on all accounts.⁷⁴ Payam Akhavan supports Eyal's observations and makes his opinion clear in the following statement:

In response to the carnage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Europe regressed to replaying the balance of power theatrics of the First World War. At a critical historical juncture, when mankind seemingly stood at the threshold of a new world order, such cynical and dithering statesmanship came to be identified with the anticlimax of a tragic drama where the protagonist turns a quintessential moral and historical challenge into a *realpolitik* quagmire.⁷⁵

While all of these critics, particularly of the EC's inaction (as it was then), make some interesting and valid points, they nevertheless assume that there was a self-evidently 'right' policy to choose. However, these scholars are blessed with hindsight to help them suggest which 'correct' action should have been taken. And moreover, if Tito could no longer keep these nations together could the EC really be expected to succeed?

Conclusion

Whether the war in Yugoslavia was 'inevitable' or not, all the causal factors discussed above are embedded in the national, linguistic, religious, cultural and historical differences of the region. To these could also be added the lack of a liberal democracy, an authoritarian heritage, and indecisive Western policies. Thus, the conditions for war at the start of the 1990s were present in numbers and were conclusive. At present, it is impossible to 'weigh' the reasons for the conflict and say whether the traditional ethnic cleavages contributed to the onset of war to a greater or lesser degree than the absence of a strong federalist democratic alternative to nationalism; or, whether Yugoslavia's economic crisis caused more dissatisfaction among the populace than the effect of increasing social and political uncertainty on people who, because of an authoritarian political heritage, sought further collective security in nationalism. In time these questions may be resolved, though this is unlikely given the political nature of historical writing, but what seems clear is that

⁷⁴Eyal (1993), p. 69.

⁷⁵Akhavan (1995), p. xxv.

the war in the former Yugoslavia was not simply a spontaneous continuation of the inter-ethnic fighting which had been simmering for decades and occasionally rising to the surface. To accept that 'myth' is to read from the script prepared by nationalist leaders and demagogues.⁷⁶

This chapter has identified and analysed various factors said to explain the war in the former-Yugoslavia. The main areas of focus were questions of identity, nationalism, religion, the economy and the response of the West. What has emerged from this brief investigation into Yugoslavian history is two-fold. First, the complex and at times traumatic cultural and political heritage had left divisions within their society which appear to have been exploited and deepened, rather than ameliorated and healed by those seeking war. Second, the many hypotheses trying to explain the extenuating circumstances which led to war are, of course, not mutually exclusive and the escalation of the war in the former-Yugoslavia is best explained as a result of multi-causal rather than reductionist factors.

This account of possible explanations for the war provides a necessary background and introduction to Part Three - the investigation of the ways in which the British broadsheet press represented the allegations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict, and how the accounts of rape in war by the journalists might be better understood by viewing them through a feminist 'lens'.

⁷⁶William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 97-109.

PART TWO

REPRESENTATIONS

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

As was stated in the Introduction, the study of press representations in the thesis as a primary source of information would produce two distinct categories of information. First, the press can provide a rich source of information on mass rape in war in the Balkan conflict. In the absence of any government, EU, or NGO reports at the time, the press reports of the raping of women on a massive scale in the Balkans offered a large body of previously untapped information with which to investigate these claims. Moreover, the overall response of the British broadsheets to the issue of rape in war stands in stark contrast to the initial silence of national and international institutions. Indeed, much of the broadsheets' coverage and discussion provided daily evidence, interpretation and comment of a sophistication not found anywhere else.

Second, the press can provide a great deal of interesting material surrounding contemporary attitudes to mass rape in war. Under analysis the journalists' reports can reveal how mass rape in war is currently understood, with the explanations of the journalists providing an insight into how this wartime phenomenon is interpreted within a social context. However, using the press representations as a primary source of information presents certain problems, particularly questions of impartiality, credibility of reports, and verification of the claims. Moreover, any investigation into the workings of journalists and the press will find it steeped in contradictions and anomalies.

As discussed in the Introduction, it is virtually impossible in the Western world to remain detached and unaffected by the media in some form or other. The media, in its various forms, makes increasing demands on our lives and to some extent even defines our lives - our leisure interests, our consumer preferences, and what interests us politically, economically and/or culturally. It also helps shape our attitudes, values and beliefs and that we live in a 'global media culture', with the collective media

forming what some have called the 'world's central nervous system'.¹ This implies an ability to induce reactions or responses from society and most would also argue that the media also has commensurate responsibilities.² The notion of responses and responsibilities will be discussed next.

Responses and Responsibilities

The representation of any 'event' through the media elicits a response, from government leaders, from individuals, from communities, and so on. That response is shaped by many factors: by the event itself, the way it is represented, and the way in which that event impacts upon individual and society's values. For example, either collectively or individually, we frequently identify with the events being represented in the media. That response may be a positive one, which may possibly motivate some people to action: giving money to charity, joining a local support group, writing to an MP, and so on. Or it may be a negative one, perhaps a dismissal of the information as irrelevant to their lives. Nevertheless, whether positive or negative these responses illuminate a certain set of social or individual values.

In an age of rapidly expanding global communications, media representations and societal responses are playing an increasing part in international politics at every level.³ Governments have to react to the reports in the media, while governments also use the media to disseminate messages both on a domestic and an international level.⁴ Media coverage in some recent wars, particularly in Vietnam, in the Falklands and in the Gulf, to a greater or lesser degree demonstrated the complex interplay between the power and control of the media,⁵ the use of the media by the political/military elites, and the influence public responses to media/press representations can have on

¹John Downing, Ali Mohammadi, and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, eds., Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. xvi.

²James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 262.

³Martin Shaw, Civil Society and Media in Global Crisis: Representing Distant Violence (New York: Pinter, 1996), ch. 1.

⁴Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

⁵Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 298 & ch.5.

governments, resulting in significant shifts in policy.⁶ As Martin Shaw states categorically in his latest work:

Media coverage directly affects state responses, and the responses of groups within Western society to the mediation of the conflict also have an affect on state policies. It is important to distinguish these factors in principle, but in practice it is often difficult to separate them. Governments often act on calculations about how coverage will affect public opinion, and media do not only report but also attempt to mobilise and represent opinion.⁷

If we turn to the representation of any 'event' such as the mass raping of women during the war in the former-Yugoslavia, this could, arguably, evoke an empathetic response from the majority of the British public. Women, children, and men were raped, the conflict was in reasonably close geographical proximity to Britain, and particular religious and ethnic prejudices were involved. Therefore, there were some key similarities with which the British people could probably identify with and subsequently make a 'response'. However, whatever the response of the British public and for whatever reason, those responses were due solely to the media's representations of the conflict. We were not present in the Balkans witnessing the war, the rapes, the bombings, at first hand. We therefore have to rely on reports, images, and representations of the war from the media; this is where the concept of 'responsibility' comes in. Indeed, Ian Jack, Editor of *Granta*, has argued that the primary role journalists now play in society is not to record the facts, but to act as the conscience of society. Almost, that is, a religious role and one that carries important normative responsibilities.⁸

It is not unusual these days to come across discussions of the ethical responsibilities of journalists.⁹ Sociologist Denis Quail, for example, has proposed the following list of responsibilities:¹⁰

⁶Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker* (London: Pan Books, 1989), ch. 18.

⁷Shaw (1996), p. 7.

⁸Ian Jack, "Now for the bad news," *The Guardian*, 8 August 1998, p. 3; also see, Linda Grant, "Can we hack the truth?" *The Guardian*, 11 August 1998, sec. G2, p. 8.

⁹Andrew Belsey and Ruth Chadwick, "Ethics and Politics of the Media: The Quest for Quality," in Belsey and Chadwick, eds., *Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-15.

¹⁰Denis Quail, *Mass Communication Theory* (London: Sage, 1994), p. 126.

- Truth and accuracy
- Impartiality and fairness, Respect for individual privacy
- Independence from vested interests
- Responsibility to society and the public good
- Respect for law
- Moral decency and good taste

Here we are primarily concerned with the first responsibility - truth and accuracy.

However, it is important here not to misunderstand Quail's point, and in these postmodern times notions such as 'truth', 'accuracy' and 'facts' can appear distinctly passé, if not even anachronistic. Quail's claim, however, is not that journalists always adhere to and achieve these aims, but that they act as norms guiding journalistic practices. If Quail is correct, violation of these norms should meet with censure, and recent high profile cases of journalistic misconduct, such as the furore in 1998 over Carlton TV's award winning programme 'The Connection', do seem to validate Quail's argument.¹¹ In this respect the responsibilities of journalists are similar to those of academics. An academic who deliberately falsifies evidence and who is discovered is also liable to be censured.

This raises an important theoretical point. For as Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have consistently argued, what separates the study of the social world from the study of the natural world is that in the social world what the agents think they are doing crucially affects the way they carry out their studies.¹² For the purposes of the thesis this is what matters. Journalists, as well as academics, 'normally' adhere to the norm of seeking truth and accuracy.¹³ This is not to claim that this is ever achieved, but merely to highlight that this is what the journalists think they are doing. Even in those cases where journalists intentionally violate this norm, they are aware that they are violating it. In instances where a misrepresentation unintentionally occurs, journalists

¹¹Kamal Ahmed, Joanna Coles, Michael Sean Gillard and Laurie Flynn, "CBS drawn into fake TV storm," *The Guardian*, 5 August 1998, sec. HOM, p. 3.

¹²Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), ch. 4.

¹³For the purposes of this research most of the journalists (whose articles are reviewed in the thesis) have been written to and asked for their opinions on these issues. However, not enough replies were received to make a valid generalisation.

adhering to the norm welcome the corrections to their reports because they see the corrections as upholding the norm. As Don Hewitt, editor of the influential US documentary programme '60 Minutes' has put it, 'Any time any reputable news organisation gives its readers or viewers details that later turn out not to be true, they are obligated to tell the truth'.¹⁴ Journalists, then, insofar as they adhere to the norm, believe they have a duty to actually report the war and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the thesis will proceed on the basis of this assumption.

Accepting the assumption that journalists are reporting events 'truthfully' does not entail the claim that these reports are literally The Truth in some absolute sense. Obviously there are complexities and difficulties involved in any interpretation of events, and perhaps these complexities are exacerbated in war with propaganda in full flow. However, as David Morrison and Howard Tumber in their book Journalists at War have stated:

All we can expect from journalists is a reasonable amount of accuracy and a round presentation of the facts. Unfortunately, however, facts are provisional upon wider understandings than that which is observed; but a factual account can be taken to be what a community accepts as reasonably accurate, given the limitations and difficulties of observing events.¹⁵

Thus, one cannot treat the journalist, any more than any other observer, as if they were simply a pair of eyes objectively viewing an event and responding with unbiased neutrality. We must consider that they are active, thinking human beings who make judgements based on their, no doubt extensive, but always limited, knowledge. Indeed, one well-respected journalist has even stated that there are instances when it would be morally wrong to remain neutral. Ed Vulliamy, in a recent statement on his discovery of the Omarska 'death' camp, made the following comment regarding a journalist's responsibility to be both objective and neutral:

It is, of course, essential for a reporter to be objective so long as objectivity concerns the facts. Sometimes, however, those facts are so appalling that to remain neutral is not really neutral at all - there are moments in history when neutrality is complicit in

¹⁴Ahmed, Coles, Gillard and Flynn, 5 August 1998.

¹⁵David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber, Journalists at War (London: Sage, 1988), p. xi.

the crime. I cannot and do not want to be neutral between the inmates of Omarska and its guards, torturers and managers.¹⁶

Given this statement, it would be wrong on the readers' part to accept that the journalist's account of events was a 'true' representation of the facts and relayed from a position of neutrality, to do so would be to presume a perfect knowledge of events and an inhuman sense of amorality. As one Salvadoran journalist has stated, 'I do not believe in journalistic objectivity. For me, objectivity cannot exist, because we are human beings, with feelings, thoughts, and the capacity to analyse. We are not simply transcribers of what one or the other says. We have a right and a duty to what is said'.¹⁷

Journalists are, therefore, not simply passive observers of these things called facts, but are active witnesses of happenings that call for judgements on their part. And to support Vulliamy's point above, Mark Pedelty in his study of war correspondents, has concluded that journalists who profess total objectivity and deny any political agenda are doing their readers a disservice. For example, Penelty states that, '[o]bjective journalists deny their subjectivities, rather than acknowledge and explain them. They evade contradiction, rather than letting the reader in on the inevitable doubts and difficulties encountered in any act of discovery'.¹⁸ Although it should be noted that the judgements that journalists make are made within professional codes of conduct¹⁹ and they are held responsible for ensuring certain standards of accuracy.²⁰

From the perspective just discussed, journalists have a responsibility to represent the war as accurately as possible so that the recipients of the information can also make reasonable judgements based on what they are reading. Furthermore, those fighting and suffering in war also have a human 'right' to have their needs and values effectively relayed to those in positions of global power. For the victims of rape in war, for example, the representation of their experiences and suffering is almost always indirect. They seldom have the opportunity to communicate directly to the

¹⁶Ed Vulliamy, "Death that cheated justice," *The Guardian*, 4 August 1998, sec. G2, p. 9.

¹⁷Quoted in Mark Pedelty, *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 10.

¹⁸*ibid.*, p. 196.

¹⁹Denis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory* (London: Sage, 1994), p. 125.

²⁰Nigel G. E. Harris, "Codes of Conduct for Journalists," in Belsey and Chadwick (1992), pp. 62-76.

Western public or political elites, they cannot convey their own experiences or create their own images. They rely on a third party which can be either individuals or institutions, but over which they have no control and, in addition, they can neither regulate that representation nor judge its political impact. Frequently, *what* is represented and *how* it is represented is dependent upon how the particular issue to be represented fuses with the interests, values and agendas of the individual journalist and the specific media group involved, which in turn are fed by the dominant interests, values and agendas of Western society as a whole.²¹ Those being represented are, in effect, powerless. As a consequence, the inequitable evolution of global communications has made it difficult for those people who become victims of human rights abuses in peripheral countries, away from the core of global power, to achieve accurate representation. Thus, the responsibilities of the journalist, particularly those reporting from distant conflict should not be under-estimated. As journalist John Pilger has put it, 'journalists write history's first draft'.²²

One suggestion that news reports are tailored to suit British concepts of 'taste' comes from journalist and MP Martin Bell. He claims that the accusations aimed at journalists of news exaggeration, distortion, and misconstruing the context of reports are mis-placed. For example, regarding his reporting from Bosnia, he makes the following comment:

[I]n the Bosnian war we tended to understate and under-report and not show things quite as we found them. Sometimes courage failed. Certainly mine did. I believe we should show more than we do and take out less than we do on the grounds of taste.²³

John Pilger has also commented on this point in what he describes as 'censorship by exclusion'.²⁴ He defines this form of censorship as 'leaving out the unpalatable, a process that is important to the task of minimising or obfuscating the culpability of governments and their institutions'.²⁵ Therefore, whether achieved by exaggeration or exclusion, the journalist still appears to be guilty of a distortion of the 'facts',

²¹Editorial, "The Media and Images of War: Perception Versus Reality," The Defense Monitor Vol. XXIII, no. 4 (Washington, DC: Centre for Defense Information, 1994), p. 3.

²²John Pilger, "John Pilger Column," New Statesman, 2 August 1996, p. 26.

²³Martin Bell, "Conflict of interest," The Guardian, 11 July 1996, p. 11

²⁴John Pilger, 2 August 1996.

²⁵*ibid.*

however, as mentioned above, Bell was aware of this 'violation' of the journalistic 'norm' while he was reporting. Furthermore, Pilger concludes that '[t]here is no suggestion here of a conspiracy. Historians and journalists are no different in their capacity to internalise the priorities and fashions of unaccountable power'.²⁶

There is, then, a complex web of relationships formed between the British press, its effect on the ideology, culture, religion, language and identity of Western society (and *vice versa*), its representation of the ideologies, cultures, religions, and identities of 'others', and the process of British socialisation. This entails a complex set of social forces and tensions that are difficult to separate and analyse in isolation. However, one way in which these forces can be identified and critically analysed is by focusing on one particular issue and how it has been reported in the British press. Therefore, by critically analysing the British print media's representations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict, it will help to illuminate these various cultural forces and how they affect the reporting of, and the responses to, mass rape in war.

Structure of Part Two

Part One equipped us with an understanding of some basic theories of rape, an insight into the history of mass rape in war, and some knowledge of the background to the Balkan conflict. Part Two attempts to offer an in-depth study of the reports of the rapes as published in the chosen British broadsheet newspapers. In researching the reports between 1991-1995, that included references to rape in war in the former-Yugoslavia, they have been categorised depending on the context in which the rapes were represented. Consequently, the articles have been divided into three distinct issue areas: nationalism, war games and Western responses. These three areas each frame a chapter and within each chapter other related themes are also drawn out.

Chapter Four analyses articles which claimed that *nationalism* is at the root of mass rape in war in the Balkans and the categorisation of these reports were dependant on the way in which this nationalism had been expressed. Some journalists claimed that

²⁶ibid.

the rapes in the Balkans were due to ethnic cleansing, some suggested religious manifestations of nationalism, and yet more claimed that nationalistic wartime propaganda has been the provocation.

In Chapter Five, the articles analysed have 'war games' as their focus, suggesting that the rapes were possibly part of a pre-planned strategy of intimidation and terror by the military elites. Some articles suggested that, as in most wars, the rapes simply form a part of the soldier's R&R (rest and relaxation) and had little to do with overtly political motives. Other articles, however, stated that the rapes were the result of misogyny, either innate, or derived from the forms of socialisation involved in military training. Chapter Five also includes a number of reports which deal with the subject of *male* rape and mutilation in war, of which there are a surprising number, given that male rape is generally regarded as a 'forbidden' subject.

Finally, Chapter Six analyses newspaper articles that are based on the responses of Western political elites, feminists, and other commentators to the reports of mass rape in the Balkans. For example, these were articles by journalists who concentrated on one or more aspect of the 'Western response' to the reports of rape. These responses include discussions of EC (as it was known then) and NGO investigations, the adoption of 'rape babies', women's human rights and the setting up of the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.

Overall, then, Part Two identifies and describes the reports of British broadsheet journalists, and offers a critical examination of them in an attempt to establish how the rapes have been represented and what explanations have been suggested for their occurrence.

4

NATIONALISM

Issues surrounding nationalism make up a large proportion of the texts analysed within this case study. The war in the former-Yugoslavia has been constantly referred to in the media as an 'ethnic conflict', thus presenting the conflict as a war between rival ethnic groups. In numerous articles, which will be identified throughout this chapter, the press has written simply about 'Muslims', 'Croats' and 'Serbs'. They have also continually and subtly endorsed this 'ethnic account' of the war by constantly referring to the legitimate and pluralist Bosnian government - which prided itself on its own multi-ethnic composition - as the 'mainly Muslim Bosnian government'. Indeed, such was the frustration of the Bosnian government over what they considered to be a false representation by the British media, that in October 1994 during the launch of an appeal by the Sarajevo Citizen's Assembly to gain support for a free, open and ethnically undivided Sarajevo, Eric Herring noted the following ironic remark:

With heavy humour, the Bosnian Embassy in London stated in its press release: 'A special award for services to the Foreign Office will go to any British journalist or editor who manages to insert the prefixes "Muslim-dominated", "Muslim-led" or "predominantly Muslim" into any of the ... aims of the campaign.'

By the same token, no articles have been unearthed which refer to the Serbian Nationalist regime of Radovan Karadic as anything other than the 'Bosnian Serbs'. Although many people of Serb origin remained in Bosnian government territory,

¹Eric Herring, "An Uneven Killing Field: The Manufacture of Consent for the Arms Embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Malcolm Evans, ed., The Challenge of Change: The European Union and International Law (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Press, 1996), p. 8.

many opposed to Serbian nationalism; no article researched reported this fact. Likewise, the media referred to those Croatian leaders and fighters who committed atrocities against Muslims as 'Bosnian Croats', even though more Croats lived in government areas than in the newly formed Croatian state, again, many were opposed to Croatian nationalism.

Despite these implicit accommodations to the official British government line, the media in Britain arguably played a critical role in relaying the information concerning multiple rapes, genocide and other atrocities to the attention of the British public and political elites. It was due to the press/media's representations, and attempted explanations, of the experiences and needs of the victims of rape that these issues were placed, however briefly, onto the political agenda, implicitly generating pressure for action. The articles in the British press which contain possible explanations, or assumptions, for the mass raping of predominantly women in the former-Yugoslavia based on nationalism, fall into separate, but related, categories: Rape as 'ethnic cleansing', religion, identity, or propaganda. Each will be identified in turn.

Rape as 'ethnic cleansing'

A United Nations Commission of Experts was appointed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in October 1992 to 'examine and analyse information gathered with a view to providing the secretary-general with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia'.² Quoting from its first interim report (S/25274 - note 55 and 56), the commission describes 'ethnic cleansing' as follows:

The expression "ethnic cleansing" is relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, "ethnic cleansing" means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. "Ethnic cleansing" is contrary to international law.

²Cited in Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 43.

Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia, "ethnic cleansing" has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.³

Given the above definition, rape and sexual assault can be described as a form of 'ethnic cleansing'. Indeed, there are many newspaper reports that represent the rapes in this manner, although this is not consistent throughout the broadsheet newspapers. Between January 1991 and December 1995, the Sunday Times and The Times both made the direct link between the reports of mass rape and 'ethnic cleansing' in only one and three articles respectively. In the same time period, however, The Guardian published eighteen articles that referred to the rapes as a form of 'ethnic cleansing'.

The majority of these articles can be divided into three distinct categories. The first group appears to be offering 'evidence' of rape as 'ethnic cleansing', mostly by using Western sources of information. These include reports by the EU, quotations from a UN High Commissioner, and so on. A second, smaller group of articles, concentrates on verifying the journalists claims of rape as 'ethnic cleansing' by including anti-Muslim sentiments which are mainly derived from interviews with Serb or Croat nationalists. The third and smallest category is linked to the second group, but includes the responses of Muslims to 'ethnic cleansing'. In these articles the Muslims are generally represented as the victims with part, or all, of their experiences used as 'evidence' against Serb 'ethnic cleansing'.

Published in The Times in December 1992, and as an example of the first category of article, Roger Boyes wrote simply that '[t]he "rape camps" appear to be a sinister offshoot of ethnic cleansing'.⁴ This view was continued in The Times in January 1993 when the authors commented that:

The European Community last night confirmed in an official interim report that rape was being used as a systematic weapon of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As many as 20,000 Bosnian

³ibid.

⁴Roger Boyes, "Churches say Serbs are using rape as a weapon," The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6.

Muslim women may have been raped by Serb soldiers as part of a plan to enforce the 'ethnic cleansing' of captured districts and to drive them and their families from their homes.⁵

Both these reports represent rape as just one tactic which is involved in the construction, or execution, of what has been called 'ethnic cleansing' - an 'off-shoot' even implying that it plays a rather minor role. Many of the articles actually refer to 'ethnic cleansing' as a 'by-product' of the war and in turn the rapes as being a 'by-products' of 'ethnic cleansing'. Some journalists, however, have suggested that this is a mis-representation of the role of rape in the Balkan conflict and have questioned whether 'ethnic cleansing', rather than being a by-product of the war, was actually the *aim*, with rape one of the fundamental tactics used to achieve the aim. In essence, women's cultural position and their importance in the family structure - particularly appropriate in the case of the Muslim women living under traditional Muslim laws - was a key factor in their victimisation under a strategy of 'ethnic cleansing'. This point will be raised again in Chapter Seven. With the raping of Muslim women in mind, Catherine Bennett wrote the following passage in an early 1993 article for The Guardian:

For rape is an effective instrument of war - an act which at once demoralises and humiliates the enemy, defiles his property, and deters him from propagating his own people through the bodies of violated females, and hence assists in crushing a people.⁶

This is not to suggest that Muslim women were the only targets of 'ethnic cleansing', however, this does constitute one explicit definition of 'ethnic cleansing' which is referred to as 'genocidal rape'. (This notion of 'genocidal rape' will be discussed at length in Chapter Eight) However, while understanding that the term 'genocidal' has probably been attached in order to emphasise the heinousness of the crimes and also the possible *raison d'être* behind the crimes, the use of the term could also be regarded as a counter productive. Rape and genocide are generally regarded as different crimes.⁷ Although both are based on the dehumanisation of the victim(s) and seek to humiliate, terrorise and destroy, genocide is the attempt to destroy a people

⁵Michael Evans and Joel Brand, "Serbian heavy guns hit British base in central Bosnia," The Times, 9 January 1993, p. 11.

⁶*ibid.*

⁷Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).

based on their national identity, whereas rape is sexualised violence, generally against a woman and based on her identity as a woman.

These two separate atrocities appear to have intersected in the Balkans and from the standpoint of the rape victims they could be regarded as inseparable. But to concentrate on representing the rapes as 'genocidal', which at the time of writing remains factually dubious, could eventually render the rapes invisible. For example, in war, rape is still not *fully* recognised as a war crime.⁸ Therefore, now the war is over, and the atrocities are being analysed and the war criminals named, for what crimes are they being held accountable? At the War Crimes Tribunal set up in The Hague, genocide has proved to be an indictable war crime, but rape has played a very minor role in comparison.⁹ Yet, if rape in war is continually recognised as a war crime, at least by the press and the public, then eventually it might be regarded as such by those political elites involved in expanding and developing the international legislation which is put in place to protect civilians in war.

Traditionally, the civilian casualty has been represented as being outside the target of attack. Terms such as 'unintentional' and 'accidental' are bound up with the notion that civilian casualties are unavoidable 'by-products' of war, which arguably reduces civilian victims on all sides to non-entities, or at least diminishes their importance to some extent. However, recent military history suggests that civilian casualties, the majority of whom are women and children, rather than being 'unexpected by-products' of war, have actually constituted a significant part in many military victories. Indeed, over time the ratio between civilian and military casualties has dramatically changed.¹⁰ Therefore, within the context of the systematic involvement

⁸Theodor Meron, "Editorial Comment," American Journal of International Law Vol. 87, no. 3 (July 1993): pp. 424-428.

⁹Christopher Greenwood, "The International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia," International Affairs Vol. 69, no. 4 (1993): pp. 641-655; Theodor Meron (July 1993), pp. 424-428; and also Theodor Meron, "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): pp. 122-135.

¹⁰The suggestion that civilian populations are systematically drawn into war strategy is confirmed by the following numbers: In World War I a disproportionately greater number of civilians than soldiers were killed. The former Soviet Union cites the number of 9 million soldiers of both sexes killed in World War II compared with more than 16 million civilians. Official statements about the Korean War quote a proportion of 1:5, and for the Vietnam the proportion is 1:13. According to UNICEF data, in the wars fought since World War II 90% of all victims were civilians, a large percentage of them women and children. For future wars, a study from 1979 anticipates a proportion of 1:100; also see Richard Gabriel, The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development (London: Greenwood Press,

of the civilian population in war strategies, it could be argued that the attack on women in the Balkans was not a 'by-product' of war, but a conscious military tactic - a target of 'ethnic cleansing'. Again, this point will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven, under the heading 'rape as a weapon'.

The Guardian in the spring of 1993 published an article which, to some extent, reiterated these sentiments and represented the rapes of women and children as being a particular 'target' of the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' not merely a 'by-product' of it. The article states:

Information about massacres, futile deaths and human suffering affects men and women alike. But the images from Bosnia have a particular horror for women. We have read the reports about mass rape, the rape of children, the holding captive of pregnant women until it is too late for abortions and then the extermination of whole families and villages. "Ethnic cleansing" is a term repeated only reluctantly. But its reality in Bosnia has to be faced. The aim is the destruction of one's group's integrity, either by literal annihilation or by the abuse and rape of women ... [w]omen and children are the target of ethnic cleansing, not just innocent victims of an incomprehensible ethnic clash, as the western media portrays them.¹¹

Against this background the representation here is that these mass rapes appear to take on a new meaning, they are no longer represented as acts of senseless brutality, but as culture-destroying actions with a strategic rationale. According to this article, in a Bosnian war zone women appeared to be in a more precarious situation than men. As mentioned earlier, for the majority of Muslim women their unique position within their particular societal structure denotes that their destruction is a specific objective in 'ethnic cleansing'.

According to an article published in The Times in January 1992, it was not just women who were singled out as specific targets. Despite Geneva Conventions demanding the contrary all civilians - women, children, the old and infirm - were the

1990); Carolyn Nordstrom, "Women and War: Observations from the Field," Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military Vol. 9, no. 1 (1991); and Ruth Seifert, "War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis," in Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln, 1994), pp. 54-72.

¹¹Rosalind Coward, "Loud and clear," The Guardian, 30 April 1993, sec. G2T, p. 12.

targets of 'ethnic cleansing'. The 'evidence' given by Borislav Herak, a volunteer Serbian fighter who had been charged with rape and murder by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal supported this suggestion. In a front-page leading article, it states the following:

His eyewitness testimony, the first by a participant in the notorious process of 'ethnic cleansing', should also offer a unique insight into how Serb forces killed tens of thousands of Muslim and Croat Bosnians and drove hundreds of thousands more from their homes... "The order was that nobody should stay alive, we should kill everybody," he said, adding that the instruction had come down the Serbian chain of command from the area commander in the town of Ilijas. "We did not have any choice. He told us what had to be done, and we did it." In probably the most gruesome episode, he said the Serb fighters were encouraged to rape young Bosnians at the prison turned military brothel where inmates were killed to make way for newcomers.¹²

The representations in this passage not only highlight the issue of civilians as prime targets in 'ethnic cleansing', with women being particularly vulnerable, but also depict the soldier's role in 'ethnic cleansing' as one of passive obedience to the military, or at least the orders of their next-in-command. This notion of military expectations will be discussed in Chapter Five, and again in Chapter Eight. However, the soldier's role here appears to be one that unquestioningly promotes the use of 'ethnic cleansing' in order to satisfy the Serb ideology of ethnic dominance.

In the summer of 1993, Ed Vulliamy wrote an article that was published in The Guardian entitled "Croats' new ethnic purge leaves a ghost town". This article is depicted as a first-hand account of the results of 'ethnic cleansing' as can be seen in the following passage:

Capljina is left a terrifying, sealed-off town, penetrated only by The Guardian and The Washington Post this weekend, and found to be 'cleansed' of almost its entire male Muslim population between 18 and 60, their womenfolk cowering in fear in their houses, Muslim shops systematically dynamited, their houses looted, the first reports of rape reaching the United

¹²Leading article, "Serb learnt rape and murder," The Times, 14 December 1992, p. 1.

Nations High Commission for Refugees. The UNHCR says these violent conditions are "a pattern across the region".¹³

In this article, rape is represented again as a result, or a by-product, of 'ethnic cleansing'. If the inventory of atrocities are listed in order of importance, which they tend to be given the nature of newspaper editing (i.e. cutting articles from the bottom), then rape lies at the end of the list. Above it are what are considered by Vulliamy to be the more newsworthy components of 'ethnic cleansing': the expelling of the majority of Muslim males from the town (their fate is unknown); the fear of the remaining women; destroyed shops; and looted houses. There is no further mention of rape in this lengthy 1,000-word article. However, this article does include an 'anti-Muslim' quotation, which brings us to the second category of article: those which try to expose and support the 'ethnic cleansing' theory by incorporating excerpts from anti-Muslim statements made by Serb or Croat nationalists.

Following Vulliamy's visit to Capljina his investigations took him to the man allegedly responsible for the 'ethnic cleansing' in the Bosnian town. Vulliamy makes the following statement:

The man behind the expulsions in Capljina is the mayor and head of the local Croatian HVO army, Pero Markevic. He was unavailable for interview this weekend. A UNHCR official described Mr. Markevic as being "about as extreme as possible" and summarised a "breeding programme" he has been trying to introduce to restrict Muslim women having children. The UNHCR quoted Mr. Markevic as calling the Muslim refugees "a Bohemian group breeding anti-social, anti-authoritarian individuals".¹⁴

Many variants have been reported in the patterns of alleged systematic rape and 'ethnic cleansing' throughout the war zone, possibly reflecting the predilection of the local commanders, or the reporters. However, this reporting of a 'breeding programme', even though Vulliamy does not expand on the subject further, is rare. Research has unearthed only one other article which mentions an equally radical and abhorrent form of 'ethnic cleansing', based on the curbing of the Muslim population's reproductive freedoms. It was written by Michael Simmons at the same time that Roy

¹³Ed Vulliamy, "Croats' new ethnic purge leaves a ghost town," *The Guardian*, 19 July 1993, sec. HOM, p. 20.

¹⁴ibid.

Gutman's first accounts of mass rape were being published in August 1992. The article by Simmons was also published in The Guardian and stated that a report had been issued by a 'Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights' (ISHR), which contained information on Serb-generated 'ethnic cleansing' programmes. The article included the following extract:

[The report] claims that "thousands may have been killed" in two [prison camps], Prijedor and Foca, and that Albanian children in Kosovo have been poisoned *en masse* in an attempt to sterilise them. Using material it says is based on eyewitness testimony collected over the last month and which has been authenticated in every case, the report lists allegations of murder, torture, starvation and rape.¹⁵

In other previously mentioned articles, claims by numerous other 'international bodies', particularly those specialising in human rights, have been taken seriously and further investigations by journalists to support the claims have been carried out where possible. Furthermore, they have been represented as 'truth-telling' organisations and their reports have been represented as 'fact'. However, in this case, as Vulliamy states, the ISHR's report has been met with 'caution' if not scepticism and Vulliamy even suggests that the group may have 'a political axe to grind'. To support this view Vulliamy uses quotations from other prominent humanitarian groups in which they confirm that they are doubtful of the authenticity of the report's content. For example, Vulliamy paraphrases Christian Aid's head of research, Derrick Knight, as saying 'that ISHR reports had to be seen in the context of its strongly anti-Communist background ... According to Mr. Knight, the society was founded by a group of Ukrainian and Romanian anti-Communist nationalists "with fascist inclinations"'.¹⁶ Although Vulliamy included a quotation from the society's international secretary, Robert Chambers, which refuted all accusations in the following manner: '[t]here is a whole bag of those kinds of abuse floating around. But it is not true'.¹⁷ The resulting impression is that all the reports of human right's violations that have emanated from this source, including rape, are at best exaggerated and at worse falsified.

¹⁵Michael Simmons, "German atrocity report treated with caution," The Guardian, 12 August 1992, p. 6.

¹⁶*ibid.*

¹⁷*ibid.*

Rape, here, has been represented as both a lesser atrocity and as unsubstantiated political rhetoric. This is not to say that all allegations of rape, no matter what the context, should be regarded without question as factually correct, but in this case to dismiss allegations of atrocities because they are made by a group whose history stems from a controversial ideology is to buy into the same mode of thought that is being criticised in the first place. In other words, to disallow the ISHR's report to be taken seriously and investigated further because of some dubious historical beliefs and allegiances is to render all the allegations of enemy atrocities by warring factions worthless.

Writing on the issue of anti-Muslim statements - it being the basis for the journalists' links between rape and 'ethnic cleansing' - Ian Traynor in November 1993 made the following statement:

In a war where the establishment of ethnically pure mini-states has always been the central ambition for the Serbs and the Croats, ethnic cleansing - the forced uprooting of people through terror, killing, rape, and looting - is less an effect of the fighting than its aim.¹⁸

In a similar vein, this time reporting from Mostar in September 1994, Traynor stated that, 'most Croats here see the Muslims as the threat. A local Croat official said to me this morning, "The Muslims have got to be destroyed or the Muslims will win"'.¹⁹ This view that both the Serbs and the Croats have used 'ethnic cleansing' as a means of achieving their goal of ethnically-pure states is one that is fairly consistent throughout the representation in the British press. In comparison, although there have been abuses committed by the Bosnian forces, on the whole these have been represented as unauthorised, unplanned and in no way comparable to the abuses committed by the Serb and Croat forces. In the second Traynor quotation above, there is also a discernible fear in the tone of the Croatian official's statement. But does this fear of a Muslim victory extend beyond the 'normal' fear of an enemy victory that one would expect to find in any wartime scenario? Although the Serbs, Croats and Muslims have lived along side each other in the homogenous state of Yugoslavia for

¹⁸Ian Traynor, "Aid saves lives but keeps the war going," The Guardian, 25 November 1993, sec. FOR, p. 11.

¹⁹Ian Traynor, "Home is a hundred yards away but another world for Mostar's victims," The Guardian, 5 September 1994, sec. FOR, p. 10.

decades and mixed-marriages, and off-spring from those mixed marriages, are common-place,²⁰ the propaganda machine put in motion by the Serb and Croat leaders has been so pervasive, as will be illustrated in the following quotations, that many Serb and Croat people appear to be fearful, not only of the Muslim *population*, but of the Muslim culture as a whole. In a Guardian article outlining the story of Borislav Herak, the convicted Serbian soldier already mentioned above, and whose alleged crimes include genocide, rape and looting, John Burns, the author, outlines various propaganda exercises which were allegedly used to encourage soldiers like Herak to rape. In the article, he continues:

According to these accounts, Herak says, Muslims would also require Serbian children to wear Muslim clothing. "We were told that we would have to cleanse our whole population of Muslims. That's what we have been told. That's why it has been necessary to do all this".²¹

For this 'cleansing' - as Herak describes it - to be successful it appears as if the Muslim women were the important quarry for the 'cleansers' to target. And, in turn, it is these 'cleansers' who are targeted by the propagandists who use 'fear' to achieve their objectives just as the 'cleansers' use rape. The overall representation is that rape for any purpose, whether to defile and dishonour, to sexually abuse and mutilate, to threaten and terrorise, or to impregnate with enemy seed, lies at the core of the 'ethnic cleansing' project. To quote from a Western European Union motion that was published in The Guardian in December 1992: 'Those responsible for the rape want to reduce the Muslim population, which is tantamount to 'ethnic cleansing'".²²

In response to the perceived reality of 'ethnic cleansing', some journalists depicted the Muslim population as powerless to defend themselves from both the enemy soldiers and the enemy propagandists. Jon Swain, writing in the Sunday Times in the summer of 1995, gives his impression of the double standards at work, which he attempts to persuade the reader is integral to the 'ethnic cleansing' plan:

²⁰Hermann Bausinger, "Concluding Remarks," in Renata Jambresic Kirin and Maja Povrzanovic, eds., War, Exile, Everyday Life: Cultural Perspectives (Zagreb: X-Press, 1996), p. 287.

²¹John Burns, "Slaughter in the name of Serbia," The Guardian, 3 December 1992, sec. G2T, p. 2.

²²Reuter in Paris, "WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims," The Guardian, 4 December 1992, sec. FOR, p. 11.

Mladic played a sordid role, reassuring frightened [Muslim]civilians they were safe as his troops handed out chocolates and patted children's heads for the benefit of Serbian television. At the same time his creed of total war encompassing murder, rape and destruction was put into brutal effect ... The Serbs were so sure of themselves, said [one] woman, "they told us they were expelling us, that we were 'Muslim vermin' no country wanted. They said they would kill our men they were taking away".²³

The Muslim response to 'ethnic cleansing' is difficult to assess. Some press representations seem to suggest that the Muslims were aware that they were being 'ethnically cleansed', but the term 'ethnic cleansing' is an expression which came into popular usage *after* many of the reported atrocities had taken place and in addition, the term is a phrase which is peculiar to the English language, although it, of course, has its equivalents in other languages.²⁴

The articles on the Muslim responses are concluded, as indeed is the chapter as a whole, by reviewing a report by Maggie O'Kane published in The Guardian on Christmas Eve 1993. In the small village of Krustica in central Bosnia, Maggie O'Kane interviewed one of a dying breed of idealists who still held out hope for a return to a peaceful multi-ethnic Bosnia. Misha, a businessman from the village fights with the men of the 17th Brigade, the 'Refugee Army', who were survivors of Serb detention camps. In O'Kane's words these men have been 'routed from their homes, wrenched from their families, they have lost everything but the will to live and the forlorn hope of a multi-ethnic Bosnia'.²⁵

My father is a Serb, my mother is a Croat, my wife is a Muslim and I'm wondering what my children are. All I'm interested in is who can provide a normal free life for my children and these people [men of the '17th Brigade']. They are the only ones who make any sense.²⁶

This particular O'Kane article is one of the few accounts of the Bosnian war which suggested that the war began because of a Serb 'campaign of territorial expansion',

²³Jon Swain, "Bosnia endures more atrocities," Sunday Times, 23 July 1995, p. 1&13.

²⁴Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (London: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 12-15.

²⁵Maggie O'Kane, "Bosnia's Last Stand," The Guardian, 24 December 1993, sec. WEE, p. 4.

²⁶ibid.

rather than the standard simplistic explanation of the war as an 'ethnic conflict' - part of a continuing squabble between ancient ethnic tribes - a 'myth' which some academic commentators have stated is circulated by the majority of the press.²⁷ One example of this particular representation is an article written by Paul Wilkinson and published in The Guardian in the summer of 1994. In one passage it states:

Characteristically, [inter-ethnic] conflicts are fought by armed militias ...extreme savagery is shown to the civilian population, frequently including the policy of ethnic cleansing to terrorise whole sectors of the civilian population into fleeing from their homes; and mass rape, torture and massacre are common.²⁸

However, O'Kane clarifies *her* position by stating that 'pillage, rape and detention camps' were all part of the campaign by Serbian nationalists 'aimed at building an ethnically homogenous state'.²⁹ It should be noted though, that O'Kane is literally 'camped out' with a group of multi-ethnic Bosnians who are fighting against Serb nationalism. Therefore, however sympathetic one is to her views, it is also apparent that she is not reporting from a position of impartiality.³⁰ Although Ian Traynor, writing in The Guardian supported her arguments stating that:

In a war where the establishment of ethnically pure mini-states has always been the central ambition for the Serbs and the Croats - the forced uprooting of people through terror, killing, rape and looting - is less an effect of the fighting than its aim.³¹

In addition, The Times, in response to Roy Gutman's initial reports of rape and 'systematic slaughter on a huge scale' published in The Guardian in August 1992,³² also linked rape to 'ethnic cleansing' in an article by Barbara Hewson. The article states that:

One hundred Muslim women and girls were rounded-up and held at a school in Rogatica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, during

²⁷See, for example: Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994).

²⁸Paul Wilkinson, "Mad dogs of war are still running wild," The Guardian, 17 August 1994, sec. FEA, p. 16.

²⁹*ibid.*

³⁰Perhaps, as Ed Vulliamy suggested in the Introduction to Part Two, O'Kane has found that neutrality is sometimes a difficult position to morally justify.

³¹Ian Traynor, "Aid saves lives but keeps the war going," The Guardian, 25 November 1993, sec. FOR, p. 11.

³²Roy Gutman, "Survivors tell of thousands killed in Serbian camps," The Guardian, 5 August 1992, sec. HOM, p. 1 and "Witnesses call teenager's rape in camp 'typical'," The Guardian, 10 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 8.

'ethnic-cleansing' by Serbs. The women were repeatedly gang-raped.³³

While concentrating on the rapes of Muslim women, Hewson also describes how 'Serbian women were subjected to a two-month reign of terror by Croats',³⁴ thus, possibly convincing the reader that the analysis is comprehensive and liberal in its approach with an implicit attempt at fairness and balance. Hewson does admit, however, that 'these accounts were carried in the British press on August 10' - a reference to the first Gutman accounts of the rapes and other atrocities - so the actual reports of rape are actually second-hand accounts and to some extent merely reiterated Gutman's own sentiments.

The claim that 'ethnic cleansing' played a role in the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict is a strong one and it is probably safe to assume that if there had been no 'ethnic cleansing' the numbers of women raped would have been considerably less. However, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, it is just one explanation among other potentially destructive concepts.

Rape as Religion

Religion is one issue that has played a rather dualistic role in the representation of rape in the Balkan conflict within the British press - it has been represented as both an issue and a non-issue. To explain this, I suggest that the term 'Muslim' is used in the British press more often as a marker of nationality as of religion. Croats, Serbs and 'Muslims' are generally represented as the three warring factions in the 'Bosnian' war, not Croats, Serbs and 'Bosnians'. Yet, the war has been represented as a war between *nations* not religions. Therefore, I would also suggest that when the term 'Muslim' is used in this context - as a marker of a national identity - then the religious meaning it carries becomes a less significant issue.³⁵ However, the word 'Muslim' is a religious term. It denotes the religion of the person as being Islamic, which in itself could be

³³Barbara Hewson, "Rape is a war crime too; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Modern Times," The Times, 8 September 1992, sec. LT, p. 4.

³⁴ibid.

³⁵Sells (1996), p. 14.

seen to make it an over-riding 'issue' given the implications of the traditional Islamic culture upon women's lives. As it has been documented in many places, for women in the Islamic faith, being a Muslim is not simply a set of beliefs but a whole way of life with her role in the community clearly defined.³⁶ But is this the way in which Bosnian Muslim women have been represented in the British press? And how has the religion of the rape victims affected the way in which they have been represented?

First, Bosnian Muslim women have generally been represented as 'traditional', devout Islamic women. One example of this can be found in an article in The Times, written by Alice Thomson in January 1993. The ensuing quotation probably comes from a statement by the president of Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge, Dame Anne Warburton, who was asked by the EC, via the British Foreign Office, to investigate allegations of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia. Dame Anna was interviewed by Thomson on her return from a 'fact finding mission' to Bosnia. I say 'probably' because in this rather disordered article the quotation marks simply begin and end with no mention of who is talking. However, as the article is written primarily as a documentary of Dame Anna's visit to the Balkans I believe that it is safe to assume that they are her words - although contextually I am a little more sceptical. This section of the article is discussing the female victims of rape and states:

It is difficult for any woman in a state of trauma to talk. But the Bosnian Muslim women are even more inhibited. Traditionally, they do not come out of their houses, let alone have outside sexual relationships.³⁷

This statement runs contrary to other information sources that portray the Bosnian Muslims in the former-Yugoslavia as having become more liberal thinking and accepting of Western values. Azra Zalihić-Kaurin, a reporter for the Croatian daily newspaper Vecernji List, has written on this subject and comments that in the former Yugoslavia the traditional influence of the Islamic culture has considerably weakened over time and states that:

Muslims were scarcely different from members of other nationalities. Muslim women lived new lives, transmitted this

³⁶See for example: Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, eds., Woman-Nation-State (London: Macmillan, 1989).

³⁷Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear," The Times, 1 January 1993, p. 11.

new way of life to their children ... [t]hey no longer had anything to do with Islam: the only thing they still knew was that Muslims do not eat pork. Travel, city life, education, and communist ideology had changed them.³⁸

This is a different picture than the one painted by the previous Warburton quotation. Of course, there are many other factors which could have a bearing on the level of commitment to the Islamic faith - geographical location (urban or rural), the diminishing influence of communism, and so on. However, many contemporary scholars have suggested that the for Yugoslav people, particularly the younger city dwellers, the orthodox fundamentalist Muslim lifestyle was little practised.³⁹ While Zalihic-Kaurin endorses this point of view, nevertheless, she states without hesitation in then following quotation the one area in which the Bosnian Muslims 'never fully forgot their traditions'. She claims that, '[y]oung Muslim women today may wear miniskirts and have boyfriends, may study and work, but they still respect the commandment of virginity'.⁴⁰ This is obviously an important point with respect to the raping of Muslim girls and women and will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

There is also evidence that may point to the fact that the Bosnian Muslim men never fully forgot their religious traditions too. In one of Roy Gutman's articles in August 1992, a Bosnian man who had been held prisoner by the Serbs in a detention centre is quoted as saying that while being detained 'he experienced nearly every form of humiliation the Serb captors inflicted on Muslim prisoners, from desecration of the local mosque to witnessing the murder and mutilation of male prisoners and gang rape of women'.⁴¹ From this statement it can be deduced that this Muslim man felt personally humiliated, even defiled when the Serbs desecrated his local mosque, or at least Gutman represents him as having those feelings. Religion, as demonstrated by this case, was a significant factor in how the war was fought.⁴² Furthermore, the Serbian troops would surely have considered the issue an important one given the

³⁸Azra Zalihic-Kaurin, "The Muslim Woman," in Stiglmeier (1994), pp. 170-173.

³⁹See, for example: Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Dusan Necak, "Historical Elements for Understanding the 'Yugoslav Question'," in Payam Akhavan, ed., *Yugoslavia the Former and the Future: Reflections by scholars from the region* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995); and Branka Magas, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92* (London: Verso, 1993).

⁴⁰Zalihic-Kaurin (1994), p. 171.

⁴¹Roy Gutman, 5 August 1992.

⁴²Sells (1996), p. 93.

widespread military action involved in the destruction of the mosques throughout Bosnia.⁴³

Given the certitude that religion played a significant part in *how* the war was fought, it played a more limited role in the explanations by the British press concerning the raping of women. This could, of course, be due to the fact that, as explained above, religion is tied up with ethnicity, many journalists may have been drawn to suggest explanations for the rapes based on ethnicity rather than religion. However, the first article to mention the rapes in conjunction with religion does so in relation to the 'Islamic world' and the possibility of the 'Arab states and Iran' declaring a 'jihad' or holy war in the Balkans, due to the 'Christian West's' 'neglect of Bosnia'. The section of the article in question states:

All the pent-up tension between Islam and the Christian West seems now to be concentrating on the Bosnian war. Graphic accounts of the rape of Muslim women that have been circulating around Middle Eastern embassies and information ministries are partly to blame. Partly to blame is also the bombardment of mosques, while frustration with Western reluctance to commit a large military force to the region is also a factor.⁴⁴

As the above quotation demonstrates, throughout most of the article both the author and the sources he quotes take a very detached attitude to the raping of the Bosnian Muslim women, preferring instead to concentrate the discussion on which Islamic countries are helping the Bosnian Muslims financially by donating humanitarian and military aid. The crux of the article is that the Middle Eastern Islamic states used the Balkan war, and in particular the emotive issues surrounding the war such as the raping of Muslim women, as a means of gaining a greater foothold in 'the new ordering of Europe' at a 'strategically appropriate moment'.⁴⁵ As justification for this claim, Roger Boyes the author, makes a statement concerning one of the issues already mentioned in this section - the Bosnian Muslim's level of dedication to the Islamic faith. Boyes states:

⁴³Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The policy of 'ethnic cleansing' (College Station, Texas: A&M University Press, 1995), pp. 59-60.

⁴⁴Roger Boyes, "Arab states and Iran move closer to jihad in the Balkans," The Times, 2 September 1992, p. 8.

⁴⁵ibid.

There are some oddities in this enthusiastic involvement. The first is that Bosnian Muslims are certainly not the most devout of the faithful in Europe. Their conversion more than 500 years ago was pragmatic: Bosnian landowners could keep their estates under the Ottomans if they swore allegiance to Islam.⁴⁶

The rapes of the Bosnian Muslim women are represented by Boyes as being merely a tactic by which Middle Eastern Islamic states; first, to justify their closer involvement in the Balkan conflict; second, to justify their suggestion of a possible jihad - as the article states, '[t]he commentator of Al-Riad, a Saudi Arabian newspaper, described the Bosnian fighting as a 'prelude to the war between Islam and the West'.⁴⁷ Third, the article claims that the way the rapes have been used to raise money for war aid. As Boyes states, '[t]here is surely no mosque in the Gulf that has not been drumming up donations for the Bosnian cause'.⁴⁸ As the author of the article suggests in his concluding remarks, there must be 'more than Islamic solidarity or straightforward human sympathy' involved. The rapes are therefore represented here as merely a pawn in a much wider political game.

Another article in The Times which represents the issue of rape within a religious context, but in a more positive way, is one already mentioned above and comprises an interview with Dame Anna Warburton written by Alice Thomson. In one section of the article, which is discussing the efforts being made to help the survivors of rape both mentally and physically, Dame Anna is quoted as stating the following:

We must integrate the victims back into society. We talked to men who couldn't see how raped women could be reinstated. The Imam of Zagreb made a point of saying that raped women are heroines of the war and that Muslims must treat these women as special rather than cast them aside.⁴⁹

The Imam is an influential leader within the Muslim religion and therefore this statement by the Imam of Zagreb was no doubt courageous and controversial as it indicated a significant break with tradition: this tradition dictates that the 'honourable' thing for the rape victims to do would be to commit suicide and thus become

⁴⁶ibid.

⁴⁷ibid.

⁴⁸ibid.

⁴⁹Thomson, 1 January 1993.

'martyrs'.⁵⁰ There is no further information available in the article as to the reaction of the general Muslim population to the Imam's suggestion; nevertheless, this representation of an Islamic religious leader showing a degree of sensitivity to the plight of the female rape victims stands in stark contrast to the more typical representation of Muslim leaders as intransigent and unsympathetic. Moreover, this representation of the rape victims as receiving little or no help from their own 'patriarchal' leaders has often been used as the crux of the argument for the giving of Western aid to the Bosnian rape victims.⁵¹ This bleak picture has portrayed a situation whereby there is negligible help forthcoming locally for the rape survivors due the cultural and religious restraints of Islamic law; therefore, the West needs to intervene.⁵² I concede that the point might have been stretched somewhat; however, this is the only report found that indicated that a Muslim religious leader was prepared to even acknowledge the problem of the mass raping of Muslim women, let alone call for their reintegration into Muslim society. This particular representation of women will be pursued further in Chapter Seven.

The final article to be discussed in this section is one in which the Muslim leaders have indeed been portrayed as having a less than sensitive solution to the problems surrounding the reintegration into Muslim society of the rape victims. Linda Grant in an article written in the summer of 1993 and published in The Guardian states the following:

The solution of some Muslim leaders is more sinister. Dr. Izet Aganovic, president of the Red Crescent in Croatia, went on a tour of North Africa at the end of last year to raise support for refugees. After his return, he was inundated with requests from North African men to take these light-skinned, no longer chaste women as second or third wives. "They will forgive them," Aganovic says, with a startling absence of irony.⁵³

There is no further explanation or analysis of this statement; however, the gendered, and also racial, assumptions at work in this passage are astounding. There is also no mention of whether Dr. Izet Aganovic is a Muslim, which might have some bearing

⁵⁰Zalhic-Kaurin (1994), p. 173.

⁵¹See, for example: Linda Grant, "Anyone here been raped and speak English?" The Guardian, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 10.

⁵²ibid.

⁵³ibid.

on his attitude and how he is articulating these four simple words - *'they will forgive them'*. First, what is there to forgive? Do these women have to be forgiven for being the victims of rape? Second, does the emphasis on the 'they', as in *'they will forgive them'*, mean that the North African men will be able to forgive these women their unchasteness, whereas the Bosnian Muslim men cannot? On one hand, Aganovic appears to be implying that the North African men are more merciful and understanding than their Bosnian counterparts as they are willing to marry these defiled rape victims, albeit as second or third wives. On the other hand and more insidious, is the implicit suggestion that these darker-skinned North African men will forgive almost anything to have a 'light-skinned' woman. On reflection, it seems incredible that these powerful implications can be drawn from one simple statement made by a man who is the Croatian president of one of the world's leading humanitarian organisations.

As has been demonstrated, explanations for the mass raping of women due to 'religion' alone can offer only a partial account of events. This is possibly due to the fact that within the Muslim community religion is inextricably linked to notions of ethnicity and nationalism. However, we now turn to an issue that seems to accompany all wars - that is, the use of propaganda.

Rape as Propaganda

Propaganda has been studied from various disciplinary perspectives.⁵⁴ To study propaganda from a historical perspective is to examine the practices of propagandists as past events and the subsequent happenings as possible effects of that propaganda. Political scientists, on the other hand, have generally examined propaganda by analysing the ideologies of the practitioners, the dissemination of their propaganda, and impact that propaganda subsequently had on public opinion. Alternatively, to study propaganda through a sociological lens would entail the examining of social movements, including the development of counter-propaganda, which often emerges

⁵⁴See, for example: Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (London: Sage, 1992).

in opposition. Moreover, in the academic study of propaganda there have even been psychological studies into its influence on individuals.⁵⁵ However, in this section of the thesis, the journalists' reports will be analysed by drawing on most of the above fields by loosely defining propaganda as a purveyor of ideology with specific objectives, with a view to highlighting the possible use of the journalists as a means of disseminating wartime propaganda.

Propaganda, in its most passive sense, means to disseminate or promote a particular idea or set of ideas. The word is derived from the Latin *to propagate* and the dictionary expands this information in the following way:

propaganda a congregation of the Roman Catholic Church, founded 1622, charged with the spreading of Catholicism (*de propaganda fide*, 'concerning the faith to be propagated'): any association, activity, plan, etc., for the spread of opinions and principles, esp. to effect change or reform: the information, etc., spread by such association.⁵⁶

Therefore, because the 'Church's' use of the word denoted the spread of Catholicism to the New World and in addition the opposing of Protestantism, the word 'propaganda' subsequently lost its neutrality. Thus, to identify any form of communication as 'propaganda' nowadays, is to suggest something derogatory, negative, or even dishonest. Words frequently used as synonyms for 'propaganda' are *lies, distortion, deceit, manipulation, psychological warfare, and brainwashing*. Furthermore, propaganda is also frequently associated with *control* and is often regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. The propagandist has a clear aim, to broadcast a particular ideology to an audience with a related objective. Whether it involves a government attempting to instil a wave of patriotism in the nation to support a war effort, or a military leader attempting to frighten the enemy with claims of strength, there is a careful and predetermined plan of contrived symbol manipulation which is communicated to an audience in order to fulfil the particular objective. Moreover, the objective sought generally requires the audience to reinforce or modify their attitudes

⁵⁵N.F.S. Burnett, "Ideology and Propaganda: Toward an Integrative approach," in T. Smith, ed., *Propaganda: A Pluralist Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp.115-126.

⁵⁶M. A. Seaton, J. Simpson and G. W. Davidson, eds., *Chambers Concise Dictionary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 791.

and/or behaviour. This section will be examining how journalists have identified various ways in which the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict has been used by political elites as a tool in their 'propaganda war', and how this has been represented. In addition, and contrary to the structure of previous sections which have been organised by issues, the articles analysed in this section will be dealt with chronologically in order to afford some sense of the timing and development of the 'propaganda war'.

The first article to appear in the sections of the British press researched for the thesis that made mention of propaganda, was published in the Sunday Times during the summer of 1992. The article's author, Louise Branson, was interviewing a Serbian named Zivorad Teodorovic, who she describes as a 'one-legged survivor' of the war in Croatia. The 'Serbian authorities' apparently named Teodorovic, who Branson met at a rehabilitation centre in Belgrade, as an 'eyewitness of Croatian atrocities'. Branson mentions some of his claims:

[Teodorovic] claimed he had seen a child baked in an oven, and he had even seen three pies filled with human eyes. What sort of oven? He couldn't say. But, he insisted, the eyes had been sent for analysis. Where to? He couldn't say. Not once did he look me straight in the eye ... Teodorovic claimed that a woman doctor had wanted to castrate him after he was captured by Croats. What had she looked like? He couldn't say.⁵⁷

Branson is forthright about her 'mission impossible'. She is attempting to 'establish the truth', - to discover which of the many stories of atrocities are 'true' and which are not. Branson tells the reader clearly that she considers the stories recalled above by Teodorovic to be false. She states, 'he was clearly lying. People who tell the truth look you in the eye and fill their stories with detail, unburdening themselves.'⁵⁸ Perhaps an initial question to ask would be how does Branson know that these are the actions of 'truth-tellers'? She does not expand further. However, although this article does not specifically mention rape at this point, the reason for looking at this quotation is to compare Branson's point of view with that of another interviewer in a similar position.

⁵⁷Louise Branson, "Atrocities: Muslims, Croats and Serbs in catalogue of shame," Sunday Times, 12 July 1992, p. 1&13.

⁵⁸ibid.

Alice Thomson, writing in The Times in January 1993, includes a quotation from Dame Anna Warburton who, as mentioned previously, was in Bosnia on a fact-finding mission for the EC (EU). Dame Anna had been interviewing a rape victim when she made the following comment:

The atrocities are of a kind that you don't readily give credence to and with the propaganda war in full flow in Bosnia, you have to be extremely careful...[but]...We became convinced the stories were true because of the way they were told and the fact that the women rarely looked us in the eye. One face I shall never forget was that of a beautiful Croat girl, who had been a leading light in her town. She had been repeatedly raped in a Serb camp until she was exchanged for 50 Serbian soldiers. 'At least I know my value now,' said the girl. Her face was totally expressionless. As if her experiences were beyond words.⁵⁹

So, do 'truth-tellers' look you in the eye, or not? The contrasting views of both interviewers highlight the subjective nature of personal perceptions and expectations when interviewing. Perhaps, given the situation in the Balkans and the nature of rape as a wartime atrocity, a lot of men, particularly those men who have been fighting in the war, are looked on with suspicion. And conversely, perhaps women, due to the general suffering of women reported from this war, are given a sympathetic ear. Moreover, perhaps the expectations of the interviewer are dependent on the sex of the interviewee, with women and men expected to act differently under similar circumstances. In general, perhaps the interviewers expect women to act in certain pre-determined ways; to display shyness, reserve, subservience, to look demure and avoid eye contact. Whereas men are expected to act with forthrightness, candour, to sit upright and look you straight in the eye. By acting in the expected and 'appropriate' manner for your sex you are then accepted as 'normal' and 'true' rather than excluded as 'other' and 'false'.

Although it should not be forgotten that the interviewees are war victims and quite understandably reticent, nervous and possibly psychologically damaged. Yet one is represented as a 'true' victim of mass rape in war, while the other is represented as 'false' - a deceitful ex-Serbian fighter who is intent on spreading propaganda. Perhaps

⁵⁹Thomson, 1 January 1993.

one problem with accepting that truth is always the first casualty of war is that when faced with the 'truth' it is often impossible to recognise.⁶⁰ The above representations could be accurate, but I would suggest that it is impossible to tell by simply looking into the victim's eyes.

The next two reports, both of which contain the suggestion that the 'rapes' were being used for propaganda purposes, were written by Roy Gutman and Nina Bernstein and published in The Guardian on 10 and 12 August 1992 respectively. The first report contains a quotation from the Serbian leader, Radovan Karadzic, which came in response to a Bosnian government estimate that 200,000 people were being held in prison camps. Bosnian officials had said that 'they knew of at least one camp reserved for women and children, but said there was no way to estimate how many had been raped'.⁶¹ The article, allowing Karadzic a response, stated the following:

Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, denied that there were any detention camps for civilians in Bosnia, and added that no women or children were detained. Asked about the reports of systematic rape, he said: "There are six places in Sarajevo alone where they [the Muslims] are raping Serb women. We Serbs know what is going on".⁶²

The article does not make any attempt to comment on Karadzic's statement but merely responds by retelling in detail the story of the rape of a Muslim teenager by three Serb military guards.⁶³

'Belgrade bewildered by international outcry' is the headline for the second article. It is primarily a report of the Serbian response to international condemnation of the Serb-run detention 'camps' mentioned above. The author, Nina Bernstein, has built the article around comments and opinions obtained directly from the Serbian general public in 'Belgrade's bustling shopping centre'. According to Bernstein, the majority of her interviewees blame either 'paramilitary extremists' or 'Western propaganda' for the presence, or supposed presence, of the 'camps'. For example, Bernstein quotes a

⁶⁰Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker (London: Pan Books, 1989).

⁶¹Roy Gutman, "Witnesses call teenager's rape in camp 'typical'," The Guardian, 10 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 8.

⁶²ibid.

⁶³ibid.

sales clerk as commenting that 'the rest of the world is completely misinformed ... the Serbs are not the aggressors and, in Bosnia, Serbs are not the guilty ones'.⁶⁴ This appears to be the general consensus of opinion, as Bernstein comments that the local 'Serbian Renewal Movement', like the nationalist regime, 'has treated Western media accounts of Serb-run concentration camps for Muslims in Bosnia as one-sided propaganda'.⁶⁵ Bernstein also uses quotations from the president of the local 'Democratic' party, Dragoljub Micunovic, who states that the reports of *concentration camps* are merely 'a tough propaganda manoeuvre'.⁶⁶ However, it is unclear whether Micunovic is suggesting that the concentration camps *in toto* were stage-managed as a major propaganda exercise by the Croat or Muslim governments, or whether he is referring only to the adoption of the phrase 'concentration camp'. The use of quotations is always a selective exercise, but for the journalist, Nina Bernstein, to reduce this particular quotation to such an extent that the ambiguity is startlingly obvious, is not only frustrating for the reader, but also renders the article in question delusive and somewhat questionable.

Returning to the bustling shoppers, Bernstein attempts to explain the concerted opinions and attitudes of the Serbian people by stating that they have been 'cocooned by the omissions and denials of state-dominated news media' and that they 'had not seen the television footage of the Serb-run camp in Omarska, Bosnia' as 'it was not shown on the state-run television channel'.⁶⁷ However, Bernstein does quote one man as having a slightly different view on the matter. She interviews a 'former professor' and vice-president of one of the two opposition parties who states that 'everybody here speaks of an international plot against Serbia. I don't agree. Our minister of information is so mediocre the Serbs don't find a way to present their truth. The Muslims were much more effective'.⁶⁸ One must bear in mind that this is a politician in opposition speaking.

⁶⁴Nina Bernstein, "Belgrade bewildered by international outcry," The Guardian, 12 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 6.

⁶⁵ibid.

⁶⁶ibid.

⁶⁷ibid.

⁶⁸ibid.

The issue of rape was also mentioned by the 'former professor', Komnenic, during a discussion of the problems caused by extremist paramilitary groups and who, he claims, 'strut' around the streets of Belgrade in paramilitary uniforms. The article continues with Komnenic's opinion on the subject:

"They don't go to war," Mr. Komnenic said contemptuously of the paramilitaries. "They don't cross the Drina River (into Bosnia). They rape girls and mistreat people in the street. They've become a problem here".⁶⁹

The article offers no possible explanations for the raping of Serb 'girls' by Serb paramilitary forces, suffice to say, quite unconnectedly, that the city has recently seen an influx of '500,000 ethnic Serbs who fled their homes in Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia as the former republics broke away. To many, they are refugees competing for jobs in a collapsing economy'.⁷⁰ Is Bernstein implying a connection? Is there hostility between the Serbian refugees and the native Belgradians - enough animosity to incite rape? Although this article is not using the raping of women as a propaganda tool, as such, this article stands as an example of the persuasive power of propaganda on the attitudes of the general population.

In April 1993, The Guardian published an article in which Ian Traynor profiles Ratko Mladic, who is described initially not as the head of the Bosnian Serb army, but as 'the general at the head of the campaign of ethnic cleansing'. This introduction alone confirms the direction which Traynor intends to take. In the article Traynor includes direct quotations from Mladic, who, as expected, denies even the existence of detention camps, mass rape and other atrocities. For example, the article states:

Named as a suspected war criminal by the US, General Mladic to this day ridicules the main charges against the Bosnian Serb leadership. Detention Camps? "The [television] pictures were arranged by the Bush administration to justify the use of [US] weapons throughout the entire planet." Systematic rape of Muslim women? "There has never been a Muslim woman in any prison.... We would have to be maximal sex maniacs to achieve it. [The rape charge] is a product of a sick mind and paid propaganda."⁷¹

⁶⁹ibid.

⁷⁰ibid.

⁷¹Ian Traynor, "Ruthless war-baby leads Serbian fight," The Guardian, 14 April 1993, sec. FOR, p. 8.

It is obvious from the general tone of the article that although it is Mladic, who talks about Western propaganda as being the source of the problem, the representation of the situation explicitly implied in the article is that Mladic is himself one of the main disseminators of anti-Muslim, pro-Serbian propaganda. So, even as Mladic is categorically denying that Muslim women have been detained or systematically raped, the reader is already convinced that whatever he says, it will be false.

In a later Guardian article also by Ian Traynor, written in the summer of 1993, the subject of propaganda is touched upon again. Traynor is talking to Serbian Pavle Ivic, whom he calls a 'highly educated man, [who] speaks several languages, has a distinguished career behind him and is a rabid Serbian nationalist'.⁷² Ivic works, we are told, as an academic at the 'brains trust of the Greater Serbian Project' which is housed at the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade. Traynor, during the interview raises the question of 'plots' - presumably Serbian 'plots' that are hatched within the walls of the 'brains trust'. The article continues by airing Ivic's views (although there are no quotation marks used), in the following manner:

You want to hear about plots? Ivic asks tetchily. Ethnic cleansing, mass rape, detention camps, thousands dead, hundreds of thousands homeless, the end of Yugoslavia, all of this and more has been caused not by the combatants and their political masters, but by the rest of the world.⁷³

Traynor states that this is 'a common view repeated across Serbia, a view lifted straight from the TV broadcasts Milosevic controls', and then continues to quote Ivic:

Germany definitely had an interest in creating vassal states in the Western part of Yugoslavia (Croatia and Slovenia). If we talk about the war in Bosnia, the main culprit was the West. The Muslim world is extremely important, extending from Morocco to Indonesia. The US was eager to please the Muslim world and Saudi money funded the world media which satanised the Serbs.⁷⁴

If, after assessing all the evidence to support the theory, one accepts that the raping of Bosnian women *did* occur on a massive scale, then Ivic's views, as well as accusing

⁷²Ian Traynor, "Serbia against the world," The Guardian, 3 July 1993, sec. WEE, p. 20.

⁷³ibid.

⁷⁴ibid.

others of using propaganda, could also be regarded as propaganda. The denial of an event is as much a propaganda strategy as the fabrication of fictitious events. Moreover, Traynor's representation of Ivic's views as propaganda signifies that he believes, and therefore will represent, the war-rapes as fact.

The question of the effects of propaganda on Serbian soldiers' actions, and thus possibly on their propensity to rape, is raised by Traynor in a later passage. He uses the example of Borislav Herak - the Sarajevo Serb sentenced to death in March by the Bosnian government for multiple murder and rape. Traynor states that the impact of the 'formidable weave of propaganda' on the Serbian soldiers can be seen by analysing the court testimony and press interviews with Herak. Traynor states:

A fairly unremarkable factory worker before the war, [Herak] had never nursed any hatred of his fellow Muslims and Croats with whom he grew up, he said. No tribal urge to kill nor burning resentment of ethnic adversaries. Once he joined up with the Serbian fighters, the exercises included slitting pig's throats as practice for killing Muslims, he said. He was told the Islamic government would stigmatise the Serbs, as the Nazis did the Jews, that Serbian babies were being slaughtered and Serbian girls held in brothels, and that the Muslims had killed his father. After his father visited him in prison, he said at the trial, he realised he had been lied to.⁷⁵

Propaganda for Traynor, Ivic and Herak played an important role in their perceptions of the war and hence their actions. The representations here are that for Herak it was a spur to take part in Serbian atrocities, including rape. For Ivic it convinced him that mass rape and other Serbian atrocities were simply figments of the West's imagination. And for Traynor, following research, interviews, and the weighing up of evidence, he has made his position perfectly clear and has presented his views on the dissemination of Serbian propaganda in the British press in the following way:

While the papers that no one buys may say what they like, state television, which enjoys a monopoly outside Belgrade, daily drums home its message of Serbian righteousness against the world, serving up a diet of charred and disfigured corpses; the camera invariably lingering greedily on the details. The message is that of Serbian innocence, persecution and revenge. For five years, long before the wars began, television had first

⁷⁵ibid.

been creating enemies, then dehumanising them, and representing them as a threat to the very survival of the Serbian nation. The result is that violence is routine, and implicitly condoned. What follows is that the facts are manufactured and tailored to lend credence to the propaganda lies.⁷⁶

When Traynor's and Ivic's views on what constitutes propaganda in this war are placed on a continuum, both men would take up positions close to opposite ends of the spectrum: one believed in mass rape as just Western propaganda, the other implied that initially the raping of Serbian women was used by Serbia as a propaganda tool to encourage Serbian men to fight. But in this situation what happens to the actual rapes (the information or knowledge of those rapes) and the rape victims themselves? When used as propaganda, it is the various *representations* of the rapes and the victims that become important to the warring factions, not the real pain and distress of the women, men, or the children who have suffered sexual violence and even death.

Salah Ezz, one can only assume a member of the public, in a letter to The Guardian and written a few weeks after the Traynor article was published, makes the same point, namely that propaganda allows the world's gaze to be diverted from the real victims. Writing from Oxford, Ezz states:

The first mention by Serb propagandists of the "Islamic declaration" is maliciously selective. All his subsequent writings, which stressed the virtues of democracy and pluralism, are deliberately ignored. This selectivity has always been intended to justify Serbian savagery and sway Western public opinion ... [who have] turned a blind eye to the extermination of European Muslims, let war criminals off the hook, render the mass rape of women, the slaughter of children and the genocide of a whole nation worthless.⁷⁷

Bearing in mind that the writer's background and status are unclear, this letter, written in response to the press' representation of rape and other atrocities in the Balkans, is stating that the West has been complicit in the continuous slaughter and sexual abuse of 'European Muslims'. As mentioned in the Introduction to Part Two, in all war reporting complete impartiality is difficult to achieve. Of course, an illusion of

⁷⁶ibid.

⁷⁷Salah Ezz, "Letter: War Torn," The Guardian, 23 July 1993, sec. FEA, p. 23.

balance is relatively easy for journalists to create - by including quotations from both 'sides' and by using language that sounds objective to express subjective questions. Yet, one must always question which 'side' the journalist is reporting from. For example, the journalist cannot always get access to information and interviews from all warring factions in the conflict and this is dependent, for the most part, on where the journalist's own government stands on the conflict. Take, for example, the Falklands War, British journalists did not have constant access to information and interviews with Argentines.⁷⁸ And research has since revealed that the majority of British news reporting from the Falklands War was partial due to government censorship, both at the point of delivery and in the editing rooms.⁷⁹ Thus, all war reports should be read with care.

In yet another Ian Traynor article, written again for The Guardian and published in the autumn of 1993, the notion of propaganda is briefly mentioned in passing. The article is discussing the launch of the international war crimes tribunal and its relative merits. However, Traynor comments that '[t]he rival authorities in ex-Yugoslavia have their own war crimes commissions, working overtime compiling lists of massacres and pumping out blood-curdling propaganda'.⁸⁰ Traynor offers no example of this 'blood-curdling propaganda', however, Catharine MacKinnon perhaps gives us an insight into the kind of propaganda to which Traynor is referring. In an article 'Turning Rape into Pornography: Post-modern Genocide', MacKinnon describes how some of the raped Croatian and Muslim women were videotaped as they were being abused. MacKinnon refers to many incidents and cites her source as Natalie Nenadic, an American of Croatian and Bosnian heritage. One example includes the following passage:

One woman who survived the Bucje rape/death camp in Serbian-occupied Croatia reports the making of pornography of her rapes this way: "In front of the camera, one beats you and

⁷⁸Robert Harris, Gotcha! Government, Media and the Falklands War (London: Faber, 1992).

⁷⁹See, for example: David. E. Morrison and H. Tumber, Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the Falklands Conflict (London: Sage, 1988); Phillip Knightley (1989); Robert Harris (1992).

⁸⁰Ian Traynor, "Yugoslav war crimes court takes first faltering steps," The Guardian, 17 November 1993, sec. FOR, p. 8.

the other - excuse me - fucks you, he puts his truncheon in you, and he films all that".⁸¹

MacKinnon continues to explain how the filming of these rapes is 'clearly intended' for 'mass consumption as war propaganda' and how this is most commonly done by switching the ethnic labels of both the rape victims and the rapists. Muslim and Croatian women are forced to 'confess' on film that they are Serbian women and that those raping them are not Serbian soldiers but are men from either the Croatian or Muslim forces. Through this use of propaganda, symbols, words, images and identities can be manipulated to represent anything, even to 'represent' these women - the 'real' rape victims - out of existence. It should be noted that even though scepticism might appear somehow disloyal in the face of what could be real suffering, careful reading of these and the following accounts is required before accepting their 'truth'. Particularly as MacKinnon does not offer any references to support these claims other than thanking the survivors of the Kareta Feminist Group in Zorica Spoljar whom she interviewed.

However, MacKinnon sustains the propaganda argument by claiming that the actual rapes of Muslim and Croatian women by Serbian soldiers, filmed as they happen, have been shown on the evening news in Banja Luka, a Serbian-occupied city in western Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the women were represented as being Serbian. MacKinnon continues:

In September 1992 one woman about age fifty, entirely naked and with visible bruises, was shown being raped on television. A Serbian cross hung around her neck; the rapist - using a term for Serbian fascist collaborator that has become a badge of pride among Serb forces - cursed her Chetnik mother; someone was yelling "harder". The verbal abuse was dubbed - and unmistakably Serbian in intonation and usage.⁸²

However, although this example might demonstrate to some extent the amateurish nature of these attempts at propaganda, MacKinnon's next example underlines this fact:

⁸¹Catherine MacKinnon, "Turning Pornography into Rape: Postmodern Genocide," in Stiglmeier (1994), p. 77.

⁸²ibid., p. 76.

In another televised rape a few days later, a women near age thirty-five, with short, dark hair, was shown on the ground; her hands were spread and tied to a tree, her legs tied to her hands. Many men watched her raped in person; thousands more watched her raped on television. This time in an apparent technical lapse, about four or five seconds of the actual sound track was aired: "Do you want sex, Ustashes? Do you like Serbian stud horses?"⁸³

Although these examples of Serbian attempts at 'blood-curdling propaganda' may seem bungling and inept, to concentrate on this fact is to miss the point entirely. The point is that the films might have been made,⁸⁴ and if they were the women involved not only had to suffer the pain and humiliation that accompanies violent sexual abuse, and also bear the added burden of shame that their abuse has been recorded for others consumption. Furthermore, they would have had to cope with the ignominy of being falsely represented and to carry the knowledge that they have in some way, albeit innocently, contributed to the continued raping of Muslim and/or Croatian women by the videos of their rapes inciting further retribution. The sense of complete powerlessness for these women is difficult to comprehend. Psychological reports have suggested that coming to terms with being unable to stop the rape is one of the most difficult hurdles for the victims to overcome.⁸⁵ However, these rape victims also have to come to terms with the possibility that the film of their sexual abuse and humiliation could continually be repeated - all in the name of propaganda.

This form of propaganda has been used primarily by or against rival nationalist groups within the former-Yugoslavia. However, Ian Traynor reported in mid-December 1993 that in the run-up to Serbian parliamentary elections, Slobadan Milosevic and Vojislav Seselj, the leaders of the two main political parties have been accusing *each other* of organising 'rape, massacre and plunder'.⁸⁶ According to Traynor, Milosevic has called Seselj 'the personification of evil', has published

⁸³ibid.

⁸⁴It has been documented that videotapes involving genocidal rape in the Balkans has been seen as far away as Los Angeles and Egypt. However, the videotapes have not actually been viewed by the author. See, for example: Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 35, p. 145 (n3) and p. 150 (n3).

⁸⁵Vera Folnegovic-Smalc, "Psychiatric Aspects of the Rapes in the War Against the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Stiglmeier (1994), pp. 174-179.

⁸⁶Ian Traynor, "Serb enemies trade claims of war crimes," The Guardian, 15 December 1993, sec. FOR, p. 11.

allegations of 'outrages against civilians', has claimed that Seselj's paramilitaries, the Chetniks, have 'murdered, raped and slaughtered people, and even played football with chopped-off heads'. Furthermore, Milosevic has also dropped heavy hints that Seselj may stand trial for alleged war crimes. In return, Seselj claims that Milosevic sponsored atrocities in Croatia and Bosnia, 'controlled an orgy of killing and looting', and has stashed away 'several billion dollars' in secret bank accounts in Cyprus which he and his associates have 'earned from war booty'.⁸⁷ The form that the representation of rape has taken in this instance is that it is merely pigeonholed as 'another' atrocity to be used as a propaganda tool in a game between political rivals. Throughout the article neither Milosevic nor Seselj actually deny the allegations made against them by the other party, but merely counter the other's claims with even more grotesque accusations levelled at the opposing side. For example, in the closing passage of the article Traynor states the following:

Although Mr. Seselj's campaign is flagging because it lacks access to state-controlled television, he is capable of divulging sleaze about the Milosevic regime. He said he had no objection to appearing before the recently established Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague. But there would be little point going, he added, unless accompanied by Mr. Milosevic.⁸⁸

Seselj, in this barely veiled threat to Milosevic, appears to be almost admitting that they are both guilty of war crimes, with rape, or at least the condoning of rape, included. Rape when represented in this context, as with the other atrocities of war mentioned above, appears to have lost its due context. Rape no longer seems to be about women's experiences of suffering and humiliation, but the word has been used purely for its ability to sensationalise. Neither Milosevic nor Seselj are represented as feeling apologetic or remorseful in any way and the only emotion displayed is one of concern for their own political standing. The 'rapes' were not being discussed for any other reason than to elicit a response from their political opponents, the term appears to have been used simply for its 'shock' value in a mêlée of political propaganda. This issue will be discussed again in Chapter Eight.

⁸⁷ibid.

⁸⁸ibid.

The last article, which deals in a sense with the futility of trying to argue against propaganda, was written by Maggie O'Kane and published in The Guardian on Christmas Eve 1993. This article was first mentioned in the 'ethnic cleansing' section of this chapter, but to reiterate, O'Kane had been interviewing some men from the '17th Brigade' or 'the refugee army' whom she described as 'survivors of [Serbian] detention camps' and who had been living in a forest on the side of a mountain for fifteen months. Originally fighting with the Croats, O'Kane quotes one Bosnian Muslim soldier as saying that 'now the Croats have turned against us too'.⁸⁹ After interviewing the soldiers of 'the refugee army', who recounted many horrendous stories and various sets of tragic circumstances which brought the individual men together as a unit, O'Kane returns to Vitez and states the following:

Back in Vitez, our Croat landlady, Victoria, asks the returning journalists about the men we met on Krustica mountain, men she calls "mujahadeen" (Muslim guerrilla fighters). Her husband, Milan, spends his days in a muddy trench waiting for them to come over the hill. For a brief moment, around their stove, you try to explain that their are no mujahadeen, about Commander Churkin who lost all his family in Kozarac, and Kalco whose bus never came to take him back to his village. But Victoria says she knows they are preparing for a Muslim jihad (holy war) and it just seems easier to shut up and drink some more schnapps.⁹⁰

It has been shown that the effects of propaganda are the greatest where the message is in line with the existing opinions, beliefs and experiences of the receivers.⁹¹ For example, we are not told how old Victoria, the Croat landlady is, but it is possible that she has memories of previous antagonisms between the Serb and Croat people. In addition, she may harbour stereotypical views of the Muslim people as Islamic fundamentalists, and through continuous massaging by the nationalistic media these 'vague beliefs' become 'truth' for Victoria. Here the effects of propaganda would tend to take the form of reinforcement rather than change. Moreover, when propaganda does have an affect on Victoria, it does so due to a number of factors, not due solely to the Croatian media. The media, of course, plays a major role, however, the social context, social interaction and the perceived credibility of the sources of the information all contribute to the affect of this propaganda. For example, an article in

⁸⁹Maggie O'Kane, "Bosnia's Last Stand," The Guardian, 24 December 1993, sec. WEE, p. 4.

⁹⁰ibid.

The Times detailing the confession of Borislav Herak, the Serb conscript who admitted rape and murder, states that '[Herak] added that Serb commanders continually told their men that Bosnian troops were performing worse atrocities against Serbian civilians and that they were in a fight for their survival'.⁹² In an equivalent article in The Guardian it also states that '[f]rom Serbian radio and television and in gatherings with other Serbian fighters, particularly the older generation steeped in Serbian folklore going back to Serbian defeats by the Ottoman Turks in the Middle Ages, [Herak] said he learned that Muslims posed a threat to the Serbs'.⁹³ Given the representation within these articles of Herak's social situation, it does seem a possibility that he *did* believe everything his commanders, his comrades, the media, and so on were telling him.

Furthermore, generally a propagandist does not have to convince people on every issue in order to gain their support. If the propagandists can change opinions on one or two issues, often-favourable responses to other issues will follow. For example, if Victoria (the Croatian landlady) believed her leaders when they assured her that the Muslims were preparing for a *jihad*, then it was likely that she would also believe them if they announced that the Muslims were mass raping Croatian women, or that the Serbians were playing football with severed Croatian heads. Moreover, the greater the monopoly of the propaganda source over the receivers, the greater would be the effect in the direction favoured by the source.

The outcome of the use of rape as propaganda as discussed above, is that it becomes nothing more than just another faceless atrocity: 'mass rape' becomes a dehumanised term which appears to be used in political circles in an attempt to discredit one's political opponents. While at the same time, women of all nationalities throughout the Balkans are struggling to come to terms with the physical and psychological damage inflicted upon them, albeit indirectly, by these same political elites. As Barbara Hewson states in an article written for The Times in September 1992, in war '[w]omen it seems are peripheral; rape is so much propaganda'.⁹⁴ In other words, to

⁹¹See Jowett and O'Donnell (1992).

⁹²Leading article, "Serb learnt rape and murder," The Times, 14 December 1992, p. 1.

⁹³John Burns, "Slaughter in the name of Serbia," The Guardian, 3 December 1992, sec. G2T, p. 2.

⁹⁴Barbara Hewson, 08 September 1992.

those in political power the actual experiences of the raped women are insignificant; the only value of 'rape' is as a propaganda tool.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered an analytical and critical examination of the newspaper articles, which claim that *nationalism* in its various manifestations is the root cause of the occurrence of mass rape in war in the Balkans. Some journalists have claimed that the alleged rapes in the Balkans were due specifically to ethnic cleansing, some suggested that religion played a major part in inciting the rapes, while others claimed that the use of nationalistic wartime propaganda was significant in promoting the use of rape as a retaliatory weapon against women in the Balkans.

However, when explained as just 'part' of ethnic cleansing, the reality of mass rape in war - specifically the women's experiences of rape - become invisible within the term 'ethnic cleansing'. For example, when taken as a part of an all-encompassing atrocity it is not viewed as a separate act of sexual abuse and violence against women, but as just one part of a larger wartime phenomenon.⁹⁵ When placed within a religious context, however, and explained as occurring due to religious differences, the rapes appear more visible. This specifically seems to be the case when set against the backdrop of the traditional roles played by Muslim women and the 'sacredness' of virginity for unmarried females and monogamy for married women. Yet, as the Muslim women's bodily integrity is so inextricably linked to their religious laws and a gross violation of one is also a gross violation of the other, there is the danger that the women's bodily experiences will be overshadowed by the community's reaction to the 'religious' violations. Moreover, within a religious framework, the women's experiences of rape, as has been illustrated, were often hijacked by politicians from other Islamic countries attempting to use the rapes either in a game of political point scoring, or as a means of gaining extra wives for their own male populace - arguably

⁹⁵Jasmina Kuzmanovic, "Legacies of Invisibility: Past Silence, Present Violence Against Women in the former-Yugoslavia," in Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds., Women's Rights and Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1995).

adding 'trafficking of women for sexual slavery' to the women's experiences of rape in war.⁹⁶

In the propaganda war, as with ethnic cleansing, when the rapes are regarded as just another tactic, the consequence is that they become invisible in the *mêlée* of theories concerning larger wartime phenomenon. Moreover, once the notion of propaganda has been introduced, whether the rapes are 'fact' or 'fiction', whether they appear 'believable' or 'unbelievable', it is almost impossible to differentiate between them. Thus, one tends to suspend belief until more 'evidence' is forthcoming, which in the case of incidences of rape in war often never does.⁹⁷ Consequently, the experiences of the rape victims are relegated to mere 'stories', at least temporarily.

While sections of the British press have portrayed the rapes as having happened on a massive scale, the current mainstream explanations for mass rape in war discussed in this chapter are unable to fully explain all incidents of this wartime phenomenon as they occurred in the Balkan conflict. Therefore, theories based on a 'war game' framework will now be discussed. In other words, Chapter Five attempts to identify those journalists' explanations which look at rape as 'strategy', as soldier's R&R, militarisation and/or misogyny.

⁹⁶Editorial, "The Coalition Against the Trafficking in Women," Coalition Report Vol. 3, no. 1 (1995): p. 3.

⁹⁷Alex C. Lakatos, "Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses' Needs Against Defendants' Rights," Hastings Law Journal Vol. 46, no. 3 (1995): pp. 909-940; and Dorothy Thomas and Regan Ralph, "Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity," SAIS Review Vol. 14, no. 1 (1994).

WAR GAMES

Any inquiry into rape in war is soon embroiled in a confusion of myths and ideologies. One of the most frequently cited and seemingly widely accepted of myths, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, is the theory that rape is a 'natural' part of war and that the male soldier's sexual urges, normally kept in check by societal 'peacetime' restraints, run rampant during the anarchy of war. This explanation is predicated on a 'pressure-cooker' theory of male 'nature',¹ as detailed in Chapter One, where men are seen as involuntary victims of their own violent and instinctive nature, and thus relieved of any personal responsibility for their actions. This chapter intends to expand on this theme by critically analysing newspaper articles which have used this, and similar theories based on 'war game' themes such as 'strategy', 'R&R', 'misogyny' and 'militarisation', to try and explain the rapes in the Balkan war. In so doing it questions the press' role in perpetuating simplistic explanations for a far more complex issues.

Language has obvious significance in the writing of newspaper articles, and the way it is used is of interest here. In particular, it is within some articles analysed in this chapter that the most sustained use of military euphemisms and 'war language' are found. Throughout the various issues addressed in this chapter, including 'rape camps', misogyny and two smaller sections within 'misogyny' which deal with the issues of militarisation and male rape, there is a discernible change in the rhetoric used by the press, from the language of humanitarianism to the euphemistic language of war. It appears as though the use of military euphemisms is designed to achieve a particular objective, that is, whether consciously or subconsciously, abstraction. It

¹D. Scully, Understanding Sexual Violence: A Study of Convicted Rapists (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

seems to remove the reader from the real experiences of war, because confronted by descriptions of actual wartime experiences such as rape and death, the reader is more likely to interpret the report in a personal and identifiable way.² But, the press' use of euphemistic 'war-talk' anaesthetises the reader to the harsh realities of fighting a real war: rape, death, and genocide.³

Rape as Strategy

To begin the discussion of 'rape as strategy' we review an article first discussed in Chapter Four which describes the personal account of Borislav Herak, a 'Serbian volunteer' drafted as an auxiliary to the regular Serbian army, and his claims that he was ordered to rape by his commanders. Herak had been convicted of rape and was awaiting execution. The majority of the two thousand word article, written by John Burns for The Guardian, is primarily concerned with detailing Herak's recollections of the atrocities he took part in during a six month period of the Balkan war. For example, Herak spoke of massacring Muslim civilians, including whole families from young children to grandparents. According to The Guardian, Herak's indictments include the following:

29 individual murders between June and October, including eight rape-murders of Muslim women held prisoner in an abandoned motel outside Vogosca, seven miles north of Sarajevo, where Herak says he and other Serbian fighters were encouraged to rape women and then kill them. The indictment also covers the killings of at least 220 other Muslim civilians, many of them women and children, in which Herak has confessed to being a witness or taking part.⁴

The article begins with a quotation from Herak himself in which he claimed, '[i]t was an order. I simply did what I was told.' There are some unanswered questions that arise from reading this passage. For example, who encouraged the soldiers to rape? The implication from Herak's statement is that the order came from above, from his

²Roger Fowler, Language in the news: Discourse and Ideology in the Press (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 41-45.

³Israel Charny and Chanan Rapaport, How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Human Cancer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).

⁴John Burns, "Slaughter in the name of Serbia," The Guardian, 3 December 1992, sec. G2T, p. 2.

commander. Does the fact that he was not a regular soldier, but a volunteer or an 'irregular' and represented in this article as more undisciplined than 'regular' soldiers, mean that he was more likely to rape? Again, that appears to be the implication as the article continues with Herak explaining the incidents of rape and murder that he has confessed to and recalled in fairly explicit detail.

Meanwhile, Burns keeps up a running commentary on some of the more negative aspects of Herak's life. The reader is informed that Herak had a history of poor grades in school, erratic behaviour as a conscript in the Yugoslav navy, and a problem with alcohol which led to bouts of heavy drinking accompanied by threats to physically harm his father. The cupboards in Herak's room were filled with 'piles of pornographic magazines and empty liquor bottles'. (It should be noted, that these possible explanations for Herak's behaviour mirror the explanations given for rape by both Groth and Scully in Chapter One.) Furthermore, prior to the war, Herak apparently had only 'a menial job at a Sarajevo textile company.' In addition, to these negative pieces of information we are also told that until Herak joined the Serbian fighters Herak had, in Burn's words:

spoke[n] kindly of Muslims, in particular of Jankovic, his brother-in-law, whom he described as exceptionally kind and a good husband to his sister. Speaking of the couple's daughter, Indijana, who like tens of thousands of people in Sarajevo has a mixture of Serb, Muslim and Croat forebears, he says, "I love her more than anything in my life ... Everywhere I went, Muslims helped me. They are a very correct people."⁵

Herak then goes on to describe his claims of indoctrination by the Serbian political leaders and military commanders against the Muslim people. He said he was also persuaded by 'Serbian radio and television' and by 'the older generation steeped in Serbian folklore' who told him that 'Muslims posed a threat to Serbs' and were planning to declare 'an Islamic Republic'. So, here is a man who by his own admission had been involved in the mass slaughter and rape of Muslims. He could quite understandably be labelled a delinquent or a drunkard and, moreover, it is also a fair assumption that he had difficulty in getting a girlfriend, as the article states that he

⁵ibid.

was 'also motivated [to join the army as an irregular] by the urge to have things he never had before the war, including women'. Another important point brought out by the above quotation is the assumption that because Herak had no regular girlfriends before the war this gave him an additional spur to rape. The implications of this assumption are far-reaching and will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

However, another over-riding question that comes to mind is whether Borislav Herak is typical of the Serbian volunteer fighters? Does the military at large, or perhaps just the volunteer force attract those men who are dysfunctional and dissatisfied with what their society has to offer them? Perhaps it is a 'strategy' of the military commanders to encourage 'Herak-type' individuals into the irregular forces; as dysfunctional individuals who are so dissatisfied with society that they prove to be open to manipulation. Alternatively, of course, the information contained within this article could have been carefully selected by The Guardian to present a photofit of a Serbian psychopath which suitably represents the public's image of an evil Serb soldier, which while fitting the general anti-Serb pattern of reporting, nevertheless contributed to the criminalising of an entire nation. Yet, it is interesting to note that less than a quarter of all Serbs voted for Milosevic's nationalist regime:⁶ but to my knowledge that small 'fact' was never widely reported in the British press during the period covered by this thesis.

The last few paragraphs of the article are given over to Herak's description of the actual rape and murder of Muslim women. The most surprising thing about the rapes Herak describes, if the quotations are accurate, is their apparent organisation. Given Herak's background, particularly the claim that before the war he had 'not had any women', one might have expected the rapes he committed to have been random and opportunistic. As in the reports from Vietnam in Chapter Two, a young soldier with little or no sexual experience of women and facing death on a daily basis might have used the occasional opportunity for rape in war as his 'first and last' chance (I am not suggesting here that this, or any other reason, could ever excuse the act). Yet, Herak's accounts of the rapes talk exclusively of the Sonja Cafe, a motel and restaurant complex on the main road north of Sarajevo, which was used as 'a prison for women'

⁶Ivan Vejvoda, "Not our war," New Internationalist, June 1994, No. 256., pp.10-11.

and 'ruled' by a Serbian fighter named Miro Vukovic who established 'a system' for the Serbian fighters to rape and kill Muslim women.

Herak continues his account by explaining how 'Serbian commanders' told the soldiers that 'raping Muslim women was 'good for raising the fighters' morale', and how the 'prison commander' had told them, '[y]ou can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from here - we don't have enough food for them anyway - and don't bring them back.' The author interjects at this point and explains that Herak understood the prison commander 'to mean that the women should be killed'. Herak's recollections also include the recalling of names and approximate ages of some of the women he raped and murdered, and even how and where the women were taken away and killed. The article also claims that, '[Herak] says he went to the motel once every three or four days, and that although Serbian fighters routinely took women away and killed them, there were always more women arriving'. Borislav Herak's last words on the subject are 'It was never a problem. You just picked up a key and went to a room.'

So, how are the rapes of these Muslim women being represented? Could they be regarded as part of a strategy devised by military or political elites, with orders passed on 'down the line'? It's difficult to ignore the fact that Herak's accounts of the atrocities he, and his fellow Serbian fighters, committed are represented in a 'believable' way, replete with intricate details of the events. This is not to suggest that The Guardian journalist and editorial staff were not selective in information they included from the interview with Herak: but why would Herak embellish, or even admit to, atrocities he did not commit? He was unlikely to do this when the end result for him could be death by firing squad. To recall Herak's opening statement: '[i]t was an order. I simply did what I was told'. This may, of course, have been the standard defence of many soldiers indicted - or risking indictment - of war crimes.⁸

⁷ibid.

⁸Danise Aydelott, "Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under International Law," Emory International Law Review Vol. 7, no. 2 (Fall 1993): pp. 585-631; Clare Dyer, "Bringing barbarians to the bar," The Guardian, 24 September 1996, p. 17.

In another article written for The Guardian by Catherine Bennett, Helena Harbraken, a researcher on Amnesty International's Yugoslavia research team, was asked for her opinion on whether concerted rape is radically different from random, opportunistic rape during wartime. Harbraken, at the time the article was written, had yet to find any conclusive proof that rape has been used as a 'strategy' rather than a side effect of war in the Balkans. Moreover, she suggested that any speculation which infers that the rapes in Bosnia were ordered from 'above' is unhelpful and serves to mask the real root of the problem. By way of explanation Harbraken states that, 'men never need an excuse to rape, and if you say they rape because it's an order you take all the power out of that first statement, and you're saying actually they don't want to rape, and in general they're really good, brave guys'.⁹ To support Harbraken's viewpoint - that 'the current concern over rape-strategy is peripheral' - Catherine Bennett quotes feminist Susan Brownmiller, whose book Against Our Will written in 1975, still remains the most comprehensive account of rape, including rape in war, produced to date. Brownmiller has said:

My point has always been that you don't need orchestration, or commands from on high when you have a young soldier with a gun. You don't need any orders to rape'.¹⁰

These arguments, while attempting to show that 'all men' are capable of rape, an idea that will be discussed in Chapter Seven, and that no 'strategy' of rape, initiated and condoned by military commanders, is necessary for men to rape in war, could also be regarded as an apologist argument for military or political elites who may, or may not, have ordered their armed forces to rape as part of a pre-determined and organised strategy.

In an attempt to balance the 'rape as strategy' argument, Bennett includes a quotation in at the beginning of her article from an unnamed source. The quotation is short and seemingly obvious given that the subject being discussed is rape in war. It reads, '[t]hey said they'd kill me if I didn't'. Within the context of the article, the reader is expected to believe that this is a rape victim speaking, but Bennett informs us that

⁹Catherine Bennett, "Ordinary Madness," The Guardian, 20 January 1993, sec. G2T, p. 2.

¹⁰ibid.

these are in fact the words of a convicted rapist - a 'deserter' from the Serbian forces. Bennett continues the explanation in the following manner:

The people who were going to kill him if he didn't rape two teenage girls were his fellow soldiers. His story, together with statements from other penitent rapists, is part of the evidence that rape in Bosnia is not sporadic but systematic, organised rather than adventitious'.¹¹

First, the use of the label 'deserter' is questionable. On one hand a 'deserter' conjures up the image of a coward or a traitor who has abandoned his 'post' and his comrades for purely selfish reasons. Could he be regarded as trustworthy or his stories accurate? On the other hand, if this 'deserter' was being forced by his 'brothers in arms' to commit rape and other sexual abuse, and he sacrificed his 'post' to save his and possibly other women's honour, do we sympathise with him? Is he perceived as a brave, moralistic man; a defector from the 'wrong' side to the side of 'truth and right'? Second, Bennett also mentioned 'other penitent rapists'. However, research has indicated that there are no further reports which suggest that there are more than one or two 'penitent rapists' waiting to tell their stories to the world. And as to their 'penitence', that is another subject for debate, although the cynical view would be that penitence frequently accompanies the discovery of one's crimes. The identity of the 'deserter come penitent rapist' is not disclosed and it is not made clear whether this 'evidence' is going to form part of prosecution evidence at the War Crimes Tribunal.

That the mass raping women in the Balkans was due to a prearranged military or political strategy has been a popular accusation carried in the British press and levelled in particular at the Serbian government. Although there has been no hard evidence to support this allegation, the numbers of rape victims and the wide geographical spread of the incidence of rape, does suggest that there was more than random sexual abuse and wartime violence against women at work. Whether the allegations are ever substantiated or not, as mentioned above, these suggestions fitted the general consensus of opinion at the time, which rightly or wrongly served to demonise the Serb population further.

¹¹ibid.

However, it should be noted that even if these allegations were accurate and there was a Serb 'policy' of rape, then that policy would have called for a considerable number of men to be complicit in this strategy. If so, did *all* the men have to be ordered to rape? Moreover, is it physically possible to rape to order? Whatever the answers to these questions, the fact remains that if one accepts the extent of the rapes, then there must have been plenty of men who did not need much coercion. Therefore, the explanations for the rapes that concentrate solely on 'strategy' cannot be sufficient; there must have been other factors at work. Thus, a further journalistic explanations for the rapes is now discussed, namely the soldiers need for R&R.

R&R (& 'Rape Camps')

Rest and Relaxation (R&R) appears to have become an integral part of war.¹² As has been illustrated in Chapter Two, in Vietnam 'camp followers' were condoned and even encouraged by military commanders,¹³ and in the Second World War 'comfort women' were imported specifically to sexually service the Japanese soldiers 'need' for R&R.¹⁴ The newspaper articles analysed in this section primarily represent the rapes in terms of R&R for the soldiers, but rather than this R&R being portrayed as a collection of random acts of rape and violence committed as the soldiers move from village to village, the majority of the articles conclude that, in a similar fashion to the World War II experiences of the 'comfort women', women and girls were rounded up and held in 'rape camps' or 'makeshift brothels' for the soldiers regular use.

The use of the word 'camp' in this instance carries with it some emotive baggage, as it conjures up pictures of World War II concentration camps replete with images of Nazi atrocities. On the other hand, it also evokes images of holiday camps packed with fun and excitement - and R&R. The use of the word 'camp' conjures up conflicting images, neither of which sit comfortably with the word 'rape'. The use of the word 'brothel' in these circumstances also raises a few questions. One connotation

¹²Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1990).

¹³Linda Grant, "Vietnam Tango," Sexing the Millennium (London: Harper Collins, 1993), ch. 10.

¹⁴Barbara Ehrenreich, "Wartime in the Barracks," Time, 2 December 1996, p. 80.

carried by the word is the suggestion that those living/working in a brothel are somehow complicit in their actions, therefore, on some level this phrase also sits uncomfortably next to the issue of rape. This is supported by the dictionary definition of the word 'brothel', which states, '[h]ouse etc. where prostitutes may be visited'.¹⁵ To my knowledge the women and girls who have been subjected to rape in the Balkan conflict have never been represented as 'consenting' prostitutes. Therefore, the terms 'brothel camps' and 'enforced prostitution' - another term often used to refer to the women's detention in 'rape camps' - could both be viewed as a contradiction in terms.

The first journalist to be credited with reporting on the raping of women in the Balkan conflict was Roy Gutman writing from Split in August 1992. However, a month earlier Louise Branson, writing for the Sunday Times, detailed two small accounts of rape which seem to have been lost within the lengthy fifteen hundred word article. The paragraph in question begins as follows:

It is without question that rapes and torture occur on both sides in camps where hostages are held for exchange. One woman, Liliana Sjeran, said she listened as a Serb woman doctor, Olga Drasko, 40, was raped repeatedly in a camp in Caplina. "She was raped perhaps a hundred times. She has gone crazy," Sjeran told me. In one of the seedy Belgrade hotels where many Serbian refugees now live, I also met Bozo Vucetina, who said his wife and daughter had been raped outside Sarajevo and were still trapped in the city. He was a broken man.¹⁶

It is interesting that the British media in general did not appear to pick up on these accounts. Was this because they were not described in graphic detail as were the accounts by Roy Gutman a month later? Or was it because the accounts were both concerning the rape of *Serbian* women and therefore did not fit with the representation of the Serbs as the 'bad guys'? It could, of course, have been simply that both cases of rape were second-hand accounts and not direct interviews with the rape victims themselves. Alternatively, it has been suggested that because the reporter was a woman her stories might have been regarded as more unbelievable than that of her male counterparts, particularly when discussing what has traditionally been

¹⁵J.B. Sykes, ed., "Brothel," The Concise Oxford Dictionary - 6th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 125.

¹⁶Louise Branson, "Atrocities: Muslims, Croats and Serbs in catalogue of shame," Sunday Times, 12 July 1992, p. 1&13.

regarded as an 'emotive women's issue'.¹⁷ (An interesting point which will be raised again in Chapter Seven.) However, a recent report (June 1998) detailing the raping of women on a large scale during Indonesia's latest troubles was written and reported by a man,¹⁸ yet the report was paid little attention by the British media. Perhaps it was simply the subject that was found to be uncomfortable and unbelievable and not the sex of the journalist.

It was Gutman's account in August 1992, published in both the North American tabloid Newsday and The Guardian, that was credited with apparently first detailing rape and other atrocities in a Serb-run detention 'camp' by retelling the experience of, and directly quoting, a sixteen-year-old rape victim. I say 'apparently' because in the article it appears that Gutman is quoting directly from a personal interview with the young victim, however, in his later book, A Witness to Genocide, he admits that he was not. In Gutman's own words he defined the articles as 'explosive',¹⁹ and at the beginning of his book Gutman discusses the story of the atrocities and rapes in the Balkans as it was breaking, and states:

I sensed that the story was of such dimensions and seriousness that every element had to be sourced, using eyewitnesses or official statements, and that photos were essential to establish instant credibility. Every theory I developed about the events and those responsible should be potentially falsifiable - that is, structured in a way that if it was wrong, it could be so proven.²⁰

However, Gutman decided to break his own rules and in the very next paragraph he stated the following:

Having set such lofty standards, I immediately made an exception and wrote about the Omarska camp, which I had not visited, based on the second-hand witness account. The witness was too scared to talk with me directly, but her account had so

¹⁷Linda Steiner, "Power at Work: Accounting for discrimination in the Newsroom" (paper presented at the News, Gender and Power, University of Wales, Cardiff, 12-13 September 1996); Kay Mills, "What Difference do Women Journalists Make?" in Pippa Norris, ed., Women, Media and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 41-55.

¹⁸Reported on BBC Radio 4's 'Today' programme (23 June 1998) and also found on the Web site: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/easiasiatoday/ea980623.htm#story4>. Although not a broadsheet there was also comprehensive coverage in the following article. Sarah Strickland, "The systematic rape of ethnic Chinese women was so terrible that counsellors break down describing it," The Express, 10 August 1998, p. 16.

¹⁹Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1993), p. xiii.

²⁰*ibid.*, p. xii.

startled the Muslim leadership in Banja Luka that I asked them to dictate their notes to me. My thought was that if Omarska was a death camp, this needed to be put in print to alert others.²¹

To even the most uncritical reader, armed with this information, it would be difficult to read the article in question without speculating on its factual content and raising the possibility of the 'Muslim leadership' using Gutman for propaganda purposes. There are, without doubt, some seemingly implausible statements in the article. For example, the article states:

Reports of rape have been so extensive that some analysts think it may be systematic. Sevko Omerbasic, the leader of the Muslim community in Croatia and Slovenia, who is in touch with hundreds of refugees, has reached that conclusion. "There is more and more evidence that all the young women have been raped," he said in a recent interview ... [T]housands, perhaps tens of thousands, of rape victims may remain in the prison camps that have been set up in schools, factories and entire villages.²²

In Gutman's defence, he states in his book that following the writing of this initial article, he immediately went to the Balkans to report directly from the war zone and all subsequent reports were written from first-hand experience. However, with regard to the above article, considering that the report as a whole is a shocking account of rape in war, and by Gutman's own standards was regarded by him as 'explosive', the issue of 'rape camps' does not surface again in The Guardian for a further four months. Other atrocities are discussed in the interim period and rape is mentioned in other contexts, but the issue of 'rape camps' is not explored further.

Another point worth making is that Gutman did not use the phrase 'rape camps', but spoke only of incidents of rape within 'Serbian prison camps'. It was not until later in 1992 that the term appears to have come into common usage. For example, the next article to mention the rape of women and girls in 'camps' was published in The Guardian on 4 December 1992.²³ The article has no cited author, but was simply submitted from the international news agency 'Reuter in Paris'. Therefore, it is not

²¹ibid.

²²Roy Gutman, "Witnesses call teenager's rape in camp 'typical'," The Guardian, 10 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 8.

²³Reuter in Paris, "WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims," The Guardian, 4 December 1992, sec. FOR, p. 11.

possible to say now whether the term came from Reuters, from editorial input, or whether the term was already in use in other areas of the British/international media.

This short article with the headline 'WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims', packs a considerable amount of supposition into only eight sentences. The article begins in the following manner: 'The Western European Union parliamentary assembly said yesterday that it had received credible reports of the rape and torture of women and girls in Serb-run camps in former Yugoslavia'.²⁴ The obvious question here is: How does one define 'credible'? What is a 'credible report'? There is no further information given on these reports so the reader is left wondering who compiled the reports. Where in the former Yugoslavia were the 'camps'? On what scale was the 'rape and torture'? The fact that the article only mentions 'Serb-run camps' would generally not arouse criticism as it is quite legitimate that the author was simply reporting one event in a war of atrocities committed by all sides. (It should be mentioned here that it is standard practice in most broadsheet reporting to make reference, at the end of the article, to an alternative viewpoint, thereby balancing the main line of argument and suggesting an unbiased stance.) However, the majority of articles researched so far *have* only made reference to Serb atrocities. Therefore, one can assume that either the reporting is an accurate reflection of wartime events and there have been proportionally more atrocities committed by the Serbs than by Croats and/or Muslims, or the press have been extremely selective in their reporting, or the press did not have access to all the warring sides in the conflict.

It is important to reiterate one point which might have some bearing on the reporting style and content of the article in question, and that is the fact that the article does not have a by-line (it has not been attributed to any particular journalist) but merely states 'Reuter in Paris', meaning that the information was passed on to The Guardian by the news agency Reuters' office in Paris. Does this suggest that the newspaper is likely to be more liberal and sweeping with its editing, as there is no commissioned journalist to offend? Possibly. But one also has to remember that all news articles are subject to the structural constraints of the newsroom. For example, once a piece has been written it moves on to a sub-editor for changes in sentence structure, wording, heading, and

²⁴ibid.

so on. Then a copy-editor decides on how much, if any, of the article will appear in print, depending on the development of 'other' news stories, advertising space, and so on. The final published piece often does not resemble the original article in length or possibly in meaning, therefore, journalists cannot afford to be 'precious' about their work.²⁵

The article continues in its condemnation of only Serb actions and its detailing of only Muslim victims when reporting on the 'rape camps' and the subsequent motion signed by thirty two West European MPs. The article states:

"Those responsible for the rape want to reduce the Muslim population, which is tantamount to ethnic cleansing," the motion said. "Women and girls are held in 'rape camps' where each day they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and ... are often even killed." Women were being forced to have 'Chetnik' (Serb) children, the motion said.²⁶

This passage leaves similar concerns as the previous article, namely that the word 'rape' can be used in conjunction with 'camps' to create what has become a well-known journalist-friendly phrase, but when some form of explanation is required - i.e. what is actually taking place in the 'rape camps' - the author talks of women's humiliation, repeated torture, killing, even their being forced to have Serb children, but there is no mention of the word 'rape'. One is left to make the, perhaps obvious, assumption that the women and girls are being raped. The majority of the terminology used in the article is, on the whole, derived from direct quotations from the 'EU motion', however, it would be interesting to discover what words have been omitted. For example, what information came before '... are often even killed' in the original document? It is possible, of course, that the motion originally mentioned rape in that space. If so, and the Guardian editorial team choose to omit it, perhaps they felt that the word was being over-used. This is just one suggestion, and it should also be noted that the motion did in fact refer to rape earlier in the passage so it does not appear that the Euro MPs were shying away from the use of the word.

²⁵Personal experience and conversation with the Features Editor of The Guardian on 1 October 1996.

²⁶ibid.

The next equally short Guardian article, also written in December 1992, is entitled 'Tory demands Bosnia action'. In it the Tory MP for Staffordshire South, Patrick Cormack, stated categorically that, in his opinion, the Government's decision not to use force in Bosnia was 'faint-hearted' and their inaction made them 'parties to a great crime'.²⁷ There was only a brief mention of rape, and this came when Cormack was recounting his visit with the Bosnian foreign Minister, Haris Silajdzic, during the Edinburgh summit the week before. He states that Silajdzic had 'spoken of children being tortured and women being killed in 'rape camps''.²⁸ Cormack continued to be quoted as saying that, 'a total of 128,000 people were reported to have been killed in Bosnia between May and November 23'.²⁹ This may be a pedantic point, but it is interesting to note that rape is only mentioned within the context of 'rape camps' which quite quickly, as mentioned above, became a well-used, if rather controversial, phrase. It is a phrase which journalists could regard as 'easy to use' because there is seemingly little responsibility to be borne for using it. In other words, once a phrase has been used regularly in the media, a journalist can pick it up and use it without the need for explanation, or responsibility. However, when mention was made of the activities which were carried out within those 'camps' the words 'tortured' and 'killed' were used, but again there was no mention of rape taking place: even though the journalist described the holding place for the detainees as 'rape camps'.

The Times' contribution to the discussion also did not begin until December 1992 when two articles, both published on the 23 December, stated categorically that 'rape camps' did exist. After mentioning, as did The Guardian, that the WEU (Western European Union) had reported that 'women and girls are held in rape camps where each day they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and ... are often even killed', the first article continued:

The "rape camps" appear to be a sinister offshoot of ethnic cleansing. Many victims say they were told that they would be raped repeatedly until they became pregnant and could bear ethnic Serbian children. Once they were visibly pregnant they

²⁷No byline, "Tory demands Bosnia action," The Guardian, 15 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 7.

²⁸ibid.

²⁹ibid.

were left alone until the seventh month of pregnancy, when abortion would be impossible.³⁰

While both articles discussed the presence of 'rape camps' this article discussed the issue in a slightly different context. In essence, this article was suggesting that the 'rape camps' were primarily initiated for the purpose of impregnating Muslim women and forcing them to bear Serbian children. Whereas the second article ('first' and 'second' mean nothing in this context, save the order that they were filed in the Times' indexing system) concentrates on telling the story of two rape victims and comparing their experiences with women in previous wars. Rather than using the term 'rape camps' this article refers to them as 'brothel camps'. For example:

Bosnian and Croatian human rights groups list more than a dozen sites, which they describe as "brothel camps" where women of all ages have been held and repeatedly raped by Serb fighters. In survivors' testimonies the name of the Vilina Vlas appears again and again. In the Second World War the Nazis had their "joy division" of female concentration camp inmates, and the Japanese ran "comfort camps" where Korean women were forcibly recruited to act as prostitutes. Now the Bosnian war appears to have its own version.³¹

The article also tells of survivors who claim that, 'once the soldiers have finished with their female captives, many of the women are killed'.³² This 'policy' appears to agree with 'Herak's' description of events, but runs in stark contrast to the 'policy' of impregnation mentioned in the 'first' article above, unless, of course, all the women killed happen to have been either under or over reproductive age. To support the idea that soldiers were using the 'brothel camps' as simply a means of R&R, the author, Adam Lebor, recounts the story of Borislav Herak, mentioned at length earlier in this chapter. His accounts of being ordered to rape and murder, as represented in the British press, make no mention of orders to impregnate the Muslim women he raped, on the contrary he specifically mentions that it was suggested to him that he kill them due to the lack of food available to feed the women.³³ Of course, neither of these contrasting representations of the functions of the 'rape/brothel camps' are mutually exclusive, on the contrary, in the second report a Dr. Mihamet Sestic rejects both

³⁰Roger Boyes, "Churches say Serbs are using rape as a weapon," The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6.

³¹Adam Lebor, "Victim tells of her brothel camp ordeal," The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6.

³²ibid.

³³ibid. Also see, John Burns, 3 December 1992.

R&R theories and instead suggests that the 'organised rapes' served a far wider and 'darker' political purpose; that of ensuring that 'Serbs and Muslims are never able to live together again'.³⁴ Sestic, a psychiatrist, is quoted as being representative of 'many Bosnians' and states that, '[t]hese Serbs are destroying our culture, the tradition and the houses of the Muslims. And (by these rapes) they destroy relations between neighbours'.³⁵ Sestic, then regards these rapes, as a crime against the *nation*, rather than a crime against individual women.

The next article, written by Alice Thomson, appeared in The Times on the 1 January 1993. The short section of the article devoted to a discussion of 'rape camps' begins on a historical note, but then becomes rather familiar as it appears in part to have been lifted straight from Adam Lebor's article, published the previous month:

Homer's Iliad refers to Greeks enslaving captured women and distributing them to soldiers as spoils of war. The Nazis had their concentration camp "joy division", and the Japanese ran "comfort camps" where Korean women were forcibly recruited to act as prostitutes. Now the Bosnian war seems to have its own version. Is this a by-product of brutality in war, or is there something more sinister?³⁶

Historical analysis is, of course, important to demonstrate the ongoing nature of the 'rape in war' phenomenon. However, the journalists appear to have concentrated their comparative historical analysis of the Bosnian rapes, predominantly with the experiences of the 'comfort women' in World War II.³⁷ The mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict have rarely been compared with other incidences of large scale rape in war, many of which are much closer in timescale to events in the Balkans; for example, Kuwait, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Peru, Somalia, Liberia, Burma, Uganda, or Rwanda.³⁸ Moreover, the journalists have tended to draw comparisons with World

³⁴Adam Lebor, 23 December 1992.

³⁵ibid.

³⁶Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear," The Times, 1 January 1993, p. 11.

³⁷For further press coverage during August 1993 of the Japanese 'comfort women' issue see, Leading article, "Apologists of war," The Guardian, 5 August 1993, sec. FEA, p. 19; and Kevin Rafferty, "Japan admits forced wartime prostitution," The Guardian, 5 August 1993, sec. FOR, p. 10.

³⁸Slavenka Drakulic, "The Rape of Women in Bosnia" in Miranda Davies, ed., Women and Violence (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), p. 176. Although including no comparisons, the following are a selection of articles which do discuss other incidents of rape in war: David Harrison, "Frail Suu Kyi prepares for final showdown," The Observer, 2 August 1998, p. 20; Editorial, "Uganda: Security for whom?" Ms., November/December 1992, p. 10; Donatella Lorch, "Campaign of Rape Emerges in

War II events, in order that they might utilise the 'camp' analogy: with many references, for example, to Auschwitz?³⁹

By August 1993, approximately a year after the first accounts of large-scale rape had begun to appear in the British press, the media's thirst for 'rape camp' stories seemed to have dwindled to nothing.⁴⁰ As Linda Grant, writing in The Guardian, notes, '[h]aving had their fill of both pretty Muslim virgins sobbing out their tales of sexual violation and British couples cradling the Bosnian rape babies they have adopted, the media have lost interest'.⁴¹ Linda Grant goes on to suggest possible reasons for the lack of interest and scepticism in the media, for example, she states that '[n]o one was able to come up with any reliable figure for the numbers of women actually raped'.⁴² She also submits that 'these doubts have crept in because some aid agencies have begun to admit privately that rape has always been a part of the spoils of war: the officers get the paintings and the jewellery, the men are let loose on the local population'.⁴³ It is interesting to note Grant's assumption that the 'officers' are not interested in taking part in rape. Presumably, as officers, their minds are on higher things - such as art and finery - whereas the satisfying of base physical urges is the soldiers domain. In fact, there are references within the articles analysed which comment that the military commanders have 'first pick' of the female detainees.⁴⁴ Concerning the presence of 'rape camps', however, Grant states the following:

Even the allegation of rape camps now seems contentious. Certainly, women were raped in general prisoner of war camps. But no one has produced hard evidence of special installations established to impregnate Bosnian women with Serbian babies. What seems more likely is that Serbian paramilitaries would move into an area and establish a base in a village. After most of the local population had been terrorised into fleeing, a number of women would be rounded up and held in a motel or

Rwanda," International Herald Tribune, 16 May 1995, pp. 1&6; Kenneth Auchincloss, "1992: The year of fratricide," Newsweek, 4 January 1993, pp. 24-25.

³⁹See, for example: Leading article, "The German responsibility," The Times, 14 May 1993, p. 15.

⁴⁰For an interesting account of newspaper editor's 'victim fatigue' and how they require news that is 'new', 'hot' and 'sexy', see, Jenny Kitzinger, "Silent voices and the risks of False Memory," Paper presented at the News, Gender and Power' Conference, University of Wales, Cardiff, (12-13 September 1996).

⁴¹Linda Grant, "Anyone here been raped and speak English?" The Guardian, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 10.

⁴²ibid.

⁴³ibid.

⁴⁴Leading article, "Serb learnt rape and murder," The Times, 14 December 1992, p. 1.

restaurant which would be used as an enforced brothel by soldiers tanked up on drugs after a hard days killing and torture. When the Serbians moved on, after a few weeks, the women would be murdered or released according to no clear pattern.⁴⁵

Although attention has been drawn to the use of emotive language by the British press, particularly with their continual use of 'camp' analogies, Grant's interpretation of the term 'rape camps' - that of '*special installations* established to impregnate Bosnian women with Serbian babies' - seems to constitute a rather narrow definition of the term. Moreover, given this definition, then the journalists by their use of the term 'camp' - which carries with it images of row upon row of purpose-built huts and which was not the reality in the Balkans - have relegated the experiences of the rape victims into the realms of indeterminacy. In essence, if the idea of a 'rape camp' cannot be expanded to incorporate the reality of 'a number of women rounded up and held in a motel or restaurant and used as an enforced brothel by soldiers' then what of those women's experiences? Therefore, is it a fiction to suggest that the women were held in 'rape camps'? It appears that for Grant, if reality does not resemble the journalists' established, self-built imagery then she is content to ignore it: once again 'rape in war' is effectively invisible. Yes, an 'enforced makeshift brothel' probably does more closely describe the reality than the term 'rape camp', but using a different term does not make the rape victim's experiences any less real.

The last of the articles which refer to 'rape camps', or in this case a 'Serb-controlled brothel', is concerned primarily with a discussion surrounding the break-down of peace talks between Croatia and the Serb-held enclave of Krajina. However, at the end of the article, as an aside, it states the following:

In Sarajevo, the United Nations confirmed that an investigation would be held into allegations that peacekeeping troops in Bosnia had patronised a Serb-controlled brothel containing captive Muslim and Croat women.⁴⁶

There follows no elaboration, no further information or explanation, and I can find no subsequent reference to the UN investigation in British newspapers to date, although in Beverley Allen's book Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina

⁴⁵Linda Grant, 2 August 1993.

⁴⁶Michael Evans, "Secret talks over Krajina break down," The Times, 3 November 1993, p. 13.

and Croatia she does make (unsubstantiated) claims that 'Unprofor soldiers had also been perpetrators of rape...[at]...Sonja's, a restaurant-rape/death camp in Vogošća, six miles north of Sarajevo'.⁴⁷ (Indeed, the same location as mentioned by Borislav Herak in his confession.) Allen also quotes the Bosnian Serb commander of the camps as saying that UN personnel came to the camp several times a week, 'for food and drinks, to watch television on his satellite receiver, and they came for the girls too'.⁴⁸ However, to my knowledge this was not reported in the British press, and for the purposes of the thesis the 'truth' of the allegation is, to some extent, irrelevant. The significance of this passage is that it represents 'good' soldiers, presumably good 'male' soldiers if they were 'patronising a brothel', as subject to the same uncontrollable sexual urges and disregard for the suffering of women as the 'bad soldiers' discussed above.⁴⁹ Whatever label one wants to place on the representations, the outcome remains the same; that is, that male soldiers whether regarded as 'goodies' or 'baddies', 'terrorists' or 'freedom fighters', when it comes to the issue of 'sex' they all appear to be represented in a similar fashion: as misogynistic.

Rape as Misogyny

'Andrea Dworkin has a theory', suggests Catherine Bennett in The Guardian. 'Rape happens, she thinks, because we live in cultures which promote hatred of women, which purvey debased images of women - and despite the best efforts of polemicists like herself, nothing has changed'.⁵⁰ This claim sets the scene for this section, which is looking at those explanations for rape in war that are based on the theory that instances of mass rape in war are acts of misogyny.

Catherine Bennett's extended article entitled "Ordinary madness" begins in uncompromising fashion:

⁴⁷Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 67.

⁴⁸ibid.

⁴⁹Cynthia Enloe, "Spoils of War," Ms., March/April 1996, p. 15.

⁵⁰Catherine Bennett, 20 January 1993.

Thousands of abused women testify to systematic rape in Bosnia. But the Serbian army is not made up of proven sex offenders; they are 'regular guys'. Are, then, all men potential rapists?⁵¹

Bennett's claim that 'thousands' of women have been 'abused' is later substantiated, although unsatisfactorily, by stating that an 'EC mission has estimated that 20,000 women have been the victims of 'organised rape' in Bosnia.' The first, perhaps obvious, question to be asked is, which EC mission? Bennett makes no mention of its name, its members, or its mandate.⁵² Is she purposely withholding the information to protect the anonymity of the mission? Or, has this rather woolly statement been lifted second-hand from another source? Possibly from the same source, Bennett quotes Muslim and Croat sources as alleging that the incidence of rape is much higher, '50,000 women raped, more than 30,000 women impregnated'.⁵³ However, Bennett does not assume these figures are correct, as she states: 'Uncorroborated, one-sided, and publicised by a desperate people, the figures must be received with scepticism'.⁵⁴ It may be an inconsequential point, but when reading an article such this, it could be argued that one generally remembers the more shocking elements in the story, particularly a large rounded number - 50,000 - phenomenally large when it is describing the number of raped women. The scepticism that follows could easily get forgotten in the wake of such abhorrent statistics. This just leaves the question as to whether it is defensible to use uncorroborated, unreferenced statistics which, when read in context as an complete article, could readily be perceived as 'truth'. On the other hand, one could argue that these enormous figures, although vastly different, are large enough to justify the concern that something significant could have taken place. Also, the accounts, in a sense, could be seen to corroborate one another, although without checking the sources this is rather dubious.

The crux of Bennett's article is concerned with asking the fundamental question: which men rape in war, and why? Challenging the claim that all rapists are criminals,

⁵¹ibid.

⁵²Following an interview with Catherine Bennett she informed me that the EC mission was headed by Dame Anne Warburton, the President of Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge. Dame Anna was approached by the EC, via the British Foreign Office, to lead a delegation of European specialists to investigate the allegations of mass rape in war in the former Yugoslavia. The investigation was carried out in December 1992.

⁵³ibid.

⁵⁴ibid.

Bennett remarks that '[w]hatever the figures, the collective testimony of the women who have been sexually abused in this war still challenges the assumption that rape is the preserve of a criminal minority'.⁵⁵ Bennett extends her argument by using Susan Brownmiller's opinion on what changes 'common soldiers into rapists'. In her reply, and reiterating an argument she has made before, Brownmiller implies that, given the right circumstances, *all* men are capable of rape. The circumstances appear frighteningly straightforward. Thus, according to Brownmiller:

First [men are] adrenaline rushed; second, in Bosnia the Serbian fighters are irregulars, they're not part of an official army. Every army has rules of conduct in warfare, and we know that rape is outlawed in the terms of the Geneva Convention - but what is the authority that's going to court martial these guys? There is no authority there, so they have permission to rape, the way they have permission to kill.⁵⁶

If this is the heart of Bennett's argument, and it does appear to be, then it could be argued that it is not only too simplistic, but also quite disconcerting for the reader. A rush of adrenaline and a touch of anarchy can often be found at many football grounds throughout Britain every Saturday afternoon, and while Bennett comments that 'it certainly tells us something about the conditions in former Yugoslavia' she also continues, 'does it also, as women's groups are now asserting, tell us something about the men we live with here?'⁵⁷ The implicit suggestion being that all men carry with them an ingrained misogyny and desire to rape, which could violently manifest itself if the conditions are right - an unnerving claim. Therefore, it could be argued that to put forward this theory without the balance of other possibilities or counter-theories is on some level irresponsible and unnecessary.

Bennett's thesis - that 'ordinary' men can and do rape - is continued as she interviews Slavenka Drakulic, a Croatian writer, who in turn has interviewed Bosnian rape victims. Bennett states that Drakulic's questioning of the rape victims 'reflects a common female incomprehension that 'ordinary' men can rape'.⁵⁸ Bennett quotes Drakulic as stating that:

⁵⁵ibid.

⁵⁶ibid.

⁵⁷ibid.

⁵⁸ibid.

I asked one woman who was raped by four men, were they drunk? Did they look abnormal? How did they look? She said, "No, no, they were perfectly normal men, if you were to meet them in the street you wouldn't say they were rapists".⁵⁹

Firstly, neither Bennett nor Drakulic make any mention within the article of how many women Drakulic interviewed, or how many gave similar answers to the woman quoted above - perhaps Drakulic's interviews were at a very early stage when she was approached by Bennett - nevertheless, on some level the use of just *one* woman's testimony actually seems to weaken the argument rather than solidify it. On the other hand, if one studies the press' representations of the incidence of rape in the Bosnian conflict in its entirety, one would discover numerous references in which interviewed rape victims have commented that the men who raped and abused them were in fact, prior to the war, 'ordinary' friends and neighbours.⁶⁰ And this also reiterates the point made in Chapter One, that rapists are just 'ordinary guys'.

This brings me to the second point, and to two standard questions, both of which were raised in Chapter One in the context of 'peacetime' rape. Did they look abnormal? And second: Is it a 'common female incomprehension' that all rapists are somehow recognisable by their obvious physical abnormalities? Bennett clarifies her views on this. She sets out who she considers to be the 'types of men who are likely to rape in peacetime', and they are, according to Bennett, 'proven sex offenders', former victims of sex abuse' or 'sufferers from disinhibiting brain abnormalities'. All of which appear to be mental conditions (some of which can be likened to suggestions in Chapter One) rather than physical disabilities; although I would consider the last category to need some form of accompanying psychological or physiological definition before it could be taken seriously. However, Bennett's use of these classifications, with the implication being that if a man falls into one of these categories then he is more likely to rape - as she makes no attempt to suggest otherwise - could be perceived as being naive and analytically crude in the extreme.

⁵⁹ibid.

⁶⁰See, for example: Roy Gutman, "Witnesses call teenager's rape in camp 'typical'," The Guardian, 10 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 8; or Ian Traynor, "War that had rewritten Europe's rules," The Guardian, 22 December 1994, sec. FOR, p. 6.

To return again to Catherine Bennett's article, Slavenka Drakulic concludes that although a 'disheartening' and 'unattractive' verdict, in her opinion, all men *are* potential rapists. She states the following, although perhaps with a little reticence:

I'm very unhappy to say that, I really am - but what can you conclude? How can they do it under the conditions? How can they do it when a gun is pointed at their head? You would say they cannot do it if a woman is revolting against it, and screaming - but they do it! It's amazing.⁶¹

Bennett appears to have used this concluding statement of Drakulic's for its sensationalist or melodramatic value rather than as part of a balanced consideration of the issue; this overly simplistic reading of events could no doubt leave the reader a little more than 'disheartened': whether the reader is the wife, the partner, the lover, the mother, the sister, the daughter of a man, or the man himself. Of course, it would take a detailed physiological and psychological study to ascertain how one's behaviour would be affected by a situation in which one was subjected to rape and sexual abuse - if such a study was possible at all. In the absence of such a study and without personal experience, how can one make sound judgements about how a man, or woman, would act when a gun is held against their head? It is difficult to comprehend what men and women might be physically capable of if forced at gunpoint, however, perhaps in general Western society has very set ideas about where, how and why men should be capable of performing a 'sexual' act, and these 'romantic' notions do not fit any accounts of rape, particularly those being reported from the war in Bosnia.

Bennett also draws on other sources to support her theory, all of which make further sweeping generalisations which remain unsubstantiated by any concrete evidence. Robert Bly, the author of Iron John, a book which encourages men to 'rediscover the wild, hairy man within',⁶² is quoted as saying, 'I'd say 50 percent are capable of doing it [raping].' When questioned about the other 50 percent, he states that 'they're not the type, they would be the ones who are expressing emotion and doing art'.⁶³ Bly's representation of men in this quotation appears to be that the world's male population

⁶¹Catherine Bennett, 20 January 1993.

⁶²Robert Bly, Iron John: A Book About Men (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1990).

⁶³Catherine Bennett, 20 January 1993.

can be divided in half, with one half - those who are 'gendered' with masculine traits - having a propensity to rape, while the other half - those who have been 'gendered' with feminine traits - do not. Bennett also quotes a Vietnam veteran who was commenting on seven of his friends who he saw gang rape a young Vietnamese girl. He states that they were all 'basically nice people, I just couldn't figure out what was going on to make people like this do it. It was just part of the everyday routine'.⁶⁴

Finally, in this section of the article, Bennett quotes Carol Sellars, a principal clinical psychologist at Broadmoor, who comments that, '[w]hat stops most men is social sanction and a sense of the sequel to what would happen in peacetime'. In an attempt to substantiate this claim, Sellars cites an American study of male undergraduates in which 'a healthy majority said they would commit a rape if they thought they could get away with it'.⁶⁵ At face value the results of this study can be perceived to be extremely 'disheartening'. However, surveys - probably a more accurate word to describe the aforementioned 'study' - of this nature are notoriously controversial and are often found to have a large margin of error. Moreover, one has to question the validity of even a survey which considers 'US male undergraduates' to be typical of all men everywhere. Therefore, if Bennett tries to authenticate her arguments with the use of such dubious data, she deserves to be challenged. However, in Bennett's defence, the average age of army regulars and conscripts is usually around the 18-22 year old age range - undergraduate age.

Bennett's article, having discussed the 'which men rape?' question, then moves on to discuss the question of 'why men rape?' And, 'what kind of act actually is rape?' Bennett has accepted without question, on Sellars' advice, that rape, although frequently portrayed as such, is not a sexual act. To reiterate the point, as Sellars explicitly states, 'one of the problems is that it's always portrayed first and foremost as a sexual act, which it isn't'.⁶⁶ Now Bennett poses the question 'then what is it?' Sellars expands on her position in the following manner:

If you actually talk to rapists, in most cases it's about two things.
One is about asserting domination and humiliating the victim,

⁶⁴ibid.

⁶⁵ibid.

⁶⁶ibid.

and sexual degradation is seen as the ultimate form of degradation. The other is to do with asserting masculinity, which again is essentially about domination and aggression, not really about true sexuality.⁶⁷

So, on the one hand Sellars - and presumably Bennett as she offers no alternative explanation - contends that rape is *not* a 'sexual act', but on the other hand, states that rape is about 'sexual degradation'. This brings into question the way in which Sellars and Bennett are defining the word 'sexual'. Sellars defines it as, or to be more accurate Sellars states that '*women* commonly' define it as, 'an expression of warm feeling and closeness' and Bennett clarifies it as 'the most intimate act'. However, it could be argued that these are over-idealised definitions of the sexual act, which trade on contemporary culturally manufactured images of male/female bonding, and could be seen as having confused issues of sex with those of love. Moreover, the defining of rape as 'sexual degradation' is explicit recognition of the sexual nature of the act. Equally, although power, domination, anger, frustration, aggression, and so on, may well be the motivating factors behind specific instances of rape, insofar as it is an act of 'rape' then these factors can be seen to manifest themselves in a *sexual* act. In other words, although sexuality can be viewed as only the method through which other motivational factors are expressed, this does not mean that its sexual content should be denied.

For example, when discussing the 'intimacy' and 'closeness' of the sexual act Bennett asks, '[i]f male Bosnian Serbs hate female Bosnian Muslims, how can they tolerate this proximity?' In reply, I would refer Bennett to Sellars' earlier suggestion that 'sexual degradation is seen as the ultimate form of degradation'. The soldiers, of whatever nationality, who are actualising this 'degradation', are not shaving the women's heads or cutting off their hands, or committing any other form of degradation in isolation, they have chosen a sexual act as their primary method of humiliation. Put simply, sexual gratification appears to be the *fuel* which drives this expression of power and dominance.⁶⁸ This issue will be discussed at length in the final chapter, Chapter Eight.

⁶⁷ibid.

⁶⁸For further discussion on this issue see, Robert Crooks and Karla Baur, Our Sexuality (London: Brooks & Cole, 1996), pp. 715-720.

Generally though, throughout this section Bennett's simplistic view of the individual, borne out by her use of support from those who advocate a similar position, appears to be that of a coherent rational entity, who, no matter what the circumstances, can engage in a predetermined and rational set of social interactions. In reality, however, individuals are constantly being pulled by unconscious, multiple drives and desires, which during wartime are arguably heightened, or at least made more complex. Therefore, there can be no mono-causal explanation for individual actions, particularly ones based on a simple misogynistic explanation. This is not to deny that rape generally appears to be an act of pure misogyny - indeed, it could be argued that it is the ultimate misogynistic act. But it is extremely hard to consider that latent peacetime misogyny can be transformed into the mass raping of women in war to the extent that has been witnessed in the Balkans. Can we really believe that all those men consciously and sequentially decided to unleash their suppressed hatred and contempt for women through expressions of sexual violence and rape?

Once again, we have considered a reductionist explanation for the mass raping of women in the Balkans and found that it has not proven satisfactory in helping us to fully understand the occurrence of this wartime phenomenon. The next section considers another explanation, which some would consider to be an institutionalisation of misogyny - militarisation.

Militarisation

Writing on behalf of the World Council of Churches, the 'Commission of the Churches on International Affairs' has offered this definition of 'militarisation':

Militarisation should be understood as the process whereby military values, ideology and pattern of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic and external affairs of the state, and as a consequence the structural,

ideological and behavioural patterns of both the society and the government are 'militarised'.⁶⁹

In the Bosnian conflict, the manifestations of militarisation can be identified in the stories and representations of, and explanations for, mass rape in war. Some journalists, writing for The Guardian, in their analysis of the reported rapes in the Bosnian conflict, implicitly suggest militarisation as a possible root cause of the phenomenon, and in particular when militarisation is defined as a socialised 'military' form of masculine identity. Journalists writing for The Times, however, have not been so forthright as there are no articles in The Times that suggest a direct link between the incidence of rape in the war in the former-Yugoslavia and militarisation, as defined above.

Throughout the early 1990s most sections of the press covered a number of stories regarding this issue - the link between the militarisation of soldiers and the incidence of rape. The US, British, and Japanese military, for example, have all been forced to acknowledge that there are serious problems of sex abuse in their ranks,⁷⁰ and further reports from Amnesty International have concluded that 'women and girls as young as 14 are being raped or sexually abused' by soldiers and government agents throughout the world.⁷¹ In the United States a Senate Committee recently stated that, '[s]ome 60,000 women have been sexually assaulted or raped while serving in the United States armed forces' - and they are not referring to rapes committed by 'enemy forces'.⁷² One American Senator, Dennis DeConcini, even commented that, 'American women serving in the Gulf were in greater danger of being sexually assaulted by our own troops than by the enemy'.⁷³ The British Army also had to face the indiscipline of their own troops following the rape and murder of a tourist guide on Cyprus by three

⁶⁹Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Disarmament Prospects and Problems (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1990-2) cited in Jeanne Vickers, Women and War (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 39.

⁷⁰See, for example: Kevin Rafferty, "Second rape claim stirs anti-US anger," The Guardian, 28 November 1995, p. 10; or Sharon Churcher, "The rape that is America," The Mail on Sunday, 12 November 1995, p. 41; Kevin Rafferty, "Japan admits forced wartime prostitution," The Guardian, 5 August 1993, sec. FOR, p. 10.

⁷¹Michael Simmons, "Rape of women by soldiers and police 'is global occurrence'," The Guardian, 5 February 1992, sec. FOR, p. 9.

⁷²Martin Walker, "Sex attacks 'rife' on US servicewomen," The Guardian, 2 July 1992, sec. HOM, p. 22.

⁷³*ibid.*

privates with the First Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets,⁷⁴ and they have also had serious complaints from sexually assaulted female soldiers.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Japanese Government has now been under pressure for a considerable time to openly acknowledge, and apologise for, the enforced prostitution of 'comfort women' during the Second World War. Numerous other articles in the British press have also reported similar stories.⁷⁶

A letter written by reader Michele Wates and printed in The Guardian as a response to the article by Catherine Bennett (analysed at length in the previous section), comments that what was missing from Bennett's account of rape in war was recognition of the dehumanising effects of soldiering in general and being a soldier in wartime in particular.⁷⁷ The dehumanising theme is also raised in The Guardian in a later article, however, on this occasion it is used to describe the effects of rape on the victims. Rosalind Coward, the journalist, states that rape 'is a violation of rights, a dehumanising experience [and] mass rape is the dehumanising of a whole culture, an assault on those who give a community its life and meaning'.⁷⁸ Wates, in her letter, then attempts to link these two issues by predicting the possible outcomes when soldiers who have been 'dehumanised' through the militarisation process and subsequently rape, and the victims of those rapes, try to 'reconnect with their humanity'. For the soldiers, Wates suggests that, '[r]aping women and witnessing their terrified screams is one way in which men get to hear the sound of their own buried terror'. And for the rape victims, Wates concludes that '[t]he issue for the women who have been raped is essentially the same except that the desperate attempts at

⁷⁴John Mullin, "Cyprus Troops face lesser charge," The Guardian, 8 November 1994, sec. HOM, p. 5.

⁷⁵No byline, "14 recruits allege sexual harassment," The Guardian, 23 June 1997, sec. HOM, p. 9.

⁷⁶See, for example: Derek Brown, "India 'tortures thousands'," The Guardian, 25 March 1992, sec. FOR, p. 6; Kathy Evans, "Rape prompts call for tribal warfare," The Guardian, 16 December 1991, sec. FOR, p. 10; Kathy Evans, "Kuwait's rape children offer bitter reminder," The Guardian, 29 July 1993, sec. HOM, p. 24; Kevin Rafferty, "Japan admits forced wartime prostitution," The Guardian, 5 August 1993, sec. FOR, p. 10; Jon Swain, "Asian maids flee Kuwaiti terror," Sunday Times, 3 May 1992, p. 1&20; Editorial, "The Name of Comfort," The Times, 5 August 1993, p. 15; Lindsey Hilsum, "Rwanda's time of rape returns to haunt thousands," The Observer, 26 February 1995, sec. NEW, p. 17; Julie Wheelwright, "War's hidden horror," The Guardian, 13 February 1991, sec. FEA, p. 35; Kevin Rafferty, "Second rape claim stirs anti-US anger," The Guardian, 28 November 1995, sec. FOR, p. 10; Editorial, "The comfort of strangers: US 'sexual imperialism' in Japan," The Guardian, 30 September 1995.

⁷⁷Michele Wates, "Letter: Universal soldiers, universal rape," The Guardian, 23 January 1993, sec. FEA, p. 24.

⁷⁸Rosalind Coward, "Loud and clear," The Guardian, 30 April 1993, sec. G2T, p. 12.

reconnection are more likely to be turned inwards in so called madness and self-hatred'.⁷⁹ Her explanation for the rapists' acts of sexual violence suggests that the act of rape is almost psychologically affirming for him. Furthermore, it also implies that their role is almost a passive one and devoid of ultimate responsibility. This psychoanalytical explanation of rape in war, while reflecting a recognised theory of rape, is not an explanation that is expounded further in the sections of the British press researched. If the process of militarisation dehumanises soldiers it is to be hoped that societies can discover a more acceptable way of 'reconnecting them with their humanity'.

One theme that was given significant coverage in the articles analysed, was the notion that the rapes were committed primarily by 'irregular' soldiers. Therefore, rather than the suggestion that it is military training, replete with the repression of emotion, the embracing of all things 'macho' and the 'dehumanisation' of the soldier, which contributed to the raping in Bosnia, these particular representations suggest that it was untrained 'irregulars' who were the main perpetrators of the crime of rape. As early as August 1992, public uneasiness due to 'irregular forces' in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, was being reported. For example, in a previously mentioned article in The Guardian, Nina Bernstein included quotations from the Serbian public. Komnenic, a former professor, stated his concern over the young men who 'strut' the city streets in 'the paramilitary uniforms of extremist groups'. "They don't go to war", Komnenic said contemptuously of the paramilitaries. "They don't cross the Drina River [into Bosnia]. They rape girls and mistreat people in the street. They've become a problem here".⁸⁰

It is interesting to note that although these young men may be 'irregulars' they, nevertheless, have a uniform and take pride in wearing it - note 'the paramilitary uniforms of extremist groups'. Roy Hattersley, writing in The Guardian, has also commented on the appearance of the 'irregular soldiers in the Balkans. For example, he makes the following observation:

Shirtsleeves were ripped to display biceps. Bandanas were tied around foreheads. Cartridge belts were worn over shoulders and

⁷⁹Michele Wates, 23 January 1993.

⁸⁰Nina Bernstein, "Belgrade bewildered by international outcry," The Guardian, 12 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 6.

across chests. The style was neither Serb nor Croat. It was based on the Hollywood nightmare of what some Americans wore in Southeast Asia, circa 1965. The role model was Rambo. I have never seen one of Sylvester Stallone's epics. No doubt they neither extol nor encourage rape. But they undoubtedly glorify other forms of violence.⁸¹

That these 'rapists' are represented in the press as 'Ramboesque' feeds into various debates surrounding rape, militarisation, and media imagery. The instantly recognisable Rambo image carries with it a complex assortment of ideas and practices which has at its core a particular strain of militarised masculinity. The use of imagery in the media is commonplace and in the absence of photographic evidence, the press journalist must often use powerful language to 'draw' an image in the mind of the reader. However, to conjure up a well-known image from popular culture, such as Rambo, takes little skill or imagination on the part of the journalist or the reader, as such, the story is 'sold' with little effort. The Rambo image is generally perceived to be the epitome of masculinised power, including the power to kill, to maim, and to rape at will. Is this the image that the 'irregular' soldiers have tried to portray, or have the media manipulated the Rambo image for their own purposes? If so, is the media correct in perpetuating this unrealistic, stereotyped image? I raise this question because, inseparable from the Rambo image, are inferences of unreality and 'big screen fiction'. Therefore, with these images of Hollywood fantasy established in the subconscious, will the reader have difficulty separating out the 'real' - the 'irregulars' and the rapes - from the 'fantasy' - the 'irregular soldier/Rambo image? Is there a possibility of the rapes becoming lost in a blurring of fact/fiction, reality/imagery, which renders them as unbelievable as Rambo? As Roy Hattersley explains, life has prepared him to think about many natural and/or man-made disasters, however, on the subject of (the reality of) rape, he writes:

But mass rape - rape as a political statement, rape as an assertion of territorial rights, rape as a military strategy carried out on orders and to numbers - is near to literally beyond my comprehension. I accept the truth of the reports. But the descriptions that they contain remain a step away from reality. The taboos of our society have prevented me from thinking

⁸¹Roy Hattersley, "Endpiece: The terrible facts of war that I refuse to face," *The Guardian*, 12 April 1993, sec. FEA, p. 17.

about such things and I am not equipped to think about them now.⁸²

If Western society has ill-prepared us to think about and accept the full horror of mass rape, does it need the press making it even more difficult to comprehend. I am not suggesting here that society should ever be able to 'come to terms with it' for that suggests some form of acceptance, but we should be able face up to the reality - to improve our understanding of the phenomenon and look for solutions.

Another point raised in the press relating to the wearing of uniforms has been made by Barbara Ehrenreich, who supports the argument that an (in)voluntary identity accompanies the donning of a uniform. Speaking specifically about the US military, Ehrenreich draws parallels between the recent events at Waco, Texas and the war in Bosnia, and suggests some interesting connections between aggression, 'uniforms' and power. She states that 'Americans are not known for their restraint in matters involving armed confrontation A uniformed American with firepower is much like a three-year-old with a garden hose: Someone in whose presence no one can expect to remain dry and composed for long'.⁸³ Feminist Georgina Ashworth made a similar point in Chapter Two when she commented on the higher than average level of violence against women experienced in 'uniformed' homes.⁸⁴

Another article concerned with the behaviour of 'irregulars' and published in The Times, reports how 'Serbian women were subjected to a two-month reign of terror by Croats who had joined the local militia'. Journalist, Barbara Hewson, recounts the story of Ljubica, a young Serbian woman:

[S]he and three other women were taken to a house where 15 men in battle fatigues abused them: "They said, 'We want to see you naked.' They told us that the Chetniks [Serbian irregulars] had raped 150 women and now they were going to do the same to us. Seven men raped us, one after the other we were abused for five hours. They were all neighbours of mine..." Another, Gordana, was taken to a house and gang-raped by drunken irregulars: "They tried to make me yell that I was having a good

⁸²ibid.

⁸³Barbara Ehrenreich, "Just Waco over Bosnia," The Guardian, 1 May 1991, sec. FEA, p. 26.

⁸⁴Georgina Ashworth, Of Violence and Violation: Women and Human Rights (London: Change, 1985), p. 7.

time. When I screamed, one of them smashed my head against the floor. It all lasted three hours. Afterwards they said I would have an Ustashi (Croatian fascist) child."⁸⁵

This passage does indeed state that 'irregulars' took part in rape and abuse, but what of the '15 men in battle fatigues'? There is no mention of their military status as there is the 'irregulars'. Can the reader therefore assume that they are 'regular' soldiers? If so, it would seem that both trained, discipline soldiers and 'irregulars' rape in war, although whether they rape in proportionate numbers in would be impossible to say, as there is no mention of how many 'irregulars' were involved in the gang-rape of Gordana.⁸⁶

This passage also brings out another point - that the 'irregulars' were drunk. In another letter in The Guardian, also written in reply to the Catherine Bennett article, the writer berates Bennett for making 'no mention of the effect of alcohol on the tendency of many men to rape whether in times of war or peace'.⁸⁷ This is an interesting point and one that I feel is worth pursuing briefly. The writer supports his argument by stating that '[e]ven the supposedly moral US armed forces have recently witnessed frightening tales of serving female personnel being stripped and molested whilst running the gauntlet of their masculine counterparts following victory parties'.⁸⁸ One can assume that the author of the letter, Bill Jackson, was here referring to the US Navy's Tailhook scandal.⁸⁹

From this point the arguments begin to slip into worn rhetorical generalisations: although he does make three interesting points. First, that marriage and the home - often assumed to be the safest environment for women - is a place where women are

⁸⁵Barbara Hewson, "Rape is a war crime too; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Modern Times," The Times, 08 September 1992, sec. LT, p. 4.

⁸⁶For an in-depth discussion on adolescent 'irregular' soldiers and violence in war, see, Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998).

⁸⁷Bill Jackson, "Letter: Ultimate power against women," The Guardian, 22 January 1993, sec. FEA, p. 24.

⁸⁸ibid. For further discussion on this topic see, An extract from the Detroit Free Press, "Surprise! Rape in the Army," in Alison Jaggar, ed., Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 609; and, Barbara Ehrenreich, "Wartime in the Barracks," Time, 2 December 1996, p. 80.

⁸⁹One of the most well-known incidents was the Tailhook Scandal. For a feminist analysis see, Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993); for a general analysis see, William H McMichael, The Mother of all Hooks: The Story of the US Navy's Tailhook Scandal (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997); and also, Jean Ebbert, Crossed Currents: Navy Women from World War I to Tailhook (London: Brassey's, 1994).

often 'cowed into submission by threats of physical violence from husbands seeking their conjugal rights after a night down the local'.⁹⁰ Indeed, research has indicted that the suggestion that married women are safer due to the fact that they are 'protected' by the husbands is a fallacy.⁹¹ Second, that '[v]ery few gang rapes take place without the presence of alcohol'. While there is an acknowledged link between levels of alcohol and levels of violence,⁹² Jackson offers no supporting evidence to back up his claim.

Third, Jackson states that 'most individual and multi-rapes by a victorious aggressor in times of war are invariably preceded by large intakes of local spirits and wines to provide the necessary Dutch courage to those who would otherwise be regarded as normal law-abiding citizens'.⁹³ Again, he offers no basis for his claim. However, his suggestion that soldiers use alcohol to 'provide the necessary Dutch courage' in order to rape is a disturbing suggestion. The general connotation connected with gaining 'Dutch courage' is that one needs an extra boost of confidence in order to achieve a premeditated, intentional goal. The implication being that many 'normal, law-abiding male citizens' (civilians and soldiers) carry an innate desire to rape and that a certain level of alcohol is all it takes to transform this innate desire into reality. This argument can be likened to Catherine Bennett's simplistic and 'disheartening' explanations for rape in war discussed earlier in this chapter.

The issue of 'irregulars' was mentioned again in November 1993, when it was reported in The Guardian that the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, facing a vote of no confidence in his government tabled by the Serbian Radical Party - former allies of the president - ordered the arrest of 'paramilitary members and supporters of the racist Serbian Radical Party, accusing them of terrorising civilians'.⁹⁴ The article continues to state that:

[P]olice arrested 14 members of a handful of Serb irregular units, among them the ferocious Serbian Chetnik Movement, the armed wing of the Radicals (SRS). The charges range from

⁹⁰Bill Jackson, 22 January 1993.

⁹¹Judith Hicks Stiehm, "The Protected, the Protector, the Defender," in Alison Jaggar (1994), pp. 582-608.

⁹²Alcohol Concern, Measure for Measure: A Framework for Alcohol Policy (London: Alcohol Concern, March 1997).

⁹³Bill Jackson, 22 January 1993.

⁹⁴Yigal Chazan, "Serbian radicals held before poll," The Guardian, 6 November 1993, sec. FOR, p. 14.

illegal arms possession to rape and murder. Police said the crimes were committed on Serbian territory, primarily in the ethnically mixed province of Vojvodina. Croats and Hungarians there have been victims of ultra-nationalist terror since the outbreak of the Yugoslav war.⁹⁵

The article goes on to discuss the measure of control that President Milosevic has over these 'ferocious' irregulars. My point in including this quotation is two-fold. First, it represented a balance to the reporting above of the raping of Serbian women by Croatian 'irregulars'. And second, it depicted the possible fallaciousness of what is frequently represented as one of this war's unresolvable dilemmas - the difficulty of the regulation and control of 'irregular' soldiers. However, as the above quotation demonstrates, when a political need arises, 'irregulars' can be duly dealt with, although the extent to which their activities can be curtailed depends, of course, on the particular circumstance. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that this article represents Milosevic as having had sufficient power to restrain Serbian 'irregulars' when he saw fit to serve his political ends, but there is no record of him making an attempt to act in a similar manner to stem the tide of rape, a large proportion of which has been reported as being due to Serbian 'irregulars', and accounts of which were being reported throughout the world for at least the previous fifteen months.

According to a report in the Sunday Times it was not only the 'irregulars' who were, on occasion, undisciplined and disobedient. Louise Branson begins her report by stating that '[t]he victorious Bosnian Serb army has been exposed as a chaotic, mutinous force by its own second-in-command, General Slavko Lisica'.⁹⁶ General Lisica, now head of the Bosnian Serb military academy, commented to a Serb magazine and was duly reported in the Sunday Times, that in the Bosnian Serb army 'commanders disobey orders' and 'morale is so low that the army relies on heavy weapons rather than men'.⁹⁷ Lisica's disillusionment with the Serb army arose when 'regular' soldiers under his command refused to obey his orders to advance and take the town of Livno. In Lisica's words:

I said those who do not want to fight should lay down their arms and remove their uniforms ... they all started doing it. Then I got

⁹⁵ibid.

⁹⁶Louise Branson, "Troops scared out of their pants," Sunday Times, 8 August 1993, sec. p. 1&13.

⁹⁷ibid.

angry. And I said: 'Everything, even your underpants, is army property.' And imagine ... 40 of them, including the commander, took off their underpants.⁹⁸

The story ends with the author stating that 'the naked men not only left the front, they later began shelling [Lisica's] headquarters'. While this 'story' is not directly related to the issue of rape in war, it challenges the assumptions that trained, disciplined soldiers act in a predictable, militarised, almost unconscious fashion and illustrates the fact that soldiers do not always blindly follow orders, to rape or otherwise⁹⁹ - although the 'deserting' of these soldiers was still a *collective* action. The notion of 'collective action' in the context of military training will be discussed in Chapter Eight. Of course, Lisica's decision to talk to a 'Serb magazine', particularly about the constant undermining of his own leadership, could have been made for a myriad of different political reasons, however, no possible explanations for his revelations are given, or even alluded to, in the article.

Another interesting point that this article brings out relates, once again, to the position of 'irregulars'. The journalist comments that '[n]othing appears to have angered Lisica more than Serb paramilitary forces fighting alongside the regular army'.¹⁰⁰ Was this the scenario in the above account of soldier's defiance? The reader is not told. Nevertheless, Lisica describes the 'irregulars' as:

a burden ... disorganised, irresponsible ... war profiteers. They are the types who would kill a man of 90 for a lamb ... my men on the front line would say, 'General, they rob, they rape and they steal. Why are we fighting and for what?'¹⁰¹

There is no way of knowing whether the accusations by Lisica are accurate or whether he had a political axe to grind, or perhaps another agenda altogether. Although it does appear contradictory that in the first instance Lisica is condemning his soldiers for insubordination, while immediately following this statement he is attempting to blame

⁹⁸ibid.

⁹⁹Peter A. French, ed., Individual and Collective Responsibility: Massacre at My Lai (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1972); Gloria Emerson, Winners and Losers: Battles, retreats, gains, losses and ruins from the Vietnam War (London: Norton, 1992); also interesting on this issue is, Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (London: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

¹⁰⁰Louise Branson, 8 August 1993.

¹⁰¹ibid.

all wartime excesses on the 'irregulars', thus, by implication, absolving the regular soldiers of any blame for breaches of international law. However, we must keep in mind the possibility of journalistic error, or if not actual error, then we could question whether the article in the Sunday Times is represented in the same context as the original interview; bearing in mind that these quotations from Lisica have been through one translation and two representations: three if this one is counted!

A final article in The Times which is also concerned with the role of 'irregular' soldiers - female Croatian 'irregular' soldiers to be precise - and begins with the suggestion that, '[w]hether as regular soldiers or fanatical guerrillas, female fighters have always had a role on the battlefield'.¹⁰² While on first reading this statement does appear to be a rather dubious claim, the author of the article, Kate Muir, qualifies this statement in a later passage by stating that:

[s]ince the Greeks, and probably before, women have always fought as irregulars. Because no established state army would have truck with them, female soldiery has been confined to civil wars, guerrilla groups, piracy, ragged half-baked armies, and revolutionary or terrorist cells.¹⁰³

Rape enters the discussion by way of an inducement for Croatian women to fight. As Kate Muir further explains:

As word came out of Serbian atrocities and the systematic rape of women prisoners as part of 'ethnic cleansing', many more women offered to become soldiers. If this war were being fought according to the Geneva Convention, which it is not, women soldiers ought to be treated as normal prisoners of war and might be less likely to be raped.¹⁰⁴

There are some issues here that need addressing (in addition to the preoccupation of *Serbian* atrocities and the indiscriminate use of the term 'ethnic cleansing'). First, in the last quotation there appears to be no clear link between the issue of a rise in the number of female volunteers and the issue of women soldiers not being treated in accordance with the international laws of war. Rape is mentioned as a significant

¹⁰²Kate Muir, "When killing is women's work," The Times, 13 April 1993, p. 12.

¹⁰³ibid.

¹⁰⁴ibid.

factor in both issues, but that appears to be as far as the connection goes.¹⁰⁵ Is this sloppy journalism or loose editing? Regardless, it is interesting to speculate whether an increase in female 'irregulars' would make a significant difference to the attitudes, behaviour, and the raping of women in war. While the article does not propound any consequences to the possible increase in numbers, this is an interesting and potentially huge issue and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight.

The second point worth making, which is alluded to in this article, is the difference in ideology between 'irregulars' - in this passage referred to as 'freedom fighters' - and 'regular' soldiers. As Kate Muir states: 'The life and rationale of the freedom fighter [read 'irregular'] is far from that of the regular soldier. The Croatian woman is there out of desperation: her life, her home and her family are threatened and all around her is chaos'.¹⁰⁶ If a parallel could be drawn between male and female 'irregulars', would this scenario be the same for both sexes? This suggestion does not fit with a previous theory that suggested that male 'irregulars' chose combat for very different reasons. Would a male 'irregular' be fighting for his life, his home, his family and to generally restore order? Possibly. But the reports so far have indicated that the primary motivations behind men becoming 'irregulars' and having the will to fight are excitement, to stem the boredom of a monotonous life and, of course, to have access to women.

Third, the suggestion that 'women soldiers' were exclusively raped and sexually abused is open to question. There are no statistics included in the article to determine the extent of female involvement as 'irregulars' or what proportion of those female 'irregulars' were raped. However, it would be safe to conclude that the numbers of female civilians, and male prisoners of war, raped would far outweigh the sum total of female soldiers suffering the same abuse.¹⁰⁷ This is not to belittle the suffering of the raped female soldiers, nor to suggest that this issue should ever develop into a contest to ascertain who had suffered the most at the hands of rapacious soldiers, either between national groups or, as in this case, between groups of women on the same

¹⁰⁵Liz Philipose, "The Laws of War and Women's Human Rights," paper given at British International Studies Association Conference, University of Southampton, Southampton (December 1995).

¹⁰⁶Kate Muir, 13 April 1993.

¹⁰⁷Alison Jaggar (1994), p. 609.

side. However, it could be argued, that when a soldier enlists or volunteers and subsequently goes to war, that soldier, regardless of her/his sex, is more aware of the consequences and possible violence, of any form, should s/he fall into enemy hands: an insight that female civilians arguably do not have.¹⁰⁸

Having now covered all the articles that discuss the rapes in relation to militarisation, it is appropriate within this 'misogyny' section to take a brief look at the issue of the sexual abuse and mutilation of men during this conflict.

Mutilation and Male Rape

While this research project is primarily looking at the mass raping of *women* in the Balkans, there have been some reports from journalists detailing the rape and mutilation of men. It may appear out of context to include a section on the mutilation and rape of men within a section entitled 'Misogyny'. However, it could be regarded as appropriate because the mutilation, sexual abuse and rape of male prisoners is, in essence, an issue of gender. The castration and sexual mutilation of men can be seen on one level to be an attempt to neutralise the victim's masculinity. And by the same token, the sexual abuse and rape of men serves to reverse his gender, literally subjugating him into an inferior, or traditionally feminine, position.

One example of such an article is the following report from The Guardian. While not directly mentioning male rape, it is nevertheless an unrestrained account of the deaths and funerals of twenty-eight sexually mutilated Serbian men. The author, Paul Martin, begins with a graphic description of the corpses stating that, '[s]ome victims had been burned to death, others bore huge gashes in their chests, legs and torso. Many had been castrated, either before or after death.'¹⁰⁹ While the issue of male sexual violence and sexual mutilation against men is one which overall is reported infrequently, in this report it is mentioned on two occasions. In addition to the above passage, the report later reiterated the same point by stating that, '[m]any of the men had been either

¹⁰⁸Maria Olujic, "The Croatian War Experience," in Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius Robben, eds., Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies on Violence and Survival (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 186-204.

¹⁰⁹Paul Martin, "Serb villagers mourn butchered menfolk," The Guardian, 30 September 1992, sec. HOM, p. 20.

castrated or crudely circumcised, either before or after death'.¹¹⁰ It is interesting to note the continued use of the phrase 'either before or after death' - suggesting the possibility of great cruelty.

However, while it makes an enormous and undeniable difference to the pain and suffering of the victims if the castrations were performed 'either before or after death', if regarded as a ritualistic act of male sexual symbolism the amount of physical pain suffered is reduced in significance. One argument could be that this kind of sexual mutilation, whether performed before, during or after death, would be regarded as the ultimate humiliation for the enemy, a sadistic act in which some of these men are denied their manhood, their means of reproducing, even in death.

This article, like many others of its kind, does not at first appear to simply relay the 'facts' of war, but reads like a piece of prose lifted from a novel. The article is embellished with adjectives and visual imagery. For example, some of Martin's phrases are as follows:

a distraught family intoned a seemingly ancient lament; the killers had gone about their task with a gruesome viciousness; the day before we had arrived the corpses had been laid gently on a lawn; others bore huge gashes into which maggots had busily swarmed'.¹¹¹

However, while one can take issue with a few of these representations - how could the author know that the corpses had been laid *gently* on the lawn if it had happened on the day *before* he arrived - it cannot be discounted that the majority of the article, although having been written in a particularly dramatic style, could nevertheless be factually accurate; if maggots were busily swarming in the wounds, why not report it?

Another interesting point is the response to the massacre by the Serbian president, Radovan Karadzic. According to the report, Karadzic was 'challenged to allow a British television team to film the evidence [of the massacre], he promptly obliged by offering a lift in his own helicopter'¹¹². He even 'cut short a meeting with the

¹¹⁰ibid.

¹¹¹ibid.

¹¹²ibid.

commander of French UN forces in Sarajevo' to accompany them and speak at the graveside. The implications within the article are that Karadzic was not going to miss an opportunity to use the situation to his advantage for a number of reasons. First, it was suggested that Karadzic used it as a forum to blame "western callousness and treachery" for the plight of the Serbs - and the massacre of the 28 [sexually mutilated Serbian men].¹¹³ Second, it was suggested that Karadzic used the incident to justify revenge attacks. And although Karadzic told Western journalists that 'his people would not take revenge', local Serb leaders apparently said that the local Muslim villages where the killers are alleged to have 'grouped themselves' will soon be 'emptied'. And lastly, the author implies that Karadzic was anxious to redress the balance of atrocities in the eyes of the West.

Karadzic could equally have been portrayed as a concerned leader who was prepared to console the families personally, was co-operative with the Western press, and who promoted policies of no revenge. But would that have reinforced the Serb stereotype which by September 1992 appeared already to be an established part of the British press' *modus operandi*? The press had already given Karadzic a 'personality' and obviously were not prepared to portray him 'out of character'. Of course, when one takes the evidence against Karadzic to date, in its entirety, it is reasonably easy to become cynical of his actions. However, in reporting incidents such as the one above, should the author's scepticism of the Serbian president's motives be quite so evident?

Another article in The Guardian by Roy Gutman tells of the mutilation of Muslim men in a Serb-run 'concentration camp'.¹¹⁴ This was the first published article in the British press which included reports of witnesses who claimed to have been held in, what was instantly interpreted by Roy Gutman as, 'concentration camps'. The emotionally loaded language used by Gutman and subsequently repeated by most broadsheet journalists seemingly without question, points to its general success in conjuring up images of Belsen, Auschwitz, and the Holocaust in the minds of other journalists and therefore, it can be assumed, in the minds of the general public too. As has been noted before, the projection of these images corresponded effectively to the

¹¹³ibid.

¹¹⁴Roy Gutman, "Survivors tell of thousands killed in Serbian camps," The Guardian, 5 August 1992, sec. HOM, p. 1.

Serbs being cast in the role of the Nazi aggressors and the Muslim population playing the oppressed nation being persecuted for their religious beliefs - a stereo-typical image which both nations found increasingly difficult to shake off. The two 'concentration camps' mentioned in Gutman's first report were actually one 'former iron-mining complex at Omarska' and one 'custom's warehouse on the bank of the Sava River'¹¹⁵ which had been converted into detention centres to house prisoners of war. However, this is not explained until later in the article and not until the term 'concentration camps' had been referred to three times.

One of the witnesses interviewed by Gutman, a fifty-three-year-old traffic engineer called Alija Lujinovic, is reported as saying that during his time at the 'camp' by the Sava River he 'experienced nearly every form of humiliation the Serb captors inflicted on Muslim prisoners, from desecration of the local mosque to witnessing the murder and mutilation of male prisoners and gang rape of women.'¹¹⁶ Lujinovic describes in his 'own words' some of the 'horrible mutilations' that he witnessed:

The very worst day, and I saw it with my own eyes, was when I saw 10 young [Muslim] men laid out in a row. They had their throats slit, their noses cut off and their genitals plucked out. It was the worst thing I saw.¹¹⁷

The journalist then interjects, stating that, '[a] Serb guard appeared before the prisoners who were made to observe the killings with a home-made wire device with three prongs attached to a long handle'. And then Lujinovic concludes that, '[h]e threatened to castrate us.'¹¹⁸ There is an interesting comparison to make between the reporting and representation of the mutilation and rape of men and the reporting and representation of the raping and torture of women. There are many reports that mention the rape and even 'torture' of women, but any mention of mutilation is rare. This following passage in The Times, for example, which has already been mentioned in this chapter, quotes a Western European Union (WEU) report comments that, '[w]omen and girls are held in rape camps where each day they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and ... they are even killed.'¹¹⁹ While the suggestion is evident -

¹¹⁵ibid.

¹¹⁶ibid.

¹¹⁷ibid.

¹¹⁸ibid.

¹¹⁹Roger Boyes, 23 December 1992.

'tortured repeatedly' - there is no mention of explicit mutilation. However, there is one later reference in the Sunday Times which refers to the mutilation of children in Srebrenica, in particular the severing of noses, ears and limbs by Serbian soldiers.¹²⁰ If one is to accept this allegation then some of these children could, of course, have been girls, but in general there is no record of women being mutilated in the same manner as in, for example Vietnam, as detailed in Chapter Two.

This raises a number of interesting questions. Does the lack of 'evidence' of physical/sexual female mutilation suggest that it simply did not occur? Given the representations studied to date, the issue of female mutilation does not seem to be an emerging characteristic of the Balkan war: as it did, for example, in Vietnam, as detailed in Chapter Two. On the other hand, perhaps the word 'rape', as used in the reporting of sexual violence against women, is used as a catch-all term to encompass a multitude of horrors inflicted on the female victims, including mutilation? However, given the possible opportunity to use another emotive and shocking term such as 'mutilation', would the British press, even with only sketchy, second-hand 'evidence' shy away from using it? If, therefore, reports of the sexual mutilation of men do far exceed that of women, what explanations could be given for this phenomenon?

Perhaps, given the popularity in the British press of the theory of 'ethnic cleansing' through the impregnation of Muslim women by Serbian soldiers, as suggested in Chapter Four, then the lack of female sexual mutilation would accord with this theory. Why, especially if acting on orders, would soldiers impregnate the women and then, literally, cut off the means by which the women could bear and feed the 'rape babies'? Catharine MacKinnon has included one account of the mutilation of a Muslim women by Serbian soldiers, not in the British press, but in her contributory chapter in Alexandra Stiglmayer's book Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia Herzegovina. This account is detailed in a previous chapter, however to reiterate, a heavily pregnant Muslim women is tied to a tree and while her Muslim husband is forced to watch, the unborn child is cut out of her.¹²¹ Horrific as this incident is, it

¹²⁰Jon Swain, "Bosnia endures more atrocities," Sunday Times, 23 July 1995, p. 1&13.

¹²¹Catherine MacKinnon, "Turning Pornography into Rape: Postmodern Genocide," in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 80.

again fits with the 'impregnation theory'. In this case the unborn child was Muslim, therefore 'aborted'. Of course, it may be the situation that there are far more incidents of female physical/sexual mutilation than have been reported to date, perhaps, as with Vietnam, these 'stories' will only be told, and listened to, with the passing of time.

Alternatively, could it be the case that the mutilation and rape of men is an even more shocking 'story' for the press to detail than that of women? Perhaps the British press, always on the look-out for a new attention-grabbing headline - as detailed in a recent article by Jenny Kitzinger¹²² - were keen to disseminate this latest, shocking revelation? If Kitzinger's theory of 'victim fatigue' is employed, then the raping of women in the Bosnian war might have become a little passé for the news editors and among the general public the constant exposure and familiarity with the subject could have bred indifference. This might have been a consideration in the reporting and printing of later reports, but the Gutman report mentioned above was the first account of the rape in the Balkan war of both men and women. It would be difficult, therefore, to accuse The Guardian of sensationalising one issue over the other.

These issues of male rape and mutilation raise the issue of whether Western society's construction of masculinity has forced male rape into silence. As cited in Chapter Four, rape is often referred to as a 'forbidden' subject or the 'hidden crime' as it frequently remains unreported due to the shame, guilt and dishonour felt by the victim and, in some cultures, the family and community as well. However, given the social pervasion of masculinity and the 'macho' baggage it carries, has this resulted in male rape becoming an even more unseen and 'silenced' crime? Is the press attempting to open up a previously 'taboo' subject in reporting these accounts of the rape and mutilation of men? This wider question is relevant because there have been an increasing number of articles published during the period of time covered by this research, particularly in The Guardian, which deal with this issue in a 'peacetime' context.¹²³ Perhaps the discussion in the press of the rape and mutilation of men during war has helped to open up the issue of male rape more generally.

¹²²Jenny Kitzinger (1996); see n. 40.

¹²³See, for example: Claire Armitstead, "Sentenced to silence," The Guardian, 21 July 1994, sec. G2T, p. 15; Sarah Boseley, "End to silence on male rape," The Guardian, 24 April 1991, sec. FEA, p. 23; Madeleine Bunting, "Confronting last taboo of male rape," The Guardian, 24 August 1992, sec. HOM,

The Times carried a total of four reports that detailed incidents of the rape and mutilation of men at the hands of their male captors. One of these contained a similar account, as previously reported in The Guardian, of Alija Lujinovic's experience, the traffic engineer who was held at the Luka 'facility' on the Sava river. (Note the use by The Times of the term 'facility' instead of the usual 'camp'. 'Camp' is, however, back in usage in the following paragraph.) The article does not appear to be a direct interview with Lujinovic but forms part of an 'American report' to the United Nations which refers to the same incident recounted in The Guardian and is reported in the following way:

Lujinovic ... once saw about fifteen naked corpses of young men with their genitals torn off. A guard at the Luka facility on the Sava river where Mr. Lujinovic was being held threatened to use a 'scissor-like instrument' on him.¹²⁴

That part of the story is virtually identical to the account previously reported in The Guardian. However, Lujinovic then continues with some supplementary information which, if one assumes that the information was gleaned from the same source, must have been edited out of his published interview with Roy Gutman in The Guardian two months earlier. The Times article continues in the following manner:

Mr. Lujinovic said he also saw a doctor slit the throats of young, healthy people, cut out their organs and pack them into plastic bags for transportation in a refrigerated lorry.¹²⁵

How did The Times receive additional information when it was a journalist working for The Guardian who carried out the original interview with Lujinovic? The interesting point here is that according to The Guardian, although Roy Gutman writes for them, he also works for Newsday, a Long Island newspaper in New York which holds the copyright to Gutman's interviews and reports. But James Bone, the author of the article in The Times, did not obtain his information from Newsday, but states that it came from an un-named US report that was filed with the United Nations. Thus, the

p. 2; Clare Dyer, "Rape law helps male victims," The Guardian, 12 July 1994, sec. HOM, p. 2; Val Sampson, "Against their will," The Guardian, 23 July 1991, sec. FEA, p. 17; Alan Travis, "Male rape recognised in law," The Guardian, 12 July 1994, sec. HOM, p. 1; Stephen Ward, "Crime that strikes at the heart of masculinity," The Guardian, 9 November 1994, sec. G2T, p. 27.

¹²⁴James Bone, "US reveals catalogue of Bosnia atrocities," The Times, 23 October 1992, p. 13.

¹²⁵*ibid.*

chain of information from source to public readership appears to be an extended and rather complex one. The incident recounted above by James Bone has travelled through a number of unanalysable human filters - translation, possible distortions, mis-representations, and so on - on its journey into the pages of The Times. The incident first had to be actually witnessed by Lujinovic who described the moment in his own words which were, of course, coloured by his own perceptions, emotions and understanding of the event. One assumes Roy Gutman filtered the information in a similar way with the added complication of translation, also Newsday could have affected the report in additional significant ways. Here the trail runs a little cold and the reader is left to fill the gap with a few vague possibilities. Could the 'US report' have obtained its information from Newsday? Is it standard practice for national reports to the United Nations to use unsubstantiated evidence as the basis for allegations against another country? If so, this accords the role of the press particular significance in the creating and recreating of society's current understanding of rape in war - a theme which will be returned to in Chapter Seven and in the Conclusion to the thesis. To question further the content of the 'US report', the article by James Bone mentions another 'unnamed' source which is included in the report as evidence, he states that:

An unnamed Muslim butcher who spent 27 days at the Luka camp said he saw about 20 soldiers rape a women in the presence of her child and that other girls were picked up almost daily and taken to the camp canteen where they were raped and then 'disappeared'.¹²⁶

Without wanting to trivialise the story the butcher is telling, it is pertinent to again ask whether 'unnamed' sources are regularly regarded as admissible evidence in reports to the United Nations? Considering the need for the victims of rape and their lawyers to produce only 'trial-grade evidence' to the War Crimes Tribunal if it is the case that these reports containing 'unnamed' sources of information are given credence, then it appears rather anomalous.

What this report brings out is not that all newspaper accounts of atrocities in the Balkans have had such a attenuated passage into print, nor that due to the hand-to-

¹²⁶ibid.

hand nature of its journey that the account must be factually incorrect. However, when analysing press reports of any description one has to be aware of the often lengthy process it has gone through to reach the final print stage, and therefore the opportunities for embellishment, misunderstandings, changes, and so on.

James Bone in The Times article also cites another two alleged incidents, which are, once again, both described by 'unnamed' men:

A Muslim cleric who was interned in the Serb-run Omarska camp for 75 days testified that guards forced male inmates to have sexual intercourse with each other, and sometimes cut off prisoners' hands and penises to frighten other men. Another survivor of the Omarska camp said that he had seen a guard rip a testicle from a young Muslim inmate by tying a wire around a motorcycle and riding off.¹²⁷

First, this raises the issue of forced sexual intercourse, which at first reading seems implausible, but is mentioned with surprising regularity throughout the articles examined. This issue was discussed in the 'Rape as Strategy' section earlier in this chapter, with reference to the forced raping of women and girls by soldiers held at gun-point by their fellow soldiers. Second, it is interesting to note that the majority of the mutilation meted out to the inmates of the detention 'camps' is based around the injury or dismemberment of the reproductive and sexual organs, with the severing of hands also being mentioned. As these forms of mutilation are carried out on men by men, does this suggest that the severing of the penis or genitals is the ultimate method of torture? Whether this mutilation is part of a symbolic war against the Muslim religion, or part of a wider 'male' symbolic ritual against the enemy male in wartime, on a sliding scale of atrocities for men, to suffer the loss or mutilation of the reproductive organs would probably rank as the worst possible scenario.

Early in 1993, The Times reported that there was to be a 'diplomatic offensive ... as new allegations of atrocities in Bosnia were revealed', which included '[h]arrowing descriptions of castration and rape ... given by survivors of two prison camps there'.¹²⁸ However, as the following passage illustrates, the accounts given as 'harrowing'

¹²⁷ibid.

¹²⁸James Bone and Eve-Ann Prentice, "France has secret plan for Western military shield round Sarajevo," The Times, 3 February 1993, p. 12.

examples of Serbian atrocities in this article are similar to those referred to above which were published in The Times four months earlier. For example, here Bone states:

One of the men incarcerated in the Omarska and Trnopolje camps said he watched as his friend was castrated by a Serb 'after three days of torture'. Another said some of the guards 'enjoyed killing people slowly. They broke their hands, their legs, everything'.¹²⁹

It is a little difficult to understand how the 'new' allegations mentioned in this passage can be regarded as having spurred the European and US negotiators into not only staging a 'diplomatic offensive', but also into further discussions regarding the possibility of military intervention. As already mentioned, allegations of this type (and notably by the same author), and some arguably much worse, were published in the same newspaper four months earlier. Moreover, Roy Gutman's original interviews with accompanying allegations were published in The Guardian six months before. However, the article does mention that '[t]he charges are made by Bosnian Muslims, living in exile, who say they were victims of Serb "ethnic cleansing"'.¹³⁰ Perhaps if the allegations were made by people 'living in exile', their stories were easier to verify. Or perhaps, the 'powers that be' decided to pre-empt a backlash of negative public opinion: as the article also mentions, as an aside, that '[t]he chilling claims, along with scenes of burnt Muslim homes, will be broadcast by the Dispatches programme on Channel 4 tonight'.¹³¹ (Is this a comment on the power of the visual image over the power of the written word?) The article does not disclose any further information regarding the atrocities in what is a rather lengthy (thousand word) article, save to identify and name two officials who were responsible for running the afore-mentioned camps. However, the article is primarily concerned with detailing the various military and diplomatic strategies open to the United Nations.

The final article in The Times which refers to the mutilation of male prisoners is based on an interview with Dame Anne Warburton, who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was asked by the EC, via the British Foreign Office, to investigate

¹²⁹ibid.

¹³⁰ibid.

¹³¹ibid.

allegations of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia. The following passage is the only mention of the sexual abuse of men in the article and begins with a quotation from Dame Anne on her findings in the former Yugoslavia:

"People were ordered to rape members of their own family and animals. Men in prison camps are being castrated." Dame Anne will not list the centres where women are being detained, because she says that has led to them being cleared and bodies being removed.¹³²

This Alice Thomson article, as commented on before, is a rather disjointed affair with quotations from Dame Anne Warburton seemingly cobbled together to support the author's arguments. As the first two sentences in the above passage demonstrates, the article consists of quotations that somehow do not fit together. In this example the tenses of each sentence are different and while it is not out of the ordinary to change tenses while speaking, in this case there is no emphasis added to aid the reader's understanding of that change. Again, it is possible that the author has lifted various sentences from the interview and combined them to create the required meaning. However, even this remains unsatisfactory as the passage above is a paragraph that stands on its own and offers no further explanation or elaboration on the contents.

One interesting point that the article does bring to light is the difference in representation of atrocities committed against men and those committed against women. The author, Alice Thomson, asks Dame Anne why she thought 'it took so much longer for the crimes against women to be recognised than the atrocities against male captives?' The reply was as follows:

I think the tales told [about the raping of women] were so far from our idea of reality that people found them hard to grasp. We accepted the images of men because they reminded us of the concentration camps in the second world war.¹³³

Dame Anne is probably right in assuming that the British people, including the general public and political elites alike, responded to the various media representations they were presented with in different ways. However, Roy Gutman, in writing his initial reports from the former Yugoslavia in August 1992, appeared

¹³²Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear," *The Times*, 1 January 1993, p. 11.

¹³³ibid.

balanced in his coverage of the atrocities, in as much as he wrote equally about the raping and detaining of civilian women and girls, and the torture, detention and sexual abuse of men. Therefore, it may not have been that the crimes against women were not 'recognised', and it may not even have been that the crimes against women were particularly unbelievable or 'hard to grasp', but, in a practical sense, given the option between acting on reports of rape, which are notoriously difficult to substantiate,¹³⁴ or acting on reports of 'concentration camps' which are accompanied by hard evidence, including television news footage, the 'authorities' would no doubt choose the option which could be substantiated by supportive material.

The final article to be reviewed in this chapter was published in the Sunday Times during the summer of 1993, and begins in the following way:

Chilling accounts of rape and sexual abuse of male prisoners by all three sides in the Bosnian war are beginning to surface as victims talk about their suffering at a United Nations refugee camp in the Croatian town of Karlovac and at other centres. While attention has been focused on allegations of systematic rape of Muslim women by Serbian captors, atrocities committed against men by each of the warring factions have remained largely hidden from the world.¹³⁵

Here is a slightly different view than the one suggested in previous articles. In this passage the author, Louise Branson, comments on the extent to which the media's preoccupation with the 'systematic rape of Muslim women' has overshadowed the 'atrocities committed against men'. And, indeed, by July 1993 The Guardian alone had published forty articles which all commented to a greater or lesser degree on the mass raping of women and girls in the Balkan conflict, whereas apart from Roy Gutman's contribution in early August 1992, only one other article had been published in The Guardian which dealt with the sexual abuse of male prisoners in the Balkans.¹³⁶ But, one has to ask whether the journalists knew about the rape and sexual abuse of men in the 'camps' yet chose not to write about it. Were the editors aware of the atrocities but decided to edit those sections out? Both these scenarios seem very unlikely, and I would suggest, given the previous comments on the value of sensationalism, that a

¹³⁴See, for example: the section on the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague in Chapter Six.

¹³⁵Louise Branson, "Men tell of sexual abuse," Sunday Times, 25 July 1993, p. 1&20.

¹³⁶Paul Martin, 30 September 1992.

more conceivable explanation is that the victims of this abuse simply preferred, for their own reasons, to remain silent.

This possibility is also supported by Louise Branson who, after interviewing Pierre Salignon, a French aid worker studying the psychological treatment of refugees, stated that, '[s]o far it is proving difficult to coax evidence from victims because Yugoslav men, with their deeply macho culture, regard rape as a humiliation that can never be erased'.¹³⁷ So, the social construction of masculinity within the Yugoslav and/or Muslim culture has seemingly created men who can discuss starvation, torture and tribulation of any kind, except that of a sexual nature. However, if men are *now* beginning to respond to the coaxing of psychologists and are starting to talk about their suffering, this could prove to be invaluable for the psychological healing process, not only for the men themselves, but for their relationships with their possibly raped and abused wives, mothers, sisters, daughters, neighbours, and so on. In essence, perhaps they could now empathise with the female victims who have also suffered sexual abuse, and their mutual suffering could form part of the foundation for rebuilding relationships.

The article continues by asking who were the 'torturers'? And why did they use sexual abuse as a means of torture? In reply, the author uses another quotation from Medecins sans Frontieres' Pierre Salignon. Branson first comments that Salignon 'believes male rape is carried out by "intelligent" torturers who want to degrade their victims as much as possible. They don't want to kill them, they want to break them,' [Salignon] said'.¹³⁸ This explanation has, of course, been used in a similar form to explain the mass raping of Muslim women and has been discussed at length in previous chapters. However, this is the first time that it has been used to account for male rape and mutilation. As with the raping of women, this 'theory' suggests that the sexual abuse was pre-meditated: the implication being that this was a policy that was decreed, or at least condoned, by some higher authority. Whether 'true' or not, this explanation runs contrary to the image conjured up by the 'irregulars theory', mentioned earlier in this section. This suggested that the 'torturers' were primarily an

¹³⁷Louise Branson, 25 July 1993.

¹³⁸*ibid.*

opportunistic, undisciplined, rapacious, group of irregular soldiers who commit rape and sexual abuse at will, ostensibly answering to no one.

It appears that the reports of the rape and mutilation of men are significantly different from those of women in one respect. Although a large proportion of the women victims were allegedly raped in some form of detention camp, it is evident that this was not so in all cases; however, men's experience of rape in this war appears to have been solely in 'camps' of some kind. One can deduce from this, then, that the raping and mutilation of the men would have to have been premeditated and orchestrated by their torturers. Yet, although some men are now beginning to speak of their experiences, one can only speculate how many Balkan men are alive and silently suffering both physically and mentally from the trauma of rape and mutilation. The conclusion to be drawn from this article is that there must be a significant number.

The article gives two examples of male victims who admitted publicly to having suffered sexual abuse at the hands of their captors and it is refreshing to see that Branson has attempted to portray a balanced picture of the atrocities, in as much as she has given examples of both Serb and Muslim men as having suffered from sexual abuse. The first is Rade Drljaca, a Serbian bricklayer - a job which is traditionally associated with 'macho' culture in Western society - who was captured by Croatian forces bent on revenge after their families had been killed by advancing Serbs. He and another Serb called Goran, were held in a cell in the town of Pula on the Dalmatian coast. Drljaca is quoted as retelling the following account of his rape:

[The Croatian forces] were full of hatred, their state of mind was far from healthy. The guards wanted to humiliate us and they enjoyed torturing us while we were tied to a wall. One of their favourite games was to see which one of them could urinate longer in our faces. We were sexually abused and beaten. We were made to perform oral sex on the guards and Goran was raped a few times even before my arrival. I cannot describe the other things we were made to do to the guards. My life will never be normal again.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ibid.

While I have read no account of soldiers of any nationality urinating in the faces of women prisoners - perhaps this is one humiliation that can only be understood by men¹⁴⁰ - the other abuses mentioned above are identical to stories that have been told by raped women, once again, of all nationalities. There is nothing in this account that immediately identifies the victim as either male or female. However, in the second example the victim recalls suffering sexual abuse of a distinctive and now familiar kind. Dian Menkovic, a young Muslim driver was held in the 'notorious' Serb-run Omarska detention camp, the article continues:

Since the closure of the camp after an international outcry, scores of former inmates have testified about massacres and torture. Mankovic says he was strung up against a wall while a guard tried to cut off his genitals with a bayonet. The clumsy operation failed as Mankovic fainted; he recovered in hospital after being given 20 stitches for his wounds.¹⁴¹

There is only one question that arises from this passage that does not fit with previous reports from the Omarska detention centre, and that is, if the 'camp' was as 'notorious' as the reader is led to believe and 'scores of former inmates have testified about massacres and torture' how did Menkovic end up in hospital? After the bungled castration attempt why was he not just killed, the evidence destroyed and his fate the same as those mentioned in other reports? The 'reported' fact that he was taken to hospital for medical assistance appears inconsistent with previous representations of the 'detention camps'. However, there is no further explanation and the article ends with Branson making a poignant statement with more than a hint of resignation. She suggests that, '[the psychological trauma of these experiences remains deeply buried and can only contribute to the endless cycle of Balkan revenge'.¹⁴²

Within this section there have been a series of explanations for rape in the Balkans based loosely around the notion of misogyny and there have been some interesting assertions. For example, Catherine Bennett's reiterated a classic feminist theory that suggests that, given the right circumstances, all men are capable of rape. Michael Simmons also acknowledged the problem of rape in war, but suggested that due to

¹⁴⁰For an account of an American GI urinating into the mouth of a dead Japanese soldier, see: Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding the Behaviour an the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 293.

¹⁴¹Louise Branson, 25 July 1993.

militarism troops of many nationalities and stationed all over the world have been shown to display a tendency to rape - either locals, their fellow servicewomen, and in 'peacetime'. In addition, the idea of mostly 'irregular' soldiers being to blame for the rapes was mentioned, due, it was suggested, to their lack of control and anyone's control over them. Moreover, in the analysis of the reports which referred to the mutilation and raping of men it was revealed that this sexual abuse of male prisoners was a more common occurrence than had been expected. This suggests that some simple explanation of 'rape in war', like misogyny, is not sufficient.

Conclusion

Chapter Five has offered a critical examination of the newspaper articles which claim that an analysis of certain forms of 'war games' can offer satisfactory explanations for the occurrence of mass rape in war in the Balkans. The various journalists identified in this chapter have claimed that the rapes were due to either a premeditated strategy on the part of military or political elites - and that 'irregular' soldiers might, or might not, have formed part of that strategy; or, they have suggested that the rapes were due to an in-built misogyny which manifest itself in the raping and mutilation of both women and men, and which was heightened by militarisation; alternatively, some journalists suggested that for the soldier's the rapes just became part of their expected R&R.

However, when explained as just one part of a soldier's rest and relaxation the crime of mass rape in war, and specifically the crime as a violation of women's human rights becomes less significant. It is almost regarded as excusable, due to the apparent socially acceptable 'need' of the soldier to unwind and release his sexual tension: presumably so that his soldiering skills will subsequently be more efficiently utilised. This explanation touches on two previously mentioned theories of rape in war, both of whose validity was questioned. The first is the notion that when soldiers go to war it is just expected that they will take any 'spoils of war' which they feel are due to them.

¹⁴²ibid.

Second, is the idea that soldiers have 'natural' biological urges which just have to be satisfied, or they will fail to perform to the best of their ability on the battlefield. These theories, which will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven, are based on highly gendered notions of human nature and of biological determinacy (a notion that will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven), are not useful when looking for solutions to this age-old problem. They rely on fixed notions of human propensities that set limits for social change, implying that any search for 'solutions' will be fruitless. When placed within a misogynistic context, however, and explained as occurring due to an in-built contempt of women which is 'learnt' during 'peacetime' and enhanced through the militarisation process, then the explanation that soldiers rape as part of their R&R becomes more understandable.

The journalists' explanations, which claimed that the rapes were part of a military or political strategy were interesting, although again, confusing messages were given out regarding the soldiers' general behaviour. There were some journalists who reported the rapes as being very much 'under control', that is, the rapes were controlled by political and military elites and by the commanders of the troops and so on down to the infantry. They were reported as being orchestrated from above and deliberate in their conception and this was the case for both the raping of women and men. However, there were also journalists, particularly those who wrote about the actions of the 'irregular' soldiers, who described the rapes as a crime that was 'out of control' and committed on a more random and opportunist level. These conflicting accounts make it difficult for the reader to build up a general picture of the events surrounding the rapes. However, this is not to suggest that both these accounts are not accurate, there may well have been different motivations for different groups of soldiers, with the 'irregulars' having a different agenda from that of the 'regulars', and the representations could, of course, reflect that possibility. While the journalists' suggestions for the underlying motivations for rape in war discussed in this chapter are all plausible explanations, there is a danger of looking for a reductionist explanation that would explain all rape in war.

We now turn to the final chapter analysing the press representations on mass rape in war. Chapter Six offers journalists' explanations based on the West's reaction to the reports on mass rape in the Balkans, for example, governmental and non-

governmental investigations into the reports of rape, the issue of 'rape babies', the 'rapes' in relation to women's human rights, and also the press representations of the setting up of the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.

6

WESTERN RESPONSES

This chapter will examine those press reports that identify *Western responses* to the reports of rape in the Balkans. In particular, it seeks to identify the differing responses to the issue of rape in the Balkan conflict. The chapter is divided into four sections, each dealing with a separate type of response, but each issue provoking a high level of response in the British press. The first section looks at representations of government, EC and NGO investigations into rape in the Balkan conflict, and discusses the differing responses of the governmental and non-governmental institutions. The second section will look at one consequence of rape in war in which the media in general showed great interest, that of 'rape babies': and in particular the possibility of the 'rape babies' being adopted by childless British couples. The third section discusses the issue of women's human rights and looks primarily at the reporting of the activities of women's groups in Britain and in the former Yugoslavia, many of whom are working to both raise the profile of the consequences of rape in war and to offer practical support to rape victims from all sides in the conflict. The final section, linked to the notion of women's human rights as detailed in the previous section, focuses on the reporting of rape as a war crime and the instigation of the subsequent War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague, which also raises the issue of indicting and convicting wartime rapists on the available evidence.

Rape and Western Investigations

Roy Gutman has made some interesting comments regarding the reaction of the West to reports of rape and other atrocities. At the beginning of his book A Witness to Genocide, Gutman recounts the way in which he first highlighted the atrocities being committed at the Omarska detention 'camp'. However, Gutman claims that once these

first 'shocking' reports were written and in the public domain, he was surprised by the Western response, or lack of it, to these accounts. He states that the British media responded first by sending an ITN team to Omarska, but that the United States Government failed to respond even though 'every major government agency' had been alerted in advance.¹ Gutman explains his concerns on this matter in the following lengthy excerpt:

Something about the world reaction did not sit right. Since when in the age of spy satellites does a reporter come up with such a scoop? After all, U.S. intelligence or UN organisations must have had some information and could have disclosed the practices in the camps weeks if not months earlier. I began to develop a theory that the Western governments had written off Bosnia and had not bothered to tell the public. Media reports such as mine represented so much inconvenience. The assault against Bosnia had all the earmarks of genocide, but no official would utter the word because it would force them to come up with a policy response. So there was no official confirmation, and public interest diminished. Indeed, the [U.S.] acting secretary of state publicly raised doubts about the entire story.²

Gutman's first reports of Serbian and Croatian atrocities and possible 'ethnic cleansing' to which he was referring, were published in August 1992, and included the suggestion that Bosnian women were being raped *en masse*. Following these reports, other sources also began making similar accusations. However, Michael Simmons, writing in The Guardian, reported on 12 August that 'aid agencies and human rights organisations reacted with caution' to a report by a Frankfurt-based organisation.³ The International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) and its allegations of Serbian atrocities included 'murder, torture, starvation and rape'.⁴ The reasons for the caution have been detailed in Chapter Four, but to summarise briefly, the general consensus of opinion among the aid agencies mentioned in this particular article, was that ISHR had a 'strongly anti-Communist background' and as an example of this stated that ISHR had 'support[ed] the pro-apartheid status quo' in South Africa.⁵ Although it is reported in the article that ISHR's information is sourced from authenticated eye-witness

¹Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury: Element, 1993), p. xii.

²*ibid.*, p.xiii-p. xiv.

³Michael Simmons, "German atrocity report treated with caution," The Guardian, 12 August 1992, sec. FOR, p. 6.

⁴*ibid.*

⁵*ibid.*

testimonies and faxes from a Muslim and Croat 'citizens committee' appealing for help, Simmons appears to share the scepticism of the aid agencies and human rights organisations as the article concludes that 'almost all massacre reports in Bosnia's ethnic conflict have come from second-hand sources or from individual refugees and have been difficult or impossible to verify independently'.⁶ The underlying suggestion here is that these reports are impossible to verify without governmental support, or intervention. Moreover, Simmons appears to be saying that these allegations could be 'true', but that there seems to be a general lack of will on the part of the political elites to attempt to verify the reports.

Barbara Hewson, writing in The Times a month later, makes a similar point. Her article begins with the statement that '[t]he world remains silent over reports of violations of women in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina'.⁷ Hewson continues to explain that the accounts of rape that she recounted in the article were carried in the press on 10 August (she is referring to one of Gutman reports) and that ITN had also shown news footage of an interview with a rape victim, yet still there had been no official recognition of the problem by either politicians or human rights observers. Hewson compares the accounts of rape with the accounts of men being held in detention centres and suggests that the reports of mass rape in 'rape camps' have not attracted the same international outcry as the camps where men are held'.⁸ This is, of course, in contrast to Gutman's suggestion in the earlier quotation which implied that Western political elites had been silent about *all* the reports of atrocities emanating from the Balkan conflict. Although Hewson could have been referring to *initial* media interest. Hewson suggests a possible reason for this general silence and states that 'possibly male politicians believe that war is a tacit licence to rape'.⁹ Furthermore, she proposes that the lack of response illustrates that 'silence' is the 'standard censoring mechanism that men employ when dealing with the rape of women'.¹⁰ Hewson also makes the point that as well as many other reported atrocities, rape is also a *war crime* and should be treated as such and not dismissed by silence. (This point will be discussed further in the final section, which deals directly with the War Crimes Tribunal.)

⁶ibid.

⁷Barbara Hewson, "Rape is a war crime too," The Times, 08 September 1992, p. LT/4.

⁸ibid.

⁹ibid.

¹⁰ibid.

The issue of the general silence of Western Europe to the mass raping of women in the Balkans was poignantly illustrated in an Observer article by Richard Brooks, which commented on the fact that a painting by Britain's official Bosnian war artist, Peter Howson, had been vetoed from being shown with the remainder of his collection.¹¹ The painting, entitled 'Croatian and Muslim', depicts the rape of a women - a common occurrence in war - yet it was deemed by the Imperial War Museum's curator to be 'too upsetting' and 'too brutal'.¹² The two women who serve on the museum's artistic record committee had wanted the picture shown, but they were overruled by their three male colleagues. While disappointing, this scenario does not appear surprising. The Imperial War Museum, a bastion and showplace of all that is deemed to be heroically symbolic in war remains in denial: it would not want its walls sullied with an image that graphically details the sordid reality of war, and tarnishes the image of the gallant, hero soldier. But this exclusion highlights their complicity in the discourse of silence that surrounds rape in war and allows its continuation.

The silence of Western governments was also apparent and there was still no sign of any response by Western governments to Gutman's allegations of mass rape in the British press until over six weeks later when James Bone, writing from New York, appears to have broken the silence, with the US finally taking the initiative. He reports that the United States had filed a report with the United Nations detailing atrocities, including rape, that had occurred during the Balkan conflict. To quote directly from the article, the report describes 'atrocities that a State Department spokesman said "make your blood boil and your stomach turn".¹³ However, interestingly in a later leading article written in The Times, the author criticises the 'Europeans' jaundiced view that American policy over Yugoslavia fluctuates from 'inaction to over-commitment', stating that it is 'high time' that the European governments followed the Americans example and took a more 'activist stance'.¹⁴ The author could have been referring to a more 'militaristic' response, however, it would be equally poignant if the author were referring to 'responses' in general. The representation of both those

¹¹Richard Brooks, "Bosnian rape too brutal as war art," The Observer, 18 September 1994, sec. NEW, p. 6.

¹²ibid.

¹³James Bone, "US reveals catalogue of Bosnia atrocities," The Times, 23 September 1992, p. 13.

¹⁴Leading article, "Time to act," The Times, 17 December 1992, p. 13.

statements is that they were positive and supportive of the Bosnian war victims, and advocated some form of response. The James Bone article also cites another report that was published on the same day by the London-based human rights organisation, Amnesty International. However, although torture, killing and detention centres were discussed and condemned, there was no mention of rape in this particular report.

The next article in The Times to discuss the responses of Western political elites also fails to mention the issue of rape in war. This 'leading article', promisingly titled 'Time to act', begins in the following manner:

Foreign ministers arrived in Geneva yesterday in a very different mood from the start of the London conference four months ago. Disillusioned, angry, determined, they no longer have hopes that the murderous Serb advance in Bosnia can be halted by reason, negotiation and sanctions. The horrors of the detention camps, the callousness of the daily slaughter in Sarajevo, the cynical deceit of the Belgrade government and their placement in Bosnia: all have swelled a wave of international revulsion and increased the pressure to confront the Serbian fighters and halt their attack of the Muslim victims.¹⁵

In comparison to the James Bone article above, this article conveys a positive and hopeful response to the reported atrocities, which makes frequent reference to the fact that, in the author's opinion, Western governments have been 'too cautious for too long'. However, this comment, and those made above, remain simply the opinion of the author. There are no supporting statements by interviewed ministers, for example, to assure the reader that there is indeed a 'wave of international revulsion' which has spurred Western political elites into producing a coherent and united course of action and which will in turn halt the detention, murder and rape of 'Muslim victims'. How does the reader, or the author for that matter, know that the ministers are 'disillusioned', 'angry' or 'determined'? Have they been personally interviewed? There is certainly no evidence in the article that points to any interviews having taken place and this raises the question of whether this article can legitimately be included in this section if it does not actually include a reported response by political elites to the allegations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. However, it does demonstrate, once again, the attempts by the press to encourage a concerted response to the Balkan crisis.

¹⁵ibid.

During December 1992 a number of articles appeared in the British press all of which included responses by governmental and NGO sources to the atrocities in the Balkans - with The Times publishing two major articles and The Guardian offering double that figure. These may not seem large numbers when compared with issues such as 'ethnic cleansing' which have been discussed in previous chapters; however, considering the minimal response by political elites recorded over the five year research period, six articles in one month indicates widespread coverage of the issue. The 'Church', for example, was next in line to respond to the allegations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict and did so in the following manner:

Rape has become a systematic weapon of war in the Bosnian conflict and the rapists should be put before war crimes tribunals, according to a report by the World Council of Churches (WCC). Women investigators from the WCC have just returned from two Croat refugee camps and have compared their evidence with that gathered by other groups, including the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees Other international bodies, including the parliamentary assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), had been collecting credible reports of large-scale rape.¹⁶

There are several interesting points raised by this article. First, concerning the language used and why Roger Boyes, the author, mentioned the fact that the investigators were women? It is possible that Boyes was probably passing on this fact to the reader in an effort to portray the WCC in a sensitive gender-aware light. However, are we as readers to assume that all investigators are male unless we are informed otherwise? This may appear pedantic, but I have yet to read an article that refers to a report having been written by 'male investigators'. And second, at first it appears encouraging that both the WCC and the WEU are investigating the reports of mass rape, indeed the article states that both organisations are in agreement that 'many thousands of women' have been raped.¹⁷ However, the article also states that the Western response to the rapes has provoked anger among the rape victims and refugees, not only anger at having been raped and sexually assaulted, but also anger at the way in which the rapes have been 'sensationalised'.¹⁸ In fact, Brenda Fitzpatrick,

¹⁶Roger Boyes, "Churches say Serbs are using rape as a weapon," The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6.

¹⁷ibid.

¹⁸ibid.

speaking on behalf of the WCC, went so far as to call the Western response 'international voyeurism'.¹⁹ She criticised most Western organisations as having fail to offer the rape victims psychiatric assistance, although how she is defining 'organisation' is unclear and she continued by stating that 'many victims believe that the rapes are not being treated seriously when they are reported to the authorities'.²⁰ This is, then, an article detailing a Western response that in turn is criticising the very Western response of which it is a part.

Also published in The Times, on the same day and, incidentally, on the same page, Adam Lebor writes an article from the Balkans entitled 'Victim tells of her brothel camp ordeal'.²¹ Towards the end of the article, following a lengthy description of the rape victim's 'ordeal', Sylvana Foa, a spokeswoman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva is quoted as saying: 'We have credible and consistent reports of widespread and systematic rape stories of rape and sexual abuse that independently bear each other out'.²² This supports the suggestion in the previous quotation, that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had also sent investigators into the Balkans to examine the 'truth' behind reports of mass rape. The article also explains the concerns of UNHCR and Red Cross relief workers in the area by commenting in the following manner:

Neither the Red Cross nor the UN has access to sites such as the Hotel Vilina Vlas. Relief workers fear that any woman still being held there could be killed and the evidence destroyed, should they demand access. Already the UN has recorded a sinister imbalance in the ages of the refugees who manage to leave Bosnia. "There is a lack of women of reproductive age, just as there is of men of draft age, especially among refugees who left after their towns were occupied by the Serbs," said Ms. Foa.²³

This appears to be a Western response on behalf of the people of Bosnia in an effort to elicit further responses from Western government sources. And in terms of hierarchical political NGO status, UNHCR and the Red Cross were arguably very well

¹⁹ibid.

²⁰ibid.

²¹Adam Lebor, "Victim tells of her brothel camp ordeal," The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6.

²²ibid.

²³ibid.

placed to influence government policy, compared with the small women's human rights groups that were also attempting to achieve similar responses and promises of practical help. This issue will be discussed further in the 'women's human rights' section later in this chapter.

In The Guardian, December's interest in Western responses to the raping of women in the former Yugoslavia continued, and on the fourth of the month The Guardian reported in an article already mentioned in Chapter Five, entitled 'WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims' that, '[t]he Western European Union parliamentary assembly said yesterday that it had received credible reports of the rape and torture of women and girls in Serb-run camps in former Yugoslavia'.²⁴ There is no mention, however, of the sources of these 'credible' reports - perhaps it was the Red Cross and UNHCR? Nor is there any intimation of the scale of the rapes. Nevertheless, although the article lacks satisfactory detail and sources to support its claims it does continue by stating that, '[t]he assembly demanded in a unanimous resolution that those responsible be tried for crimes against humanity'.²⁵ A seemingly positive step and one that was supported by thirty-two West European MPs. However, towards the end of the article the reader is informed that the assembly has only consultative powers and although they have 'called on reluctant governments of the nine members states to start planning a possible military intervention',²⁶ they could do no more. The article ends on a high note, though with the author informing the reader that Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany has 'urged the European Community to act' in offering 'rapid help for the women' and has even offered them a 'haven in Germany'.²⁷

Ten days later on 14 December 1992 it was the turn of the 'European Council' to have their response to the rape and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia detailed in the British press. The Guardian reported that the Council called the detention and rape of Muslim women 'acts of unspeakable brutality' which formed part of a 'strategy of

²⁴Reuter in Paris, "WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims," The Guardian, 04 December 1992, sec. FOR, p. 11.

²⁵ibid.

²⁶ibid.

²⁷ibid.

terrorism and ethnic cleansing'.²⁸ The general impression one gets from the article is that the author, Hella Pick, is attempting to portray the European Council's stance in a positive light. Pick portrays them as a European Council which holds a strong, united position with major deterrents at its disposal to use against the aggressors should they fail to meet the demands the council has set. These deterrents, which the European Council can, it appears, use at will, are detailed as follows: '[A] tightening economic noose, rupture of diplomatic relations, exclusion from the United Nations and other international bodies, and the use of force'.²⁹ Yet, these strong words of warning to the aggressors, spoken at the Edinburgh summit were, only a matter of weeks later, condemned as being 'toothless rhetoric' to appease the media.³⁰

One undoubtedly positive move that emerged from the Edinburgh summit was the decision to send a delegation, headed by Dame Anna Warburton, to the Balkans to investigate the reports of rape and other atrocities. As The Guardian puts it: '[A]n EC fact-finding mission, led by Dame Anna Warburton, is to leave for Bosnia to report urgently on the state of the camps and inmates'.³¹ The issues surrounding Dame Anna's proposed visit to the Balkans is further remarked upon in another Guardian article published a few days later which suggests that the widespread condemnation of rape in 'Serb-run detention centres' is coming from diverse sources throughout the international community. The article states that many international bodies have joined in the condemnation, but mentions by name the European Community, the UN Security Council, who have agreed to provide a military escort for the delegation, the Ecumenical Council of Churches and the Croatian government.³²

The day after Hella Pick's article was published, another Guardian article began with the following statement by Patrick Cormack, MP for Staffordshire South. Cormack

²⁸Hella Pick, "Edinburgh summit: Serbs given ultimatum," The Guardian, 14 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 2. To date research has indicated that no 'haven' in Germany was forthcoming: although there have been reports that the US have announced new immigration legal guidelines that formally recognise wartime rape victims as having potential grounds for political asylum. See, for example: Ashley Dunn, "US opens door for abused women," International Herald Tribune, 30 May 1995, p. 4.

²⁹ibid.

³⁰Ian Traynor, "War that has rewritten Europe's rules," The Guardian, 22 December 1992, sec. FOR, p. 6.

³¹ibid.

³²Foreign Staff, "Bosnia crisis: Sex assaults 'a war crime'," The Guardian, 19 December 1992, sec. FOR, p. 9.

was speaking in response to a conversation he had with the Bosnian foreign minister, Haris Silajdzic, whom he had met at the Edinburgh summit the week before and who had spoken of 'children being tortured and women being killed in rape camps'. The article recounts Cormack's remarks in the following manner:

A senior Tory said last night he was "rather ashamed" of Britain's approach to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, and warned the Government it could not rely on his support unless action was taken. [Cormack] said that ministers made a serious mistake when they ruled out the use of force. "I feel rather ashamed of my country and the faint-hearted view that seems to prevail. We have got to do something now. If we don't, we could all be parties to a great crime."³³

This particular response to, a conversation rather than previous press representations of rape in war could be regarded as a strenuous, if controversial, call for government action. Patrick Cormack is represented in this article as showing genuine concern for the plight of the Bosnian rape victims and as being prepared to go 'out on a limb' to demonstrate his support for them publicly, even though he could incur the wrath of senior government ministers. In contrast, another political figure, Roy Hattersley, again writing in The Guardian and published four months later, states that he 'no longer read[s] the descriptions of the horrors which are inflicted on Bosnian women and children'. Part of the following statement by Hattersley has been quoted in the previous chapter, however, he continues this 'confession' in the following way:

My refusal to face the details of ravage and rape is, I know, a less than heroic response to the tragedy. But I take craven comfort from this thought: that an improvement in my knowledge would not save one life or feed a single child. And I insist that my retreat into ignorance is, in part, prompted by a different emotion from that which impels me to change channels whenever pictures of starving babies appear on my television screen ... life and literature has prepared me at least to accept famine. But mass rape ... is literally beyond my comprehension. I accept the truth of the reports. But the descriptions which they contain remain a step away from reality. The taboos of our society have prevented me from previously thinking about such things and I am not equipped to think about them now.³⁴

³³No byline, "Tory demands Bosnia action," The Guardian, 15 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 7.

³⁴Roy Hattersley, "The terrible facts of war that I refuse to face," The Guardian, 12 April 1993, sec. FEA, p. 17.

There are many questions that arise from the representation of these differing responses and the reasons underlying Cormack's and Hattersley's particular attitudes. While both were apparently sympathetic to the plight of the rape victims, Hattersley, unlike Cormack, felt unable to lobby publicly for governmental action. Perhaps after many years in the political arena, Roy Hattersley was more aware of his inability to alter the course of events than Cormack. In other words, despite Cormack's posturing, perhaps both men felt impotent in the face of unyielding governmental policy. Nevertheless, regardless of the political outcome, both Cormack and Hattersley were instrumental in keeping the topic alive and debated in a public forum.

The Times carried a series of responses to previous reports of mass rape in Bosnia throughout January 1993. The first was an interview with Dame Anna Warburton on her return from the EC fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of mass rape in the former-Yugoslavia. As previously mentioned, the author, Alice Thomson, begins the article in a manner which does not engender confidence in her ability to deliver an ungendered and thought-provoking article. In the process of contextualising the article, Thomson makes the unnecessary, stereotypical link between women and *shopping*, by stating that Dame Anna 'originally ... had no intention of spending her pre-Christmas shopping period in the Balkans'.³⁵ Would this phrase 'pre-Christmas shopping period' be used in conjunction with male political elites? Thomson continues on the stereotypical theme by stating that the 'Foreign Office was told to find a woman ... who would be tough enough not to squirm at the details or be blinded by sympathy'.³⁶ The implication being that most women are 'naturally' too 'soft' for the job, one would presume. There is no indication that these sentiments are Dame Anna's, therefore, one can only deduce that they are the author's contributions. The issues surrounding the representation of 'women' in the press will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

Nevertheless, Dame Anna's response to the first-hand accounts of mass rape, which she heard in the Balkans, is represented as being fair and sympathetic, despite the Foreign Office's job description. When asked about the number of women raped and

³⁵Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear," The Times, 1 January 1993, p. 11.

³⁶*ibid.*

the reason why she thought it took so much longer for the crimes against women, rather than those against men, to be recognised, Dame Anna is quoted as stating the following:

The atrocities are of a kind that you don't readily give credence to and with the propaganda war in full flow in Bosnia, you have to be extremely careful ... Even if the numbers are exaggerated, the methods used are intolerable, you have to ask yourself, does it matter how many? Any is too many ... I think the tales told were so far from our idea of reality that people found them hard to grasp. We accepted the images of men because they reminded us of the concentration camps in the second world war.³⁷

Dame Anna's final sentence above restates the point made by Roy Hattersley in his earlier statement, that of the difficulty in finding comparative experiences to draw upon from either 'life or literature' (as Roy Hattersley put it) which helps us understand the reality of mass rape. For most, this constitutes new knowledge - new, horrific, unbelievable knowledge - and given the choice of whether to think about the actual experiences of the rape victims and try to come to an empathetic appreciation of their suffering, or to close our minds to the real horrors of war, which option will most people choose? Bearing in mind that a well read, highly regarded member of the political elite, with no doubt still a modicum of influence chose the latter.

Towards the end of Thomson's article, she asks Dame Anna how much she thinks the EC can do in helping to shape a secure and rewarding future for the rape victims. In her reply Dame Anna states the following:

If the community could act together it would be the best way forward. Our brief was just humanitarian, not political. I want something to happen as a result of these visits so I don't want aid mixed up with politics. I want governments to increase their aid now that we are beginning to be able to pinpoint where it is needed. I am very conscious that people are fighting for their lives.³⁸

It is surprising that a senior British diplomat would state categorically that she does not want 'aid to be mixed with politics'. This may be a laudable sentiment - though always difficult to separate in practice - but Dame Anna appears to be arguing against

³⁷ibid.

³⁸ibid.

herself, in as much as she is calling for an increase in aid from EC and governmental sources, yet she believes that this aid can be divorced from politics. Her brief from the Foreign Office may have been 'just' humanitarian and her subsequent report apolitical, but the commissioners of that report did so as a means of gleaning further information concerning the situation in the Balkans before taking *political* action.

The first of the EC's responses to Dame Anna's 'four-page' report, which was based on 'evidence from refugees in Croatia and aid organisations in Geneva', was summarised in The Times approximately a week later on 9 January 1993 with the author, Michael Evans, stating that:

The European Community last night confirmed in an official interim report that rape was being used as a systematic weapon of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As many as 20,000 Bosnian Muslim women may have been raped by Serb soldiers as part of a plan to enforce the "ethnic cleansing" of captured districts and to drive them from their homes ... "It's horrifying and very serious," one EC official said yesterday. "Soldiers are being ordered to go out and rape."³⁹

There is no mention of the identity of the EC official who made the final comment above, therefore there is no way of knowing the extent of the official's involvement with Dame Anna's investigative team and/or whether the official had read the report first-hand. However, on one level this information is unnecessary, as it is the way in which his comment is represented and subsequently received that is important. And in this particular case, the impression is that this official is speaking from a position of knowledgeable authority. However, there is no mention in any of the reported quotations from Dame Anna Warburton of soldiers being ordered to rape. On the contrary, in the quotation above, Dame Anna is quoted as saying: 'We kept asking ourselves, is the rape systematic? Regiments *don't* seem to have been issued specific orders, but there is a recognisable pattern'.⁴⁰ The implicit suggestion of a 'pattern' being quite a different matter from the explicit assertion that soldiers are being 'ordered to go out and rape'. Perhaps the important question here is whether or not casual statements like the EC official's serve to undermine the genuine findings of the

³⁹Michael Evans, "Serbian heavy guns hit British base in central Bosnia," The Times, 9 January 1993, p. 11.

⁴⁰Alice Thomson, 1 January 1993.

delegation. One example of these 'genuine findings' is mentioned in the closing sentences of the article. The author, referring to comments made by the EC delegation headed by Dame Anna Warburton, states that, '[t]hey said that the number of credible reports of rape was "horrifying". Women were being raped in "particularly sadistic ways" to inflict maximum humiliation. The vast majority of victims were Muslims, but Croats and Serbs were also violated.⁴¹ It should be noted that this notion of 'rape as a weapon' will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven.

Charles Bremner writing in The Times also appears to have taken the EC team's findings out of context. For example, Bremner reported that, on their return, the EC investigative team had 'charged the Serbians with committing mass rape as a weapon of terror'.⁴² First, 'charged' is an interesting choice of words as it suggests that the EC delegation have the legal authority to officially 'charge' someone with an offence, whereas their mandate was purely a humanitarian fact-finding mission. Second, this statement seems to imply that it was only the Serbians who were found to have committed acts of rape as a weapon of terror'. However, the delegation's interim report stated clearly that both women and men from all sides of the warring factions had suffered rape.

In a lengthy article in The Guardian, the authors, William Colby and Jeremy Stone discuss the development of the Balkan crisis and the various military and/or humanitarian options available to the West - rape is only mentioned once. That occasion is when the authors, as commentators on the crisis, suggest that both 'Yeltsin and the West have a common interest in preventing the spread of the diabolical techniques of "ethnic cleansing" by which rape, killings, torture and family separation are used to degrade, demoralise and drive people out'.⁴³ The authors conclude that the techniques of war mentioned above, including rape, could spread to the world's 'ethnic flashpoints' of which, according to this article, there are at least sixty in existence in the former Soviet Union.

⁴¹Michael Evans, 9 January 1993.

⁴²Charles Bremner, "Sarajevo assassination exposes UN impotence," The Times, 11 January 1993, p. 8.

⁴³William Colby and Jeremy Stone, "It's time to break the siege of Sarajevo," The Guardian, 18 January 1993, sec. FEA, p. 19.

It is interesting to note that these authors regard the issue of rape in the Balkans as a potentially potent enough issue to play a part in inciting unrest in other parts of the globe. Although I accept that the issue of rape is represented in this article as merely one element of the wider 'technique' of ethnic cleansing, nevertheless, the point is that it *was* mentioned, which is unusual given that the article is primarily concerned with military analysis. My research has indicated that in the majority of articles which comment on the Balkan crisis and have as their main focus some aspect of military involvement - possible intervention, UN troop manoeuvres, arming of Muslims, and so on - there is no mention of the occurrence of rape.

The next two articles analysed offer an interesting insight into first, the standard Western response to reports of mass rape and other atrocities in the Balkan conflict; and second, the possible barriers, either real or socially constructed, which prevent the proposals contained within those responses from being carried out. The first article, written by Michael Binyon, was published in The Times during the summer of 1993 and is entitled 'Revulsion prompts Geneva meeting'.⁴⁴ It sets out one Western government's response to the growing reports of atrocities in the former-Yugoslavia, including mass rape, in the following manner:

Prompted by increasing world revulsion at "ethnic cleansing", civilian massacres, mass rape and the brutality of the war in Bosnia, the Swiss government has called an international conference to reaffirm the signatories' commitment to the Geneva conventions and look at ways of enforcing them.⁴⁵

As mentioned above, this is a 'standard' representation in the British press of a Western government's response to the wartime events in the Balkans. The government in question (or NGO, collective international organisation, political institution, etc.) first, states their repulsion at the reported atrocities; second, they condemn the actions of the aggressors (generally the Serbians); third, they call for a forum in which Western political elites can discuss the matter; and finally, words like enforcement, intervention, or military action are used - possibly to appease those less cynical readers who are hoping for a rapid end to the suffering and for some form of justice, or, possibly to add credence to, and justification for, the proposed international

⁴⁴Michael Binyon, "Revulsion prompts Geneva meeting," The Times, 19 August 1993, p. 8.

⁴⁵ibid.

conference. However, towards the end of the article - and again, we can use the Binyon article as an example - the potential problems will be highlighted by the author. Both to prepare the reader for the inevitable news that the conference has been unable to secure any collective opinions on the matter - let alone collective *action*. And so that with great aplomb, the political commentator or journalist can, at a later date when the conference's achievements are acknowledged to have been minimal, remind the reader of his/her political foresight. To quote from the Binyon article: 'The conference may be mired in arguments over how to define the rules of modern warfare, and how offenders against the convention should be punished'.⁴⁶ This quotation could, of course, be read as one barrier to the realisation of particular proposals of action often accompanying Western responses to mass rape, genocide and other atrocities. However, the 'second article, written by Will Hutton, offers a more insightful analysis into possible reasons why even collective Western responses had not been translated into collective political action.

Will Hutton's article was published in The Guardian on 1 February 1993. It is entitled 'New tribalism threatens to infect us all' and bears the sombre message that if Western governments allow racial intolerance within the Balkans to go unchecked then it will eventually spread throughout Europe. For example, Hutton states in the following excerpt:

In Yugoslavia the notion of the barbarian (the "other") has been resurrected and with that has come its twin - the idea of ethnic purity. These disfigure not only Yugoslavian civilisation but also a Europe unable to intercede successfully to bring the conflict to a close.... As the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy argued at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Europe feels that its border implicitly stops somewhere around the limits of Catholic Europe - certainly before the complexities of the Balkans. Within our borders there is civilised Europe; beyond there is a land of the barbarian, of ethnic cleansing, of multiple rape. We observe; of course we care; but ultimately it is not of us.⁴⁷

Whether one agrees with Hutton's view or not, it remains an interesting analysis of, and a thought-provoking explanation for, the lack of responsive action on the part of

⁴⁶ibid.

⁴⁷Will Hutton, "New tribalism threatens to infect us all," The Guardian, 1 February 1993, sec. CIT, p. 11.

Western political elites. Or, at least, that was the continuing representation - that Western political elites were forthright in their verbal responses, yet apathetic in their practical application of those responses to the Balkan crisis.

Ian Traynor, in another Guardian article, cites an example of the lack of practical application on behalf of Western governments - the EU in this case. Traynor reports from the city of Mostar where 'Croatian extremists' 'rule the west bank'. He writes of Croatian troops who spend their days clearing the west side of the city of Muslims and who talk openly of 'need[ing] Muslim women to rape'.⁴⁸ The European Union has been charged with keeping the peace in Mostar by way of a multi-ethnic federation. Heading this newly established EU peacekeeping mission on the ground is Hans Koschnick, a German Christian Democrat and former mayor of Bremen, however, Traynor remains sceptical of its potential for success. He states that the EU's sense of urgency in helping these people appears 'less than urgent', and qualifies this with the following statement:

In the critical area of policing and security, Brussels promised 200 Western European police officers to oversee and retrain the local forces. Ten have arrived. "EU bureaucracy is a wonderful thing," Mr. Koschnick sighed. "They're still discussing what colour the cars will be and what symbols to put on the uniforms. But don't ask me why it's not secure here. Ask your government why they don't send the police they promised".⁴⁹

This representation, arguably, bears out Will Hutton's analysis above - that the EU has definitely 'observed', probably 'cared', but in the end has views shaped by the fact that those being raped and victimised are not 'us'. However, press representations are often very simplistic readings of the various problems on which they report. And in this instance the many complex issues surrounding international peacekeeping are not fully represented in this article. This also applies to the final point below which again comments on Hutton's ideas surrounding the relationship between the present European member states and those European countries that fall outside the EU's borders - the 'others'.

⁴⁸Ian Traynor, "Home is a hundred yards away but another world for Mostar's victims," The Guardian, 5 September 1994, sec. FOR, p. 10.

⁴⁹ibid.

As already stated, the final article in this section is arguably another example of Hutton's theory. Published in The Guardian in May 1993 and written by John Carvel and Alan Travis, it is entitled 'EC rule adds to Bosnia misery'.⁵⁰ The article is an account of British and EC decisions regarding the rules of immigration for Bosnian refugees wishing to enter the EC and/or Britain. The article begins in the following way:

European Community ministers are expected to decide a tough line this week against the families of wounded, raped and threatened refugees from former Yugoslavia being allowed to join their relatives in the West. Despite an appeal from Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 12 EC immigration ministers meeting in Copenhagen tomorrow are proposing to limit the possibility of family reunion to "exceptional circumstances" [and] most people displaced by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be given protection and assistance in the region.⁵¹

Over and above the problems this 'tough line' will generate - continued enforced separation for many rape victims and their families - the West's narrow culturally-specific definition of the family will mean that even those few refugees who do fall into the 'exceptional circumstances' category will not be able to bring with them all those whom they consider to be their 'family'. Carvel and Travis set out the British definition of the family according to *British* immigration rules as: '[W]ives and children up to 18 with discretion to admit unmarried dependent daughters up to the age of 21'.⁵²

For Serbian, Croatian and particularly Muslim people, the 'family' is defined in much wider terms than this, indeed, it is not unusual to have three or even four generations of the family unit living in the same accommodation.⁵³ Yet, the representation here once again bears out Hutton's theory that even though the Balkan conflict is geographically 'on our doorstep', 'we' are unprepared to do more than observe or pay lip service to how much 'we' care. 'We' appear to be unaccepting of their different

⁵⁰John Carvel and Alan Travis, "EC rule adds to Bosnia misery," The Guardian, 31 May 1993, sec. HOM, p. 1.

⁵¹ibid.

⁵²ibid.

⁵³Thomas Butler, "The ends of history: Balkan culture and catastrophe," Washington Post, 30 August 1992, p. C3.

cultural definitions, unaccepting of their refugees, and, as Hutton stated, unaccepting of them as Europeans. The 'we', of course, could be replaced by the words 'Western political elites', but on one level that would be failing to take responsibility for 'our' actions, for it is 'we' who place those political elites in their positions of power. Carvel and Travis end the article by stating that, in their opinion, particularly vulnerable groups should continue to be admitted into the European Union. In their words, they suggest that those groups should include:

[F]ormer prisoners, as well as the wounded and those with illnesses which cannot be treated locally, those whose lives or physical safety are threatened, rape victims who do not have access to rehabilitation, and returning combatants who face serious problems in their places of origin.⁵⁴

These Western responses, while originating from different sources, nevertheless, have been concerned with the collection of information and data on who and how many women have been raped. Moreover, the press has represented Western political elites as being keen to support the rape victims in any way possible, but simply lacking the authority or the consensus of opinion needed to agree on actual 'action'. Therefore, while most of the Western responses to the mass raping of women in the Balkans, proved to be well meaning, ultimately they have had little immediate consequences for the rape victims. However, we now turn to one issue which 'grabbed' journalists' attention, albeit for a limited length of time, and that is the issue of potential 'rape babies'.

Rape and 'Rape Babies'

One rape-related topic that attracted many journalists' attention for only a very short space of time, was the issue of 'rape babies' and the possibility of British couples adopting abandoned Bosnian babies born to raped Bosnian women. Tim Yeo, the then junior health minister, appeared to have begun this short topical debate by suggesting that international adoption procedures should be 'streamlined' in order to aid the arrival of the babies. Yeo's proposals were reported in The Guardian in early January

⁵⁴John Carvel and Alan Travis, 31 May 1993.

1993 in an article written by its political correspondent, Alan Travis. The article began in the following manner:

Government ministers will accelerate local authority legal formalities to allow British families to offer homes to babies born to Muslim women raped by Serbian soldiers ... and the Foreign Office requested to consult welfare organisations in Bosnia looking after women who have been raped to identify unwanted children who could come to Britain ... [Tim Yeo] said yesterday he had been horrified by reports of the systematic rape of hundreds of Muslim women in Bosnia and Serbia. "We are talking about babies not yet born," said Mr. Yeo.⁵⁵

Note that there is no mention of Croatian or Serbian women having been raped, even though by January 1993 there had been numerous reports, including the interim report by the EC's investigative team mentioned in the previous section, which concluded that Croat and Serb women had also suffered a considerable degree of rape at the hands of enemy soldiers, with presumably a consequential number of unwanted pregnancies. Yeo also makes a huge assumption in preparing the ground for an influx of 'rape babies' which might never happen. Although if Mr. Yeo accepted the stereotypical view of Muslim women and their role within traditional Muslim society as being the 'norm' in Bosnia, and indeed this view had been promoted in the British press, then it is not surprising that he preferred to address the worse case scenario - that of the mothers being rejected by husbands, fathers, as well as the community at large and in turn the mothers rejecting and abandoning their 'rape babies'. However, Tim Yeo is reported as making the following admission:

I do not know whether they will be rejected by their mothers or communities. But if they are, it is right that we, with our considerable experience of adoption, should ensure there are no bureaucratic obstacles in coming to this country.⁵⁶

It is interesting to compare the reluctance of the British government to adapt and 'streamline' immigration procedures to help rape victims, prisoners of war or the dispossessed refugees of the Balkans in their search for humanitarian assistance in Britain, with the speed at which the government wish to 'accelerate legal formalities' in the acquiring of 'rape babies' for British couples to adopt. As Alan Travis comments

⁵⁵Alan Travis, "Britain will ease way for adoption," *The Guardian*, 4 January 1993, sec. FOR, p. 9.

⁵⁶*ibid.*

in the article: 'There was no shortage of British couples formally approved as foster parents but who could not find babies to adopt'.⁵⁷

Four days later the issue of 'rape babies' appeared in The Guardian again and takes the form of a leading article entitled 'The babies of Bosnia'. The article is a measured critique of Tim Yeo's proposals reported above - cutting the bureaucracy which controls adoption from overseas - and includes the following assertion:

His cause is a worthy one: the large number of Bosnian babies who will be abandoned this year by their young Muslim mothers, repeatedly raped by Serb soldiers. There has been widespread horror at this latest Bosnian atrocity: systematic rape by the Serbs with the deliberate intention of impregnating Muslim women with unwanted Christian babies. No doubt at all about the need for a humanitarian response. The issue is the form it should take.⁵⁸

The point this leading article makes is a valid one, although the question of whether or not Serb soldiers raped with the 'deliberate intention of impregnation Muslim women' remains a controversial one.

Another question brought up by this passage which needs some qualification is what exactly does the article mean by a 'large number' of Bosnian babies? There appeared to be no estimates in the British press, either in this article or any other articles dealing with this issue, which alluded to the total number of 'rape babies' abandoned by their Bosnian mothers and available for adoption. The reader has only The Guardian's word that such large numbers exist. In an article in The Observer dealing with the same issue in Rwanda a spokesperson for the Ministry of Population is quoted as stating that between 2,000 and 5,000 women have 'delivered or are ready to deliver children conceived through rape'.⁵⁹ Although all estimates of this kind should, of course, be read with care. Regarding the Balkans, however, an adoption specialist is quoted as stating, in yet another Guardian article concerned with the issue, that '[t]here is no

⁵⁷ibid.

⁵⁸Leading article, "The babies of Bosnia," The Guardian, 8 January 1993, sec. FEA, p. 18.

⁵⁹Lindsey Hilsum, "Rwanda's time of rape returns to haunt thousands," The Observer, 26 February 1995, sec. WOR, p. 17.

clarity about how many children are expected as a result of the abuses or what arrangements will be made in Bosnia'.⁶⁰

There is, however, some statistical evidence offered by Alexandra Stiglmayer in her book Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶¹ Stiglmayer quotes statistics from a UN report drafted by a UN delegation which was commissioned to investigate the human rights situation in the former-Yugoslavia including allegations of mass rape. In January 1993 the commission analysed the situation in the larger women's clinics of Zagreb (Croatia), Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Belgrade (Serbia) and found 119 cases of pregnancy resulting from rape.⁶² Stiglmayer initially states that '[w]omen who become pregnant following a rape normally reject both the pregnancy and the children'.⁶³ She then continues with the following statistics:

In 104 of the 119 cases the women decided to abort the pregnancy. In nine cases the women were forced to carry the child to term because it was too late for an abortion. (In the remaining 6 cases - 4 current pregnancies and 2 births - there is no information about whether the women decided to have the child voluntarily or had to carry it to term for medical reasons).⁶⁴

These statistics, if they are a true reflection of reality, appear to bear out the widely accepted idea that women generally *do* reject the pregnancies that are the consequence of rape. However, this data cannot claim, as Stiglmayer does, to prove that the women would also reject the children once they are born, as at the time the statistics were documented the children were not yet born. There are some further statistics that support the theory of pregnant rape victims rejecting the pregnancies, and to a lesser degree the children of rape, in a recent journal article by Claudia Card. The article entitled 'Rape as a weapon of war' includes statistics originally published in the New York Times and refers to the raping of women and girls in Rwanda. Card states that:

⁶⁰Angella Johnson, "Confusion clouds Bosnia adoptions," The Guardian, 8 January 1993, sec. HOM, p. 6.

⁶¹Alexander Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p.135.

⁶²ibid.

⁶³ibid.

⁶⁴ibid.

According to a front page report in the *New York Times*, of more than 15,700 women and girls between the ages of thirteen and sixty-five who were raped in Rwanda between April 1994 and April 10, 1995, more than 1,100 gave birth but 5,200 had abortions, and many more pregnancies were untrackable (Lorch 1995). Many raped Rwandan women were reported to have abandoned new-borns or killed themselves.⁶⁵

For The Guardian's leading article ('The babies of Bosnia') mentioned above, however, this issue does not seem to be the overall focus of this particular article. The crux of which is basically the myriad of potential problems which adopting a child from the former-Yugoslavia could entail; problems of a physical, mental, emotional and cultural nature.

Yet another Guardian article published on the same day continued to highlight these problems by comparing the possible adoption of 'rape babies' from the Balkans with the failed adoptions of 'orphaned' Romanian children, many of whom 'ended up in council care' because, in some cases, the children had emotional problems or genetic defects. An additional worry of adoption specialists was Tim Yeo's proposals to 'speed-up' the adoption process, which would create a two-tier adoption system 'possibly letting people who would not usually pass rigorous screening procedures to get a child'.⁶⁶ However, none of these articles even made a passing reference to the possible fate of the mothers; the rape victims. The overall inference of the articles was that, on the whole, the 'rape babies' had been a rather convenient solution to the lack of British babies available for adoption, although there was, of course, a general air of British magnanimity emanating from each article, persuading all but the most cynical of readers that British political elites had only the welfare of the 'rape babies' at heart.

One Guardian article which took a rather more candid view of the situation, and one that was more in line with both Stiglmyer's and Card's theories and statistics, was a piece written by Linda Grant and published in August 1993 - a good six months after the initial furore surrounding the possible influx of 'rape babies' into Britain. The influx did not, in fact, materialise and this article offered one reason why the 'rape babies' were not 'delivered'. Linda Grant elaborates with the following explanation:

⁶⁵Claudia Card, "Rape as a Weapon of War," *Hypatia* Vol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996): pp. 5-18.

⁶⁶Angella Johnson, 8 January 1993.

The reason for the lack of rape babies is obvious. Only women who have been held over a period of months would be forced to bring a child to full term. Abortion on demand is available in Bosnia up to 10 weeks, in Croatia up to 12. Most raped pregnant women would have had abortions without having to notify anyone of the cause of the pregnancy. The rate of miscarriage has also increased generally throughout Bosnia. The very high level of this and abortion makes it impossible ever to estimate how many women might have been raped.⁶⁷

Grant's suggestions here fall in line with the story told by the official UN statistics as set out in Stiglmeier's book. However, her article also tries to tell another story; that of the 'media's' constant search for 'hot' news. And how, in that search, the real underlying social and political issues are either ignored in the drive for sensationalist copy, or trivialised. Grant's views are clearly highlighted in this excerpt from her article:

Eight months ago, in a maternity hospital in Zagreb, a British journalist and a French camera crew degenerated into an undignified tussle over the bed of a teenage girl who was pregnant after being raped by a Serbian. The media was desperate for rape babies. Rape in Bosnia was the hottest story of the new year. The city was teeming with foreign journalists, scouring refugee camps with a revival of that familiar wartime phrase: "Anyone here been raped and speak English?"⁶⁸

This article by Linda Grant, as well as trying to halt the 'rape babies' bandwagon, takes the view that the press' preoccupation with questions such as: how many 'rape babies' are there?; how many are coming to Britain?; how many women have actually been raped?; and why were they raped? These questions have overshadowed another issue, that is, what has happened to the women since their ordeal ended? Grant illustrates this point while in conversation with two psychiatrists, Dr. Vera Folnegovic and Dr. Dragica Kozaric-Kovacic. 'For them' Grant states, 'the numbers game is irrelevant.' She then quotes the psychiatrists as commenting that, '[w]e have one or two women who were raped eight or nine times a day for five months. Is this one case or hundreds?'⁶⁹

⁶⁷Linda Grant, "Anyone here been raped and speak English?" *The Guardian*, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 10.

⁶⁸ibid.

⁶⁹ibid.

The 'Western response' by British political elites concerning this issue appears to be rather egotistical, however, the press' preoccupation with the 'rape babies' issue is perhaps understandable. On one level it seemed to be regarded by the press as something positive to come out of a messy and complex war which they were finding increasingly difficult to keep up the momentum of coverage and condemnation for. Moreover, it also appeared to have been represented as one war issue that could have immediate practical consequences, and would possibly not be halted by the usual complex political bureaucracy. Yet, this is not to excuse their tendency to sensationalise certain aspects of the war, particularly those that sell papers, to the detriment of other more 'real' issues. However, Linda Grant's concerns over the need for the rape victims to be offered support and counselling brings us on to the next section of this chapter which will be looking at those reports of the raping of women during the Balkan conflict that have been linked with the issue of women's human rights.

Rape and Women's Human Rights

Constituted in 1945 as a response to the atrocities committed during World War II, the Human Rights dimension of the United Nations Charter served to usher in the contemporary international movement for human rights.⁷⁰ However, in recent years scholars and advocates have criticised human rights law for its failure to grant protection to women facing gender-based violence,⁷¹ including rape in war. Although the physical abuse of women in war is pervasive, cutting across cultural, class and economic boundaries, traditional concepts of human rights have been developed within a male-dominated framework which arguably does not recognise the

⁷⁰Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 111-134.

⁷¹See, for example: Pamela Goldberg and Nancy Kelly, "Recent Development: International Human Rights and Violence Against Women," Harvard Human Rights Journal Vol. 6 (1993): pp. 195-209; Stanlie James, "Challenging Patriarchal Privilege Through the Development of International Human Rights," Women's Studies International Forum Vol. 17, no. 6 (1994): pp. 563-578; Georgina Ashworth, "Promoting Women's Human Rights in the International Arena," Paper given at The International Studies Association Conference York University, UK. (December 1994); or, Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Let's Finally Right the Wrongs: Rape is a War Crime," On The Issues Vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993): pp. 36-40

experiences of women as women.⁷² Violence against women, therefore, is frequently viewed as the result of 'private' disputes and not as having an important, political context. The articles analysed within this section attempt to challenge this view and to bring the issue of mass rape in the Balkans into the wider context of women's human rights.

In Linda Grant's article, just mentioned at the end of the last section, we see that she criticises the press in general for concentrating solely on certain aspects of the 'rape story', sensationalising those aspects to the detriment of what she regards as the important issues. To illustrate her viewpoint the following quotation, reviewed previously in Chapter Five, and which is taken from the introduction to her two thousand word feature article, 'Anyone here been raped and speak English?'. It begins in the following way:

Having had their fill of both pretty Muslim virgins sobbing out their tales of sexual violation and British couples cradling the Bosnian rape babies they have adopted, the media have lost interest. One issue, however, still burns: what has happened to these women in the wake of their ordeal?⁷³

Following this question and the berating of the insensitivity and superficiality of the journalists involved in the sensationalism of many of the issues surrounding rape in the Balkans, Grant goes on to catalogue a few of the issues that have made 'recent' headline news. On the list is the EC investigation into the allegations of mass rape which, according to Grant, 'concluded that around 20,000 women had suffered sexual assault at the hands of Serbian forces'. Referring to the investigation she also states that 'the mission gave credence to the claim that rape was being used as a systematic weapon in the campaign of ethnic cleansing'. Grant then mentions the junior health minister, Tim Yeo, and his attempt cut through red tape thereby 'helping childless British couples to adopt the potentially thousands of Bosnian rape babies that were supposed to be languishing in orphanages in former Yugoslavia'.⁷⁴ Then, in Grant's words 'the issue went dead as far as the foreign press was concerned ... The hospitals

⁷²Philipose, Liz, "The Laws of War and Women's Human Rights," paper given at British International Studies Association Conference University of Southampton, Southampton (December 1995).

⁷³Linda Grant, 2 August 1993.

⁷⁴ibid.

of Zagreb and Sarajevo did not fill with abandoned infants and the media lost interest'.⁷⁵

The article claims that doubt and scepticism, regarding the importance of the issue of rape in war, has gradually crept in because, again in Grant's words, 'some aid agencies have begun to admit privately that rape has always been part of the spoils of war: the officers get the paintings and the jewellery, the men are let loose on the local population'.⁷⁶ Grant, however, makes no mention of which aid agencies she is referring to, neither does she make clear whether it is the opinion of just one individual. That rape has occurred in war since records began is generally accepted, and it is therefore surprising that an aid agency would alter its policy on rape in the Balkans because of the realisation that rape is not a new phenomenon in war, and furthermore that they would accept, not resist, any suggestion that rape in war is a 'natural' side-affect of war.

Grant also states that rape only became an international issue in the Balkans because 'it is the first war that has been monitored by a well-organised, modern women's movement, which has survived the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state and maintained links with feminist groups in Europe'.⁷⁷ The article also states that there have been 'demands by women's organisations that rape be included as a war crime within the Geneva Convention'. In calling for the expansion of the conception and practice of human rights legislation to incorporate the specific experiences of women, or indeed, to create new mechanisms that address the human rights concerns of women as women, these (nameless) women's organisations have sought to begin to address the shortcomings of the present international human rights legislation - an issue that will be addressed at length in Chapter Nine. One major shortcoming being that gender-based violence in war is generally not recognised as a violation of human rights, but is regarded as a by-product of war, and often simply interpreted as the isolated actions of individual soldiers. This notion of inadequate international legislation to address the problem of rape in war will be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine, along with some feminist proposals for change.

⁷⁵ibid.

⁷⁶ibid.

⁷⁷ibid.

A large proportion of Grant's article is taken up with the issue of post-rape support for the victims. She makes the point that due to the absence of any established rape counselling service the only way in which the rape victims can get help and support is through medical channels. Grant explains the situation in the following manner:

In Zagreb, there is a growing number of reports of suicide and attempted suicide among female Bosnian refugees. The stigma associated with rape in a country that has never had a rape counselling service means the most likely way for women to receive help is if they have developed psychiatric problems. Other women have been referred by their families after two psychiatrists went on a local radio phone-in.⁷⁸

The psychiatrists explained the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorders to the radio listeners in an attempt to reach those women and families suffering in silence.⁷⁹ Yet, Grant also informs the reader that 'earlier this year, the Croatian government announced that the Bosnian refugees would no longer receive free medical treatment and this avenue of help is no longer open'. This is a clear representation of the failure to recognise gender-based sexual violence as a violation of human rights - women's human rights - and to accord the rape victims the rehabilitation and support they need. Once again, this failure can be attributed to a male-dominated conception of what constitutes a human rights abuse and also a patriarchal definition of human rights which privileges 'public' over 'private' activity - using, of course, masculinist definitions of both 'public' and 'private'.

Grant continued her article with a statement that suggests that there is considerable controversy surrounding the actual form the support for the rape victims should take. For example, she states that:

A debate had been raging about what should happen to the raped women of Bosnia. Women's groups in Zagreb want to set up a special hostel where they could receive long-term counselling. Specialists in war trauma, however, argue that rape as a specific issue will become an acute problem only after the conflict is over and people are no longer in survival mode. The Muslim

⁷⁸ibid.

⁷⁹Slavenka Drakulic, "Women hide behind a wall of silence," The Nation, 1 March 1993, p. 1&268.

community believes special hostels will identify and stigmatise the women.⁸⁰

However, one positive consequence of the 'EC mission' to the area and, arguably, a recognition of post-rape counselling being, if not a necessity in basic human rights terms, then certainly a recognition of the desirability for the future welfare of the rape victims, was the recommendation for money to be made available to set up rape counselling services throughout Bosnia. Grant reports that it was the Marie Stopes Society which 'snapped up' the money and went on to establish bases at Tuzla and Zenica, with its directive being to help existing groups and to deliver resources and training. This is at least a departure from the generally narrow 'Western' conception of human rights which tends to focus on state violations of civil and political rights and subordinate economic, social, cultural, and in this case, 'intimate' or 'private' rights such as bodily integrity.

Linda Grant finished this extended article by, once again, accusing the press of cheapening and sensationalising the rape victims suffering by using some unnecessarily uncomfortable, sexual images. First, Grant comments on her own article, stating that on the whole '[t]his makes pretty dull reading' when compared with the issues raised, and the images used, by the media in general. She continues to berate the press in the following manner:

There is something sexy, in media terms, about thousands of pretty Muslim virgins sobbing out their tales of sexual violation: "The 15-year-old pulled her thin blouse over her full breasts and said, 'The Chetnik penetrated me many times'," was the general quality of the news reporting in January. When there are no more weeping girls posing prettily and no photogenic babies in the arms of happy British couples, the long-term fate of a traumatised nation became substantially less worthy of media attention.⁸¹

The question that Grant's closing passage raises for this section is to what degree are the following linked; the media, policy-making Western political elites, feminist calls for greater awareness of gender-related abuse as an abuse of human rights, and the practical application, if any, of that heightened awareness? In other words, does the

⁸⁰Linda Grant, 2 August 1993.

⁸¹ibid.

call by feminists for an expansion of the responsibility of states, at the local, national and international levels to protect women under existing legal mechanisms, and to further expand that those mechanisms, fall on deaf Western political elites' ears unless the media is extensively covering the 'story'? If this is the case, even to a small degree, then the dilemma for feminists, or arguably any gender-sensitive person, is whether or not to condemn the overtly sexual manner in which the 'story', in this case the Bosnian rape victims plight, is covered. If the media is restricted in the way in which it can report the 'story', would they then feel inclined to ignore it. And if the 'story' is ignored will the impact on policy-makers be as strong as if the story had constant media exposure? But, does there have to be a choice at all? While calling for increased awareness of gender-specific abuse in war and for that awareness to be used in the expansion of the definitions of human rights given that many of the current legal mechanisms fail during wartime, feminists could also condemn insensitive press/media reporting. Moreover, this would serve to further emphasise the degree to which narrow, male-dominated definitions of what constitutes a 'story' dominates the media. Yet, it is difficult not to condemn some of the press' representations of the Bosnian rape victims more directly when they present reports that are replete with obviously sexist and overtly sexual connotations. The rape victims in the Balkans have already had their bodies officially and systematically targeted a first time, should the press remain unchallenged while they target their them (and their bodies) for a second time?

The work in Bosnia of the Marie Stopes Foundation (the organisation is referred to by the British press as both a 'Society' and a 'Foundation'), mentioned above, makes another appearance in the British press nearly a year later in the early summer of 1994. An article in the Sunday Times, written by Anna Pukas, follows the society's work with the victims of rape in the Balkans and in particular the work of Chelsea Renton, the daughter of Tim Renton, a former Tory chief whip. The article explains that Chelsea Renton was one of a team of helpers who were dispatched by the Marie Stopes Foundation after a 'horrific report by the European Community-sponsored Warburton Commission, which estimated that 20,000 women had been sexually violated in a campaign of terror by the Serbs'.⁸² The reality, Pukas reports, proved to

⁸²Anna Pukas, "Cheerleader Chelsea gives Bosnians hope," Sunday Times, 19 June 1994, pp. 1&22.

be rather different. Pukas justifies this point by quoting from her interview with Chelsea Renton, in which Renton states the following:

Within a couple of weeks, we were seriously wondering about the figures. If they are true, they are impossible to corroborate. We barely found a handful, never mind thousands. Pukas states that by the time the Marie Stopes team had arrived many of the victims were lost among the diaspora of the former Yugoslavia. Any rape victims left behind are not telling anyone about it, and even if they are, rape is just not top of their trauma list, the women are far more worried about their husbands or fathers fighting on the front line, about what happens to their children, about when they can go back home and start their lives again. All those problems are far more important than anything that they have suffered personally.⁸³

There are three points which are raised by this passage and the first draws on a later comment in the article, which is, that another women's aid organisation called the Muslim Union of Women in Bosnia had also collated information on the rapes in Bosnia, however, Pukas states that this organisation 'will not share data with a foreign, non-Muslim organisation'.⁸⁴ That the Bosnian Muslim rape victims may have preferred to share their experiences with an organisation that appreciates more closely their cultural and social background is not surprising, although it is also not necessarily the case, as the data has not been made available. Second, the assumption that the rape victims are preoccupied with other 'more important' issues - the welfare of husbands, fathers, children, and so on, even given the context - is a sweeping generalisation to make.

Without wanting to be guilty of making similar generalisations, it is possible that many older women, perhaps those with more experience of life are able to compartmentalise their own, personal suffering, and to focus on other problem areas of their lives - even to force those issues to become 'more important'. But what of the younger survivors of rape? What of the young girls, and boys, for whom their rape at the hands of enemy soldiers, could have been the most harrowing incident of their lives; it might not have been quite so easy for them to focus on other more pressing matters. The third point, which is inextricably linked to the second, is reiterating a

⁸³ibid.

⁸⁴ibid.

possibility that was suggested in Linda Grant's article above. That is, the possibility that the women are still functioning in survival mode and that the full extent of the physical and psychological damage these rape victims have suffered will not be manifest until their lives have returned to some semblance of normality. Perhaps only then, when they no longer have other traumatic circumstances in their lives to focus on, will they have the time and/or the need to deal with their experiences.

This general argument - that the women need to focus on 'more important' issues in their lives in order to cope with the trauma of rape - put forward by Chelsea Renton in Pukas' article, is contrasted with Renton's next argument which contends that it is important for the well-being of the Bosnian rape victims that they have 'trivia' in their lives. Pukas explains that faced with a dearth of rape victims to counsel the Marie Stopes team 'tailored its ambitions and offered more general encouragement to Bosnian women'.⁸⁵ Chelsea Renton and the team have established sixteen drop-in centres throughout the Bihac region of north-west Bosnia and offered a range of activities from hairdressing to aerobics. In explaining the reasoning behind the centres, and the types of activity offered, Pukas uses a direct quotation from Renton, who explains the situation in the following manner:

Some people think that all refugees need is food and a roof over their heads. They're supposed to have too much on their minds to be bothered with trivial things like hairstyles. We say these women have lost control over every part of their lives. They have no say in where they live and for some, the only personal space they've got is a mattress in a school hall. They can't choose what they eat or what they wear. They have no control over their future they can't even see a future. All they can control is how they spend the time while they wait for their future to happen.⁸⁶

It is difficult to criticise the work of the Marie Stopes team. While on a national and international level the Foundation was helping towards the call for the recognition and incorporation of human rights that are particular to women, on a local level the team worked towards giving the Bosnian women encouragement, support and a modicum of control over their lives. There are undeniably arguments that might suggest that in offering the women activities such as new hair styles and aerobics the Marie Stopes

⁸⁵ibid.

team is aiding the perpetuation of the Western stereo-typical image of women. However, one could also argue that that argument pre-supposes a pre-social view of woman and, moreover, there are utilitarian and pragmatic arguments that could also be valid in supporting the work of the Marie Stopes team.⁸⁷ As Pukas goes on to elaborate, the success of the drop-in centres in building the women's confidence both on a personal level and between themselves and the Marie Stopes team, apparently resulted in the gradual 'opening up' of many of the Bosnian women, some of whom began to share their experiences of rape with the team and with the other women members of the centres. Although stories of rape and sexual abuse at the hands of mostly Serbian troops are disclosed, as Pukas states, '[u]nspeakable suffering is never far behind the jollity', other more hopeful stories have also emerged 'of the good Serbian neighbour who gave a whispered warning by telephone or persuaded the Serbian soldiers to leave a Muslim house standing'.⁸⁸

Although initially suspicious of the centres, fuelled by accusations from local leaders of frivolity, spying, performing illegal abortions and trying to destabilise the Muslim birth-rate by issuing free contraceptives, Pukas states that the women 'soon came to trust the vivacious Englishwomen who would not allow them to sink into depression'.⁸⁹ In fact, on one level, the whole article reads like a acclamation to the work of Chelsea Renton. As Pukas continues:

Renton is greeted with embraces and kisses whenever she appears. Her contract with Marie Stopes ends in a month but she is already being showered with leaving presents. One of them is a tapestry from the women of Buzim, a remote mountain village, which says simply: 'We love you Chelsea.' For the women the centres are a lifeline. "This is our second home and our second family," said 39-year-old Merima.... "Without it we'd be stuck doing nothing all day, going quietly crazy".⁹⁰

One has to wonder whether or not the Marie Stopes Foundation and the Bosnian rape victims would have received this degree of press attention had they not had a young,

⁸⁶ibid.

⁸⁷Rada Boric and Mica Mladineo Desnica, "Croatia: Three Years After," in Chris Corrin, ed., Women in a Violent World: Feminist Analyses and Resistance Across Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p. 139.

⁸⁸Anna Pukas, 19 June 1994.

⁸⁹ibid.

⁹⁰ibid.

vivacious, Tory MP's daughter cast in the starring role. However, overall the article represents both rape victims and the international organisations as trying to offer help and support in a positive light, even to the degree that one is given the impression that there was an emerging, although somewhat amorphous, international community of supportive women offering solidarity and understanding to the Bosnian women - while also fighting for their human rights.⁹¹

An article published in The Guardian over a year before, also created the image of a growing international movement of female solidarity. It was written by Wendy Webster and entitled 'Women against war crimes against women'. In the article Webster gathered together information on some of the women's groups that were working toward helping the women of the Balkans either on a national, international, or local level. Webster begins the article in the following up-front way:

Martina Belic states the facts: "Women in the refugee camps are in a situation of overwhelming instability. Many do not know what has happened to their relatives, their houses are destroyed, they have no money, no status. They face complete uncertainty about their future."⁹²

The press is notorious for categorically stating 'facts'; taking one small representation and giving it the distinction of being a factual account of an event and leaving little visible room for the reader to question the 'facts' without appearing cynical in the extreme. In this case, the 'facts', as Belic stated them and Webster represented them, are probably reasonably accurate. This assumption can be made given that we are in the position of having looked at many press representations on the Balkan conflict and the plight of the rape victims, and by stepping back and viewing the 'big picture' one can appreciate the 'story' that these representations have built up, consequently one can make a fair judgement on the possible credibility of Belic's 'facts'. Of course, we can never be one hundred percent certain that our judgement is correct - we are not Bosnian rape victims in a refugee camp experiencing the 'overwhelming instability' (and if we were would we recognise that our position was unstable).

⁹¹For further information on some women's projects which are trying to rehabilitate women suffering from wartime atrocities and attempting to bridge violent communal divides, see, Cynthia Cockburn, "Mixing it," Red Pepper (September 1996), pp. 22-24.

⁹²Wendy Webster, "Women against war crimes against women," The Guardian, 17 February 1993, sec. G2T, p. 11.

Webster's article goes on to explain that Martina Belic worked in the Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb and planned for the group to play a similar role to that initially planned by the Marie Stopes Foundation. Webster specifies the practical ways in which they intended to help and support the victims of rape:

[The Centre for Women War Victims] is forming teams of women to go into refugee camps to counsel those who have been raped. It also plans to establish a counselling service and self-help groups for women outside the camps, and to open a house for 15 women and their children who are in the greatest need.⁹³

Other groups, such as the National Women's Network for International Solidarity are attempting to help in other ways. For example, Webster quotes one spokeswoman for the Network as stating that grassroots women's movements are 'actively calling for our support on money and resources, and our influence on bodies like the UN Commission'.⁹⁴ At first sight the article appears a little 'piecemeal', as do the representations. In other words, in Webster's first few passages she seems to be just listing the supporting roles that the different women's organisations are undertaking and it leaves one a little uneasy about the possible lack of co-ordination and communication between the groups and also the possible waste of time and resources if all the groups are trying to play the same role. However, eventually Webster clarifies the position by stating that:

In January, a wide-ranging coalition of women's groups in the UK came together in response ... to the widespread violence against women in former Yugoslavia. Women Against War Crime is campaigning for the prosecution of rape as a war crime, for the lifting of immigration restrictions on women war refugees and for the channelling of government resources to women's aid groups working with women victims of violence in Bosnia.⁹⁵

Webster also included information on the Women's Rights Committee of the European Parliament which was demanding action from European governments and was quoted as saying that, '[w]e cannot be passive spectators while innocent women in

⁹³ibid.

⁹⁴ibid.

⁹⁵ibid.

their thousands, only a day's drive from Brussels, are being torn and broken. We want action to stop the sexually violent use of women as a weapon'.⁹⁶ The representation is now clear; a wide and diverse collection of women's organisations had joined together to consolidate their expertise towards a common goal - to help and support the rape victims of the Balkan conflict. This support took many forms with each group playing a particular role depending on its strengths. Some lobbied the EC/EU to fund practical projects. For example, the supplying of buildings to provide space for living, counselling and medical help, while other groups spent their time lobbying for an expansion of present human rights definitions to take account of the gender-based violence that the rape victims have suffered. Yet more groups specifically followed up the recommendations of the EC Investigative Mission and called for the identifying of rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault against women as a war crime. Finally, those groups with specialised training offered counselling and medical help to the rape victims themselves. Whether the reality ran as smoothly and co-ordinated as the representation remains to be seen, but at the end of the article Webster publicised a Europe-wide vigil 'to mark support for all women victims of war', and then remarks 'women only, bring candles'.⁹⁷ Throughout the article there was no explicit comparison with the general inertia and lack of consensus which characterises the response of Western governments (led in the most part by male political elites), but the implicit contrast was there, perhaps reinforced by the fact that men were not invited to the vigil. But would men attending the vigil really pose a threat to female solidarity, or just to the statement, the image, or the representation of that solidarity?

In April 1993, The Guardian ran a thousand word article by Rosalind Coward that was simply called 'Loud and clear'. It was published in conjunction with a statement about Bosnia which was signed by 200 'influential' women and expressed a simple desire, 'to let women's voices be heard on the issue'.⁹⁸ Here, Coward uses a quotation from Sarah Dunant, one of the protagonists of the statement, as an example of the motivations behind the action. Dunant is quoted as making the following statement:

I couldn't bear to read the newspaper reports. I didn't feel able to have a view. But as more pictures came from the camps, more

⁹⁶ibid.

⁹⁷ibid.

⁹⁸Rosalind Coward, "Loud and clear," The Guardian, 30 April 1993, sec. G2T, p. 12.

news of the rapes and murders of women and children, I felt I had to have a response. I have two little girls and I kept thinking, what will I tell them in fifteen years if they ask me what I did about the atrocities in Bosnia?⁹⁹

Although the signed statement, in effect, advocates military intervention, Coward's article reveals that many of the women are active members of groups that tend to take an anti-militarist stance, for example, CND and END. Indeed, Coward comments that their action goes 'against the grain of women's traditional alliance with pacifism'.¹⁰⁰ Putting aside the generalisation of this view of women's links with peace movements, this statement happens to be a reasonably accurate historical representation. Coward also states that for many of the signatories there were long 'moments of soul-searching' - pacifist ideals were being put aside in favour of calls for military intervention. Yet, Coward justifies their actions by stating that the common feeling amongst the signatories was that 'as the carnage deepens, the consequences of inaction seem worse than those of action'.¹⁰¹ Many members of the 1980s 'peace movements' favoured military action in the Balkans - leading some to call them 'B-52 Liberals'.¹⁰²

The above quotation by Sarah Dunant implies, as does the signed statement in general, that women have reacted to the rape crisis in the Balkans in a different way than men. Coward's article supports this view and she explains this viewpoint in the following way:

Information about massacres, futile deaths and human suffering affects men and women alike. But the images from Bosnia have a particular horror for women. We have read the reports about mass rape, the rape of children, the holding captive of pregnant women until it is too late for abortions and then extermination of whole families and villages ... As Maggie O'Kane reported, raped Bosnian women have been told, "There are too many Muslims and a lot of Muslims are going to give birth to Serbian children." Women and children are the target of ethnic cleansing, not just innocent victims of an incomprehensible ethnic clash, as the Western media portrays them.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ibid.

¹⁰⁰ibid.

¹⁰¹ibid.

¹⁰²See Ken Booth, "Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 59.

¹⁰³Rosalind Coward, 30 April 1993.

It is interesting to note that Wendy Webster's article, written approximately two months before this article was published, was detailing how a coalition of women's organisations were lobbying, planning, calling for additional funds for humanitarian aid, and so on, yet there was no mention of a demand for military intervention. Could this signed statement possibly be part of that 'planning and lobbying process', or conversely is it a result of the women's experience of planning and lobbying? In other words, past representations have indicated that the women's coalition was a well-organised, highly motivated, professional body of women who had clear goals and defined methods of how to achieve those objectives. But, generally speaking, it would be difficult for the coalition to achieve all those objectives without the support and co-operation of, at least some, Western political elites. Perhaps frustration at the failure of the coalition to gain support for their more 'peaceful' goals led this group of women, many of whom belong to one of the women's groups within the coalition, to demand stronger action publicly.

Another point raised by Coward in the article is that she, and many other of the signatories, felt a particular solidarity with the women of the Balkans due to their previous close working relationship with some of the ex-Yugoslavian women's movements. Coward illustrates this solidarity in the following quotation:

European women feel a particular horror at this war's proximity. Many of us had contact with the active women's movement in former Yugoslavia. Broadly speaking, their concerns were our concerns.... Many of us have spent time in Yugoslavia, welcomed into their homes, sharing discussions about democracy, communism, feminism, desire and sexuality. To misquote Baudelaire, it's a case of "Mon semblable, ma soeur." They are like us, they are our sisters.¹⁰⁴

Again, the strong representation of female solidarity is in evidence. However, the European theme was taken one step further by Coward and in a similar vein to the view espoused by Will Hutton in the earlier section on 'Western Investigations', she asks the question, just '[h]ow much are they like us?' This question could be taken two ways. First, as Hutton proposes, it could be suggesting that the inaction of Western governments is due in part to the notion that these are women who live outside the

¹⁰⁴ibid.

borders of 'real' Europe and that they are therefore viewed as the 'other'. Alternatively, and this is the option expanded by Coward, a parallel could be drawn between the events in the former Yugoslavia and ethnic conflicts in other European countries, including Britain. Coward defines this argument in the following way:

If it was so easy for nationalism, chauvinism and systematic male violence to erupt there, how far is it buried here? Would it need only the 10 years they had of massive inflation, unemployment and shifting populations for all our latent ethnic and social conflicts to take on a more brutal aspect?¹⁰⁵

The idea of rape occurring on a massive scale in Britain, France, Germany, or any other EU country, seems inconceivable, even absurd, yet the idea could also have appeared to be beyond the realms of possibility for the Balkan women before the conflict began. Moreover, the suggestion that nationalism plays a crucial role in the occurrence of rape in war will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

Coward's article, in its entirety, was both a demand for the Western world to take responsibility in defending the ideal of a multi-ethnic society and also a demonstration of the strength of support that a policy of intervention would have. She concedes that 'military action is extremely problematic' and that calls for stronger UN action in Bosnia is 'complex and will cause heated debate'. However, in her concluding remarks Coward makes one of the objectives of the signatories clear, and also illustrates their awareness of the need for flexibility. She concludes that '[t]his is only the beginning of the debate. Many women will disagree with the conclusions reached. And the instability and confusion of the situation make rigid positions undesirable. But the British and American governments are still being told there is no public support to end the killing in Bosnia. Today, women have begun the process of letting them know that just isn't true.'¹⁰⁶

The last of the articles reviewed in this section was written by Janet Daley and was published in The Times on 16 April 1993, two weeks before the above article by Rosalind Coward. It carried the same message although in a very different manner as the Coward article - that Western governments were not doing enough to protect the

¹⁰⁵ibid.

¹⁰⁶ibid.

people of Bosnia, and in particular the rape victims. The article begins by confirming that Britain is contributing to the sending of a force to Bosnia to support the local populace, a force made up of experts in their field. The article then continues in the following way:

Will it be a squad of paratroopers, a contingent of the SAS or even a fleet of munitions lorries? No, what we are talking about, wait for it, is an "emergency team" of psychologists and social workers to offer counselling to Muslim women who have been the victims of rape and violence. The European Community, having given much thought to what is urgently needed by the tragic population of Bosnia, has instructed the charity Marie Stopes International.... to dispatch this task force with all due speed. The women of Bosnia raped, impregnated, widowed and starving as they may be are not to be offered the wherewithal either to defend or avenge themselves. Never mind: they are to be offered the ultimate panacea instead. No circumstances are so appalling, no fate so unjust, as not to be susceptible to the ministrations of psychological therapy.¹⁰⁷

This explicit criticism at the inaction of the EC and the work of the team from Marie Stopes International is continued throughout the article, however, Daley does make some interesting points. First, she comments that a single rape victim in Britain may, however irrationally, feel shamed and a loss of self-respect and consequently may benefit from the 'talking cure', as Daley puts it. But Daley goes on to say that in Bosnia rape has become a weapon of war and almost an entire generation of women have been 'subjected to indiscriminate degradation, which as they must know, has nothing to do with them as individuals'.¹⁰⁸ According to Daley, this 'fact', while possibly dehumanising the women, has led to solidarity between the rape victims which has helped 'to keep them sane' and, in addition, while an individual rape has the legacy of 'irrational terrors' the Bosnian rape victims would feel 'rational terror and rage', which again would have helped them to 'go on living'. Daley justifies her viewpoint in the following manner:

[I]f I may be so arrogant as to try to identify with them, the one emotion which I should imagine is keeping them alive is outrage. Anger and hatred, in cases such as theirs, can sometimes be the sustaining forces which can make the

¹⁰⁷Janet Daley, "Janet Daley Column," The Times, 16 April 1993, p. 16.

¹⁰⁸ibid.

difference between real life and the living death which comes with despair.¹⁰⁹

Daley's insistence that the rape victims should nurture their anger as a means of coping with their suffering is, according to Daley, contrary to the advice that the rape victims would have been receiving from the Marie Stopes team. The advice that is favoured by professional counsellors, states Daley, is to 'get rid of your anger', to 'talk through the problems' and to 'come to terms' with your experience. But, in Daley's opinion this advice would not be helpful to the rape victims in Bosnia for two reasons. First, for the reasons stated above, Daley suggests that the women need to harbour their 'anger and hatred' in order to have a reason to survive, and second, to quote Daley directly: 'Is there not something at least fatuous, if not downright offensive, about suggesting that people come to terms with the kind of horror which has been perpetuated against the Muslim women of Bosnia?'¹¹⁰

To support her arguments - that the rape victim's main problem was physical danger not psychological stress - Janet Daley included a quotation from Indijana Harper, a spokeswoman for the organisation Bosnian Women in London, who asserted that '[t]hese women you are trying to counsel will soon be captured again and either raped or slaughtered'.¹¹¹ Indeed, there is a powerful, although complex, argument put forward by the Coward article and endorsed by Janet Daley which called for military intervention in order to secure the future of the rape victims. However, Daley's other argument - that the anger and hatred felt by the Bosnian rape victims should not be defused - perhaps needs further expansion. It has been suggested in other articles mentioned above that many of the rape victims are still functioning in 'survival mode' and that they have yet to 'come to terms' with their experiences, but there has been no mention that inherent to this 'survival mode' is the need to foster feelings of outrage and hate. Indeed, it is the long term harbouring of these very destructive emotions, as discussed in Chapter Three, that arguably contributed to the initial triggering, and the continuation, of the Balkan conflict; although Daley may, of course, have been restricting her argument to the short term - there is no way of knowing. Therefore, the representation is that she was encouraging a further period of ethnic hatred.

¹⁰⁹ibid.

¹¹⁰ibid.

¹¹¹ibid.

Another question mark that remains over Daley's argument is the question of solidarity among the rape victims themselves. As mentioned in a Chapter Four, there have been reports from Bosnia that claim that the Muslim women in particular have found it extremely difficult to talk about their experiences of rape amongst themselves. While this could be true of women in all cultures, this reluctance may be heightened due to their religious and cultural background and the shame and humiliation commonly portrayed as being the primary emotion felt by this group of women. Whether this is the case or not, if one has not got comprehensive, first-hand knowledge of the group one is trying to prescribe for it would probably be an extremely speculative business. Indeed, apart from military intervention, Daley's other prescription for the people of Bosnia is the withdrawal of the Marie Stopes team who, according to Daley's theory are doing more harm than good by talking away the rape victim's will to survive. Yet, the representation of the work being accomplished by the Marie Stopes team in the earlier Pukas article, is that it has achieved a remarkable amount of success in a fairly short period of time. The anger and hatred of the rape victims and women in general appears to have been defused. For example, Pukas mentions that the women have discussed the fact that not all Serbs are 'bad' just as not all Muslims are 'good'.¹¹² And in addition, the Marie Stopes team offered other activities to try and fill the women's lives with positive images. Indeed, in contrast to this article by Janet Daley, the Pukas article portrays the Marie Stopes team and their work as playing a positive and supportive role.

That these efforts were being made to consider the specific needs of the female rape victims was a positive step, and one that was particularly welcomed by advocates of women's human rights. Moreover, that measures were being offered to aid the women's recovery in a practical way was more heartening still. Yet, perhaps just as important as the pragmatic shows of support was the appreciative reporting that, for the most part, was characteristic of the reports detailed in this section. Thus, feminist notions of women's human rights have been relayed to the public in a positive light, and thereby assisting their incorporation into mainstream social discourse.

¹¹²Anna Pukas, 19 June 1994.

Rape and the War Crimes Tribunal

This final section is concerned primarily with analysing articles in which the issue of rape in war has been linked to the establishment of the international War Crimes Tribunal situated in The Hague.¹¹³ These consist mainly of the opinions of journalists, 'experts' and Western political elites. The first article to be looked at here is neither a leading article, nor is it accredited to a particular author, but was published as a historical feature within the Education section of The Guardian. It is entitled 'War Crimes: A history of war's killing codes' and details the history of the laws of war, from the armies basic 'code of conduct' in the field, formulated at the end of the American Civil War, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977. The issue of rape is briefly mentioned in the following passage:

The Geneva Conventions also contained the principle of "grave breaches". Those are particularly repulsive violations of the law of war such as mistreatment of civilians or prisoners of war, torture, rape, etc.¹¹⁴

This article, although providing simple, factual, rather than analytical, information, nevertheless provides an insight into one issue that the editors of The Guardian would have the children of Britain learn about and the fact that rape was mentioned within the context of the laws of war is a small but positive step in keeping 'rape in war' on the agenda. The next article in this section, written seven months later, and dealing for the most part with the limited progress of the Vance-Owen peace plan, reiterates the fact that rape, as a violation of the Geneva Convention and as mentioned in the previous article, can and should be punished by the War Crimes Tribunal. In the closing passage, Ian Black, the author and The Guardian's diplomatic editor, summarises Lord Owen's views in the following statement:

An international court already set up by the UN should pursue efforts, for years if need be, to bring Yugoslav war criminals to justice, Lord Owen said. "It needs to be reaffirmed ... that the laws which govern conduct in war - the rape of women, torture

¹¹³For a comprehensive analysis of the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague see, for example: Christopher Greenwood, "The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia," International Affairs Vol. 69, no. 4 (1993): pp. 641-655; or, Payam Akhavan, "Punishing War Crimes in the Former-Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture for the New World Order," Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 15 (1993): pp. 262-289.

¹¹⁴No byline, "War crimes: A history of war's killing code," The Guardian, 27 April 1993, sec. eG, p. 10.

of prisoners and other gross violations of the legal framework we have established to operate world-wide - will be upheld".¹¹⁵

It is interesting to note that Lord Owen talks of the *rape* of women and *torture* of prisoners, which, due to the fact that women have already been mentioned, one assumes the 'prisoners' are meant to be men. Therefore, the rape and sexual violation of men is represented here within the general term 'torture' - although one must admit that if all the abuse inflicted on prisoners, both sexual and otherwise, was listed, it would not fit neatly into a concisely worded sound-bite for the press.

Another Guardian article which confirmed the fact that rape is indeed a war crime, was a general article by The Guardian's foreign staff and entitled 'Bosnia crisis: Sex assaults 'a war crime'.' This article was written almost a year before the previous Black article and quotes a leading international jurist and advisor to the United Nations Security Council, Frits Kalshoven, as stating categorically that 'the systematic, repeated rape of women prisoners in former Yugoslavia is a war crime'.¹¹⁶ Kalshoven attempts to justify and elaborate his view by stating what at first reading appears to be the obvious. He concludes that '[t]he numerous cases of rape amount to a war crime when it is connected to a situation of war'.¹¹⁷ However, is he stating 'the obvious'? Whether Kalshoven meant to or not, on closer inspection he appears to be saying two very different things. In the first statement he suggests that rape is a war crime if the women are, first, prisoners (In a 'camp'? In their homes?), and second, that the individual women have to be *repeatedly* raped. Yet, in the second statement, Kalshoven implies that there needs to be a certain *number* of women raped for it to be recognised as a war crime. These are two very different scenarios. Despite the inherent confusion of these statements, which does not engender confidence in those Western political elites whose job it is to define rape as a war crime, once again the representation is generally positive; rape, in some form, is officially recognised by both Western political elites and in international law as a war crime.

¹¹⁵Ian Black, "Owen says Bosnian split is inevitable," The Guardian, 26 November 1993, sec. HOM, p. 1.

¹¹⁶Foreign Staff, 19 December 1992.

¹¹⁷*ibid.*

As early as the summer of 1992 calls were being heard for the need to set up a 'Nuremberg-style' war crimes tribunal. One of these calls was documented in a two thousand word article printed in the Sunday Times. The main point made by this extended article, written by Louise Branson, was that contrary to popular representation, the Serbs were not the only aggressors and the Bosnian Muslims were not the only victims, but all sides in the war committed atrocities and suffered atrocities themselves. Towards the end of the article, following a passage describing the rape of some Serbian women, comes the specific appeal for a war crimes tribunal. It comes from Dr. Milan Bulajic, head of the Serbian federal commission on war crimes and genocide, and who is also an international lawyer with United Nations experience. Branson explains Bulajic's request in the following manner:

[Bulajic] has appealed to Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN secretary-general, for help in gathering evidence and setting up Nuremberg-style trials, under the auspices of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, for those who have perpetrated and ordered atrocities and massacres, possibly including senior political and military leaders.... [I]n order to underline his credibility and sincerity, he has suggested that the UN should first investigate atrocities by his fellow Serbs. "For those families whose members were killed we have to establish the truth. I don't make any borderlines." he said.¹¹⁸

The above quotation is just one of many that call for those accused of war crimes in the former-Yugoslavia to be indicted and brought before an official tribunal. The reason for choosing this example was that it was the only appeal for a war crimes tribunal found that came from a Serbian political elite. There may, of course, have been other general appeals for a War Crimes Tribunal from Serbians, but they were not included in the press reports analysed. However, another statement regarding the setting up of a war crimes tribunal did come from the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, and was more typical of the Serbian response, as represented in the British press. George Brock, the co-author of the article, stated that Karadzic 'would refuse to co-operate with the war crimes tribunal over the former Yugoslavia' and Brock also

¹¹⁸Louise Branson, "Atrocities: Muslims, Croats and Serbs in catalogue of shame," Sunday Times, 12 July 1992, pp. 1&13.

claimed that Karadzic stated categorically that any criminals would be dealt with 'by our own judiciary'.¹¹⁹

Karadzic's statement aside, there were many calls of support and encouragement for the speedy instigation of a War Crimes Tribunal to be set up in The Hague. However, there had also been as many displays of frustration in the British press, particularly by feminists who considered that governments were failing to act in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the more recent War Crimes Act of 1991. Barbara Hewson, writing in The Times in September 1992 is one such example and she makes the following statement:

[H]aving passed the War Crimes Act 1991, and with more and more evidence of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, the British government shows little enthusiasm for bringing contemporary war criminals to justice. The London peace conference did not mention the violation of women's rights by the military, let alone reparation. Rapes are ritually denied by official Serb, Croat and Muslim spokesmen. Women, it seems, are peripheral'.¹²⁰

This admonition of the British government, due to its seeming lack of resolution in supporting the most recent War Crimes Act, came only a few months before the World Council of Churches added their name to the growing list of NGOs and women's groups who were calling for more commitment on the part of the Western governments who signed the 1991 War Crimes Act. Roger Boyes, reporting for The Times, stated that the World Council of Churches had declared that, in their opinion and following extensive evidence-gathering in Bosnia, 'rape has become a systematic weapon of war in the Bosnian conflict and the rapists should be put before war crimes tribunals'.¹²¹ In addition, they claimed that the experiences of the rape victims were not being taken seriously by the authorities, or the 'international community'. This may well have been the case, but once again, it is impossible to draw any accurate conclusions. However, there were no references in the British press for approximately five months following this article which displayed any attempt by the British government or other political elites to assure the readers that either the rapes were

¹¹⁹George Brock and James Bone, "NATO refuses to back five-nation formula for peace in Bosnia," The Times, 27 May 1993, p. 11.

¹²⁰Barbara Hewson, 8 September 1992.

¹²¹Roger Boyes, 23 December 1992.

being taken seriously or that the War Crimes Tribunal would attempt to bring those accused of committing, and/or ordering, the rapes to trial.

Perhaps one reason for this silence becomes evident in the Spring of 1993 when Ian Black, writing for The Guardian, stated that 'experts' had estimated that in its first year the War Crimes Tribunal, to be set up in The Hague, would cost approximately thirty million pounds and doubts over the practicality of the tribunal had surfaced. Black elaborates on this claim in the following way:

Plans to set up an international tribunal to deal with war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia are being given the go-ahead by the United Nations Security Council despite widespread recognition that legal and political complications mean very little justice is likely to be done ... some officials and lawyers are sceptical as to whether the tribunal will ever have more than symbolic value.¹²²

Without doubt, the explicit representations in this article, are that the problems besetting the instigators of the tribunal were immense, including financial restrictions, the non-compliance of the former-Yugoslavia with extradition demands, and the gathering and presenting of 'trial-grade' evidence. 'Trial-grade' evidence is not defined however, and it is interesting to note that Black comments that the British Government, initially *against* the strong US-sponsored attempts to formulate a tough UN war crimes policy because of the need to involve the Serb leaders in the peace process, nevertheless relented when presented with *evidence* which illustrated the scale of the atrocities. If this evidence is of a sufficient 'grade' to alter governmental policy, is it not sufficient for the prosecution to use at the war crimes tribunal? Moreover, the 'evidence' available to the tribunal must be extensive. It has been gathered from many sources and by various organisations. For example, there is the war crimes commission's own investigations; the research of human rights groups; press reports; not to mention diplomatic, intelligence and humanitarian assessments by foreign embassies and other UN missions in the Balkans. In fact, it was also reported that Britain had 'handed over to the UN investigating commission 100 pages of evidence of war crimes, including rape, committed in Yugoslavia'.¹²³ The source of

¹²²Ian Black, "UN lays plan for war crimes trial," The Guardian, 26 May 1993, sec. FOR, p. 8.

¹²³Michael Evans, "Bosnia raid rift puts UN general's job in jeopardy," The Times, 18 January 1994, p. 12.

this evidence was interviews with approximately four thousand refugees from the former-Yugoslavia eventually offered asylum in Britain. Surely some of this evidence could be corroborated by other sources, although I do not underestimate the time and manpower needed to achieve this. Indeed, Melanie Phillips, writing in The Observer, commented that the difficulties in setting up the War Crimes Tribunal and 'bringing the perpetrators to justice remain formidable'.¹²⁴

Despite the inherent problems, the War Crimes Tribunal was launched on 17 November 1993, a few months behind schedule, but launched nevertheless. Ian Traynor, writing for The Guardian, marked the launch with a lengthy article entitled 'Yugoslav war crimes court takes first faltering steps'. First, Traynor set the scene by putting the War Crimes Tribunal into context. He summarises past events in the following way:

[T]he court's ambit is former Yugoslavia, for the past two years the site of ethnic cleansing, massacres, prison camps, rape, looting and pillage - a calendar of atrocities not seen in Europe since Auschwitz. An estimated 200,000 people have died or are missing, and hundreds of thousands, the overwhelming majority civilians, have been displaced or dispossessed [and] the Bosnian war rages on.¹²⁵

While this article begins with a positive almost gung-ho attitude, particularly with Traynor's comparisons of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal with Nuremberg and Tokyo, it soon becomes clear that the problems and general lack of will are what overshadows all other representations. To support his general lack of confidence in the tribunal, Traynor used quotations from various 'expert' sources. A Canadian navy commander and expert on the law of armed conflict, who is also the commission's sole on-site investigator, was asked for his opinion on whether the tribunal will 'bring the villains to book'. Traynor quotes the commander as saying that as yet, 'the prosecution service has to be set up, no cases are prepared, and it has a very tiny budget'.¹²⁶

¹²⁴Melanie Phillips, "War Crime and Punishment," The Observer, 16 July 1995, sec. LEA, p. 25.

¹²⁵Ian Traynor, "Yugoslav war crimes court takes first faltering steps," The Guardian, 17 November 1993, sec. FOR, p. 8.

¹²⁶ibid.

Traynor also quoted a 'fed up' and sceptical retired Dutch professor of international humanitarian law, Frits Kalshoven, who commented that because of British and French efforts to frustrate his work there would be no 'speedy results'.¹²⁷ Traynor stated that other, unnamed critics are even suggesting that 'the tribunal is an empty gesture by the Western powers to offset accusations that they stood by idly while a defenceless Bosnia was mauled by extreme nationalists'.¹²⁸ The overall representation of this article is that the War Crimes Tribunal and the War Crimes Commission have been generally under-funded, under-resourced, under-staffed and will be unable to deal effectively with opposition from Western governments, notably Britain. Unfortunately, this 'representation' turned out to be somewhat prophetic.

Considering the problems noted above, it is not surprising that it was almost a year later, in the autumn of 1994, that the prosecution of the first suspected war criminal began at the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. This fact was reported in The Guardian by Jon Henley in a very short (one hundred and fifty-word) article which outlined the crimes of which he was accused. Henley's article gives the reader the following information on the suspect:

Dusko Tadic, aged 38, a reserve militiaman who was arrested earlier this year in Germany, is accused of the torture, murder and rape of Muslim prisoners at the Omarska and Trnopolje camps in Serb-held north-west Bosnia ... One witness statement describes Mr. Tadic as "beating and torturing prisoners on a daily basis, and personally responsible for the murder of more than 10 prisoners ... using truncheons, iron bars, rifle butts, wire cables and knives".¹²⁹

However, although the article gives the impression that the prosecution was due to begin immediately, towards the end of the article Henley mentions that Richard Goldstone, the judge heading the tribunal, would not begin to prepare a formal indictment until the following month. Nevertheless, although the administrative wheels of the war crimes tribunal do appear to have begun to turn, and are still turning, albeit extremely slowly, the overall representation is positive with the appearance that justice is being done.

¹²⁷ibid.

¹²⁸ibid.

¹²⁹Jon Henley, "Ex-Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal names Serb as first suspect," The Guardian, 15 October 1994, sec. FOR, p. 17.

A further call for increased resolution and commitment toward the War Crimes Tribunal came from the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who wrote an article in The Guardian two months later. The article was entitled 'Bosnia: what Labour would do' and set out Cook's own 'six-point plan for peace'. The only reference to rape and the War Crimes Tribunal came in 'point six' of the plan which Robin Cook details in the following way:

Sixthly, we must inject some urgency into the War Crimes Tribunal established in response to the horrors of ethnic cleansing and mass rape. It is grotesque that three years on only one person has been indicted. The dilatory proceedings of the tribunal is one more signal to the combatants that the world community will acquiesce in whatever outcome is achieved by the force of arms.¹³⁰

Point six, like the previous five points, portrays an emphatic, almost zealous commitment to 'sorting Bosnia out'. Were it not for the fact that Cook appeared, on occasion, to be lapsing into a party political broadcast, the reader could be quite heartened by his apparent dynamism and dedication in the fight for 'truth and justice'. However, at the time Cook held no more than *potential* power, therefore, his policies, his prescriptions and his six-point plan came across as little more than political posturing, albeit well-meaning.

The following article, which digresses slightly from the main issue of this section, was published in The Guardian in August 1993 and was written by Veronica Horwell. It is simply called 'Called to account' and was an account of a Channel Four documentary called 'Frontline' - in the 'Bloody Bosnia' series - and describes the attempts of the Guardian reporter, Maggie O'Kane, to find and interview two Serbian 'war-lords active in the name of Serbian nationalism'. They were 'Arkan (wanted pre-war across Europe for murderous criminality) and Seselj, a separatist, Belgrade demagogue ... And Milosevic, but he wasn't available for confrontation'.¹³¹ O'Kane's reasons for meeting the 'war-lords' was reasonably simple - she wanted to ask them about the rapes and killings in Bosnia and whether or not they had ordered them. And in

¹³⁰Robin Cook, "Bosnia: what Labour would do?" The Guardian, 10 December 1994, sec. FEA, p. 26.

¹³¹Veronica Horwell, "Called to account," The Guardian, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 4.

Horwell's words, O'Kane was there to determine 'who is the guilty party [and] document what they are guilty of'.¹³² At this stage of the article Horwell neither challenges O'Kane's reasons, nor comments on the enormity of the task, but merely continues to recount the manner in which O'Kane meets her impromptu interviewees. Prior to O'Kane's encounter with Arkan,¹³³ her first target, Horwell first insists on giving the reader a little background information on the 'warlord' by stating that 'he's after becoming the [Serbian] representative for Kosovo state' and his promotion video shows him 'urgent in cam-cream, planning, in his words, 'a mopping-up process where you go into a village and throw a bomb in each cellar'.¹³⁴ O'Kane's confrontation with Arkan does not prove to be very productive, as Horwell states:

O'Kane asked if he had Milosevic's endorsement. He looked down at her, and said smoothly "I don't know what he thinks ... do you know what is in the head of President Milosevic or in my head? You can't know it ..." And he walked off, his support escort rolling their shoulder-blades almost into the C4 lens. The information was mostly in that last image, the footage any news bulletin would have cut, in which the self-certainty of Arkan and his boys got shoved in your face. They controlled their world.¹³⁵

O'Kane's second interviewee, Seselj, who was referred to by Horwell as 'an attested monster', was tracked down in a Sarajevo occupied zone. Horwell states that Seselj 'was so confident, so contemptuous [that] he charges 800 deutschmarks for an appearance'.¹³⁶ Horwell then explains how O'Kane handled the interview:

She behaved almost embarrassed at the obviousness of what she must ask. She testified to what she knew of his men's killings and rapes in Bosnia: "What do you have to say to that?" ... He remarked that the West would have to defeat him on the battlefield - and that wouldn't be easy - before he would be accountable. He sneered that his devotees would have had to have been supermen to rape as many women as had been claimed.¹³⁷

¹³²ibid.

¹³³It has been suggested in the press that the British Government helped fund Arkan's election campaign. See, for example: Julian Borger, "UK funds Serb war criminal," *The Guardian*, 5 September 1996, p. 1.

¹³⁴Veronica Horwell, 2 August 1993.

¹³⁵ibid.

¹³⁶ibid.

¹³⁷ibid.

This article, although not directly related to the issue of the War Crimes Tribunal, nevertheless, illustrates the problem the War Crimes Commission has in tracking down possible war criminals and bringing them to trial, particularly as the former-Yugoslavia adamantly refuses to co-operate with extradition orders.¹³⁸ If the 'warlords' mentioned above *were* indicted for war crimes by the Commission, would the tribunal simply wait until some time in the future when the men might choose to leave their country before arresting them? *Generally*, this would not be the case: as although NATO may have the resources to arrest suspected war criminals, it could prove to be too volatile an issue politically.

The last article covered in this section was written in the summer of 1995 and was primarily concerned with debating the possibility of mass graves in Bosnia, following the publication of US satellite pictures. As well as discussing the possibility that the graves may contain the bodies of 'thousands of missing Bosnian Muslim men', the article also goes on to comment on the type of evidence which has been documented at the War Crimes Commission in The Hague. Moreover, the article makes the point that all of the warring factions are guilty of war crimes, thus, the article continues in the following manner:

The Serbs are not alone in committing war crimes. Documents now being filed in The Hague to the international war crimes tribunal have scores of allegations of killings by the Croats of Serbs held in death camps, and atrocities of electrocution, starvation, rape and of men being forced to eat sliced-off ears.¹³⁹

After detailing these and other wartime atrocities committed by all sides and commenting on the comparisons between them and other war crimes committed by the Nazis during the Second World War and Stalin's massacres in the Katyn Forest, the article continues to defend the need for the War Crimes Tribunal to be as effective as Nuremberg. However, in its closing passage the article's reserve turns to despondency when it states that the chances of 'General Mladic ever appearing before a tribunal are minimal; as after Katyn, realpolitik is poised to win the day'.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸No byline, "Rape and other war crimes," *Newsweek*, 8 July 1996, p. 17.

¹³⁹Leading Article, "Buried bodies," *The Times*, 12 August 1995, p. 17.

¹⁴⁰*ibid.*

Furthermore, subsequent developments have proved this to be the case - so far.

The majority of these articles have had an air of resignation and/or despondency about them. Moreover, the general representation has been that although the War Crime Tribunal was a necessary move on behalf of the European community, its ability to indict and bring to trial possible war criminals has been called into question. And in particular the problem of indicting war criminals on a charge of rape has been primarily represented as one of a lack of 'trial-grade' evidence. In practical terms, then, rape as an indictable war crime appears to have progressed little from the days of Tokyo and Nuremberg. It remains an issue that, while attracting some positive and hopeful statements, both verbal and written, still appears to lack the political will and the means to bring those responsible to justice. By the summer of 1998, however, a decision had been made to establish a permanent International Criminal Court, which represents a considerable step forward, although it should also be noted that, to date, the US have failed to sign up.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined a series of articles that discussed various aspects of the 'Western response' to the wars in the Balkans. That is, the journalists recorded the responses of governments, NGOs, 'women's rights organisations', and so on, to the initial reports of mass rape in the Balkans. Those newspaper articles were subsequently analysed in this chapter and the differing responses that were discussed by various quarters were noted and analysed.

The first section, which dealt primarily with the responses of Western political elites revealed few surprises, in that, although politicians and EC/EU representatives showed verbal support for the rape victims and their plight, there was little practical help forthcoming from their 'posturing'. Even when governmental reports had been commissioned and considerable time and money spent on gathering first-hand data on the extent of the problem, there still appeared to be reticence on the part of the political elites to follow through with 'action' to support the rape victims.

On the other hand, the organisations which have been lobbying for the recognition of rape as a single crime of war in its own right and have even called for military intervention to halt the sexual violence against women (and the violence in general), have been represented as having translated their verbal and written support into practical aid. The Marie Stopes team, in particular, have been represented as having helped the rape victims within the Balkans in sensitive, yet pragmatic ways. Although, generally supportive of these measures, the press were by no means partial, with some of the methods employed by the Marie Stopes team criticised. Generally though, women's groups were portrayed as doing their utmost to help the rape victims of the Balkan War, with their main handicap being the bureaucracy and lack of conviction on the part of the political elites.

The press, having lost interest in the 'stories' of the rape victims, once again found an issue that would breathe new life into the 'Balkans' story' - that of the 'rape babies'. One could probably argue that there were signs of a slight drop in (broadsheet) journalistic standards where this issue was concerned - in that the journalists tended to sensationalise the issue - which came across in the representations, and was highlighted by some of the journalists themselves: for example, Linda Grant. However, the preoccupation by the press with the potential 'rape babies', albeit temporary, does emphasise the ease at which the actual rape victims and their suffering are relegated by the press when a more 'newsworthy' 'story' is discovered.

The final section in this chapter looked at the representations of the instigation and the viability of the War Crimes Tribunal set up in The Hague to try those indicted of war crimes in the former-Yugoslavia. In general, while not taking an overtly critical position, the journalists tended to write their reports from a negative angle: the articles had an overall air of submission about them and tended to concentrate on the seemingly insurmountable problems that were besetting the Tribunal. For the rape victims, one of the main obstacles in achieving any convictions against the wartime rapists was given as the lack of 'trial-grade' evidence, which would be admissible and provable in court. This immediately prejudices any case involving rape, as procuring a conviction for rape during 'peacetime', as has been mentioned before, is extremely difficult, therefore, to achieve a conviction at a war crimes tribunal, with all the logistical and cultural problems to overcome, appears to be almost impossible. Once

again, women, and the crimes that are almost exclusively aimed at them, whether purposely or by the established structural forces, are silenced.

A very complicated picture emerges from Part Two, but one which confirms that the age-old phenomenon of mass rape in war occurred on a massive scale in the Balkans (and also that it happened to men, although this was reported on a lesser scale). Analysis of the articles has highlighted the main contemporary explanations for rape in war, which provides insights into Western society and to the possible impact of feminist theories. To develop our understanding of the explanations and that relationship to feminist thought further, we will now turn to the final part of the thesis.